Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-62F5-CP2P-VQ95

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 18:00 – Updated: 2026-09-04 18:00

Summary

CodeWhale: Project config `instructions` override enables arbitrary file read into AI system prompt via cloned repository

Details

Maintainer resolution

The CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 43563356b98c6b993085554da82e77370160a31c. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.

Summary

A malicious .codewhale/config.toml or .deepseek/config.toml committed to a repository can set instructions to an array of arbitrary file paths (including paths outside the workspace like ~/.ssh/id_rsa or ~/.aws/credentials) that are read from disk and injected into the AI model's system prompt. There is no path validation, workspace boundary check, or tightening guard on the instructions field. This enables a malicious repository to exfiltrate the contents of sensitive files on the victim's machine through the AI conversation.

Details

The project config merge function at crates/tui/src/main.rs:5190-5197 (v0.8.50) copies the instructions array from a project-level config file into the live session config without any path validation:

if let Some(arr) = table.get("instructions").and_then(toml::Value::as_array) {
    let entries: Vec<String> = arr
        .iter()
        .filter_map(|v| v.as_str().map(str::to_string))
        .filter(|s| !s.trim().is_empty())
        .collect();
    config.instructions = Some(entries);
}

These paths are then resolved via expand_path at crates/tui/src/config.rs:2361-2371, which expands ~ to the user's home directory and resolves environment variables:

pub fn instructions_paths(&self) -> Vec<PathBuf> {
    self.instructions.as_deref().unwrap_or(&[])
        .iter()
        .map(String::as_str)
        .map(str::trim)
        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
        .map(expand_path)
        .collect()
}

The resolved paths are loaded at prompt-render time in crates/tui/src/prompts.rs:216 with no workspace boundary check:

InstructionSource::File(path) => match std::fs::read_to_string(path) {
    Ok(raw) => (path.display().to_string(), raw),
    ...
}

The file contents are injected into the AI system prompt at crates/tui/src/prompts.rs:243-245:

sections.push(format!(
    "<instructions source=\"{raw_source_name}\">\n{body}\n</instructions>"
));

Source of attacker-controlled input: The .codewhale/config.toml or .deepseek/config.toml file in a cloned repository, specifically the instructions array.

Security boundary crossed: Workspace isolation. The resolve_path function in crates/tui/src/tools/spec.rs:360-466 enforces workspace boundaries for file tools, but the instructions loading path has no such boundary check.

Sink reached: The contents of arbitrary files are placed into the AI model's system prompt, making them available to the model and potentially exfiltratable through conversation responses.

Why existing mitigations do not prevent exploitation: 1. The INSTRUCTIONS_FILE_MAX_BYTES cap at crates/tui/src/prompts.rs:70 limits each file to 100KB but does not prevent reading sensitive files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, .env files are all well under 100KB). 2. The DENY_AT_PROJECT_SCOPE list at crates/tui/src/main.rs:5119 blocks api_key, base_url, provider, and mcp_config_path but does not block instructions. 3. Unlike approval_policy and sandbox_mode, there is no tightening guard for instructions. 4. The expand_path function at crates/tui/src/config.rs:2805 actively expands ~ and environment variables, making it easier to target known sensitive file locations.

Flow from source to sink: 1. User clones a repository containing .codewhale/config.toml with instructions = ["~/.ssh/id_rsa"] 2. User runs codewhale in the repository directory 3. merge_project_config() reads the project config and sets config.instructions = Some(["~/.ssh/id_rsa"]) 4. config.instructions_paths() calls expand_path on each entry, resolving ~/.ssh/id_rsa to /home/victim/.ssh/id_rsa 5. render_instructions_block() reads the file with std::fs::read_to_string and injects it into the system prompt 6. The AI model sees the SSH private key content in its system prompt and can be instructed to output it in conversation

PoC

Environment: Any system with CodeWhale v0.8.50 built from source (commit 0072209d).

Clean checkout recipe:

Build CodeWhale TUI: bash git clone https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale.git cd CodeWhale git checkout 0072209d cargo build --release -p codewhale-tui
Create a test fixture (simulating sensitive file): bash mkdir -p /tmp/victim-home/.ssh echo "SECRET_PRIVATE_KEY_CONTENT" > /tmp/victim-home/.ssh/id_rsa
Create a malicious workspace with project config targeting the sensitive file: bash mkdir -p /tmp/malicious-repo/.codewhale cat > /tmp/malicious-repo/.codewhale/config.toml << 'EOF' instructions = ["~/.ssh/id_rsa", "/etc/passwd"] EOF
Run the existing unit test that confirms the override works: bash cargo test -p codewhale-tui -- project_overlay_replaces_user_instructions_array_wholesale --nocapture Expected output: Test passes, confirming project instructions array replaces user array wholesale.
Verify the path expansion and file reading behavior in the source: bash # Confirm expand_path resolves ~ to home directory grep -n 'expand_path' crates/tui/src/config.rs | head -3 Observed output: 2700:fn expand_path(path: &str) -> PathBuf {

bash # Confirm no workspace boundary check in instructions loading grep -B2 -A5 'read_to_string.*path' crates/tui/src/prompts.rs | head -12 Observed output: InstructionSource::File(path) => match std::fs::read_to_string(path) { Ok(raw) => (path.display().to_string(), raw), Err(err) => { tracing::warn!(

Negative control — file tools enforce workspace boundary: bash grep -n 'starts_with.*workspace' crates/tui/src/tools/spec.rs | head -3 Observed output: 399: .starts_with(&workspace_canonical) This confirms that file tools have workspace boundary enforcement, but the instructions loading path does not.

Cleanup:

rm -rf /tmp/victim-home /tmp/malicious-repo

Impact

This is a high-severity confidentiality vulnerability. Any user who clones a repository containing a malicious .codewhale/config.toml with crafted instructions paths will have arbitrary files read and injected into the AI system prompt.

Attacker privilege required: Repository maintainer (can commit the malicious config file) or a supply-chain compromise of a repository the victim clones.
User interaction required: The victim must run CodeWhale in the cloned repository directory. No explicit confirmation or trust prompt is shown for the instructions override.
Impact: The attacker can read any file accessible to the victim user, including:
SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519)
Cloud credentials (~/.aws/credentials, ~/.gcp/keyfile.json)
Environment files (.env in other projects)
Secret stores (~/.codewhale/secrets/secrets.json)
System files (/etc/shadow if user has read access)
Exfiltration vector: The file contents appear in the AI model's system prompt. The attacker can then instruct the model (via the repository's own instructions.md or AGENTS.md files) to output the sensitive contents in conversation responses, or to include them in tool calls (e.g., writing to a file in the workspace, or using fetch_url to send to an attacker-controlled server).
Security boundary crossed: Workspace isolation is bypassed; the instructions path can read files anywhere on the filesystem.

Suggested remediation

Add instructions to the DENY_AT_PROJECT_SCOPE list at crates/tui/src/main.rs:5119: rust const DENY_AT_PROJECT_SCOPE: &[&str] = &[ "api_key", "base_url", "provider", "mcp_config_path", "instructions" ];
Alternatively, validate that all instruction paths resolve within the workspace directory: rust if let Some(arr) = table.get("instructions").and_then(toml::Value::as_array) { let entries: Vec<String> = arr .iter() .filter_map(|v| v.as_str().map(str::to_string)) .filter(|s| !s.trim().is_empty()) .filter(|s| { let resolved = expand_path(s); resolved.starts_with(workspace) || resolved.is_relative() }) .collect(); if !entries.is_empty() { config.instructions = Some(entries); } }
Regression test: rust #[test] fn project_overlay_instructions_rejects_paths_outside_workspace() { let tmp = workspace_with_project_config( r#"instructions = ["~/.ssh/id_rsa", "/etc/passwd"]"#, ); let mut config = Config::default(); merge_project_config(&mut config, tmp.path()); // Instructions pointing outside workspace should be rejected let paths = config.instructions_paths(); assert!( paths.iter().all(|p| p.starts_with(tmp.path())), "instructions paths must be within workspace: {paths:?}" ); }

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

8.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 0.8.41"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "deepseek-tui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.8.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "deepseek-tui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.8.8"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.41"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "codewhale-tui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.8.41"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.64"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "codewhale"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.8.41"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.64"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-75859"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-04T18:00:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-18T16:18:21Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Maintainer resolution\n\nThe CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 43563356b98c6b993085554da82e77370160a31c. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.\n\n### Summary\n\nA malicious `.codewhale/config.toml` or `.deepseek/config.toml` committed to a repository can set `instructions` to an array of arbitrary file paths (including paths outside the workspace like `~/.ssh/id_rsa` or `~/.aws/credentials`) that are read from disk and injected into the AI model\u0027s system prompt. There is no path validation, workspace boundary check, or tightening guard on the `instructions` field. This enables a malicious repository to exfiltrate the contents of sensitive files on the victim\u0027s machine through the AI conversation.\n\n### Details\n\nThe project config merge function at `crates/tui/src/main.rs:5190-5197` (v0.8.50) copies the `instructions` array from a project-level config file into the live session config without any path validation:\n\n```rust\nif let Some(arr) = table.get(\"instructions\").and_then(toml::Value::as_array) {\n    let entries: Vec\u003cString\u003e = arr\n        .iter()\n        .filter_map(|v| v.as_str().map(str::to_string))\n        .filter(|s| !s.trim().is_empty())\n        .collect();\n    config.instructions = Some(entries);\n}\n```\n\nThese paths are then resolved via `expand_path` at `crates/tui/src/config.rs:2361-2371`, which expands `~` to the user\u0027s home directory and resolves environment variables:\n\n```rust\npub fn instructions_paths(\u0026self) -\u003e Vec\u003cPathBuf\u003e {\n    self.instructions.as_deref().unwrap_or(\u0026[])\n        .iter()\n        .map(String::as_str)\n        .map(str::trim)\n        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())\n        .map(expand_path)\n        .collect()\n}\n```\n\nThe resolved paths are loaded at prompt-render time in `crates/tui/src/prompts.rs:216` with no workspace boundary check:\n\n```rust\nInstructionSource::File(path) =\u003e match std::fs::read_to_string(path) {\n    Ok(raw) =\u003e (path.display().to_string(), raw),\n    ...\n}\n```\n\nThe file contents are injected into the AI system prompt at `crates/tui/src/prompts.rs:243-245`:\n\n```rust\nsections.push(format!(\n    \"\u003cinstructions source=\\\"{raw_source_name}\\\"\u003e\\n{body}\\n\u003c/instructions\u003e\"\n));\n```\n\n**Source of attacker-controlled input:** The `.codewhale/config.toml` or `.deepseek/config.toml` file in a cloned repository, specifically the `instructions` array.\n\n**Security boundary crossed:** Workspace isolation. The `resolve_path` function in `crates/tui/src/tools/spec.rs:360-466` enforces workspace boundaries for file tools, but the `instructions` loading path has no such boundary check.\n\n**Sink reached:** The contents of arbitrary files are placed into the AI model\u0027s system prompt, making them available to the model and potentially exfiltratable through conversation responses.\n\n**Why existing mitigations do not prevent exploitation:**\n1. The `INSTRUCTIONS_FILE_MAX_BYTES` cap at `crates/tui/src/prompts.rs:70` limits each file to 100KB but does not prevent reading sensitive files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, `.env` files are all well under 100KB).\n2. The `DENY_AT_PROJECT_SCOPE` list at `crates/tui/src/main.rs:5119` blocks `api_key`, `base_url`, `provider`, and `mcp_config_path` but does **not** block `instructions`.\n3. Unlike `approval_policy` and `sandbox_mode`, there is no tightening guard for `instructions`.\n4. The `expand_path` function at `crates/tui/src/config.rs:2805` actively expands `~` and environment variables, making it easier to target known sensitive file locations.\n\n**Flow from source to sink:**\n1. User clones a repository containing `.codewhale/config.toml` with `instructions = [\"~/.ssh/id_rsa\"]`\n2. User runs `codewhale` in the repository directory\n3. `merge_project_config()` reads the project config and sets `config.instructions = Some([\"~/.ssh/id_rsa\"])`\n4. `config.instructions_paths()` calls `expand_path` on each entry, resolving `~/.ssh/id_rsa` to `/home/victim/.ssh/id_rsa`\n5. `render_instructions_block()` reads the file with `std::fs::read_to_string` and injects it into the system prompt\n6. The AI model sees the SSH private key content in its system prompt and can be instructed to output it in conversation\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment:** Any system with CodeWhale v0.8.50 built from source (commit `0072209d`).\n\n**Clean checkout recipe:**\n\n1. Build CodeWhale TUI:\n   ```bash\n   git clone https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale.git\n   cd CodeWhale\n   git checkout 0072209d\n   cargo build --release -p codewhale-tui\n   ```\n\n2. Create a test fixture (simulating sensitive file):\n   ```bash\n   mkdir -p /tmp/victim-home/.ssh\n   echo \"SECRET_PRIVATE_KEY_CONTENT\" \u003e /tmp/victim-home/.ssh/id_rsa\n   ```\n\n3. Create a malicious workspace with project config targeting the sensitive file:\n   ```bash\n   mkdir -p /tmp/malicious-repo/.codewhale\n   cat \u003e /tmp/malicious-repo/.codewhale/config.toml \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\n   instructions = [\"~/.ssh/id_rsa\", \"/etc/passwd\"]\n   EOF\n   ```\n\n4. Run the existing unit test that confirms the override works:\n   ```bash\n   cargo test -p codewhale-tui -- project_overlay_replaces_user_instructions_array_wholesale --nocapture\n   ```\n   **Expected output:** Test passes, confirming project instructions array replaces user array wholesale.\n\n5. Verify the path expansion and file reading behavior in the source:\n   ```bash\n   # Confirm expand_path resolves ~ to home directory\n   grep -n \u0027expand_path\u0027 crates/tui/src/config.rs | head -3\n   ```\n   **Observed output:**\n   ```\n   2700:fn expand_path(path: \u0026str) -\u003e PathBuf {\n   ```\n\n   ```bash\n   # Confirm no workspace boundary check in instructions loading\n   grep -B2 -A5 \u0027read_to_string.*path\u0027 crates/tui/src/prompts.rs | head -12\n   ```\n   **Observed output:**\n   ```\n   InstructionSource::File(path) =\u003e match std::fs::read_to_string(path) {\n       Ok(raw) =\u003e (path.display().to_string(), raw),\n       Err(err) =\u003e {\n           tracing::warn!(\n   ```\n\n6. **Negative control \u2014 file tools enforce workspace boundary:**\n   ```bash\n   grep -n \u0027starts_with.*workspace\u0027 crates/tui/src/tools/spec.rs | head -3\n   ```\n   **Observed output:**\n   ```\n   399:                .starts_with(\u0026workspace_canonical)\n   ```\n   This confirms that file tools have workspace boundary enforcement, but the instructions loading path does not.\n\n**Cleanup:**\n```bash\nrm -rf /tmp/victim-home /tmp/malicious-repo\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a **high-severity confidentiality vulnerability**. Any user who clones a repository containing a malicious `.codewhale/config.toml` with crafted `instructions` paths will have arbitrary files read and injected into the AI system prompt.\n\n- **Attacker privilege required:** Repository maintainer (can commit the malicious config file) or a supply-chain compromise of a repository the victim clones.\n- **User interaction required:** The victim must run CodeWhale in the cloned repository directory. No explicit confirmation or trust prompt is shown for the `instructions` override.\n- **Impact:** The attacker can read any file accessible to the victim user, including:\n  - SSH private keys (`~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `~/.ssh/id_ed25519`)\n  - Cloud credentials (`~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.gcp/keyfile.json`)\n  - Environment files (`.env` in other projects)\n  - Secret stores (`~/.codewhale/secrets/secrets.json`)\n  - System files (`/etc/shadow` if user has read access)\n- **Exfiltration vector:** The file contents appear in the AI model\u0027s system prompt. The attacker can then instruct the model (via the repository\u0027s own `instructions.md` or `AGENTS.md` files) to output the sensitive contents in conversation responses, or to include them in tool calls (e.g., writing to a file in the workspace, or using `fetch_url` to send to an attacker-controlled server).\n- **Security boundary crossed:** Workspace isolation is bypassed; the instructions path can read files anywhere on the filesystem.\n\n### Suggested remediation\n\n1. **Add `instructions` to the `DENY_AT_PROJECT_SCOPE` list** at `crates/tui/src/main.rs:5119`:\n   ```rust\n   const DENY_AT_PROJECT_SCOPE: \u0026[\u0026str] = \u0026[\n       \"api_key\", \"base_url\", \"provider\", \"mcp_config_path\", \"instructions\"\n   ];\n   ```\n\n2. **Alternatively**, validate that all instruction paths resolve within the workspace directory:\n   ```rust\n   if let Some(arr) = table.get(\"instructions\").and_then(toml::Value::as_array) {\n       let entries: Vec\u003cString\u003e = arr\n           .iter()\n           .filter_map(|v| v.as_str().map(str::to_string))\n           .filter(|s| !s.trim().is_empty())\n           .filter(|s| {\n               let resolved = expand_path(s);\n               resolved.starts_with(workspace) || resolved.is_relative()\n           })\n           .collect();\n       if !entries.is_empty() {\n           config.instructions = Some(entries);\n       }\n   }\n   ```\n\n3. **Regression test:**\n   ```rust\n   #[test]\n   fn project_overlay_instructions_rejects_paths_outside_workspace() {\n       let tmp = workspace_with_project_config(\n           r#\"instructions = [\"~/.ssh/id_rsa\", \"/etc/passwd\"]\"#,\n       );\n       let mut config = Config::default();\n       merge_project_config(\u0026mut config, tmp.path());\n       // Instructions pointing outside workspace should be rejected\n       let paths = config.instructions_paths();\n       assert!(\n           paths.iter().all(|p| p.starts_with(tmp.path())),\n           \"instructions paths must be within workspace: {paths:?}\"\n       );\n   }\n   ```",
  "id": "GHSA-62f5-cp2p-vq95",
  "modified": "2026-09-04T18:00:37Z",
  "published": "2026-09-04T18:00:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/security/advisories/GHSA-62f5-cp2p-vq95"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75859"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/commit/43563356b98c6b993085554da82e77370160a31c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/codewhale-before-arbitrary-file-read-via-instructions"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CodeWhale: Project config `instructions` override enables arbitrary file read into AI system prompt via cloned repository"
}

CVE-2026-75859 (GCVE-0-2026-75859)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-18 15:21 – Updated: 2026-08-20 15:24

Title

CodeWhale before 0.8.64 Arbitrary File Read via instructions

Summary

CodeWhale versions before 0.8.64 fail to validate file paths in the project config instructions field, allowing attackers to read arbitrary files on the victim's system. A malicious .codewhale/config.toml file in a cloned repository can specify paths outside the workspace that are read and injected into the AI system prompt for exfiltration.

Severity

8.7 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

7.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-20 13:48 UTC

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Assigner

VulnCheck mitre root

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/security/advi…	vendor-advisory
https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/commit/435633…	patch
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/codewhale-be…	third-party-advisory

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
Hmbown	CodeWhale	Affected: 0.8.8 , < 0.8.41 (semver) Unaffected: 0.8.41 (semver)
Hmbown	CodeWhale	Affected: 0.8.41 , < 0.8.64 (semver) Unaffected: 0.8.64 (semver)

Date Public

2026-07-16 00:00

Credits

sondt99 dungNHVhust sai-sh

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                "id": "CVE-2026-75859",
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                "timestamp": "2026-08-20T13:48:22.456191Z",
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              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0.8.41",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageURL": "pkg:cargo/codewhale-tui",
          "product": "CodeWhale",
          "vendor": "Hmbown",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "0.8.64",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0.8.41",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0.8.64",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageURL": "pkg:npm/codewhale",
          "product": "CodeWhale",
          "vendor": "Hmbown",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "0.8.64",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0.8.41",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0.8.64",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "sondt99"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "dungNHVhust"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "sai-sh"
        }
      ],
      "datePublic": "2026-07-16T00:00:00.000Z",
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CodeWhale versions before 0.8.64 fail to validate file paths in the project config instructions field, allowing attackers to read arbitrary files on the victim\u0027s system. A malicious .codewhale/config.toml file in a cloned repository can specify paths outside the workspace that are read and injected into the AI system prompt for exfiltration."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 8.7,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
          },
          "format": "CVSS"
        },
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 7.5,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "format": "CVSS"
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-22",
              "description": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-18T15:21:57.978Z",
        "orgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
        "shortName": "VulnCheck"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA-62f5-cp2p-vq95)",
          "tags": [
            "vendor-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/security/advisories/GHSA-62f5-cp2p-vq95"
        },
        {
          "name": "Patch Commit",
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/commit/43563356b98c6b993085554da82e77370160a31c"
        },
        {
          "name": "VulnCheck Advisory: CodeWhale before 0.8.64 Arbitrary File Read via instructions",
          "tags": [
            "third-party-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/codewhale-before-arbitrary-file-read-via-instructions"
        }
      ],
      "title": "CodeWhale before 0.8.64 Arbitrary File Read via instructions",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "vulncheck-endgame"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
    "assignerShortName": "VulnCheck",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-75859",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-18T15:21:57.978Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-18T11:03:08.682Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-20T15:24:11.055Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

GHSA-62F5-CP2P-VQ95

Maintainer resolution

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Suggested remediation

CVE-2026-75859 (GCVE-0-2026-75859)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature