GHSA-Q764-G6FM-555V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-23 22:05 – Updated: 2023-02-07 04:11Summary
If a malicious URI is passed to the library, the library can be tricked into performing an operation on a different API endpoint than intended.
Details
The code Spotipy uses to parse URIs and URLs accepts user data too liberally which allows a malicious user to insert arbitrary characters into the path that is used for API requests. Because it is possible to include .., an attacker can redirect for example a track lookup via spotifyApi.track() to an arbitrary API endpoint like playlists, but this is possible for other endpoints as well.
Before the security advisory feature was enabled on GitHub, I was already in contact with Stéphane Bruckert via e-mail, and he asked me to look into a potential fix.
My recommendation is to perform stricter parsing of URLs and URIs, which I implemented in the patch included at the end of the report. If you prefer, I can also invite you to a private fork of the repository.
Impact
The impact of this vulnerability depends heavily on what operations a client application performs when it handles a URI from a user and how it uses the responses it receives from the API.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "spotipy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.22.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-23608"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-01-23T22:05:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-26T21:18:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nIf a malicious URI is passed to the library, the library can be tricked into performing an operation on a different API endpoint than intended.\n\n### Details\nThe [code Spotipy uses to parse URIs and URLs ](https://github.com/spotipy-dev/spotipy/blob/master/spotipy/client.py#L1942) accepts user data too liberally which allows a malicious user to insert arbitrary characters into the path that is used for API requests. Because it is possible to include `..`, an attacker can redirect for example a track lookup via `spotifyApi.track()` to an arbitrary API endpoint like playlists, but this is possible for other endpoints as well.\n\nBefore the security advisory feature was enabled on GitHub, I was already in contact with St\u00e9phane Bruckert via e-mail, and he asked me to look into a potential fix. \n\nMy recommendation is to perform stricter parsing of URLs and URIs, which I implemented in the patch included at the end of the report. If you prefer, I can also invite you to a private fork of the repository.\n\n### Impact\nThe impact of this vulnerability depends heavily on what operations a client application performs when it handles a URI from a user and how it uses the responses it receives from the API.\n",
"id": "GHSA-q764-g6fm-555v",
"modified": "2023-02-07T04:11:52Z",
"published": "2023-01-23T22:05:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spotipy-dev/spotipy/security/advisories/GHSA-q764-g6fm-555v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23608"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/spotipy-dev/spotipy"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Path traversal in spotipy"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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