GHSA-62P4-GMF7-7G93
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 21:08 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:08Summary
When Pillow loads an uncompressed image whose tile uses the raw codec and a mode in Image._MAPMODES, and the image was opened from a filename, it memory-maps the file and builds the image's row pointers directly into the mapping via PyImaging_MapBuffer (src/map.c). The per-row spacing (stride) is taken from the tile arguments. map.c validates offset + ysize*stride <= buffer_len but never checks that stride is at least the natural row width xsize * pixelsize.
The McIdas AREA plugin (McIdasImagePlugin.py) derives stride, offset, xsize, and ysize directly from attacker-controlled 32-bit header words with no validation. By supplying a stride far smaller than the row width, an attacker makes each row pointer read xsize*pixelsize bytes that run past the mapped region. Accessing the pixels (e.g. Image.tobytes(),
getpixel, convert, save) then reads adjacent process memory (information disclosure) or faults (SIGBUS, denial of service).
Complete Code Trace
Step 1: McIdasImageFile._open - turns attacker header words into image size, file offset, and row stride with no validation.
# src/PIL/McIdasImagePlugin.py:41-70
s = self.fp.read(256)
if not _accept(s) or len(s) != 256: # _accept: prefix == b"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04"
raise SyntaxError(...)
self.area_descriptor = w = [0, *struct.unpack("!64i", s)] # w[1..64] = signed BE int32, ALL attacker-controlled
if w[11] == 1:
mode = rawmode = "L" # pixelsize 1, in _MAPMODES
elif w[11] == 2:
mode = rawmode = "I;16B" # pixelsize 2, in _MAPMODES
...
self._mode = mode
self._size = w[10], w[9] # (xsize, ysize) <-- attacker
offset = w[34] + w[15] # <-- attacker
stride = w[15] + w[10] * w[11] * w[14] # <-- attacker (set w[14]=0, w[15]=1 => stride=1)
self.tile = [
ImageFile._Tile("raw", (0, 0) + self.size, offset, (rawmode, stride, 1))
]
Step 2: ImageFile.load (mmap branch) - selects mmap and delegates to map_buffer.
# src/PIL/ImageFile.py:322-348
if use_mmap: # use_mmap = self.filename and len(self.tile) == 1
decoder_name, extents, offset, args = self.tile[0]
if (decoder_name == "raw" and isinstance(args, tuple) and len(args) >= 3
and args[0] == self.mode and args[0] in Image._MAPMODES):
if offset < 0: # only lower-bound guard on offset
raise ValueError("Tile offset cannot be negative")
with open(self.filename) as fp:
self.map = mmap.mmap(fp.fileno(), 0, access=mmap.ACCESS_READ)
if offset + self.size[1] * args[1] > self.map.size(): # == offset + ysize*stride; NO stride>=linesize check
raise OSError("buffer is not large enough")
self.im = Image.core.map_buffer(
self.map, self.size, decoder_name, offset, args # args = ("L", stride, 1)
)
Step 3: PyImaging_MapBuffer - builds row pointers at stride spacing into the mmap; validates everything except stride >= row width.
/* src/map.c:65-140 */
if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "O(ii)sn(sii)",
&target, &xsize, &ysize, &codec, &offset, &mode_name, &stride, &ystep))
return NULL;
...
const ModeID mode = findModeID(mode_name); /* "L" */
if (stride <= 0) { /* attacker sets stride=1 (>0) -> NOT recomputed */
if (mode == IMAGING_MODE_L || mode == IMAGING_MODE_P) stride = xsize;
else if (isModeI16(mode)) stride = xsize * 2;
else stride = xsize * 4;
}
if (stride > 0 && ysize > PY_SSIZE_T_MAX / stride) {/* overflow guard only */
PyErr_SetString(PyExc_MemoryError, "Integer overflow in ysize"); return NULL;
}
size = (Py_ssize_t)ysize * stride; /* = 1*1 = 1 */
if (offset > PY_SSIZE_T_MAX - size) { ... }
...
if (offset + size > view.len) { /* 1 + 1 = 2 <= 256 -> PASSES */
PyErr_SetString(PyExc_ValueError, "buffer is not large enough");
PyBuffer_Release(&view); return NULL;
}
im = ImagingNewPrologueSubtype(mode, xsize, ysize, sizeof(ImagingBufferInstance));
/* im->linesize = xsize * pixelsize = 200000 (the REAL per-row read width) */
/* setup file pointers -- NO check that stride >= im->linesize */
if (ystep > 0) {
for (y = 0; y < ysize; y++) {
im->image[y] = (char *)view.buf + offset + y * stride; /* row points into mmap, spacing=1 */
}
} else { ... }
im->linesize (the number of bytes any consumer reads per row) is xsize * pixelsize = 200000, but the row pointers are only stride = 1 byte apart and the buffer is only offset + ysize*stride = 2 bytes "claimed". Nothing reconciles the two.
Step 4: pixel access (Image.tobytes() → raw encoder copy1) - reads linesize bytes from im->image[0], i.e. xsize bytes starting at view.buf + offset, running far past the mmap.
/* the raw "L" packer copies linesize (=xsize) bytes per row from im->image[y];
for row 0 that is view.buf+1 .. view.buf+1+200000, vs a 256-byte file. */
Chain Summary
SOURCE: McIdas AREA header words w[9],w[10],w[11],w[14],w[15],w[34] (Image.open on a path)
↓ McIdasImagePlugin._open: stride = w[15]+w[10]*w[11]*w[14] -> attacker sets stride=1 [McIdasImagePlugin.py:66]
↓ tile = ("raw", (0,0,xsize,1), offset, ("L", 1, 1)) [McIdasImagePlugin.py:68]
GADGET: ImageFile.load mmap branch -- only checks offset+ysize*stride<=len <- BUG: no stride>=linesize check [ImageFile.py:343]
↓ core.map_buffer(map, (xsize,1), "raw", offset, ("L",1,1)) [ImageFile.py:346]
SINK: PyImaging_MapBuffer: im->image[0] = view.buf + offset + 0*stride; linesize=xsize [map.c:134]
↓ Image.tobytes() raw "L" encoder reads linesize (=xsize) bytes from im->image[0]
IMPACT: reads xsize bytes from a tiny mmap -> OOB read of adjacent process memory (leak) or SIGBUS (DoS)
Proof of Concept
See attached poc.zip
Impact on a Parent Application
Any application that opens image files supplied by users from a path on disk (the common pattern: save upload to a temp file, then Image.open(path)), has the default plugin set (McIdas is registered by default), and subsequently reads/returns/re-encodes the decoded pixels (thumbnailing, format conversion, serving a preview), is exposed:
- Information disclosure (High): the decoded "image" contains bytes of the worker process's adjacent heap/mapped memory, which the app then serves or stores - potentially leaking secrets, credentials, or other users' data.
- Denial of service (High): a larger
xsizereliably crashes the worker with SIGBUS.
Suggested fix
Core fix in src/map.c (PyImaging_MapBuffer): reject offset < 0 and stride < im->linesize. Defense-in-depth in McIdasImagePlugin._open: reject offset < 0 or stride < xsize*pixelsize .
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pillow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "12.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54058"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-20T21:08:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T17:17:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen Pillow loads an uncompressed image whose tile uses the `raw` codec and a mode in `Image._MAPMODES`, and the image was opened **from a filename**, it memory-maps the file and builds the image\u0027s row pointers directly into the mapping via `PyImaging_MapBuffer` (`src/map.c`). The per-row spacing (`stride`) is taken from the tile arguments. `map.c` validates `offset + ysize*stride \u003c= buffer_len` but **never checks that `stride` is at least the natural row width `xsize * pixelsize`**.\n\nThe **McIdas** AREA plugin (`McIdasImagePlugin.py`) derives `stride`, `offset`, `xsize`, and `ysize` directly from attacker-controlled 32-bit header words with no validation. By supplying a `stride` far smaller than the row width, an attacker makes each row pointer read `xsize*pixelsize` bytes that run past the mapped region. Accessing the pixels (e.g. `Image.tobytes()`,\n`getpixel`, `convert`, `save`) then reads adjacent process memory (information disclosure) or faults (SIGBUS, denial of service).\n\n\n## Complete Code Trace\n\n**Step 1: `McIdasImageFile._open`** - turns attacker header words into image size, file offset, and row stride with no validation.\n\n```python\n# src/PIL/McIdasImagePlugin.py:41-70\ns = self.fp.read(256)\nif not _accept(s) or len(s) != 256: # _accept: prefix == b\"\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x04\"\n raise SyntaxError(...)\nself.area_descriptor = w = [0, *struct.unpack(\"!64i\", s)] # w[1..64] = signed BE int32, ALL attacker-controlled\n\nif w[11] == 1:\n mode = rawmode = \"L\" # pixelsize 1, in _MAPMODES\nelif w[11] == 2:\n mode = rawmode = \"I;16B\" # pixelsize 2, in _MAPMODES\n...\nself._mode = mode\nself._size = w[10], w[9] # (xsize, ysize) \u003c-- attacker\noffset = w[34] + w[15] # \u003c-- attacker\nstride = w[15] + w[10] * w[11] * w[14] # \u003c-- attacker (set w[14]=0, w[15]=1 =\u003e stride=1)\nself.tile = [\n ImageFile._Tile(\"raw\", (0, 0) + self.size, offset, (rawmode, stride, 1))\n]\n```\n\n**Step 2: `ImageFile.load` (mmap branch)** - selects mmap and delegates to `map_buffer`.\n\n```python\n# src/PIL/ImageFile.py:322-348\nif use_mmap: # use_mmap = self.filename and len(self.tile) == 1\n decoder_name, extents, offset, args = self.tile[0]\n if (decoder_name == \"raw\" and isinstance(args, tuple) and len(args) \u003e= 3\n and args[0] == self.mode and args[0] in Image._MAPMODES):\n if offset \u003c 0: # only lower-bound guard on offset\n raise ValueError(\"Tile offset cannot be negative\")\n with open(self.filename) as fp:\n self.map = mmap.mmap(fp.fileno(), 0, access=mmap.ACCESS_READ)\n if offset + self.size[1] * args[1] \u003e self.map.size(): # == offset + ysize*stride; NO stride\u003e=linesize check\n raise OSError(\"buffer is not large enough\")\n self.im = Image.core.map_buffer(\n self.map, self.size, decoder_name, offset, args # args = (\"L\", stride, 1)\n )\n```\n\n**Step 3: `PyImaging_MapBuffer`** - builds row pointers at `stride` spacing into the mmap; validates everything except `stride \u003e= row width`.\n\n```c\n/* src/map.c:65-140 */\nif (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, \"O(ii)sn(sii)\",\n \u0026target, \u0026xsize, \u0026ysize, \u0026codec, \u0026offset, \u0026mode_name, \u0026stride, \u0026ystep))\n return NULL;\n...\nconst ModeID mode = findModeID(mode_name); /* \"L\" */\n\nif (stride \u003c= 0) { /* attacker sets stride=1 (\u003e0) -\u003e NOT recomputed */\n if (mode == IMAGING_MODE_L || mode == IMAGING_MODE_P) stride = xsize;\n else if (isModeI16(mode)) stride = xsize * 2;\n else stride = xsize * 4;\n}\n\nif (stride \u003e 0 \u0026\u0026 ysize \u003e PY_SSIZE_T_MAX / stride) {/* overflow guard only */\n PyErr_SetString(PyExc_MemoryError, \"Integer overflow in ysize\"); return NULL;\n}\nsize = (Py_ssize_t)ysize * stride; /* = 1*1 = 1 */\n\nif (offset \u003e PY_SSIZE_T_MAX - size) { ... }\n...\nif (offset + size \u003e view.len) { /* 1 + 1 = 2 \u003c= 256 -\u003e PASSES */\n PyErr_SetString(PyExc_ValueError, \"buffer is not large enough\");\n PyBuffer_Release(\u0026view); return NULL;\n}\n\nim = ImagingNewPrologueSubtype(mode, xsize, ysize, sizeof(ImagingBufferInstance));\n/* im-\u003elinesize = xsize * pixelsize = 200000 (the REAL per-row read width) */\n\n/* setup file pointers -- NO check that stride \u003e= im-\u003elinesize */\nif (ystep \u003e 0) {\n for (y = 0; y \u003c ysize; y++) {\n im-\u003eimage[y] = (char *)view.buf + offset + y * stride; /* row points into mmap, spacing=1 */\n }\n} else { ... }\n```\n\n`im-\u003elinesize` (the number of bytes any consumer reads per row) is `xsize * pixelsize = 200000`, but the row pointers are only `stride = 1` byte apart and the buffer is only `offset + ysize*stride = 2` bytes \"claimed\". Nothing reconciles the two.\n\n**Step 4: pixel access (`Image.tobytes()` \u2192 raw encoder `copy1`)** - reads `linesize` bytes from `im-\u003eimage[0]`, i.e. `xsize` bytes starting at `view.buf + offset`, running far past the mmap.\n\n```c\n/* the raw \"L\" packer copies linesize (=xsize) bytes per row from im-\u003eimage[y];\n for row 0 that is view.buf+1 .. view.buf+1+200000, vs a 256-byte file. */\n```\n\n## Chain Summary\n\n```\nSOURCE: McIdas AREA header words w[9],w[10],w[11],w[14],w[15],w[34] (Image.open on a path)\n \u2193 McIdasImagePlugin._open: stride = w[15]+w[10]*w[11]*w[14] -\u003e attacker sets stride=1 [McIdasImagePlugin.py:66]\n \u2193 tile = (\"raw\", (0,0,xsize,1), offset, (\"L\", 1, 1)) [McIdasImagePlugin.py:68]\nGADGET: ImageFile.load mmap branch -- only checks offset+ysize*stride\u003c=len \u003c- BUG: no stride\u003e=linesize check [ImageFile.py:343]\n \u2193 core.map_buffer(map, (xsize,1), \"raw\", offset, (\"L\",1,1)) [ImageFile.py:346]\nSINK: PyImaging_MapBuffer: im-\u003eimage[0] = view.buf + offset + 0*stride; linesize=xsize [map.c:134]\n \u2193 Image.tobytes() raw \"L\" encoder reads linesize (=xsize) bytes from im-\u003eimage[0]\nIMPACT: reads xsize bytes from a tiny mmap -\u003e OOB read of adjacent process memory (leak) or SIGBUS (DoS)\n```\n## Proof of Concept\n\nSee attached [poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/28460498/poc.zip)\n\n\n## Impact on a Parent Application\n\nAny application that opens image files supplied by users **from a path on disk** (the common pattern: save upload to a temp file, then `Image.open(path)`), has the default plugin set (McIdas is registered by default), and subsequently reads/returns/re-encodes the decoded pixels (thumbnailing, format conversion, serving a preview), is exposed:\n\n- **Information disclosure (High):** the decoded \"image\" contains bytes of the worker process\u0027s adjacent heap/mapped memory, which the app then serves or stores - potentially leaking secrets, credentials, or other users\u0027 data.\n- **Denial of service (High):** a larger `xsize` reliably crashes the worker with SIGBUS.\n\n## Suggested fix\nCore fix in `src/map.c` (`PyImaging_MapBuffer`): reject `offset \u003c 0` and `stride \u003c im-\u003elinesize`. Defense-in-depth in `McIdasImagePlugin._open`: reject `offset \u003c 0` or `stride \u003c xsize*pixelsize` .",
"id": "GHSA-62p4-gmf7-7g93",
"modified": "2026-07-20T21:08:14Z",
"published": "2026-07-20T21:08:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-62p4-gmf7-7g93"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54058"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/pull/9719"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/6a8de891fb00968e5ea79bfa84368ed90b3cfc1d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/releases/tag/12.3.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Pillow: Out-of-bounds read via attacker-controlled row stride on Pillow\u0027s mmap path (McIdas AREA files)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.