Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-47735 (GCVE-0-2026-47735)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-21 22:42 – Updated: 2026-08-21 22:42

Title

Arc has an authenticated arbitrary local-file read via DuckDB I/O functions that bypasses RBAC table-level checks

Summary

Arc is an open, SQL-native time-series database for telemetry. Prior to version 26.06.1, Arc's user-SQL validator (`internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest`) blocked only `read_parquet(` and `arc_partition_agg(` via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family — `read_csv_auto`, `read_csv`, `read_json`, `read_json_auto`, `read_text`, `read_blob`, `glob`, `parquet_metadata`, `parquet_schema`, `read_xlsx`, etc. — was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only `FROM`/`JOIN` clauses, so scalar table functions in the `SELECT` list slipped past both layers. This is fixed in 2026.06.1 via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer. After lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further `INSTALL`/`LOAD`. Already-loaded extensions remain callable. Some workarounds are available. Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules or, as a temporary mitigation, add `read_csv*`/`read_json*`/`glob` etc. to `dangerousSQLPattern` in `internal/api/query.go`.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/security/adv…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/pull/442	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/commit/91bdc…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/releases/tag…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
Basekick-Labs	arc	Affected: < 2026.06.1	guessed

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "arc",
          "vendor": "Basekick-Labs",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2026.06.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Arc is an open, SQL-native time-series database for telemetry. Prior to version 26.06.1, Arc\u0027s user-SQL validator (`internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest`) blocked only `read_parquet(` and `arc_partition_agg(` via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family \u2014 `read_csv_auto`, `read_csv`, `read_json`, `read_json_auto`, `read_text`, `read_blob`, `glob`, `parquet_metadata`, `parquet_schema`, `read_xlsx`, etc. \u2014 was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only `FROM`/`JOIN` clauses, so scalar table functions in the `SELECT` list slipped past both layers. This is fixed in 2026.06.1 via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer. After lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further `INSTALL`/`LOAD`. Already-loaded extensions remain callable. Some workarounds are available. Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules or, as a temporary mitigation, add `read_csv*`/`read_json*`/`glob` etc. to `dangerousSQLPattern` in `internal/api/query.go`."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 7.1,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-22",
              "description": "CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-200",
              "description": "CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-918",
              "description": "CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-21T22:42:55.886Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/security/advisories/GHSA-p2j4-c4g6-rpf5",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/security/advisories/GHSA-p2j4-c4g6-rpf5"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/pull/442",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/pull/442"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/commit/91bdc29d1a02178ccf8c66375eccf85203108dfb",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/commit/91bdc29d1a02178ccf8c66375eccf85203108dfb"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/releases/tag/v26.06.1",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/releases/tag/v26.06.1"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-p2j4-c4g6-rpf5",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Arc has an authenticated arbitrary local-file read via DuckDB I/O functions that bypasses RBAC table-level checks"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-47735",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-21T22:42:55.886Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-05-19T22:16:39.503Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-21T22:42:55.886Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-47735",
      "date": "2026-08-22",
      "epss": "0.00294",
      "percentile": "0.22044"
    },
    "nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-47735\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"security-advisories@github.com\",\"published\":\"2026-08-21T23:16:24.917\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-08-21T23:16:24.917\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Received\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"Arc is an open, SQL-native time-series database for telemetry. Prior to version 26.06.1, Arc\u0027s user-SQL validator (`internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest`) blocked only `read_parquet(` and `arc_partition_agg(` via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family \u2014 `read_csv_auto`, `read_csv`, `read_json`, `read_json_auto`, `read_text`, `read_blob`, `glob`, `parquet_metadata`, `parquet_schema`, `read_xlsx`, etc. \u2014 was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only `FROM`/`JOIN` clauses, so scalar table functions in the `SELECT` list slipped past both layers. This is fixed in 2026.06.1 via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer. After lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further `INSTALL`/`LOAD`. Already-loaded extensions remain callable. Some workarounds are available. Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules or, as a temporary mitigation, add `read_csv*`/`read_json*`/`glob` etc. to `dangerousSQLPattern` in `internal/api/query.go`.\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\",\"affectedData\":[{\"vendor\":\"Basekick-Labs\",\"product\":\"arc\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"\u003c 2026.06.1\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]}]}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV40\":[{\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"4.0\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X\",\"baseScore\":7.1,\"baseSeverity\":\"HIGH\",\"attackVector\":\"NETWORK\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"attackRequirements\":\"NONE\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"LOW\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"vulnConfidentialityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"vulnIntegrityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"vulnAvailabilityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"subConfidentialityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"subIntegrityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"subAvailabilityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"exploitMaturity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"confidentialityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"integrityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"availabilityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackVector\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackComplexity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackRequirements\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedPrivilegesRequired\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedUserInteraction\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Safety\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Automatable\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Recovery\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"valueDensity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"vulnerabilityResponseEffort\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"providerUrgency\":\"NOT_DEFINED\"}}]},\"weaknesses\":[{\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\",\"type\":\"Primary\",\"description\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-22\"},{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-200\"},{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-918\"}]}],\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/commit/91bdc29d1a02178ccf8c66375eccf85203108dfb\",\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\"},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/pull/442\",\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\"},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/releases/tag/v26.06.1\",\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\"},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/security/advisories/GHSA-p2j4-c4g6-rpf5\",\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\"}]}}"
  }
}

FKIE_CVE-2026-47735

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-21 23:16 - Updated: 2026-08-21 23:16

Severity

7.1 (High) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/commit/91bdc29d1a02178ccf8c66375eccf85203108dfb
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/pull/442
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/releases/tag/v26.06.1
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/security/advisories/GHSA-p2j4-c4g6-rpf5

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "arc",
          "vendor": "Basekick-Labs",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2026.06.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Arc is an open, SQL-native time-series database for telemetry. Prior to version 26.06.1, Arc\u0027s user-SQL validator (`internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest`) blocked only `read_parquet(` and `arc_partition_agg(` via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family \u2014 `read_csv_auto`, `read_csv`, `read_json`, `read_json_auto`, `read_text`, `read_blob`, `glob`, `parquet_metadata`, `parquet_schema`, `read_xlsx`, etc. \u2014 was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only `FROM`/`JOIN` clauses, so scalar table functions in the `SELECT` list slipped past both layers. This is fixed in 2026.06.1 via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer. After lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further `INSTALL`/`LOAD`. Already-loaded extensions remain callable. Some workarounds are available. Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules or, as a temporary mitigation, add `read_csv*`/`read_json*`/`glob` etc. to `dangerousSQLPattern` in `internal/api/query.go`."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-47735",
  "lastModified": "2026-08-21T23:16:24.917",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 7.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-21T23:16:24.917",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/commit/91bdc29d1a02178ccf8c66375eccf85203108dfb"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/pull/442"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/releases/tag/v26.06.1"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/security/advisories/GHSA-p2j4-c4g6-rpf5"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-22"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-200"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-918"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P2J4-C4G6-RPF5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-08 23:51 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:51

Summary

Arc has an authenticated arbitrary local-file read via DuckDB I/O functions that bypasses RBAC table-level checks

Details

Summary

Arc's user-SQL validator (internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest) blocked only read_parquet( and arc_partition_agg( via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family — read_csv_auto, read_csv, read_json, read_json_auto, read_text, read_blob, glob, parquet_metadata, parquet_schema, read_xlsx, etc. — was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only FROM/JOIN clauses, so scalar table functions in the SELECT list slipped past both layers.

Impact

Any authenticated user, including a token with permissions: [], can read arbitrary local files via:

POST /api/v1/query
Authorization: Bearer <token>
{"sql": "SELECT * FROM read_csv_auto('/etc/passwd', header=false, columns={'l':'VARCHAR'}) LIMIT 5"}

Confirmed reachable targets:

auth.db — bcrypt hashes for every API token, plus legacy SHA-256 rows.
arc.toml — S3 secrets, TLS keys.
/proc/self/environ — environment-variable secrets.
Cross-tenant Parquet files — bypasses RBAC because the tenant scope is enforced at the table layer, not on raw file paths.
SSRF when httpfs is loaded (any S3-backed deployment) — read_csv_auto('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...') reaches instance metadata IPs.

Patches

Fixed in 2026.06.1 (PR #442) via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer:

SET GLOBAL allowed_directories = [...] enumerates Arc's legitimate filesystem prefixes (storage roots + tier prefixes + import upload dir + compaction temp).
SET GLOBAL enable_external_access = false (one-way at runtime).
Verified by reading back the flag.

After lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further INSTALL/LOAD. Already-loaded extensions remain callable.

Workarounds

Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules.
Temporary mitigation: add read_csv*/read_json*/glob etc. to dangerousSQLPattern in internal/api/query.go pending 2026.06.1.

Credits

Reported by Alex Manson (@NeuroWinter, https://neurowinter.com/) on 2026-05-19.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/basekick-labs/arc"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47735"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-08T23:51:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nArc\u0027s user-SQL validator (`internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest`) blocked only `read_parquet(` and `arc_partition_agg(` via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family \u2014 `read_csv_auto`, `read_csv`, `read_json`, `read_json_auto`, `read_text`, `read_blob`, `glob`, `parquet_metadata`, `parquet_schema`, `read_xlsx`, etc. \u2014 was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only `FROM`/`JOIN` clauses, so scalar table functions in the `SELECT` list slipped past both layers.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny authenticated user, including a token with `permissions: []`, can read arbitrary local files via:\n\n```\nPOST /api/v1/query\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e\n{\"sql\": \"SELECT * FROM read_csv_auto(\u0027/etc/passwd\u0027, header=false, columns={\u0027l\u0027:\u0027VARCHAR\u0027}) LIMIT 5\"}\n```\n\nConfirmed reachable targets:\n\n- `auth.db` \u2014 bcrypt hashes for every API token, plus legacy SHA-256 rows.\n- `arc.toml` \u2014 S3 secrets, TLS keys.\n- `/proc/self/environ` \u2014 environment-variable secrets.\n- Cross-tenant Parquet files \u2014 bypasses RBAC because the tenant scope is enforced at the table layer, not on raw file paths.\n- SSRF when `httpfs` is loaded (any S3-backed deployment) \u2014 `read_csv_auto(\u0027http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...\u0027)` reaches instance metadata IPs.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in 2026.06.1 (PR #442) via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer:\n\n1. `SET GLOBAL allowed_directories = [...]` enumerates Arc\u0027s legitimate filesystem prefixes (storage roots + tier prefixes + import upload dir + compaction temp).\n2. `SET GLOBAL enable_external_access = false` (one-way at runtime).\n3. Verified by reading back the flag.\n\nAfter lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further `INSTALL`/`LOAD`. Already-loaded extensions remain callable.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules.\n- Temporary mitigation: add `read_csv*`/`read_json*`/`glob` etc. to `dangerousSQLPattern` in `internal/api/query.go` pending 2026.06.1.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported by Alex Manson ([@NeuroWinter](https://github.com/NeuroWinter), https://neurowinter.com/) on 2026-05-19.",
  "id": "GHSA-p2j4-c4g6-rpf5",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:51:19Z",
  "published": "2026-06-08T23:51:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/security/advisories/GHSA-p2j4-c4g6-rpf5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/pull/442"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/commit/91bdc29d1a02178ccf8c66375eccf85203108dfb"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Arc has an authenticated arbitrary local-file read via DuckDB I/O functions that bypasses RBAC table-level checks"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-47735 (GCVE-0-2026-47735)

FKIE_CVE-2026-47735

GHSA-P2J4-C4G6-RPF5

Summary

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

Credits

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature