GHSA-9JF2-67MG-R5PH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-06 00:31 – Updated: 2026-06-06 00:31
VLAI
Details

The Charitable – Donation Plugin for WordPress – Fundraising with Recurring Donations & More plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference / Authorization Bypass leading to Arbitrary Attachment Deletion in versions up to, and including, 1.8.11.1 via the profile avatar update flow. This is due to the save_avatar() function in Charitable_Profile_Form calling wp_delete_attachment() on an attachment ID read from the user's 'avatar' meta without validating that the attachment is owned by the user, combined with Charitable_Data_Processor::process_picture() returning the raw posted value when no file is uploaded, allowing the 'avatar' user meta to be poisoned with any attacker-chosen attachment ID. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary attachments from the Media Library by performing a two-request chain (first poisoning the stored avatar meta value with a target attachment ID, then triggering deletion via a normal avatar upload).

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-10038"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-06T00:16:40Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Charitable \u2013 Donation Plugin for WordPress \u2013 Fundraising with Recurring Donations \u0026 More plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference / Authorization Bypass leading to Arbitrary Attachment Deletion in versions up to, and including, 1.8.11.1 via the profile avatar update flow. This is due to the save_avatar() function in Charitable_Profile_Form calling wp_delete_attachment() on an attachment ID read from the user\u0027s \u0027avatar\u0027 meta without validating that the attachment is owned by the user, combined with Charitable_Data_Processor::process_picture() returning the raw posted value when no file is uploaded, allowing the \u0027avatar\u0027 user meta to be poisoned with any attacker-chosen attachment ID. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary attachments from the Media Library by performing a two-request chain (first poisoning the stored avatar meta value with a target attachment ID, then triggering deletion via a normal avatar upload).",
  "id": "GHSA-9jf2-67mg-r5ph",
  "modified": "2026-06-06T00:31:38Z",
  "published": "2026-06-06T00:31:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10038"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10.5/includes/abstracts/abstract-class-charitable-form.php#L429"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10.5/includes/forms/class-charitable-profile-form.php#L724"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10.5/includes/forms/class-charitable-profile-form.php#L728"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10.5/includes/users/class-charitable-user.php#L986"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10.5/includes/utilities/class-charitable-data-processor.php#L270"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10/includes/abstracts/abstract-class-charitable-form.php#L429"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10/includes/forms/class-charitable-profile-form.php#L724"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10/includes/forms/class-charitable-profile-form.php#L728"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10/includes/users/class-charitable-user.php#L986"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10/includes/utilities/class-charitable-data-processor.php#L270"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3557047/charitable/trunk/includes/forms/class-charitable-profile-form.php?old=3435951\u0026old_path=charitable%2Ftrunk%2Fincludes%2Fforms%2Fclass-charitable-profile-form.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/657bea00-9709-48b8-807a-c9a18b0aee1d?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}


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