{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.6.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "protobufjs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.6.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.4.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "protobufjs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.4.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48712"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T17:30:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nprotobufjs could recurse without a depth limit while converting decoded messages to plain objects or JSON. This affected generated `toObject()` conversion and the custom `google.protobuf.Any` JSON conversion path.\n\nA crafted protobuf binary payload containing deeply nested `Any` values could cause the JavaScript call stack to be exhausted during conversion to JSON.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can provide protobuf binary data decoded by an application may be able to crash the process or otherwise cause message conversion to fail with a stack overflow.\n\nThis affects applications that decode untrusted protobuf input containing `google.protobuf.Any` values and then convert decoded messages to JSON or plain objects with JSON conversion enabled, for example through `JSON.stringify(message)`, `Message#toJSON()`, or `Type.toObject(message, { json: true })`.\n\nApplications that only decode and re-encode protobuf binary data without converting decoded messages to JSON are not directly affected by this issue.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n* The application must decode protobuf binary data influenced by an attacker.\n* The application schema must include `google.protobuf.Any`, and the referenced `type_url` must resolve to a message type in the loaded protobuf root.\n* The application must convert the decoded message to JSON or a plain object through an affected conversion path.\n* The crafted input must contain deeply nested `Any` values that are expanded during conversion.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nAvoid converting untrusted protobuf messages containing `google.protobuf.Any` values to JSON with affected versions. If immediate upgrade is not possible, reject or limit messages with deeply nested `Any` payloads at an outer protocol boundary where feasible, avoid JSON conversion of untrusted `Any` values, or isolate message conversion in a process that can be safely restarted.",
  "id": "GHSA-wcpc-wj8m-hjx6",
  "modified": "2026-06-15T17:30:15Z",
  "published": "2026-06-15T17:30:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/protobufjs/protobuf.js/security/advisories/GHSA-wcpc-wj8m-hjx6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/protobufjs/protobuf.js"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "protobufjs: Denial of service through unbounded Any expansion during JSON conversion"
}