FKIE_CVE-2026-14490

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-28 07:16 - Updated: 2026-07-28 16:07
Severity
7.5 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Summary
The Demi – One Click Demo Import, WP Backup & Site Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary Directory Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 0.0.7. The vulnerability exists because the plugin stores its HMAC signing key and per-step restore token as dotfiles inside a publicly accessible subdirectory of the WordPress uploads folder — without any `.htaccess` or index file protection — and the `demi_restore_step` AJAX handler, registered for unauthenticated callers, explicitly accepts possession of the on-disk signing key as a standalone alternative to WordPress capability and nonce checks; an unauthenticated attacker who retrieves the exposed key can forge a valid signed state envelope to invoke `CleanDir::execute()` with a caller-supplied absolute path that is subject to no allow-list or path-canonicalization check. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to recursively delete arbitrary directories on the server.
References
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/demi-backup-migration/tags/0.0.6/classes/Backup/Tasks/CleanDir.php#L61
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/demi-backup-migration/tags/0.0.6/classes/Import/Manager.php#L287
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/demi-backup-migration/tags/0.0.6/classes/Import/Manager.php#L50
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/demi-backup-migration/tags/0.0.6/classes/Import/Manager.php#L767
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/demi-backup-migration/trunk/classes/Backup/Tasks/CleanDir.php#L61
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/demi-backup-migration/trunk/classes/Import/Manager.php#L287
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/demi-backup-migration/trunk/classes/Import/Manager.php#L50
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/demi-backup-migration/trunk/classes/Import/Manager.php#L767
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=&old=3616690%40demi-backup-migration&new=3616690%40demi-backup-migration
security@wordfence.comhttps://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/63922c28-0cb5-4abe-85ee-20b2cc6f015d?source=cve
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Demi \u2013 One Click Demo Import, Backup \u0026 Site Migration",
          "vendor": "deveasel",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "0.0.7",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@wordfence.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The Demi \u2013 One Click Demo Import, WP Backup \u0026 Site Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary Directory Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 0.0.7. The vulnerability exists because the plugin stores its HMAC signing key and per-step restore token as dotfiles inside a publicly accessible subdirectory of the WordPress uploads folder \u2014 without any `.htaccess` or index file protection \u2014 and the `demi_restore_step` AJAX handler, registered for unauthenticated callers, explicitly accepts possession of the on-disk signing key as a standalone alternative to WordPress capability and nonce checks; an unauthenticated attacker who retrieves the exposed key can forge a valid signed state envelope to invoke `CleanDir::execute()` with a caller-supplied absolute path that is subject to no allow-list or path-canonicalization check. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to recursively delete arbitrary directories on the server."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-14490",
  "lastModified": "2026-07-28T16:07:15.840",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "security@wordfence.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-14490",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-28T13:31:12.259884Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-28T07:16:40.963",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/demi-backup-migration/tags/0.0.6/classes/Backup/Tasks/CleanDir.php#L61"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/demi-backup-migration/tags/0.0.6/classes/Import/Manager.php#L287"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/demi-backup-migration/tags/0.0.6/classes/Import/Manager.php#L50"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/demi-backup-migration/tags/0.0.6/classes/Import/Manager.php#L767"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/demi-backup-migration/trunk/classes/Backup/Tasks/CleanDir.php#L61"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/demi-backup-migration/trunk/classes/Import/Manager.php#L287"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/demi-backup-migration/trunk/classes/Import/Manager.php#L50"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/demi-backup-migration/trunk/classes/Import/Manager.php#L767"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3616690%40demi-backup-migration\u0026new=3616690%40demi-backup-migration"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/63922c28-0cb5-4abe-85ee-20b2cc6f015d?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@wordfence.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-22"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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