ghsa-92cp-5422-2mw7
Vulnerability from github
Published
2025-03-20 18:49
Modified
2025-03-20 18:49
Severity ?
3.7 (Low) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Summary
go-redis allows potential out of order responses when `CLIENT SETINFO` times out during connection establishment
Details

Impact

The issue only occurs when the CLIENT SETINFO command times out during connection establishment. The following circumstances can cause such a timeout:

  1. The client is configured to transmit its identity. This can be disabled via the DisableIndentity flag.
  2. There are network connectivity issues
  3. The client was configured with aggressive timeouts

The impact differs by use case:

  • Sticky connections: Rather than using a connection from the pool on-demand, the caller can stick with a connection. Then you receive persistent out-of-order responses for the lifetime of the connection.
  • Pipelines: All commands in the pipeline receive incorrect responses.
  • Default connection pool usage without pipelining: When used with the default ConnPool once a connection is returned after use with ConnPool#Put the read buffer will be checked and the connection will be marked as bad due to the unread data. This means that at most one out-of-order response before the connection is discarded.

Patches

We prepared a fix in https://github.com/redis/go-redis/pull/3295 and plan to release patch versions soon.

Workarounds

You can prevent the vulnerability by setting the flag DisableIndentity (BTW: We also need to fix the spelling.) to true when constructing the client instance.

Credit

Akhass Wasti Ramin Ghorashi Anton Amlinger Syed Rahman Mahesh Venkateswaran Sergey Zavoloka Aditya Adarwal Abdulla Anam Abd-Alhameed Alex Vanlint Gaurav Choudhary Vedanta Jha Yll Kelani Ryan Picard

Show details on source website

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/redis/go-redis/v9"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.7.0-beta.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.7.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/redis/go-redis/v9"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.6.0b1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.6.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/redis/go-redis/v9"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.5.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.5.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-29923"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-20T18:49:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T18:15:19Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThe issue only occurs when the `CLIENT SETINFO` command times out during connection establishment. The following circumstances can cause such a timeout:\n\n1. The client is configured to transmit its identity. This can be disabled via the `DisableIndentity` flag.\n2. There are network connectivity issues\n3. The client was configured with aggressive timeouts\n\nThe impact differs by use case:\n\n* **Sticky connections**: Rather than using a connection from the pool on-demand, the caller can stick with a connection. Then you receive persistent out-of-order responses for the lifetime of the connection.\n* **Pipelines**: All commands in the pipeline receive incorrect responses.\n* **Default connection pool usage without pipelining**: When used with the default [ConnPool](https://github.com/redis/go-redis/blob/8fadbef84a3f4e7573f8b38e5023fd469470a8a4/internal/pool/pool.go#L77) once a connection is returned after use with [ConnPool#Put](https://github.com/redis/go-redis/blob/8fadbef84a3f4e7573f8b38e5023fd469470a8a4/internal/pool/pool.go#L366) the read buffer will be checked and the connection will be marked as bad due to the unread data. This means that at most one out-of-order response before the connection is discarded.\n\n### Patches\nWe prepared a fix in https://github.com/redis/go-redis/pull/3295 and plan to release patch versions soon.\n\n### Workarounds\nYou can prevent the vulnerability by setting the flag `DisableIndentity` (BTW: We also need to fix the spelling.) to `true` when constructing the client instance.\n\n### Credit\n\nAkhass Wasti\nRamin Ghorashi\nAnton Amlinger\nSyed Rahman\nMahesh Venkateswaran\nSergey Zavoloka\nAditya Adarwal\nAbdulla Anam\nAbd-Alhameed\nAlex Vanlint\nGaurav Choudhary\nVedanta Jha\nYll Kelani\nRyan Picard",
  "id": "GHSA-92cp-5422-2mw7",
  "modified": "2025-03-20T18:49:59Z",
  "published": "2025-03-20T18:49:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/redis/go-redis/security/advisories/GHSA-92cp-5422-2mw7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-29923"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/redis/go-redis/pull/3295"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/redis/go-redis/commit/d236865b0cfa1b752ea4b7da666b1fdcd0acebb6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/redis/go-redis"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "go-redis allows potential out of order responses when `CLIENT SETINFO` times out during connection establishment"
}


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