CVE-2026-92003 (GCVE-0-2026-92003)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-15 11:43 – Updated: 2026-09-15 12:32| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2bf887433 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-09-15 11:37 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2bf887433.patch
db6f78e69079… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
2bf887433651
|
fix: [logging] Throttle the two unguarded auth_fail writes | db6f78e69079… |
Fix summary
The fix applies the existing hourly per-key log throttle to the two previously unguarded authentication-failure log writes. The throttle key is now derived from the client's source IP address rather than from caller-supplied input, preventing an attacker from generating unbounded Redis throttle entries. A per-request memo (stored in Configure::read('CurrentRequestAuthFailKeys')) is added to _shouldLog() to prevent duplicate log entries when beforeFilter() executes a second time via CakeErrorController on an exception, ensuring one request produces at most one log entry per key regardless of the operator's log_each_individual_auth_fail setting.
Patch summary
In app/Controller/AppController.php: (1) The 'no authkey' branch in beforeFilter() now calls _shouldLog('noauthkey:' . $this->User->_remoteIp()) before writing the log entry. (2) The 'incorrect length' branch in __loginByAuthKey() now calls _shouldLog('badauthkeylength:' . $this->User->_remoteIp()) before writing the log entry. (3) _shouldLog() is refactored to first check a per-request memo array (Configure 'CurrentRequestAuthFailKeys') to suppress duplicate logging across the double beforeFilter() invocation, then evaluate the log_each_individual_auth_fail setting, then fall through to the Redis EXISTS/SETEX 3600-second throttle, and finally record the key in the memo. The Redis-unavailable fallback (log everything) is preserved.
CVSS rationale
The vulnerable paths are reachable over the network (AV:N) with no authentication (PR:N) and no user interaction (UI:N). The attack complexity is low (AC:L): an attacker simply sends repeated HTTP requests to the MISP API without an API key or with a key of the wrong length. No attack target is required (AT:N). There is no impact on confidentiality (VC:N, SC:N) or integrity (VI:N, SI:N). The availability impact is high (VA:H) because unbounded log writes can exhaust database storage, degrade query performance, and ultimately make the MISP instance unavailable. No secondary availability impact (SA:N) is evident from the patch.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-770 Two authentication-failure log write paths lacked any rate-limiting or throttling mechanism, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to generate an unbounded number of database log entries and exhaust storage or I/O resources. The fix adds the missing hourly per-key throttle.
- CWE-400 The unthrottled log writes constitute uncontrolled consumption of database write capacity and disk storage, enabling a denial-of-service condition. CWE-770 is the more specific primary weakness; CWE-400 captures the broader resource-exhaustion impact.
Assumptions to verify
- The tag_version_boundary (v2.5.46, 188 commits after fix) is used as an approximate upper bound for affected versions; the exact fixed release tag is not stated in the patch metadata.
- The log entries are written to a relational database (MySQL/PostgreSQL) via MISP's Log model, based on the createLogEntry() call pattern; the specific backend is not confirmed in the patch.
- The Redis instance used for throttling is assumed to be co-located with the MISP application; a Redis outage degrades to logging everything (fail-open), which is a design choice documented in the patch comments.
- CVSS VA:H assumes that sustained unthrottled log writes can exhaust storage or I/O capacity sufficient to degrade or halt the MISP service; actual impact depends on deployment sizing and disk capacity.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 9 | medium | 4 |
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"vulnrichment": {
"containers": "{\"cna\": {\"affected\": [{\"modules\": [\"app/Controller/AppController.php\"], \"product\": \"MISP\", \"programFiles\": [\"app/Controller/AppController.php\"], \"repo\": \"https://github.com/MISP/MISP\", \"vendor\": \"MISP\", \"versions\": [{\"lessThan\": \"2.5.46\", \"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"0\", \"versionType\": \"semver\"}]}], \"credits\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"remediation developer\", \"value\": \"iglocska\"}, {\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"remediation developer\", \"value\": \"Claude Opus 5 (1M context)\"}], \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"base64\": false, \"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eAffected versions of MISP do not consistently apply the existing authentication-failure logging throttle.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eTwo API authentication failure branches wrote directly to the \u003ccode\u003eLog\u003c/code\u003e model:\u003c/p\u003e\\u2003- API requests with \u003cstrong\u003eno authentication key\u003c/strong\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\\u2003- requests supplying an API key with an \u003cstrong\u003eincorrect length\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003eUnlike other authentication failures, these paths bypassed \u003ccode\u003e_shouldLog()\u003c/code\u003e, so every request could create another durable \u003ccode\u003eauth_fail\u003c/code\u003e entry.\u003c/p\u003eVersion affected: \\u22642.5.45\u003cbr\u003e\"}], \"value\": \"Affected versions of MISP do not consistently apply the existing authentication-failure logging throttle.\\n\\n\\nTwo API authentication failure branches wrote directly to the Log model:\\n\\n\\u2003- API requests with no authentication key;\\n\\u2003- requests supplying an API key with an incorrect length\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nUnlike other authentication failures, these paths bypassed _shouldLog(), so every request could create another durable auth_fail entry.\\n\\nVersion affected: \\u22642.5.45\"}], \"impacts\": [{\"capecId\": \"CAPEC-125\", \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CAPEC-125 Flooding\"}]}], \"metrics\": [{\"cvssV4_0\": {\"Automatable\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"Recovery\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"Safety\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"attackRequirements\": \"NONE\", \"attackVector\": \"NETWORK\", \"baseScore\": 6.9, \"baseSeverity\": \"MEDIUM\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"NONE\", \"providerUrgency\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"subAvailabilityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"subConfidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"subIntegrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"valueDensity\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N\", \"version\": \"4.0\", \"vulnAvailabilityImpact\": \"LOW\", \"vulnConfidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnIntegrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnerabilityResponseEffort\": \"NOT_DEFINED\"}, \"format\": \"CVSS\", \"scenarios\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"GENERAL\"}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"cweId\": \"CWE-770\", \"description\": \"CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\", \"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\"}]}, {\"descriptions\": [{\"cweId\": \"CWE-400\", \"description\": \"CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption\", \"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\"}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8\", \"shortName\": \"CIRCL\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-09-15T11:43:19.403Z\"}, \"references\": [{\"name\": \"Security patch\", \"tags\": [\"patch\"], \"url\": \"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2bf887433\"}], \"solutions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"base64\": false, \"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eThe fix applies the existing hourly per-key log throttle to the two previously unguarded authentication-failure log writes. The throttle key is now derived from the client\u0027s source IP address rather than from caller-supplied input, preventing an attacker from generating unbounded Redis throttle entries. A per-request memo (stored in Configure::read(\u0027CurrentRequestAuthFailKeys\u0027)) is added to _shouldLog() to prevent duplicate log entries when beforeFilter() executes a second time via CakeErrorController on an exception, ensuring one request produces at most one log entry per key regardless of the operator\u0027s log_each_individual_auth_fail setting.\u003c/p\u003e\"}], \"value\": \"The fix applies the existing hourly per-key log throttle to the two previously unguarded authentication-failure log writes. The throttle key is now derived from the client\u0027s source IP address rather than from caller-supplied input, preventing an attacker from generating unbounded Redis throttle entries. A per-request memo (stored in Configure::read(\u0027CurrentRequestAuthFailKeys\u0027)) is added to _shouldLog() to prevent duplicate log entries when beforeFilter() executes a second time via CakeErrorController on an exception, ensuring one request produces at most one log entry per key regardless of the operator\u0027s log_each_individual_auth_fail setting.\"}], \"title\": \"MISP Unthrottled Authentication Failure Log Writes Enable Resource Exhaustion\", \"x_gcve\": [{\"extensions\": {\"bcp-05-x-01\": {\"ai_annotations\": [{\"ai_level\": \"generated\", \"description\": \"Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.\", \"gna_source\": 1, \"models\": [{\"gna_source\": 1, \"identifier\": \"qwen3.8:27b\", \"name\": \"qwen3.8:27b\", \"source\": \"ollama\"}], \"review_status\": \"review\", \"scope\": \"record\", \"tags\": [\"ai-computer-assisted:llm-generated\", \"ai-computer-assisted:classification\"]}]}, \"bcp-05-x-02\": {\"x_patch2vuln\": {\"assumptions\": [\"The tag_version_boundary (v2.5.46, 188 commits after fix) is used as an approximate upper bound for affected versions; the exact fixed release tag is not stated in the patch metadata.\", \"The log entries are written to a relational database (MySQL/PostgreSQL) via MISP\u0027s Log model, based on the createLogEntry() call pattern; the specific backend is not confirmed in the patch.\", \"The Redis instance used for throttling is assumed to be co-located with the MISP application; a Redis outage degrades to logging everything (fail-open), which is a design choice documented in the patch comments.\", \"CVSS VA:H assumes that sustained unthrottled log writes can exhaust storage or I/O capacity sufficient to degrade or halt the MISP service; actual impact depends on deployment sizing and disk capacity.\"], \"commit\": \"2bf8874336518d8c5ef6a42e51e78900ec242630\", \"confidence\": \"medium\", \"credits\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"remediation developer\", \"value\": \"iglocska\"}, {\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"remediation developer\", \"value\": \"Claude Opus 5 (1M context)\"}], \"cvssRationale\": \"The vulnerable paths are reachable over the network (AV:N) with no authentication (PR:N) and no user interaction (UI:N). The attack complexity is low (AC:L): an attacker simply sends repeated HTTP requests to the MISP API without an API key or with a key of the wrong length. No attack target is required (AT:N). There is no impact on confidentiality (VC:N, SC:N) or integrity (VI:N, SI:N). The availability impact is high (VA:H) because unbounded log writes can exhaust database storage, degrade query performance, and ultimately make the MISP instance unavailable. No secondary availability impact (SA:N) is evident from the patch.\", \"draft\": false, \"fixSummary\": \"The fix applies the existing hourly per-key log throttle to the two previously unguarded authentication-failure log writes. The throttle key is now derived from the client\u0027s source IP address rather than from caller-supplied input, preventing an attacker from generating unbounded Redis throttle entries. A per-request memo (stored in Configure::read(\u0027CurrentRequestAuthFailKeys\u0027)) is added to _shouldLog() to prevent duplicate log entries when beforeFilter() executes a second time via CakeErrorController on an exception, ensuring one request produces at most one log entry per key regardless of the operator\u0027s log_each_individual_auth_fail setting.\", \"generatedAt\": \"2026-09-15T11:37:41.625192Z\", \"generator\": \"patch2vuln.py\", \"model\": \"qwen3.8:27b\", \"modelComparison\": {\"rankings\": [{\"agreementScore\": 9, \"assumptionCount\": 4, \"confidence\": \"medium\", \"model\": \"qwen3.8:27b\", \"score\": 6}], \"selectedModel\": \"qwen3.8:27b\", \"selectionMethod\": \"deterministic-consensus-v1\", \"selectionNotice\": \"The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.\"}, \"patchSha256\": \"db6f78e69079c91d4ba1dac46c4ed5b8ff1ca617c00cd6733bff926c0925a2e3\", \"patchSummary\": \"In app/Controller/AppController.php: (1) The \u0027no authkey\u0027 branch in beforeFilter() now calls _shouldLog(\u0027noauthkey:\u0027 . $this-\u003eUser-\u003e_remoteIp()) before writing the log entry. (2) The \u0027incorrect length\u0027 branch in __loginByAuthKey() now calls _shouldLog(\u0027badauthkeylength:\u0027 . $this-\u003eUser-\u003e_remoteIp()) before writing the log entry. (3) _shouldLog() is refactored to first check a per-request memo array (Configure \u0027CurrentRequestAuthFailKeys\u0027) to suppress duplicate logging across the double beforeFilter() invocation, then evaluate the log_each_individual_auth_fail setting, then fall through to the Redis EXISTS/SETEX 3600-second throttle, and finally record the key in the memo. The Redis-unavailable fallback (log everything) is preserved.\", \"patchTruncated\": false, \"patches\": [{\"commit\": \"2bf8874336518d8c5ef6a42e51e78900ec242630\", \"patchSha256\": \"db6f78e69079c91d4ba1dac46c4ed5b8ff1ca617c00cd6733bff926c0925a2e3\", \"source\": \"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2bf887433.patch\", \"sourceUrl\": \"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2bf887433.patch\", \"subject\": \"fix: [logging] Throttle the two unguarded auth_fail writes\"}], \"source\": \"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2bf887433.patch\", \"subject\": \"fix: [logging] Throttle the two unguarded auth_fail writes\", \"tagVersionBoundary\": {\"commits_after_fix\": 188, \"repository\": \"https://github.com/MISP/MISP\", \"tag\": \"v2.5.46\", \"version\": \"2.5.46\", \"version_type\": \"semver\"}, \"weaknessRationale\": [{\"cweId\": \"CWE-770\", \"rationale\": \"Two authentication-failure log write paths lacked any rate-limiting or throttling mechanism, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to generate an unbounded number of database log entries and exhaust storage or I/O resources. The fix adds the missing hourly per-key throttle.\"}, {\"cweId\": \"CWE-400\", \"rationale\": \"The unthrottled log writes constitute uncontrolled consumption of database write capacity and disk storage, enabling a denial-of-service condition. CWE-770 is the more specific primary weakness; CWE-400 captures the broader resource-exhaustion impact.\"}]}}}, \"recordType\": \"advisory\", \"vulnId\": \"GCVE-1-2026-20158\"}]}, \"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2026-92003\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"none\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"yes\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"partial\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2026-09-15T12:31:54.934768Z\"}}}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-09-15T12:32:01.287Z\"}}]}",
"cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-92003\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"assignerShortName\": \"CIRCL\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-09-15T11:43:17.522Z\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-09-15T11:43:19.403Z\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-09-15T12:32:06.515Z\"}",
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.