GCVE-1-2026-20056 (CVE-2026-94401)

Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-09-21 13:35 – Updated: 2026-09-21 13:36
VLAI
Title
MISP Arbitrary Local File Read and SSRF via MISP Export Upload
Summary
MISP has a file-handling vulnerability that could let certain authenticated users make the server read files or access internal network services. When importing an XML file, MISP did not properly verify that the uploaded content was actually XML. Because of this, a user with permission to modify data could upload a file containing a local file path or a web address instead. If a local file path was supplied, MISP could read that file from the server. If a URL was supplied, MISP could make a request to that address, including systems that may only be reachable from inside the organization’s network. The vulnerability could therefore expose sensitive local files and allow unauthorized requests to internal services. Exploitation required a valid MISP account with modify permissions, but no additional user interaction was needed. Version affected: <2.5.47
Severity
8.3 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N
CWE
  • CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
  • CWE-73 - External Control of File Name or Path
Assigner
GNA-1 This instance
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
MISP MISP Affected: 0 , < 2.5.47 (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Credits
iglocska Claude Opus 5 (1M context)
GCVE extensions
AI involvement GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Review: review GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
Patch provenance GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-09-21 13:28
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/d5f247b91.patch 004f65b4d416…
Confidence
high
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
d5f247b91ad3 fix: [security] Refuse a MISP export upload whose content is 004f65b4d416…
Fix summary

The fix introduces two defensive measures in addMISPExportFile(): (1) a pre-parse validation that rejects any uploaded content not containing an XML document marker (the '<' character), preventing path or URL strings from reaching the XML parser; and (2) an explicit readFile => false option passed to Xml::build(), which disables the library's ability to interpret the input as a file path or URL to be read or fetched. Together these changes ensure that only genuine XML document content is parsed and that no server-side file access or network request is triggered by user-supplied data.

Patch summary

In app/Model/Event.php, the single line calling Xml::toArray(Xml::build($data)) is replaced with a guard clause that throws an Exception if strpos($data, '<') === false, followed by Xml::toArray(Xml::build($data, ['readFile' => false])). Nine lines are added (including a four-line explanatory comment) and one line is removed. No other files are modified.

CVSS rationale

AV:N: exploitation occurs over the network via the MISP web interface. AC:L: the attack is deterministic; uploading a file with a path or URL as content reliably triggers the read/fetch. AT:N: no special target-side conditions are required. PR:L: the attacker needs an authenticated account with perm_modify (a non-privileged but authenticated role). UI:N: the attacker performs the upload autonomously; no victim interaction is needed. VC:H: arbitrary local file read exposes sensitive server data (credentials, configs, keys). VI:N: the imported data is stored as an event but does not corrupt application state or logic. VA:N: no denial-of-service impact is indicated. SC:H: the SSRF component allows the attacker to read responses from internal services (metadata endpoints, admin panels, etc.), impacting subsequent-component confidentiality. SI:N and SA:N: no evidence of integrity or availability impact on subsequent components from the patch evidence.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-918 The primary and most severe impact is that an attacker-supplied URL in the uploaded file body causes the MISP server to issue an HTTP request to an arbitrary internal or external address and import the response. This is a textbook SSRF: user-controlled input is used as a network request target by the server.
  • CWE-73 The secondary impact is that a user-supplied local file path in the uploaded file body is passed to Xml::build() which reads that file from the server's filesystem. The attacker controls the file path that the server reads, matching CWE-73. CWE-22 (Path Traversal) was considered but the input is not a relative traversal sequence; it is an absolute path chosen by the attacker, making CWE-73 the more precise mapping.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-126 The patch explicitly describes the SSRF vector: an .xml upload containing a URL causes MISP to fetch that URL and import the result. CAPEC-126 describes an attacker manipulating a server-side application to make it issue requests to unintended targets, which is exactly the attack demonstrated here. The local-file-read aspect is a secondary manifestation of the same root cause (unvalidated input passed to a function that resolves locators) and is subsumed by the SSRF pattern in this context.
  • CAPEC-2 The attacker manipulates the content parameter of the MISP export upload to supply a file path or URL instead of a valid XML document. CAPEC-2 covers the general technique of altering application parameters to trigger unintended behavior. This is a secondary mapping; CAPEC-126 is the more specific and primary pattern. The uncertainty is that CAPEC-2 is broader and less precise than CAPEC-126 for this specific vulnerability.
Assumptions to verify
  • The commit message states the vulnerability was 'found during the internal review, not externally reported,' so no external finder or reporter credit is assigned. The internal reviewer's identity is not specified in the patch metadata.
  • The affected version range is inferred from the tag_version_boundary (v2.5.47 with 40 commits after the fix), but exact affected and fixed version numbers are not stated in the patch. The boundary is recorded as a reference point only.
  • PR:L assumes that perm_modify is a non-administrative, commonly granted role in MISP deployments. If perm_modify is equivalent to full administrative access in some configurations, PR could be elevated to PR:H.
  • The CAPEC-2 mapping is a broader, secondary pattern included for completeness; CAPEC-126 is the primary and most specific match. The uncertainty is noted in the CAPEC-2 rationale.
  • The commit message references an operator-precedence issue in Xml::build()'s readFile guard not covering the https branch. This is taken as evidence from the commit message and patch comments; the actual Xml utility source is not included in the patch, so the exact mechanism of the https bypass is assumed rather than verified.
  • CVSS SC:H assumes the SSRF can reach internal services with sensitive data. If the deployment restricts outbound network access, SC could be reduced.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 5 9 high 6
To clipboard 

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "modules": [
            "app/Model/Event.php (addMISPExportFile)"
          ],
          "product": "MISP",
          "programFiles": [
            "app/Model/Event.php"
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
          "vendor": "MISP",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "2.5.47",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "iglocska"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "Claude Opus 5 (1M context)"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eMISP has a file-handling vulnerability that could let certain authenticated users make the server read files or access internal network services.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhen importing an XML file, MISP did not properly verify that the uploaded content was actually XML. Because of this, a user with permission to modify data could upload a file containing a local file path or a web address instead.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIf a local file path was supplied, MISP could read that file from the server. If a URL was supplied, MISP could make a request to that address, including systems that may only be reachable from inside the organization\u2019s network.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe vulnerability could therefore expose sensitive local files and allow unauthorized requests to internal services.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eExploitation required a valid MISP account with modify permissions, but no additional user interaction was needed.\u003c/p\u003eVersion affected: \u0026lt;2.5.47"
            }
          ],
          "value": "MISP has a file-handling vulnerability that could let certain authenticated users make the server read files or access internal network services.\n\nWhen importing an XML file, MISP did not properly verify that the uploaded content was actually XML. Because of this, a user with permission to modify data could upload a file containing a local file path or a web address instead.\n\nIf a local file path was supplied, MISP could read that file from the server. If a URL was supplied, MISP could make a request to that address, including systems that may only be reachable from inside the organization\u2019s network.\n\nThe vulnerability could therefore expose sensitive local files and allow unauthorized requests to internal services.\n\nExploitation required a valid MISP account with modify permissions, but no additional user interaction was needed.\n\nVersion affected: \u003c2.5.47"
        }
      ],
      "impacts": [
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      "metrics": [
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            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 8.3,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
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          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
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              "type": "CWE"
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          "descriptions": [
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              "description": "CWE-73 External Control of File Name or Path",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
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      "providerMetadata": {
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      },
      "references": [
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          "name": "Security patch",
          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/d5f247b91"
        }
      ],
      "solutions": [
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          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
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              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eThe fix introduces two defensive measures in addMISPExportFile(): (1) a pre-parse validation that rejects any uploaded content not containing an XML document marker (the \u0027\u0026lt;\u0027 character), preventing path or URL strings from reaching the XML parser; and (2) an explicit readFile =\u0026gt; false option passed to Xml::build(), which disables the library\u0027s ability to interpret the input as a file path or URL to be read or fetched. Together these changes ensure that only genuine XML document content is parsed and that no server-side file access or network request is triggered by user-supplied data.\u003c/p\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "The fix introduces two defensive measures in addMISPExportFile(): (1) a pre-parse validation that rejects any uploaded content not containing an XML document marker (the \u0027\u003c\u0027 character), preventing path or URL strings from reaching the XML parser; and (2) an explicit readFile =\u003e false option passed to Xml::build(), which disables the library\u0027s ability to interpret the input as a file path or URL to be read or fetched. Together these changes ensure that only genuine XML document content is parsed and that no server-side file access or network request is triggered by user-supplied data."
        }
      ],
      "title": "MISP Arbitrary Local File Read and SSRF via MISP Export Upload",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "extensions": {
            "bcp-05-x-01": {
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                  "models": [
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                      "identifier": "qwen3.8:27b",
                      "name": "qwen3.8:27b",
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            "bcp-05-x-02": {
              "x_patch2vuln": {
                "assumptions": [
                  "The commit message states the vulnerability was \u0027found during the internal review, not externally reported,\u0027 so no external finder or reporter credit is assigned. The internal reviewer\u0027s identity is not specified in the patch metadata.",
                  "The affected version range is inferred from the tag_version_boundary (v2.5.47 with 40 commits after the fix), but exact affected and fixed version numbers are not stated in the patch. The boundary is recorded as a reference point only.",
                  "PR:L assumes that perm_modify is a non-administrative, commonly granted role in MISP deployments. If perm_modify is equivalent to full administrative access in some configurations, PR could be elevated to PR:H.",
                  "The CAPEC-2 mapping is a broader, secondary pattern included for completeness; CAPEC-126 is the primary and most specific match. The uncertainty is noted in the CAPEC-2 rationale.",
                  "The commit message references an operator-precedence issue in Xml::build()\u0027s readFile guard not covering the https branch. This is taken as evidence from the commit message and patch comments; the actual Xml utility source is not included in the patch, so the exact mechanism of the https bypass is assumed rather than verified.",
                  "CVSS SC:H assumes the SSRF can reach internal services with sensitive data. If the deployment restricts outbound network access, SC could be reduced."
                ],
                "capecRationale": [
                  {
                    "capecId": "CAPEC-126",
                    "rationale": "The patch explicitly describes the SSRF vector: an .xml upload containing a URL causes MISP to fetch that URL and import the result. CAPEC-126 describes an attacker manipulating a server-side application to make it issue requests to unintended targets, which is exactly the attack demonstrated here. The local-file-read aspect is a secondary manifestation of the same root cause (unvalidated input passed to a function that resolves locators) and is subsumed by the SSRF pattern in this context."
                  },
                  {
                    "capecId": "CAPEC-2",
                    "rationale": "The attacker manipulates the content parameter of the MISP export upload to supply a file path or URL instead of a valid XML document. CAPEC-2 covers the general technique of altering application parameters to trigger unintended behavior. This is a secondary mapping; CAPEC-126 is the more specific and primary pattern. The uncertainty is that CAPEC-2 is broader and less precise than CAPEC-126 for this specific vulnerability."
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                "cvssRationale": "AV:N: exploitation occurs over the network via the MISP web interface. AC:L: the attack is deterministic; uploading a file with a path or URL as content reliably triggers the read/fetch. AT:N: no special target-side conditions are required. PR:L: the attacker needs an authenticated account with perm_modify (a non-privileged but authenticated role). UI:N: the attacker performs the upload autonomously; no victim interaction is needed. VC:H: arbitrary local file read exposes sensitive server data (credentials, configs, keys). VI:N: the imported data is stored as an event but does not corrupt application state or logic. VA:N: no denial-of-service impact is indicated. SC:H: the SSRF component allows the attacker to read responses from internal services (metadata endpoints, admin panels, etc.), impacting subsequent-component confidentiality. SI:N and SA:N: no evidence of integrity or availability impact on subsequent components from the patch evidence.",
                "fixSummary": "The fix introduces two defensive measures in addMISPExportFile(): (1) a pre-parse validation that rejects any uploaded content not containing an XML document marker (the \u0027\u003c\u0027 character), preventing path or URL strings from reaching the XML parser; and (2) an explicit readFile =\u003e false option passed to Xml::build(), which disables the library\u0027s ability to interpret the input as a file path or URL to be read or fetched. Together these changes ensure that only genuine XML document content is parsed and that no server-side file access or network request is triggered by user-supplied data.",
                "generatedAt": "2026-09-21T13:28:43.719596Z",
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                "patchSummary": "In app/Model/Event.php, the single line calling Xml::toArray(Xml::build($data)) is replaced with a guard clause that throws an Exception if strpos($data, \u0027\u003c\u0027) === false, followed by Xml::toArray(Xml::build($data, [\u0027readFile\u0027 =\u003e false])). Nine lines are added (including a four-line explanatory comment) and one line is removed. No other files are modified.",
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                    "source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/d5f247b91.patch",
                    "sourceUrl": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/d5f247b91.patch",
                    "subject": "fix: [security] Refuse a MISP export upload whose content is"
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    "cveId": "CVE-2026-94401",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-21T13:35:58.783318Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-21T13:36:11.048Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-21T13:36:11.123285Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "vulnId": "GCVE-1-2026-20056"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.1"
}



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Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.