CVE-2026-71289 (GCVE-0-2026-71289)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-05 12:26 – Updated: 2026-08-05 15:49
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
NASA-AMMOS ANMS / JHUAPL dtnma-tools Unauthenticated Remote Command Execution via Exposed AMP Manager REST API
Summary
The NASA-AMMOS Asynchronous Network Management System (ANMS) reference implementation's default docker-compose.yml publishes the amp-manager service's REST API directly to the host network interface (port 8089, e.g. "${ION_MGR_PORT:-8089}:8089/tcp") with cap_add: NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SYS_NICE, bypassing the CAM (Configuration and Access Manager) gateway that is otherwise the system's sole authentication boundary. The underlying REST server, implemented with CivetWeb in JHUAPL/dtnma-tools (src/refdm/nm_rest.c), is configured with enable_auth_domain_check set to "no" and registers every route, including the DTNMA agent command-dispatch endpoints (.../agents/{eid|idx}/send, which accept and forward EXECSET-encoded command sets to a registered DTNMA agent), with a null authentication callback. Any network-reachable client can therefore enumerate registered agents, submit arbitrary command sets to them, and clear stored reports, entirely without credentials. This affects NASA-AMMOS/anms and JHUAPL-DTNMA/dtnma-tools as published; both repositories present this as a reference/ground DTN network-management implementation and testbed, and the affected components communicate with DTNMA agents (which may represent simulated or real spacecraft/ground nodes depending on deployment) rather than being flight software running onboard a spacecraft.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
Assigner
References
2 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| NASA-AMMOS | anms |
Affected:
0 , ≤ *
(custom)
|
Credits
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
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