CVE-2026-91006 (GCVE-0-2026-91006)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-28 10:44 – Updated: 2026-09-28 10:44
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Apache Karaf: OS Command Injection in Child-Instance Launch (instance:* / InstancesMBean)
Summary
Apache Karaf's instance-management service (InstanceServiceImpl) builds the command line used to launch a child Karaf JVM by string concatenation, then executes it through /bin/sh (Unix) or cscript (Windows). The caller-supplied javaOpts value is spliced into that string unquoted. A javaOpts value containing shell metacharacters (;, |, `, $(...)) is interpreted by the shell instead of being passed to the JVM as an option, giving arbitrary OS command execution as the Karaf process user.
Reachable via the shell commands instance:create, instance:start, instance:restart, instance:change-opts, and the equivalent InstanceMBean JMX operations (createInstance, startInstance, changeJavaOpts, cloneInstance).
Mitigation * Set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties to close the fail-open gap for all unconfigured command scopes.
* Restrict which principals can reach instance:* commands and InstancesMBean via etc/users.properties role assignments.
* Treat javaOpts passed to instance:create/instance:start/instance:change-opts/InstancesMBean as untrusted input only from fully-trusted operators.
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
- CWE-78 - Improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command ('OS command injection')
Assigner
References
1 reference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://lists.apache.org/thread/olzy0yjw82b20w59v… | vendor-advisory |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation | Apache Karaf |
Affected:
0 , < 4.4.12
(semver)
|
guessed |
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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