Vulnerability-Lookup

BDU:2025-09166 (CVE-2025-38242)

Vulnerability from fstec – Published: 2025-07-29 – Updated: 2026-03-18 – View on bdu.fstec.ru Fixed

Title

Уязвимость функции userfaultfd_move() модуля mm/userfaultfd.c ядра операционной системы Linux, позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании

Summary

Уязвимость функции userfaultfd_move() модуля mm/userfaultfd.c ядра операционной системы Linux связана с ошибками синхронизации при использовании общего ресурса («Ситуация гонки»). Эксплуатация уязвимости может позволить нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании

Severity

4.6 (Medium) CVSS 2.0


                      
                        AV:L/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C

5.5 (Medium) CVSS 3.1


                      
                        CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Class

Code vulnerability

Status

Confirmed by the vendor

Exploitation

Resource exhaustion

Incidents

Being clarified

Remediation

Software update

CWE

CWE-362 - Одновременное выполнение с использованием общего ресурса с неправильной синхронизацией («Ситуация гонки»)
CWE-770 - Неограниченное распределение ресурсов или дросселирование

Aliases

CVE-2025-38242

References

11 references

URL
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ea148a799198518d8ebab63ddd0bb6114a103bc
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c443046d8c9ed8724a4f4c3c2457d3ac8814b2f
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db2ca8074955ca64187a4fb596dd290b9c446cd3
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/2025070933-CVE-2025-38242-8f85@gregkh/
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-38242
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2025-38242
https://www.cybersecurity-help.cz/vdb/SB2025071157
https://vuldb.com/?id.315770
https://wiki.astralinux.ru/astra-linux-se18-bulletin-2025-1113SE18
https://поддержка.нппкт.рф/bin/view/ОСнова/Обновления/3.1/
https://redos.red-soft.ru/support/secure/uyazvimosti-red-os-8-0/uyazvimost-kern…

Impacted products

6 products from 7 vendors

Vendors

Canonical Ltd., ООО «РусБИТех-Астра», Red Hat, Inc., Сообщество свободного программного обеспечения, ООО «Ред Софт», АО «НППКТ»

Products

Ubuntu, Astra Linux Special Edition (запись в едином реестре российских программ №369), Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Linux, РЕД ОС (запись в едином реестре российских программ №3751), ОСОН ОСнова Оnyx (запись в едином реестре российских программ №5913)

Versions

24.04 LTS (Ubuntu), 1.8 (Astra Linux Special Edition), 25.04 (Ubuntu), 10 (Red Hat Enterprise Linux), от 6.16 до 6.16 rc4 (Linux), от 6.8 до 6.15.5 (Linux), 8.0 (РЕД ОС), до 3.1 (ОСОН ОСнова Оnyx)

Product types

Operating system

Platforms

Canonical Ltd. Ubuntu 24.04 LTS, ООО «РусБИТех-Астра» Astra Linux Special Edition 1.8 (запись в едином реестре российских программ №369), Canonical Ltd. Ubuntu 25.04, Red Hat, Inc. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10, Сообщество свободного программного обеспечения Linux от 6.16 до 6.16 rc4, Сообщество свободного программного обеспечения Linux от 6.8 до 6.15.5, ООО «Ред Софт» РЕД ОС 8.0 (запись в едином реестре российских программ №3751), АО «НППКТ» ОСОН ОСнова Оnyx до 3.1 (запись в едином реестре российских программ №5913)

Mitigations

В условиях отсутствия обновлений безопасности от производителя рекомендуется придерживаться "Рекомендаций по безопасной настройке операционных систем LINUX", изложенных в методическом документе ФСТЭК России, утверждённом 25 декабря 2022 года. Использование рекомендаций: Для Linux: https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ea148a799198518d8ebab63ddd0bb6114a103bc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c443046d8c9ed8724a4f4c3c2457d3ac8814b2f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db2ca8074955ca64187a4fb596dd290b9c446cd3 Для программных продуктов Red Hat Inc.: https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-38242 Для Ubuntu: https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2025-38242 Для ОС Astra Linux: обновить пакет linux-6.12 до 6.12.47-1.astra1+ci8 или более высокой версии, используя рекомендации производителя: https://wiki.astralinux.ru/astra-linux-se18-bulletin-2025-1113SE18 Для ОСОН ОСнова Оnyx: Обновление программного обеспечения linux до версии 6.12.60+lvc8p-0osnova3u1 Для Ред ОС: https://redos.red-soft.ru/support/secure/uyazvimosti-red-os-8-0/uyazvimost-kernel-lt-cve-2025-38242-8.0/?sphrase_id=1459248

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "CVSS 2.0": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C",
  "CVSS 3.0": "AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
  "CVSS 4.0": null,
  "remediation_\u0418\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440": null,
  "remediation_\u041d\u0430\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435": null,
  "\u0412\u0435\u043d\u0434\u043e\u0440 \u041f\u041e": "Canonical Ltd., \u041e\u041e\u041e \u00ab\u0420\u0443\u0441\u0411\u0418\u0422\u0435\u0445-\u0410\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u00bb, Red Hat, Inc., \u0421\u043e\u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f, \u041e\u041e\u041e \u00ab\u0420\u0435\u0434 \u0421\u043e\u0444\u0442\u00bb, \u0410\u041e \u00ab\u041d\u041f\u041f\u041a\u0422\u00bb",
  "\u0412\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u044f \u041f\u041e": "24.04 LTS (Ubuntu), 1.8 (Astra Linux Special Edition), 25.04 (Ubuntu), 10 (Red Hat Enterprise Linux), \u043e\u0442 6.16 \u0434\u043e 6.16 rc4 (Linux), \u043e\u0442 6.8 \u0434\u043e 6.15.5 (Linux), 8.0 (\u0420\u0415\u0414 \u041e\u0421), \u0434\u043e 3.1 (\u041e\u0421\u041e\u041d \u041e\u0421\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430 \u041enyx)",
  "\u0412\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043c\u0435\u0440\u044b \u043f\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e": "\u0412 \u0443\u0441\u043b\u043e\u0432\u0438\u044f\u0445 \u043e\u0442\u0441\u0443\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u044f \u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043e\u0442 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f \u0440\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0434\u0443\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c\u0441\u044f \"\u0420\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0434\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0439 \u043f\u043e \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043d\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u043a\u0435 \u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c LINUX\", \u0438\u0437\u043b\u043e\u0436\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0432 \u043c\u0435\u0442\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c \u0434\u043e\u043a\u0443\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0435 \u0424\u0421\u0422\u042d\u041a \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438, \u0443\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0434\u0451\u043d\u043d\u043e\u043c 25 \u0434\u0435\u043a\u0430\u0431\u0440\u044f 2022 \u0433\u043e\u0434\u0430.\n\n\u0418\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0440\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0434\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0439:\n\u0414\u043b\u044f Linux:\nhttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ea148a799198518d8ebab63ddd0bb6114a103bc\t\nhttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c443046d8c9ed8724a4f4c3c2457d3ac8814b2f\t\nhttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db2ca8074955ca64187a4fb596dd290b9c446cd3\n\n\u0414\u043b\u044f \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0443\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0432 Red Hat Inc.:\nhttps://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-38242\n\n\u0414\u043b\u044f Ubuntu:\nhttps://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2025-38242\n\n\u0414\u043b\u044f \u041e\u0421 Astra Linux:\n\u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043f\u0430\u043a\u0435\u0442 linux-6.12 \u0434\u043e 6.12.47-1.astra1+ci8 \u0438\u043b\u0438 \u0431\u043e\u043b\u0435\u0435 \u0432\u044b\u0441\u043e\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438, \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u0443\u044f \u0440\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0434\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f: https://wiki.astralinux.ru/astra-linux-se18-bulletin-2025-1113SE18\n\n\u0414\u043b\u044f \u041e\u0421\u041e\u041d \u041e\u0421\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430 \u041enyx: \u041e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f linux \u0434\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 6.12.60+lvc8p-0osnova3u1\n\n\u0414\u043b\u044f \u0420\u0435\u0434 \u041e\u0421:\nhttps://redos.red-soft.ru/support/secure/uyazvimosti-red-os-8-0/uyazvimost-kernel-lt-cve-2025-38242-8.0/?sphrase_id=1459248",
  "\u0414\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0432\u044b\u044f\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f": "04.06.2025",
  "\u0414\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0435\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f": "18.03.2026",
  "\u0414\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438": "29.07.2025",
  "\u0418\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440": "BDU:2025-09166",
  "\u0418\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0438\u0445 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c \u043e\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "CVE-2025-38242",
  "\u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043e\u0431 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0430",
  "\u041a\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0441 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430",
  "\u041d\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u041f\u041e": "Ubuntu, Astra Linux Special Edition (\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0432 \u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u043c \u0440\u0435\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435 \u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c \u2116369), Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Linux, \u0420\u0415\u0414 \u041e\u0421 (\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0432 \u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u043c \u0440\u0435\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435 \u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c \u21163751), \u041e\u0421\u041e\u041d \u041e\u0421\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430 \u041enyx (\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0432 \u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u043c \u0440\u0435\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435 \u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c \u21165913)",
  "\u041d\u0430\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u041e\u0421 \u0438 \u0442\u0438\u043f \u0430\u043f\u043f\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u044b": "Canonical Ltd. Ubuntu 24.04 LTS , \u041e\u041e\u041e \u00ab\u0420\u0443\u0441\u0411\u0418\u0422\u0435\u0445-\u0410\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u00bb Astra Linux Special Edition 1.8  (\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0432 \u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u043c \u0440\u0435\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435 \u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c \u2116369), Canonical Ltd. Ubuntu 25.04 , Red Hat, Inc. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 , \u0421\u043e\u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f Linux \u043e\u0442 6.16 \u0434\u043e 6.16 rc4 , \u0421\u043e\u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f Linux \u043e\u0442 6.8 \u0434\u043e 6.15.5 , \u041e\u041e\u041e \u00ab\u0420\u0435\u0434 \u0421\u043e\u0444\u0442\u00bb \u0420\u0415\u0414 \u041e\u0421 8.0  (\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0432 \u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u043c \u0440\u0435\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435 \u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c \u21163751), \u0410\u041e \u00ab\u041d\u041f\u041f\u041a\u0422\u00bb \u041e\u0421\u041e\u041d \u041e\u0421\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430 \u041enyx \u0434\u043e 3.1  (\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0432 \u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u043c \u0440\u0435\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435 \u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c \u21165913)",
  "\u041d\u0430\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0438 userfaultfd_move() \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0443\u043b\u044f mm/userfaultfd.c \u044f\u0434\u0440\u0430 \u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u044b Linux, \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044f\u044e\u0449\u0430\u044f \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044e \u0432\u044b\u0437\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u043e\u0442\u043a\u0430\u0437 \u0432 \u043e\u0431\u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0438\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0438",
  "\u041d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u0438\u0435 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u043e\u0439\u0442\u0430": "\u0414\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0443\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u044f\u044e\u0442\u0441\u044f",
  "\u041e\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043e\u0448\u0438\u0431\u043a\u0438 CWE": "\u041e\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0432\u044b\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0441 \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435\u043c \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0435\u0441\u0443\u0440\u0441\u0430 \u0441 \u043d\u0435\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0438\u043d\u0445\u0440\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0435\u0439 (\u00ab\u0421\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0433\u043e\u043d\u043a\u0438\u00bb) (CWE-362), \u041d\u0435\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0440\u0435\u0441\u0443\u0440\u0441\u043e\u0432 \u0438\u043b\u0438 \u0434\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 (CWE-770)",
  "\u041e\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0438 userfaultfd_move() \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0443\u043b\u044f mm/userfaultfd.c \u044f\u0434\u0440\u0430 \u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u044b Linux \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0430\u043d\u0430 \u0441 \u043e\u0448\u0438\u0431\u043a\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u0441\u0438\u043d\u0445\u0440\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0438 \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0435\u0441\u0443\u0440\u0441\u0430 (\u00ab\u0421\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0433\u043e\u043d\u043a\u0438\u00bb). \u042d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0436\u0435\u0442 \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044e \u0432\u044b\u0437\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u043e\u0442\u043a\u0430\u0437 \u0432 \u043e\u0431\u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0438\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0438",
  "\u041f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u044f \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": null,
  "\u041f\u0440\u043e\u0447\u0430\u044f \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f": null,
  "\u0421\u0432\u044f\u0437\u044c \u0441 \u0438\u043d\u0446\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u0418\u0411": "\u0414\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0443\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u044f\u044e\u0442\u0441\u044f",
  "\u0421\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u044f\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u041e\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0430",
  "\u0421\u043f\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f": "\u041e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f",
  "\u0421\u043f\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438": "\u0418\u0441\u0447\u0435\u0440\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0440\u0435\u0441\u0443\u0440\u0441\u043e\u0432",
  "\u0421\u0441\u044b\u043b\u043a\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0438\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ea148a799198518d8ebab63ddd0bb6114a103bc\t\nhttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c443046d8c9ed8724a4f4c3c2457d3ac8814b2f\t\nhttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db2ca8074955ca64187a4fb596dd290b9c446cd3\nhttps://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/2025070933-CVE-2025-38242-8f85@gregkh/\nhttps://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-38242\nhttps://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2025-38242\nhttps://www.cybersecurity-help.cz/vdb/SB2025071157\nhttps://vuldb.com/?id.315770\nhttps://wiki.astralinux.ru/astra-linux-se18-bulletin-2025-1113SE18\nhttps://\u043f\u043e\u0434\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u043a\u0430.\u043d\u043f\u043f\u043a\u0442.\u0440\u0444/bin/view/\u041e\u0421\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430/\u041e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f/3.1/\nhttps://redos.red-soft.ru/support/secure/uyazvimosti-red-os-8-0/uyazvimost-kernel-lt-cve-2025-38242-8.0/?sphrase_id=1459248",
  "\u0421\u0442\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0441 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u041f\u043e\u0434\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043c",
  "\u0422\u0438\u043f \u041f\u041e": "\u041e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0430",
  "\u0422\u0438\u043f \u043e\u0448\u0438\u0431\u043a\u0438 CWE": "CWE-362, CWE-770",
  "\u0423\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0421\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u0431\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430 CVSS 2.0 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 4,6)\n\u0421\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u0431\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430 CVSS 3.1 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 5,5)"
}

CVE-2025-38242 (GCVE-0-2025-38242)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-07-09 10:42 – Updated: 2026-08-05 12:00

Title

mm: userfaultfd: fix race of userfaultfd_move and swap cache

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: userfaultfd: fix race of userfaultfd_move and swap cache This commit fixes two kinds of races, they may have different results: Barry reported a BUG_ON in commit c50f8e6053b0, we may see the same BUG_ON if the filemap lookup returned NULL and folio is added to swap cache after that. If another kind of race is triggered (folio changed after lookup) we may see RSS counter is corrupted: [ 406.893936] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:ffff0000c5a9ddc0 type:MM_ANONPAGES val:-1 [ 406.894071] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:ffff0000c5a9ddc0 type:MM_SHMEMPAGES val:1 Because the folio is being accounted to the wrong VMA. I'm not sure if there will be any data corruption though, seems no. The issues above are critical already. On seeing a swap entry PTE, userfaultfd_move does a lockless swap cache lookup, and tries to move the found folio to the faulting vma. Currently, it relies on checking the PTE value to ensure that the moved folio still belongs to the src swap entry and that no new folio has been added to the swap cache, which turns out to be unreliable. While working and reviewing the swap table series with Barry, following existing races are observed and reproduced [1]: In the example below, move_pages_pte is moving src_pte to dst_pte, where src_pte is a swap entry PTE holding swap entry S1, and S1 is not in the swap cache: CPU1 CPU2 userfaultfd_move move_pages_pte() entry = pte_to_swp_entry(orig_src_pte); // Here it got entry = S1 ... < interrupted> ... <swapin src_pte, alloc and use folio A> // folio A is a new allocated folio // and get installed into src_pte <frees swap entry S1> // src_pte now points to folio A, S1 // has swap count == 0, it can be freed // by folio_swap_swap or swap // allocator's reclaim. <try to swap out another folio B> // folio B is a folio in another VMA. <put folio B to swap cache using S1 > // S1 is freed, folio B can use it // for swap out with no problem. ... folio = filemap_get_folio(S1) // Got folio B here !!! ... < interrupted again> ... <swapin folio B and free S1> // Now S1 is free to be used again. <swapout src_pte & folio A using S1> // Now src_pte is a swap entry PTE // holding S1 again. folio_trylock(folio) move_swap_pte double_pt_lock is_pte_pages_stable // Check passed because src_pte == S1 folio_move_anon_rmap(...) // Moved invalid folio B here !!! The race window is very short and requires multiple collisions of multiple rare events, so it's very unlikely to happen, but with a deliberately constructed reproducer and increased time window, it can be reproduced easily. This can be fixed by checking if the folio returned by filemap is the valid swap cache folio after acquiring the folio lock. Another similar race is possible: filemap_get_folio may return NULL, but folio (A) could be swapped in and then swapped out again using the same swap entry after the lookup. In such a case, folio (A) may remain in the swap cache, so it must be moved too: CPU1 CPU2 userfaultfd_move move_pages_pte() entry = pte_to_swp_entry(orig_src_pte); // Here it got entry = S1, and S1 is not in swap cache folio = filemap_get ---truncated---

Severity

7.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Assigner

Linux mitre root

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c443046d8c9ed872…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db2ca8074955ca641…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ea148a799198518d…

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
Linux	Linux	Affected: adef440691bab824e39c1b17382322d195e1fab0 , < 4c443046d8c9ed8724a4f4c3c2457d3ac8814b2f (git) Affected: adef440691bab824e39c1b17382322d195e1fab0 , < db2ca8074955ca64187a4fb596dd290b9c446cd3 (git) Affected: adef440691bab824e39c1b17382322d195e1fab0 , < 0ea148a799198518d8ebab63ddd0bb6114a103bc (git)
Linux	Linux	Affected: 6.8 Unaffected: 0 , < 6.8 (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.37 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.15.5 , ≤ 6.15.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.16 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)

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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "mm/userfaultfd.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4c443046d8c9ed8724a4f4c3c2457d3ac8814b2f",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "adef440691bab824e39c1b17382322d195e1fab0",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "db2ca8074955ca64187a4fb596dd290b9c446cd3",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "adef440691bab824e39c1b17382322d195e1fab0",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "0ea148a799198518d8ebab63ddd0bb6114a103bc",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "adef440691bab824e39c1b17382322d195e1fab0",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "mm/userfaultfd.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.8"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.8",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.37",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.15.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.15.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.16",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.12.37",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.8",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.15.5",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.8",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.16",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.8",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm: userfaultfd: fix race of userfaultfd_move and swap cache\n\nThis commit fixes two kinds of races, they may have different results:\n\nBarry reported a BUG_ON in commit c50f8e6053b0, we may see the same\nBUG_ON if the filemap lookup returned NULL and folio is added to swap\ncache after that.\n\nIf another kind of race is triggered (folio changed after lookup) we\nmay see RSS counter is corrupted:\n\n[  406.893936] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:ffff0000c5a9ddc0\ntype:MM_ANONPAGES val:-1\n[  406.894071] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:ffff0000c5a9ddc0\ntype:MM_SHMEMPAGES val:1\n\nBecause the folio is being accounted to the wrong VMA.\n\nI\u0027m not sure if there will be any data corruption though, seems no. \nThe issues above are critical already.\n\n\nOn seeing a swap entry PTE, userfaultfd_move does a lockless swap cache\nlookup, and tries to move the found folio to the faulting vma.  Currently,\nit relies on checking the PTE value to ensure that the moved folio still\nbelongs to the src swap entry and that no new folio has been added to the\nswap cache, which turns out to be unreliable.\n\nWhile working and reviewing the swap table series with Barry, following\nexisting races are observed and reproduced [1]:\n\nIn the example below, move_pages_pte is moving src_pte to dst_pte, where\nsrc_pte is a swap entry PTE holding swap entry S1, and S1 is not in the\nswap cache:\n\nCPU1                               CPU2\nuserfaultfd_move\n  move_pages_pte()\n    entry = pte_to_swp_entry(orig_src_pte);\n    // Here it got entry = S1\n    ... \u003c interrupted\u003e ...\n                                   \u003cswapin src_pte, alloc and use folio A\u003e\n                                   // folio A is a new allocated folio\n                                   // and get installed into src_pte\n                                   \u003cfrees swap entry S1\u003e\n                                   // src_pte now points to folio A, S1\n                                   // has swap count == 0, it can be freed\n                                   // by folio_swap_swap or swap\n                                   // allocator\u0027s reclaim.\n                                   \u003ctry to swap out another folio B\u003e\n                                   // folio B is a folio in another VMA.\n                                   \u003cput folio B to swap cache using S1 \u003e\n                                   // S1 is freed, folio B can use it\n                                   // for swap out with no problem.\n                                   ...\n    folio = filemap_get_folio(S1)\n    // Got folio B here !!!\n    ... \u003c interrupted again\u003e ...\n                                   \u003cswapin folio B and free S1\u003e\n                                   // Now S1 is free to be used again.\n                                   \u003cswapout src_pte \u0026 folio A using S1\u003e\n                                   // Now src_pte is a swap entry PTE\n                                   // holding S1 again.\n    folio_trylock(folio)\n    move_swap_pte\n      double_pt_lock\n      is_pte_pages_stable\n      // Check passed because src_pte == S1\n      folio_move_anon_rmap(...)\n      // Moved invalid folio B here !!!\n\nThe race window is very short and requires multiple collisions of multiple\nrare events, so it\u0027s very unlikely to happen, but with a deliberately\nconstructed reproducer and increased time window, it can be reproduced\neasily.\n\nThis can be fixed by checking if the folio returned by filemap is the\nvalid swap cache folio after acquiring the folio lock.\n\nAnother similar race is possible: filemap_get_folio may return NULL, but\nfolio (A) could be swapped in and then swapped out again using the same\nswap entry after the lookup.  In such a case, folio (A) may remain in the\nswap cache, so it must be moved too:\n\nCPU1                               CPU2\nuserfaultfd_move\n  move_pages_pte()\n    entry = pte_to_swp_entry(orig_src_pte);\n    // Here it got entry = S1, and S1 is not in swap cache\n    folio = filemap_get\n---truncated---"
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - The vulnerability is reached only through local syscalls \u2014 `userfaultfd(2)`/`/dev/userfaultfd` followed by `ioctl(UFFDIO_MOVE)` on the caller\u0027s own mm, combined with `madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT)` to drive swap. There is no remote or adjacent-network path into mm/userfaultfd.c.\nAC:L - The attacker controls every side of the race \u2014 the `UFFDIO_MOVE` thread, the faulting thread that swaps the entry back in, and `MADV_PAGEOUT` which forces the swap-out that recycles the entry \u2014 and can retry indefinitely at no cost, which the authors confirm by reproducing it with a constructed reproducer. Swap (including zram/zswap on Android and embedded targets) is the common default configuration, so no rare kernel option is required.\nPR:L - Any unprivileged local user can create a userfaultfd with `UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY`, which `userfaultfd_syscall_allowed()` permits unconditionally regardless of `vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd` or `CAP_SYS_PTRACE`, and that flag does not restrict `UFFDIO_MOVE` at all. Registering two private anonymous VMAs and issuing the ioctl requires no capability whatsoever.\nUI:N - The attacker performs all operations within its own process and address space; no action by any other user or victim process is needed.\nS:U - The corruption occurs in kernel mm structures and is exploited to gain kernel-level control within the same security authority, following the standard kernel privilege-escalation convention. No hypervisor, IOMMU, or DMA boundary is crossed.\nC:H - `folio_move_anon_rmap()` re-parents a folio belonging to a *different* VMA \u2014 potentially another process\u0027s anon page or a shmem/tmpfs page-cache folio \u2014 into the attacker\u0027s `anon_vma` at an attacker-chosen index, so foreign page contents can become reachable from the attacker\u0027s address space. The resulting `address_space`/`anon_vma` type confusion and broken rmap state provide a general kernel-memory read primitive.\nI:H - The bug lets an unprivileged process overwrite `folio-\u003emapping` and `folio-\u003eindex` on a folio it does not own, producing a hard type confusion between `struct anon_vma` and `struct address_space` (including reachable `a_ops` function pointers) plus corrupted RSS accounting and rmap invariants. This is classic heap-groom-able memory corruption exploitable for arbitrary write and control-flow hijack.\nA:H - The commit documents a reproducible `kernel BUG at mm/rmap.c:1380` in `__page_check_anon_rmap()` reached from `do_swap_page()`, an unrecoverable oops, plus `BUG: Bad rss-counter state` on teardown. Any unprivileged user can trigger a full kernel panic."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:00:38.652Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c443046d8c9ed8724a4f4c3c2457d3ac8814b2f"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db2ca8074955ca64187a4fb596dd290b9c446cd3"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ea148a799198518d8ebab63ddd0bb6114a103bc"
        }
      ],
      "title": "mm: userfaultfd: fix race of userfaultfd_move and swap cache",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2025-38242",
    "datePublished": "2025-07-09T10:42:25.396Z",
    "dateReserved": "2025-04-16T04:51:23.996Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:00:38.652Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.