Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-657V-XPF8-79X2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-03 15:32 – Updated: 2026-08-03 21:31

Details

new_from_xml reads the NameID, attribute values, SessionIndex, audience and other identity fields with document-wide XPath, such as //saml:Assertion/saml:AttributeStatement/saml:Attribute and //saml:Subject/saml:NameID, which select the first matching element in document order rather than the element covered by the verified signature. handle_response confirms that a signature is present and, when a cacert is configured, that it chains to the CA, but XML::Sig verifies only the element named by the signature's Reference URI, so unsigned sibling assertions in the same document are not covered. An attacker who holds any one IdP-signed assertion can add an unsigned attacker-authored assertion earlier in document order; the signature still verifies and the document-order XPath returns the attacker's NameID and attributes.

Any caller that passes an untrusted Response to new_from_xml can accept identity fields from an assertion the IdP never signed, even when a cacert trust anchor is configured, so a party holding one valid IdP-signed assertion can authenticate as an arbitrary user.

Severity

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-18092"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-03T14:16:25Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass via XML signature wrapping because new_from_xml reads assertion identity with document-wide XPath instead of the signed subtree.\n\nnew_from_xml reads the NameID, attribute values, SessionIndex, audience and other identity fields with document-wide XPath, such as //saml:Assertion/saml:AttributeStatement/saml:Attribute and //saml:Subject/saml:NameID, which select the first matching element in document order rather than the element covered by the verified signature. handle_response confirms that a signature is present and, when a cacert is configured, that it chains to the CA, but XML::Sig verifies only the element named by the signature\u0027s Reference URI, so unsigned sibling assertions in the same document are not covered. An attacker who holds any one IdP-signed assertion can add an unsigned attacker-authored assertion earlier in document order; the signature still verifies and the document-order XPath returns the attacker\u0027s NameID and attributes.\n\nAny caller that passes an untrusted Response to new_from_xml can accept identity fields from an assertion the IdP never signed, even when a cacert trust anchor is configured, so a party holding one valid IdP-signed assertion can authenticate as an arbitrary user.",
  "id": "GHSA-657v-xpf8-79x2",
  "modified": "2026-08-03T21:31:35Z",
  "published": "2026-08-03T15:32:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18092"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/perl-net-saml2/perl-Net-SAML2/commit/201fead7f42b83f40c84bf4a311a25b09acd18f9.patch"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.86/changes"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-18092 (GCVE-0-2026-18092)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-03 13:24 – Updated: 2026-08-03 20:01

Title

Summary

Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass via XML signature wrapping because new_from_xml reads assertion identity with document-wide XPath instead of the signed subtree. new_from_xml reads the NameID, attribute values, SessionIndex, audience and other identity fields with document-wide XPath, such as //saml:Assertion/saml:AttributeStatement/saml:Attribute and //saml:Subject/saml:NameID, which select the first matching element in document order rather than the element covered by the verified signature. handle_response confirms that a signature is present and, when a cacert is configured, that it chains to the CA, but XML::Sig verifies only the element named by the signature's Reference URI, so unsigned sibling assertions in the same document are not covered. An attacker who holds any one IdP-signed assertion can add an unsigned attacker-authored assertion earlier in document order; the signature still verifies and the document-order XPath returns the attacker's NameID and attributes. Any caller that passes an untrusted Response to new_from_xml can accept identity fields from an assertion the IdP never signed, even when a cacert trust anchor is configured, so a party holding one valid IdP-signed assertion can authenticate as an arbitrary user.

Severity

8.1 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-03 20:00 UTC

CWE

CWE-347 - Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

Assigner

CPANSec redhat root

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0…	release-notes
https://github.com/perl-net-saml2/perl-Net-SAML2/…	patch

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
TIMLEGGE	Net::SAML2	Affected: 0 , < 0.86 (custom)

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "cvssV3_1": {
              "attackComplexity": "LOW",
              "attackVector": "NETWORK",
              "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
              "baseScore": 8.1,
              "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
              "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
              "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
              "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
              "scope": "UNCHANGED",
              "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
              "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
              "version": "3.1"
            }
          },
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-18092",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-03T20:00:23.033425Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-03T20:01:20.742Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://cpan.org/modules",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "Net-SAML2",
          "product": "Net::SAML2",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/Net/SAML2/Protocol/Assertion.pm",
            "lib/Net/SAML2/Binding/POST.pm"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion::new_from_xml"
            },
            {
              "name": "Net::SAML2::Binding::POST::handle_response"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/perl-net-saml2/perl-Net-SAML2",
          "vendor": "TIMLEGGE",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "0.86",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "custom"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass via XML signature wrapping because new_from_xml reads assertion identity with document-wide XPath instead of the signed subtree.\n\nnew_from_xml reads the NameID, attribute values, SessionIndex, audience and other identity fields with document-wide XPath, such as //saml:Assertion/saml:AttributeStatement/saml:Attribute and //saml:Subject/saml:NameID, which select the first matching element in document order rather than the element covered by the verified signature. handle_response confirms that a signature is present and, when a cacert is configured, that it chains to the CA, but XML::Sig verifies only the element named by the signature\u0027s Reference URI, so unsigned sibling assertions in the same document are not covered. An attacker who holds any one IdP-signed assertion can add an unsigned attacker-authored assertion earlier in document order; the signature still verifies and the document-order XPath returns the attacker\u0027s NameID and attributes.\n\nAny caller that passes an untrusted Response to new_from_xml can accept identity fields from an assertion the IdP never signed, even when a cacert trust anchor is configured, so a party holding one valid IdP-signed assertion can authenticate as an arbitrary user."
        }
      ],
      "impacts": [
        {
          "capecId": "CAPEC-115",
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "CAPEC-115 Authentication Bypass"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-347",
              "description": "CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-03T13:24:52.137Z",
        "orgId": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
        "shortName": "CPANSec"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "release-notes"
          ],
          "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.86/changes"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/perl-net-saml2/perl-Net-SAML2/commit/201fead7f42b83f40c84bf4a311a25b09acd18f9.patch"
        }
      ],
      "solutions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Upgrade to Net::SAML2 0.86 or later, which anchors identity extraction at the assertion subtree covered by a signature that validates against the configured trust anchor."
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass via XML signature wrapping because new_from_xml reads assertion identity with document-wide XPath instead of the signed subtree",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "cpansec-cna-tool 0.1"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
    "assignerShortName": "CPANSec",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-18092",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-03T13:24:52.137Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-28T16:46:56.926Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-03T20:01:20.742Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.