CVE-2026-86304 (GCVE-0-2026-86304)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-06 22:24 – Updated: 2026-09-06 22:24
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor
Summary
MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor.
parse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST->new with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion->new_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries.
An attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries.
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
- CWE-347 - Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Assigner
References
3 references
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://cpan.org/modules",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"MojoX::Authentication"
],
"packageName": "MojoX-Authentication",
"packageURL": "pkg:cpan/MojoX-Authentication",
"programFiles": [
"lib/MojoX/Authentication/Model/SAML2.pm"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2::parse_assertion"
}
],
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.006",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor.\n\nparse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST-\u003enew with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion-\u003enew_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries.\n\nAn attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-115",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-115 Authentication Bypass"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-347",
"description": "CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-06T22:24:19.368Z",
"orgId": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"shortName": "CPANSec"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"release-notes"
],
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/POLETTIX/MojoX-Authentication-0.006/source/Changes"
},
{
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/POLETTIX/MojoX-Authentication-0.004/source/lib/MojoX/Authentication/Model/SAML2.pm#L188"
},
{
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-18089"
}
],
"solutions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Upgrade to MojoX-Authentication 0.006 or later."
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"timeline": [
{
"lang": "en",
"time": "2026-07-31T00:00:00.000Z",
"value": "Version 0.006 released with fix."
}
],
"title": "MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor",
"workarounds": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "For deployments that cannot upgrade, install Net::SAML2 0.86 or later. SAML login then fails rather than accepting a forged assertion."
}
],
"x_generator": {
"engine": "cpansec-cna-tool 0.1"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"assignerShortName": "CPANSec",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-86304",
"datePublished": "2026-09-06T22:24:19.368Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-06T17:59:12.036Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-06T22:24:19.368Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-86304",
"date": "2026-09-07",
"epss": "0.00106",
"percentile": "0.0119"
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"nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-86304\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e\",\"published\":\"2026-09-06T23:17:39.483\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-09-06T23:17:39.483\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Received\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor.\\n\\nparse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST-\u003enew with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion-\u003enew_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries.\\n\\nAn attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries.\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e\",\"affectedData\":[{\"defaultStatus\":\"unaffected\",\"collectionURL\":\"https://cpan.org/modules\",\"packageName\":\"MojoX-Authentication\",\"modules\":[\"MojoX::Authentication\"],\"programFiles\":[\"lib/MojoX/Authentication/Model/SAML2.pm\"],\"programRoutines\":[{\"name\":\"MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2::parse_assertion\"}],\"packageURL\":\"pkg:cpan/MojoX-Authentication\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"0\",\"lessThan\":\"0.006\",\"versionType\":\"custom\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]}]}],\"metrics\":{},\"weaknesses\":[{\"source\":\"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"description\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-347\"}]}],\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://metacpan.org/release/POLETTIX/MojoX-Authentication-0.004/source/lib/MojoX/Authentication/Model/SAML2.pm#L188\",\"source\":\"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e\"},{\"url\":\"https://metacpan.org/release/POLETTIX/MojoX-Authentication-0.006/source/Changes\",\"source\":\"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e\"},{\"url\":\"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-18089\",\"source\":\"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e\"}]}}"
}
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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