GCVE-1-2026-20039 (CVE-2026-72761)

Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-08-10 14:32 – Updated: 2026-08-10 14:33
VLAI
Title
Webhook SSRF guard bypassed by IPv6 transition addresses (NAT64/6to4/Teredo pass is_global check) in vulnerability-lookup
Summary
The webhook URL validator in `website/notifications/webhooks.py` uses `ip.is_global` to reject non-public addresses after DNS resolution. IPv6 transition addresses (NAT64 `64:ff9b::/96`, 6to4 `2002::/16`, Teredo `2001:0000::/32`) are classified as globally routable by IANA, so `is_global` returns `True` even when the embedded IPv4 targets a private, loopback, or cloud metadata destination. An attacker can register a webhook pointing at a hostname that resolves to a transition address to bypass the SSRF guard and exfiltrate vulnerability data to an internal endpoint. The vulnerability was introduced on a non-release version. The fix was already done on HEAD. It only affects organisation running the HEAD.
CWE
  • CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
vulnerability-lookup vulnerability-lookup Unaffected: 0 , ≤ 5.5.0 (semver)
Create a notification for this product.
Credits
tonghuaroot Cedric Bonhomme

{
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    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "vulnerability-lookup",
          "repo": "https://github.com/vulnerability-lookup/vulnerability-lookup",
          "vendor": "vulnerability-lookup",
          "versions": [
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              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.5.0",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
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      ],
      "credits": [
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          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "tonghuaroot"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "Cedric Bonhomme"
        }
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        }
      ],
      "impacts": [
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          "descriptions": [
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              "value": "CAPEC-664 Server Side Request Forgery"
            }
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        }
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      "metrics": [
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            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 6.9,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
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              "lang": "en",
              "value": "GENERAL"
            }
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      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-918",
              "description": "CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
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      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "orgId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000"
      },
      "references": [
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          "tags": [
            "patch"
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          "url": "https://github.com/vulnerability-lookup/vulnerability-lookup/commit/f3e0c6899c5b3823dcfd860fc6cb3edbedc9bf65"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Webhook SSRF guard bypassed by IPv6 transition addresses (NAT64/6to4/Teredo pass is_global check) in vulnerability-lookup",
      "x_generator": {
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  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-72761",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-10T14:32:00.000Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-10T14:32:00.000Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-10T14:33:01.108239Z",
    "requesterUserId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000",
    "serial": 1,
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "vulnId": "gcve-1-2026-20039"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.1"
}



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