CVE-2026-104025 (GCVE-0-2026-104025)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-15 12:00 – Updated: 2026-10-15 13:11 X_Open Source
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Path traversal in PeaZip object preview allows execution of arbitrary programs via a crafted archive entry name
Summary
Path Traversal (CWE-22) in the execute_obj function of the archive object viewer (peach.pas) in PeaZip 11.2.0 and earlier on Windows allows an attacker who convinces a victim to preview an entry of a crafted archive via the "Preview with... -> Associated application" action (Shift+Ctrl+O) to execute an arbitrary program already present on the victim's system, with no warning dialog. The function validates only outname (PeaZip's own temporary directory) with checkfiledirname, while the string actually executed is the concatenation outname+tempstring; tempstring is taken verbatim from the archive entry name (StringGridList.Cells[12,...]) and is never validated. checkfiledirname (list_utils.pas) rejects control and reserved characters in the file name but performs no ".." path-containment check, so an entry named ../../../../Windows/System32/calc.exe escapes the extraction directory and is passed to cp_open -> ShellExecuteW; the extracting backend (7-Zip) strips the traversal while the opener does not. In addition, the SECEXTCONST dangerous-extension confirmation prompt is implemented only in the double-click handler (grid_obj_open) and not on this preview route, so an executable inside an archive reaches ShellExecuteW unannounced, and where the prompt does fire it names the entry's display name rather than the resolved path that will run. Arbitrary code execution was demonstrated with a proof of concept against official PeaZip builds, confirmed on two archive formats (.zip and .tar) to show the defect is in PeaZip's own path handling and not in a single format parser.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-10-15 13:11 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/peazip/PeaZip/commit/009fc3553… | patch |
| https://secur0.com/en/cna/cve-list/cve-2026-10402… | third-party-advisorytechnical-description |
Impacted products
Date Public
2026-09-03 00:00
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"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseScore": 8.4,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "ACTIVE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-22",
"description": "CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-693",
"description": "CWE-693 Protection Mechanism Failure",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-15T12:00:49.995Z",
"orgId": "4daa8cea-433a-44bd-9456-53b127fc289a",
"shortName": "Secur0"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/peazip/PeaZip/commit/009fc35530e26729863969eddf4c18f1b48331cf"
},
{
"tags": [
"third-party-advisory",
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://secur0.com/en/cna/cve-list/cve-2026-104025-path-traversal-in-peazip-object-preview"
}
],
"solutions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eUpgrade to PeaZip 11.3.0 or higher. The fix sanitizes the archive entry name used to build the executed path (\u003ccode\u003esanitizenamestr\u003c/code\u003e, stripping \u003ccode\u003e../\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003e..\\\u003c/code\u003e sequences) and enforces that the resolved path stays inside the extraction directory (\u003ccode\u003esanitizepath\u003c/code\u003e, via \u003ccode\u003eExpandFileName\u003c/code\u003e containment) in \u003ccode\u003eexecute_obj\u003c/code\u003e, and extends the dangerous-extension check to the \"Open/Preview with associated application\" route, not only the double-click event. Fix commit \u003ccode\u003e009fc35\u003c/code\u003e (2026-09-03).\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Upgrade to PeaZip 11.3.0 or higher. The fix sanitizes the archive entry name used to build the executed path (sanitizenamestr, stripping ../ and ..\\ sequences) and enforces that the resolved path stays inside the extraction directory (sanitizepath, via ExpandFileName containment) in execute_obj, and extends the dangerous-extension check to the \"Open/Preview with associated application\" route, not only the double-click event. Fix commit 009fc35 (2026-09-03)."
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"tags": [
"x_open-source"
],
"title": "Path traversal in PeaZip object preview allows execution of arbitrary programs via a crafted archive entry name",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.5"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4daa8cea-433a-44bd-9456-53b127fc289a",
"assignerShortName": "Secur0",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-104025",
"datePublished": "2026-10-15T12:00:49.995Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-10-01T17:09:25.587Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-15T13:11:13.654Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.