BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-MHQ8-78PJ-5J79)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-09-17 17:24 – Source websiteSummary
On POSIX nodes, OpenClaw's system.run safe-bin checks could approve a command before shell expansion changed how the command was interpreted. A value that appeared to be a safe-bin argument could expand into additional shell words and become a file operand.
This issue is limited to paired POSIX node execution through system.run with safe-bin or allowlist-style auto-approval. It is not an unauthenticated node takeover.
Affected configurations
This affects deployments where:
- a POSIX node is paired to the gateway
system.runis reachable by an authenticated operator or agent flow- exec policy uses safe-bin or allowlist-based auto-approval
- the approved command contains shell-expanded values that can change argv shape
Impact
A lower-privilege operator flow could cause an approved safe-bin command to read a node-local file that was not intended by the policy. Depending on the local files available to the node process, this could expose OpenClaw configuration data or other node-local information.
The issue is a policy-enforcement gap in argv validation, not a general statement that every safe-bin command is unsafe.
Patched Versions
The first stable patched version is 2026.5.18.
Mitigations
Upgrade to openclaw@2026.5.18 or later. Before upgrading, avoid broad safe-bin auto-approval for commands that can read arbitrary paths, and prefer explicit approval for node commands that touch local files.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2026.5.18"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "openclaw-cli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.1.29"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.5.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.9.4",
"name": "openclaw",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.9.4"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nOn POSIX nodes, OpenClaw\u0027s `system.run` safe-bin checks could approve a command before shell expansion changed how the command was interpreted. A value that appeared to be a safe-bin argument could expand into additional shell words and become a file operand.\n\nThis issue is limited to paired POSIX node execution through `system.run` with safe-bin or allowlist-style auto-approval. It is not an unauthenticated node takeover.\n\n### Affected configurations\n\nThis affects deployments where:\n\n- a POSIX node is paired to the gateway\n- `system.run` is reachable by an authenticated operator or agent flow\n- exec policy uses safe-bin or allowlist-based auto-approval\n- the approved command contains shell-expanded values that can change argv shape\n\n### Impact\n\nA lower-privilege operator flow could cause an approved safe-bin command to read a node-local file that was not intended by the policy. Depending on the local files available to the node process, this could expose OpenClaw configuration data or other node-local information.\n\nThe issue is a policy-enforcement gap in argv validation, not a general statement that every safe-bin command is unsafe.\n\n### Patched Versions\n\nThe first stable patched version is `2026.5.18`.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nUpgrade to `openclaw@2026.5.18` or later. Before upgrading, avoid broad safe-bin auto-approval for commands that can read arbitrary paths, and prefer explicit approval for node commands that touch local files.",
"id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-53831",
"modified": "2026-09-17T17:24:13Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-mhq8-78pj-5j79"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53831"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-arbitrary-file-read-via-shell-expansion-in-system-run-safe-bin-allowlist"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s POSIX node system.run safe-bin allowlist could be widened by shell expansion",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-mhq8-78pj-5j79",
"CVE-2026-53831"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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