{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "CoreShop is a Pimcore enhanced eCommerce solution. In versions 5.0.1 through 5.1.0-beta.1,, the GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a \"Pwn Request\" vulnerability. As of time of publication, `pull_request_target` is still in the file."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-41249",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-04T20:16:57.797",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 8.2,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 4.2,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-06-04T20:16:57.797",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/coreshop/CoreShop/blob/5.1.0-beta.1/.github/workflows/static.yml#L14"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/coreshop/CoreShop/commit/cc1e3f547228ec5ebfc1dc0472f9a3cc5f4137a4"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/coreshop/CoreShop/security/advisories/GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-94"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "coreshop/core-shop"
      },
      "versions": [
        "5.0.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41249"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T13:18:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout.\nThis allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a \"Pwn Request\" vulnerability.\n\n**Steps to Reproduce:**\n1. Fork the target repository.\n2. In the forked repository, modify a file that satisfies the `paths` condition (e.g., `src/dummy.php` or `composer.json`) to trigger the workflow.\n3. Modify the `bin/console` file (which is executed in the workflow steps) with the following malicious payload:\n```bash\n#!/bin/bash\necho \"=== PWNED ===\"\necho \"whoami:\"\nwhoami\n```\n4. Commit the changes and open a Pull Request against the `5.0` or `next` branch of the base repository.\n5. The `Static Tests` workflow will trigger automatically. Navigate to the Actions tab and inspect the logs for the `Validate YAML` (or any step executing `bin/console`).\n6. You will see the output of `whoami` (typically `runner`), proving that the arbitrary code was successfully executed in the runner\u0027s context.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"490\" height=\"87\" alt=\"\u30b9\u30af\u30ea\u30fc\u30f3\u30b7\u30e7\u30c3\u30c8 2026-04-14 11 14 56\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/94276033-b989-46dc-b4a1-3dafa1603235\" /\u003e\n\n\n**Impact:**\nBecause `pull_request_target` runs in the context of the base repository, the runner has access to repository secrets (e.g., `PIMCORE_SECRET`, `PIMCORE_PRODUCT_KEY`) loaded in the environment. An attacker can exfiltrate these secrets, modify repository contents (if the token has write permissions), or abuse the runner\u0027s computing resources.\n\n**Recommended Mitigation:**\nDo not checkout untrusted PR code (`head.ref`) when using `pull_request_target` if the code will be built or executed.\nConsider adopting a separated architecture using the `workflow_run` event:\n1. Use the `pull_request` event to safely run the build/tests in an unprivileged sandbox and upload artifacts.\n2. Use the `workflow_run` event (which is privileged) to download the artifacts and perform actions requiring secrets.",
  "id": "GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T13:18:16Z",
  "published": "2026-05-14T13:18:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coreshop/CoreShop/security/advisories/GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/coreshop/CoreShop"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CoreShop Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Insecure `pull_request_target` Configuration"
}