brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-26316
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew
Summary
In affected versions, the optional BlueBubbles iMessage channel plugin could accept webhook requests as authenticated based only on the TCP peer address being loopback (127.0.0.1, ::1, ::ffff:127.0.0.1) even when the configured webhook secret was missing or incorrect. This does not affect the default iMessage integration unless BlueBubbles is installed and enabled.
Affected Packages / Versions
- npm:
openclaw< 2026.2.13 - npm:
@openclaw/bluebubbles< 2026.2.13
Details
If a deployment exposes the BlueBubbles webhook endpoint through a same-host reverse proxy (or an attacker can reach loopback via SSRF), an unauthenticated party may be able to inject inbound webhook events into the agent pipeline.
Fix Commit(s)
- f836c385ffc746cb954e8ee409f99d079bfdcd2f
- 743f4b28495cdeb0d5bf76f6ebf4af01f6a02e5a (defense-in-depth)
Mitigations
- Set a non-empty BlueBubbles webhook password.
- Avoid deployments where a public-facing reverse proxy forwards to a loopback-bound Gateway without strong upstream authentication.
Thanks @MegaManSec (https://joshua.hu) of AISLE Research Team for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2026.2.13"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "openclaw-cli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.1.29"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.9.4",
"name": "openclaw",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.9.4"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nIn affected versions, the optional BlueBubbles iMessage channel plugin could accept webhook requests as authenticated based only on the TCP peer address being loopback (`127.0.0.1`, `::1`, `::ffff:127.0.0.1`) even when the configured webhook secret was missing or incorrect. This does not affect the default iMessage integration unless BlueBubbles is installed and enabled.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- npm: `openclaw` `\u003c 2026.2.13`\n- npm: `@openclaw/bluebubbles` `\u003c 2026.2.13`\n\n### Details\n\nIf a deployment exposes the BlueBubbles webhook endpoint through a same-host reverse proxy (or an attacker can reach loopback via SSRF), an unauthenticated party may be able to inject inbound webhook events into the agent pipeline.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n\n- f836c385ffc746cb954e8ee409f99d079bfdcd2f\n- 743f4b28495cdeb0d5bf76f6ebf4af01f6a02e5a (defense-in-depth)\n\n### Mitigations\n\n- Set a non-empty BlueBubbles webhook password.\n- Avoid deployments where a public-facing reverse proxy forwards to a loopback-bound Gateway without strong upstream authentication.\n\nThanks @MegaManSec (https://joshua.hu) of [AISLE Research Team](https://aisle.com/) for reporting.",
"id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-26316",
"modified": "2026-09-17T17:24:13Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-pchc-86f6-8758"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26316"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/743f4b28495cdeb0d5bf76f6ebf4af01f6a02e5a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/f836c385ffc746cb954e8ee409f99d079bfdcd2f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.13"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw BlueBubbles webhook auth bypass via loopback proxy trust",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-pchc-86f6-8758",
"CVE-2026-26316"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.