{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "CleanStart",
        "name": "jitsucom-jitsu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.11.0-r3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [],
  "database_specific": {},
  "details": "Security vulnerability affects the jitsucom-jitsu package. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for vulnerability details.",
  "id": "CLEANSTART-2026-SJ56797",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T15:58:36Z",
  "published": "2026-09-18T10:23:31.033277Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/cleanstart-dev/cleanstart-security-advisories/tree/main/advisories/2026/CLEANSTART-2026-SJ56797.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-32887"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32887"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "summary": "Security fix for CVE-2026-32887 applied in: jitsucom-jitsu 2.11.0-r3",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-32887"
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "effect",
          "vendor": "Effect-TS",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 3.20.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:effectful:effect:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "720488DF-FC4E-43E2-9D3B-5FB783EF8BEC",
              "versionEndExcluding": "3.20.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Effect is a TypeScript framework that consists of several packages that work together to help build TypeScript applications. Prior to version 3.20.0, when using `RpcServer.toWebHandler` (or `HttpApp.toWebHandlerRuntime`) inside a Next.js App Router route handler, any Node.js `AsyncLocalStorage`-dependent API called from within an Effect fiber can read another concurrent request\u0027s context \u2014 or no context at all. Under production traffic, `auth()` from `@clerk/nextjs/server` returns a different user\u0027s session. Version 3.20.0 contains a fix for the issue."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Effect es un framework de TypeScript que consta de varios paquetes que trabajan juntos para ayudar a construir aplicaciones TypeScript. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 3.20.0, al usar `RpcServer.toWebHandler` (o `HttpApp.toWebHandlerRuntime`) dentro de un gestor de rutas del App Router de Next.js, cualquier API de Node.js dependiente de `AsyncLocalStorage` llamada desde dentro de una fibra de Effect puede leer el contexto de otra solicitud concurrente \u2014 o ning\u00fan contexto en absoluto. Bajo tr\u00e1fico de producci\u00f3n, `auth()` de `@clerk/nextjs/server` devuelve la sesi\u00f3n de un usuario diferente. La versi\u00f3n 3.20.0 contiene una soluci\u00f3n para el problema."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-32887",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:36:30.770",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.4,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
        "impactScore": 5.2,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-32887",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-03-25T13:36:39.114796Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-20T22:16:27.980",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect/security/advisories/GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-362"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "effect"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.20.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32887"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-362"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-20T20:34:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T22:16:27Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Versions\n\n- `effect`: 3.19.15\n- `@effect/rpc`: 0.72.1\n- `@effect/platform`: 0.94.2\n- Node.js: v22.20.0\n- Vercel runtime with Fluid compute\n- Next.js: 16 (App Router)\n- `@clerk/nextjs`: 6.x\n\n## Root cause\n\nEffect\u0027s `MixedScheduler` batches fiber continuations and drains them inside a **single** microtask or timer callback. The `AsyncLocalStorage` context active during that callback belongs to whichever request first triggered the scheduler\u0027s drain cycle \u2014 **not** the request that owns the fiber being resumed.\n\n### Detailed mechanism\n\n#### 1. Scheduler batching (`effect/src/Scheduler.ts`, `MixedScheduler`)\n\n```typescript\n// MixedScheduler.starve() \u2014 called once when first task is scheduled\nprivate starve(depth = 0) {\n  if (depth \u003e= this.maxNextTickBeforeTimer) {\n    setTimeout(() =\u003e this.starveInternal(0), 0)       // timer queue\n  } else {\n    Promise.resolve(void 0).then(() =\u003e this.starveInternal(depth + 1)) // microtask queue\n  }\n}\n\n// MixedScheduler.starveInternal() \u2014 drains ALL accumulated tasks in one call\nprivate starveInternal(depth: number) {\n  const tasks = this.tasks.buckets\n  this.tasks.buckets = []\n  for (const [_, toRun] of tasks) {\n    for (let i = 0; i \u003c toRun.length; i++) {\n      toRun[i]()  // \u2190 Every fiber continuation runs in the SAME ALS context\n    }\n  }\n  // ...\n}\n```\n\n`scheduleTask` only calls `starve()` when `running` is `false`. Subsequent tasks accumulate in `this.tasks` until `starveInternal` drains them all. The `Promise.then()` (or `setTimeout`) callback inherits the ALS context from whichever call site created it \u2014 i.e., whichever request\u0027s fiber first set `running = true`.\n\n**Result:** Under concurrent load, fiber continuations from Request A and Request B execute inside the same `starveInternal` call, sharing a single ALS context. If Request A triggered `starve()`, then Request B\u0027s fiber reads Request A\u0027s ALS context.\n\n#### 2. `toWebHandlerRuntime` does not propagate ALS (`@effect/platform/src/HttpApp.ts:211-240`)\n\n```typescript\nexport const toWebHandlerRuntime = \u003cR\u003e(runtime: Runtime.Runtime\u003cR\u003e) =\u003e {\n  const httpRuntime: Types.Mutable\u003cRuntime.Runtime\u003cR\u003e\u003e = Runtime.make(runtime)\n  const run = Runtime.runFork(httpRuntime)\n  return \u003cE\u003e(self: Default\u003cE, R | Scope.Scope\u003e, middleware?) =\u003e {\n    return (request: Request, context?): Promise\u003cResponse\u003e =\u003e\n      new Promise((resolve) =\u003e {\n        // Per-request Effect context is correctly set via contextMap:\n        const contextMap = new Map\u003cstring, any\u003e(runtime.context.unsafeMap)\n        const httpServerRequest = ServerRequest.fromWeb(request)\n        contextMap.set(ServerRequest.HttpServerRequest.key, httpServerRequest)\n        httpRuntime.context = Context.unsafeMake(contextMap)\n\n        // But the fiber is forked without any ALS propagation:\n        const fiber = run(httpApp as any)  // \u2190 ALS context is NOT captured or restored\n      })\n  }\n}\n```\n\nEffect\u0027s own `Context` (containing `HttpServerRequest`) is correctly set per-request. But the **Node.js ALS context** \u2014 which frameworks like Next.js, Clerk, and OpenTelemetry rely on \u2014 is not captured at fork time or restored when the fiber\u0027s continuations execute.\n\n#### 3. The dangerous pattern this enables\n\n```typescript\n// RPC handler \u2014 runs inside an Effect fiber\nconst handler = Effect.gen(function*() {\n  // This calls auth() from @clerk/nextjs/server, which reads from ALS\n  const { userId } = yield* Effect.tryPromise({\n    try: async () =\u003e auth(),  // \u2190 may read WRONG user\u0027s session\n    catch: () =\u003e new UnauthorizedError({ message: \"Auth failed\" })\n  })\n  return yield* repository.getUser(userId)\n})\n```\n\nThe `async () =\u003e auth()` thunk executes when the fiber continuation is scheduled by `MixedScheduler`. At that point, the ALS context belongs to an arbitrary concurrent request.\n\n## Reproduction scenario\n\n```\nTimeline (two concurrent requests to the same toWebHandler endpoint):\n\nT0: Request A arrives \u2192 POST handler \u2192 webHandler(requestA)\n    \u2192 Promise executor runs synchronously\n    \u2192 httpRuntime.context set to A\u0027s context\n    \u2192 fiber A forked, runs first ops synchronously\n    \u2192 fiber A yields (e.g., at Effect.tryPromise boundary)\n    \u2192 scheduler.scheduleTask(fiberA_continuation)\n    \u2192 running=false \u2192 starve() called \u2192 Promise.resolve().then(drain)\n       \u2191 ALS context captured = Request A\u0027s context\n\nT1: Request B arrives \u2192 POST handler \u2192 webHandler(requestB)\n    \u2192 Promise executor runs synchronously\n    \u2192 httpRuntime.context set to B\u0027s context\n    \u2192 fiber B forked, runs first ops synchronously\n    \u2192 fiber B yields\n    \u2192 scheduler.scheduleTask(fiberB_continuation)\n    \u2192 running=true \u2192 task queued, no new starve()\n\nT2: Microtask fires \u2192 starveInternal() runs\n    \u2192 Drains fiberA_continuation \u2192 auth() reads ALS \u2192 gets A\u0027s context \u2713\n    \u2192 Drains fiberB_continuation \u2192 auth() reads ALS \u2192 gets A\u0027s context \u2717 \u2190 WRONG USER\n```\n\n## Minimal reproduction\n\n```typescript\nimport { AsyncLocalStorage } from \"node:async_hooks\"\nimport { Effect, Layer } from \"effect\"\nimport { RpcServer, RpcSerialization, Rpc, RpcGroup } from \"@effect/rpc\"\nimport { HttpServer } from \"@effect/platform\"\nimport * as S from \"effect/Schema\"\n\n// Simulate a framework\u0027s ALS (like Next.js / Clerk)\nconst requestStore = new AsyncLocalStorage\u003c{ userId: string }\u003e()\n\nclass GetUser extends Rpc.make(\"GetUser\", {\n  success: S.Struct({ userId: S.String, alsUserId: S.String }),\n  failure: S.Never,\n  payload: {}\n}) {}\n\nconst MyRpc = RpcGroup.make(\"MyRpc\").add(GetUser)\n\nconst MyRpcLive = MyRpc.toLayer(\n  RpcGroup.toHandlers(MyRpc, {\n    GetUser: () =\u003e\n      Effect.gen(function*() {\n        // Simulate calling an ALS-dependent API inside an Effect fiber\n        const alsResult = yield* Effect.tryPromise({\n          try: async () =\u003e {\n            const store = requestStore.getStore()\n            return store?.userId ?? \"NONE\"\n          },\n          catch: () =\u003e { throw new Error(\"impossible\") }\n        })\n        return { userId: \"from-effect-context\", alsUserId: alsResult }\n      })\n  })\n)\n\nconst RpcLayer = MyRpcLive.pipe(\n  Layer.provideMerge(RpcSerialization.layerJson),\n  Layer.provideMerge(HttpServer.layerContext)\n)\n\nconst { handler } = RpcServer.toWebHandler(MyRpc, { layer: RpcLayer })\n\n// Simulate two concurrent requests with different ALS contexts\nasync function main() {\n  const results = await Promise.all([\n    requestStore.run({ userId: \"user-A\" }, () =\u003e handler(makeRpcRequest(\"GetUser\"))),\n    requestStore.run({ userId: \"user-B\" }, () =\u003e handler(makeRpcRequest(\"GetUser\"))),\n  ])\n\n  // Parse responses and check if alsUserId matches the expected user\n  // Under the bug: both responses may show \"user-A\" (or one shows the other\u0027s)\n  for (const res of results) {\n    console.log(await res.json())\n  }\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n| Symptom | Severity |\n|---------|----------|\n| `auth()` returns wrong user\u0027s session | **Critical** \u2014 authentication bypass |\n| `cookies()` / `headers()` from Next.js read wrong request | **High** \u2014 data leakage |\n| OpenTelemetry trace context crosses requests | **Medium** \u2014 incorrect traces |\n| Works locally, fails in production | Hard to diagnose \u2014 only manifests under concurrent load |\n\n## Workaround\n\nCapture ALS-dependent values **before** entering the Effect runtime and pass them via Effect\u0027s own context system:\n\n```typescript\n// In the route handler \u2014 OUTSIDE the Effect fiber (ALS is correct here)\nexport const POST = async (request: Request) =\u003e {\n  const { userId } = await auth()  // \u2190 Safe: still in Next.js ALS context\n\n  // Inject into request headers or use the `context` parameter\n  const headers = new Headers(request.headers)\n  headers.set(\"x-clerk-auth-user-id\", userId ?? \"\")\n  const enrichedRequest = new Request(request.url, {\n    method: request.method,\n    headers,\n    body: request.body,\n    duplex: \"half\" as any,\n  })\n\n  return webHandler(enrichedRequest)\n}\n\n// In Effect handlers \u2014 read from HttpServerRequest headers instead of calling auth()\nconst getAuthenticatedUserId = Effect.gen(function*() {\n  const req = yield* HttpServerRequest.HttpServerRequest\n  const userId = req.headers[\"x-clerk-auth-user-id\"]\n  if (!userId) return yield* Effect.fail(new UnauthorizedError({ message: \"Auth required\" }))\n  return userId\n})\n```\n\n## Suggested fix (for Effect maintainers)\n\n### Option A: Propagate ALS context through the scheduler\n\nCapture the `AsyncLocalStorage` snapshot when a fiber continuation is scheduled, and restore it when the continuation executes:\n\n```typescript\n// In MixedScheduler or the fiber runtime\nimport { AsyncLocalStorage } from \"node:async_hooks\"\n\nscheduleTask(task: Task, priority: number) {\n  // Capture current ALS context\n  const snapshot = AsyncLocalStorage.snapshot()\n  this.tasks.scheduleTask(() =\u003e snapshot(task), priority)\n  // ...\n}\n```\n\n`AsyncLocalStorage.snapshot()` (Node.js 20.5+) returns a function that, when called, restores the ALS context from the point of capture. This ensures each fiber continuation runs with its originating request\u0027s ALS context.\n\n**Trade-off:** Adds one closure allocation per scheduled task. Could be opt-in via a `FiberRef` or scheduler option.\n\n### Option B: Capture ALS at `runFork` and restore per fiber step\n\nWhen `Runtime.runFork` is called, capture the ALS snapshot and associate it with the fiber. Before each fiber step (in the fiber runtime\u0027s `evaluateEffect` loop), restore the snapshot.\n\n**Trade-off:** More invasive but provides correct ALS propagation for the fiber\u0027s entire lifetime, including across `flatMap` chains and `Effect.tryPromise` thunks.\n\n### Option C: Document the limitation and provide a `context` injection API\n\nIf ALS propagation is intentionally not supported, document this prominently and provide a first-class API for `toWebHandler` to accept per-request context. The existing `context?: Context.Context\u003cnever\u003e` parameter on the handler function partially addresses this, but it requires callers to know about the issue and manually extract values before entering Effect.\n\n## Related\n\n- Node.js `AsyncLocalStorage` docs: https://nodejs.org/api/async_context.html\n- `AsyncLocalStorage.snapshot()`: https://nodejs.org/api/async_context.html#static-method-asynclocalstoragesnapshot\n- Next.js uses ALS for `cookies()`, `headers()`, `auth()` in App Router\n- Similar issue pattern in other fiber-based runtimes (e.g., ZIO has `FiberRef` propagation for this)\n\n\n## POC replica of my setup\n\n```\n// Create web handler from Effect RPC\n// sharedMemoMap ensures all RPC routes share the same connection pool\nconst { handler: webHandler, dispose } = RpcServer.toWebHandler(DemoRpc, {\n  layer: RpcLayer,\n  memoMap: sharedMemoMap,\n});\n\n/**\n * POST /api/rpc/demo\n */\nexport const POST = async (request: Request) =\u003e {\n  return webHandler(request);\n};\n\nregisterDispose(dispose);\n```\n\n### Used util functions\n\n```\n\n/**\n * Creates a dispose registry that collects dispose callbacks and runs them\n * when `runAll` is invoked. Handles both sync and async dispose functions,\n * catching errors to prevent one failing dispose from breaking others.\n *\n * @internal Exported for testing \u2014 use `registerDispose` in application code.\n */\nexport const makeDisposeRegistry = () =\u003e {\n  const disposeFns: Array\u003c() =\u003e void | Promise\u003cvoid\u003e\u003e = []\n\n  const runAll = () =\u003e {\n    for (const fn of disposeFns) {\n      try {\n        const result = fn()\n        if (result \u0026\u0026 typeof result.then === \"function\") {\n          result.then(undefined, (err: unknown) =\u003e console.error(\"Dispose error:\", err))\n        }\n      } catch (err) {\n        console.error(\"Dispose error:\", err)\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  const register = (dispose: () =\u003e void | Promise\u003cvoid\u003e) =\u003e {\n    disposeFns.push(dispose)\n  }\n\n  return { register, runAll }\n}\n\nexport const registerDispose: (dispose: () =\u003e void | Promise\u003cvoid\u003e) =\u003e void = globalValue(\n  Symbol.for(\"@global/RegisterDispose\"),\n  () =\u003e {\n    const registry = makeDisposeRegistry()\n\n    if (typeof process !== \"undefined\") {\n      process.once(\"beforeExit\", registry.runAll)\n    }\n\n    return registry.register\n  }\n)\n```\n\n### The actual effect that was run within the RPC context that the bug was found\n\n```\nexport const getAuthenticatedUserId: Effect.Effect\u003cstring, UnauthorizedError\u003e =\n  Effect.gen(function*() {\n    const authResult = yield* Effect.tryPromise({\n      try: async () =\u003e auth(),\n      catch: () =\u003e\n        new UnauthorizedError({\n          message: \"Failed to get auth session\"\n        })\n    })\n\n    if (!authResult.userId) {\n      return yield* Effect.fail(\n        new UnauthorizedError({\n          message: \"Authentication required\"\n        })\n      )\n    }\n\n    return authResult.userId\n  })\n ```",
  "id": "GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T18:11:18Z",
  "published": "2026-03-20T20:34:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect/security/advisories/GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32887"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Effect `AsyncLocalStorage` context lost/contaminated inside Effect fibers under concurrent load with RPC"
}