GHSA-4HF8-5MJM-RFGQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 21:50 – Updated: 2026-06-26 21:50
VLAI
Summary
Streamable HTTP mode exposes LINE Desktop read/send tools without MCP authentication
Details

Streamable HTTP mode exposes LINE Desktop read/send tools without MCP authentication

Summary

line-desktop-mcp supports a --http-mode Streamable HTTP transport for use with clients such as n8n. In this mode the server binds to 0.0.0.0 and exposes the MCP /mcp endpoint without an MCP-layer authentication check. Any network client that can reach the port can initialize a session, list tools, and call tools that read LINE Desktop chat history or send LINE messages through the already logged-in desktop application.

This is High for deployments where the HTTP port is reachable beyond the local host, because the server acts with the user authority of the logged-in LINE Desktop session. It is lower if the listener is strictly firewalled to trusted local clients.

Affected version

Repository: dtwang/line-desktop-mcp

Current source checked: fbed0d2d3048e63f48a356a1267ed8ec5e78f3ae on main, committed 2026-05-14.

Published npm package checked: line-desktop-mcp@1.1.1.

Source evidence

README.md documents Streamable HTTP mode:

npx line-desktop-mcp@latest --http-mode --port 3000

The same README documents MCP endpoints at /mcp and explains that this mode is intended for clients such as n8n.

src/server.js registers LINE Desktop tools including:

  • get_line_chatroom_history_default
  • get_line_chatroom_history_long
  • get_line_chatroom_history_short
  • send_message_manual
  • send_message_auto

Those tool handlers call into the desktop automation layer: getChatHistory(...) and sendChatMessage(...).

In HTTP mode, src/server.js creates an Express app and Streamable HTTP transport, accepts POSTs to /mcp, creates sessions, connects the transport to the MCP server, and calls transport.handleRequest(...). I did not find an authentication or bearer-token check before session creation or tool invocation.

The listener is explicitly network-bound:

app.listen(port, 0.0.0.0, () => {
  console.error(`LINE Desktop MCP Server running on Streamable HTTP mode`);
  console.error(`  Local:   http://127.0.0.1:${port}${endpoint}`);
  console.error(`  Network: http://0.0.0.0:${port}${endpoint}`);
});

Vulnerability chain

  1. A user starts the server with --http-mode --port 3000.
  2. The server binds on 0.0.0.0:3000, not only loopback.
  3. A network client reaches /mcp and sends the normal MCP initialize request.
  4. The server creates a Streamable HTTP session without authenticating the caller.
  5. The caller can list and invoke LINE Desktop tools.
  6. Tool calls execute through the logged-in LINE Desktop application on the user workstation.

Impact

An unauthenticated network client can read LINE chat history through the MCP history tools and can send LINE messages through the send-message tools, including send_message_auto when the tool call requests immediate sending. The attacker does not need LINE credentials or a LINE API token; they only need network reachability to the MCP HTTP port.

The practical impact is disclosure of private LINE conversations and unauthorized messages sent as the logged-in desktop user.

Suggested fix

Require authentication before accepting Streamable HTTP MCP sessions or tool calls. For example:

  • require a bearer token or local secret when --http-mode is used;
  • bind HTTP mode to 127.0.0.1 by default unless the operator explicitly opts into network exposure;
  • refuse to start 0.0.0.0 HTTP mode without authentication;
  • document that host.docker.internal / n8n setups must still authenticate to the MCP server.

A defense-in-depth improvement would also keep send_message_auto disabled unless explicitly enabled by a server-side flag, because it converts MCP tool access into immediate message sending as the desktop user.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.1.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "line-desktop-mcp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-49357"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T21:50:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-19T14:16:23Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Streamable HTTP mode exposes LINE Desktop read/send tools without MCP authentication\n\n## Summary\n\n`line-desktop-mcp` supports a `--http-mode` Streamable HTTP transport for use with clients such as n8n. In this mode the server binds to `0.0.0.0` and exposes the MCP `/mcp` endpoint without an MCP-layer authentication check. Any network client that can reach the port can initialize a session, list tools, and call tools that read LINE Desktop chat history or send LINE messages through the already logged-in desktop application.\n\nThis is High for deployments where the HTTP port is reachable beyond the local host, because the server acts with the user authority of the logged-in LINE Desktop session. It is lower if the listener is strictly firewalled to trusted local clients.\n\n## Affected version\n\nRepository: `dtwang/line-desktop-mcp`\n\nCurrent source checked: `fbed0d2d3048e63f48a356a1267ed8ec5e78f3ae` on `main`, committed 2026-05-14.\n\nPublished npm package checked: `line-desktop-mcp@1.1.1`.\n\n## Source evidence\n\n`README.md` documents Streamable HTTP mode:\n\n```text\nnpx line-desktop-mcp@latest --http-mode --port 3000\n```\n\nThe same README documents MCP endpoints at `/mcp` and explains that this mode is intended for clients such as n8n.\n\n`src/server.js` registers LINE Desktop tools including:\n\n- `get_line_chatroom_history_default`\n- `get_line_chatroom_history_long`\n- `get_line_chatroom_history_short`\n- `send_message_manual`\n- `send_message_auto`\n\nThose tool handlers call into the desktop automation layer: `getChatHistory(...)` and `sendChatMessage(...)`.\n\nIn HTTP mode, `src/server.js` creates an Express app and Streamable HTTP transport, accepts POSTs to `/mcp`, creates sessions, connects the transport to the MCP server, and calls `transport.handleRequest(...)`. I did not find an authentication or bearer-token check before session creation or tool invocation.\n\nThe listener is explicitly network-bound:\n\n```js\napp.listen(port, 0.0.0.0, () =\u003e {\n  console.error(`LINE Desktop MCP Server running on Streamable HTTP mode`);\n  console.error(`  Local:   http://127.0.0.1:${port}${endpoint}`);\n  console.error(`  Network: http://0.0.0.0:${port}${endpoint}`);\n});\n```\n\n## Vulnerability chain\n\n1. A user starts the server with `--http-mode --port 3000`.\n2. The server binds on `0.0.0.0:3000`, not only loopback.\n3. A network client reaches `/mcp` and sends the normal MCP initialize request.\n4. The server creates a Streamable HTTP session without authenticating the caller.\n5. The caller can list and invoke LINE Desktop tools.\n6. Tool calls execute through the logged-in LINE Desktop application on the user workstation.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated network client can read LINE chat history through the MCP history tools and can send LINE messages through the send-message tools, including `send_message_auto` when the tool call requests immediate sending. The attacker does not need LINE credentials or a LINE API token; they only need network reachability to the MCP HTTP port.\n\nThe practical impact is disclosure of private LINE conversations and unauthorized messages sent as the logged-in desktop user.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nRequire authentication before accepting Streamable HTTP MCP sessions or tool calls. For example:\n\n- require a bearer token or local secret when `--http-mode` is used;\n- bind HTTP mode to `127.0.0.1` by default unless the operator explicitly opts into network exposure;\n- refuse to start `0.0.0.0` HTTP mode without authentication;\n- document that `host.docker.internal` / n8n setups must still authenticate to the MCP server.\n\nA defense-in-depth improvement would also keep `send_message_auto` disabled unless explicitly enabled by a server-side flag, because it converts MCP tool access into immediate message sending as the desktop user.",
  "id": "GHSA-4hf8-5mjm-rfgq",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T21:50:50Z",
  "published": "2026-06-26T21:50:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dtwang/line-desktop-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-4hf8-5mjm-rfgq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49357"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dtwang/line-desktop-mcp/commit/680617894981ea93f8f6ceb51ecde7519754d501"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dtwang/line-desktop-mcp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Streamable HTTP mode exposes LINE Desktop read/send tools without MCP authentication"
}


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