GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-8FV2-88GG-HM7Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-16 19:21 – Updated: 2026-07-16 19:21
VLAI
Summary
Envoy Gateway: Wasm cache ServeHTTP reads mappingPath2Cache without lock
Details

Vulnerability report without repro case. Repro case may be added later after harness is complete.

Preconditions (4): - Pod-network reachability to :18002 (no auth) - Tenant can create EnvoyExtensionPolicy (baseline) - Attacker pod floods GET while churning EnvoyExtensionPolicy with distinct Wasm URLs - Read at :153 must overlap a write at :201/:209 (probabilistic, attacker controls both rates)

Description:

httpserver.go:153 reads s.mappingPath2Cache with no lock while httpserver.go:201/209 write it under s.Lock(); the struct uses a plain map. Writer is tenant-reachable via EnvoyExtensionPolicy translation, reader is pod-network-reachable on :18002 with per-request goroutines. Go's concurrent map read+write detection calls runtime.throw, which net/http's per-conn recover cannot catch, so the controller process exits — cross-tenant control-plane DoS. Capped at MEDIUM: DoS-only, k8s restarts pod, timing-dependent trigger.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/envoyproxy/gateway"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.8.0-rc.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/envoyproxy/gateway"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53715"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-362"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-16T19:21:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability report without repro case. Repro case may be added later after harness is complete.\n\n**Preconditions (4):**\n- Pod-network reachability to :18002 (no auth)\n- Tenant can create EnvoyExtensionPolicy (baseline)\n- Attacker pod floods GET while churning EnvoyExtensionPolicy with distinct Wasm URLs\n- Read at :153 must overlap a write at :201/:209 (probabilistic, attacker controls both rates)\n\n**Description:**\n\nhttpserver.go:153 reads s.mappingPath2Cache with no lock while httpserver.go:201/209 write it under s.Lock(); the struct uses a plain map. Writer is tenant-reachable via EnvoyExtensionPolicy translation, reader is pod-network-reachable on :18002 with per-request goroutines. Go\u0027s concurrent map read+write detection calls runtime.throw, which net/http\u0027s per-conn recover cannot catch, so the controller process exits \u2014 cross-tenant control-plane DoS. Capped at MEDIUM: DoS-only, k8s restarts pod, timing-dependent trigger.",
  "id": "GHSA-8fv2-88gg-hm7q",
  "modified": "2026-07-16T19:21:15Z",
  "published": "2026-07-16T19:21:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway/security/advisories/GHSA-8fv2-88gg-hm7q"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Envoy Gateway: Wasm cache ServeHTTP reads mappingPath2Cache without lock"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…