CWE-407

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "league/commonmark"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.6.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-71488"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1050",
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-06T20:37:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nAffected versions of `league/commonmark` can have quadratic time complexity when parsing specially crafted Markdown lines. In practical terms, doubling the length of an affected line can make the parser perform roughly four times as much work. The parser identifies locations using character positions, but regular-expression matches report byte positions. These positions differ when a UTF-8 character uses more than one byte. Several parsing paths repeatedly rescan growing portions of the line to translate between the two positions. The Autolink extension can also copy and validate the remaining line at every URL-like prefix.\n\nIn current 2.x releases, a single non-ASCII character anywhere on a line can place that whole line on the slower multibyte path. An attacker can combine it with a long run of leading whitespace or repeated Markdown punctuation, causing increasingly large rescans. When the Autolink extension is enabled, repeated URL-like prefixes provide another trigger, even on ASCII-only lines. Each trigger fits within one long line, so complex Markdown structure is unnecessary.\n\nAn attacker who can submit Markdown for conversion can use a comparatively small request to consume disproportionate CPU time and allocation activity. Repeated or concurrent requests can occupy all available PHP workers and prevent legitimate requests from completing. The core paths affect `CommonMarkConverter`, `GithubFlavoredMarkdownConverter`, and custom environments. The autolink-specific path affects applications using `AutolinkExtension` or `GithubFlavoredMarkdownExtension`. Applications that process only trusted Markdown are not remotely exploitable. The impact is limited to availability: it does not disclose data, change rendered output, or bypass rendering restrictions. Settings such as `html_input` and `allow_unsafe_links` do not mitigate the issue because the expensive work occurs before rendering.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue is patched in `2.9.0` and later. Starting in that release, the parser records UTF-8 character-to-byte positions incrementally, converts ordered regular-expression match positions without restarting from the beginning of the line, and matches autolinks against the original line instead of copying every remaining suffix. The affected work then grows in direct proportion to the input size while preserving existing Markdown output and configuration behavior. Versions from `0.6.0` through `2.8.3` are affected. The 0.x and 1.x release lines are no longer supported, so their users must upgrade to `2.9.0` or later.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, reject or truncate inputs with excessively long individual lines before passing them to the converter. A total request-size limit is also useful, but a per-line limit is important because every demonstrated trigger fits on one line. Choose limits appropriate for the application and enforce them before Markdown parsing begins. Restricting conversion to trusted users, applying strict execution-time limits, rate-limiting requests, and limiting concurrent conversions can further reduce exposure, but these measures are not complete substitutes for upgrading.\n\nDisabling `AutolinkExtension` and avoiding `GithubFlavoredMarkdownExtension` removes the autolink-specific trigger, but the core multibyte parsing paths remain reachable in the standard parser. Existing nesting, delimiter, raw-HTML, and unsafe-link configuration options do not eliminate all affected paths. Applications that must continue processing untrusted Markdown should therefore enforce input limits even when autolinking is disabled.",
  "id": "GHSA-2q4p-g7hv-5rgv",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T20:37:20Z",
  "published": "2026-08-06T20:37:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thephpleague/commonmark/security/advisories/GHSA-2q4p-g7hv-5rgv"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thephpleague/commonmark/commit/a6ef6cdc308dfa39a34239c35818e75892a0e6a8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thephpleague/commonmark/commit/a70979ea0d7d3377bd7127536748454a922bf5eb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thephpleague/commonmark/commit/c97b02e5e652b992033b93ba5d6182f706343fc6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/thephpleague/commonmark"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thephpleague/commonmark/releases/tag/2.9.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "league/commonmark: Quadratic-time denial of service when parsing crafted Markdown"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41292"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1050",
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-20T10:16:27Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.0 is vulnerable to a degradation of service attack related to parsing long lists of incoming EDNS options. An adversary sending queries with too many EDNS options can hold Unbound threads hostage while they are parsing and creating internal data structures for the options. Coordinated attacks can result in degradation and/or denial of service. Unbound 1.25.1 contains a patch with a fix to limit acceptable incoming EDNS options (100).",
  "id": "GHSA-2wvj-gvc7-gfhx",
  "modified": "2026-08-19T12:32:10Z",
  "published": "2026-05-20T12:30:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41292"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24013"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:36320"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:36777"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:37282"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:54769"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-41292"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2480125"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-41292.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/unbound/CVE-2026-41292.txt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Red",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "nodemailer"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T21:33:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nNodemailer\u0027s address parser (`lib/addressparser/index.js`) parses a list of comma\u2011separated addresses in **quadratic time \u2014 O(n\u00b2)** in the number of addresses. A single crafted address string (e.g. a `To`, `Cc`, `Bcc`, `From`, or `Reply\u2011To` value, or any value passed to the exported `addressparser`) therefore consumes CPU proportional to the **square** of its length and blocks Node\u0027s single\u2011threaded event loop for the entire duration, denying service to every other request in the process.\n\nThis requires **no special application configuration and no cooperating receiver** \u2014 it is entirely inside the parser and triggers on the library\u0027s default code path. A ~1.5 MB address value freezes the process for ~25\u201330 seconds of 100% CPU; the cost grows with the square of the input, so a few\u2011MB value stalls the server for minutes. It is a distinct issue from the recursion DoS fixed as CVE\u20112025\u201114874 (that path is guarded by a nesting\u2011depth cap; this one is a flat, comma\u2011separated list with no such limit).\n\n### Details\n\n`addressparser` tokenizes the input, splits it into per\u2011address token groups, and then accumulates the parsed results in a loop (`lib/addressparser/index.js`, ~lines 500\u2013505):\n\n```js\naddresses.forEach(addr =\u003e {\n    const handled = _handleAddress(addr, depth);\n    if (handled.length) {\n        parsedAddresses = parsedAddresses.concat(handled);   // \u003c-- line ~503\n    }\n});\n```\n\n`Array.prototype.concat` builds and returns a **new** array containing a copy of every element accumulated so far. Reassigning `parsedAddresses = parsedAddresses.concat(handled)` on each of the *n* iterations copies 1 + 2 + 3 + \u2026 + n elements in total, i.e. **O(n\u00b2)** work (and O(n\u00b2) transient allocations) for an input containing *n* addresses. Tokenization and `_handleAddress` themselves are linear; the quadratic blowup is entirely this accumulator.\n\n**Root\u2011cause proof.** Replacing only that line with an in\u2011place append and re\u2011running the exact same input:\n\n```\nparsedAddresses = parsedAddresses.concat(handled);      -\u003e  100000 addresses:  ~6068 ms\nparsedAddresses.push.apply(parsedAddresses, handled);   -\u003e  100000 addresses:  ~51 ms   (\u2248119x faster, now linear)\n```\n\n**Measured scaling** (nodemailer 9.0.6, `\u0027a@b.com,\u0027.repeat(n)`):\n\n| addresses n | input size | parse time | ratio for 2\u00d7 input |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| 25,000  | 0.19 MB | ~0.35 s | \u2013 |\n| 50,000  | 0.38 MB | ~1.4 s  | \u00d74.0 |\n| 100,000 | 0.76 MB | ~6\u20138 s  | \u00d73.9 |\n| 200,000 | 1.53 MB | ~25\u201330 s| \u00d74.1 |\n\nDoubling the input quadruples the time \u2014 the signature of O(n\u00b2).\n\n**Reachability.** The parser is invoked on any structured\u2011address header value on the normal send path (`MimeNode.setHeader(\u0027To\u0027/\u0027Cc\u0027/\u0027Bcc\u0027/\u0027From\u0027/\u0027Reply-To\u0027, value)` \u2192 `_parseAddresses` \u2192 `addressparser`, and `getEnvelope()`), so a single `transport.sendMail({ to: \u003ccrafted string\u003e })` triggers it. It is also reached directly through the **exported** `require(\u0027nodemailer/lib/addressparser\u0027)`, which many applications call to validate or display user\u2011supplied recipient lists. Confirmed via the public API: `setHeader(\u0027To\u0027, \u0027a@b.com,\u0027.repeat(80000))` + `getEnvelope()` blocks for ~3.9 s.\n\n**Suggested fix:** accumulate in place instead of rebuilding the array each iteration, e.g. `parsedAddresses.push.apply(parsedAddresses, handled);` (or `for (const h of handled) parsedAddresses.push(h);`). Optionally cap the number of addresses / input length before parsing.\n\n### PoC\n\nEnvironment: Node.js \u2265 18 and the published `nodemailer@9.0.6`. No transport, network, or configuration required \u2014 the cost is in parsing.\n\n`poc-dos.js`:\n```js\n\u0027use strict\u0027;\nconst addressparser = require(\u0027nodemailer/lib/addressparser\u0027);\n\nconsole.log(\u0027addresses | input size | parse time\u0027);\nfor (const n of [25000, 50000, 100000, 200000]) {\n  const payload = \u0027a@b.com,\u0027.repeat(n);        // n valid, comma-separated recipients\n  const t0 = process.hrtime.bigint();\n  addressparser(payload);                       // blocks synchronously\n  const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - t0) / 1e6;\n  console.log(String(n).padStart(9) + \u0027 | \u0027 + (payload.length / 1048576).toFixed(2) + \u0027 MB   | \u0027 + ms.toFixed(0).padStart(7) + \u0027 ms\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nRun:\n```\nnpm init -y \u0026\u0026 npm install nodemailer@9.0.6\nnode poc-dos.js\n```\n\nActual output (nodemailer 9.0.6):\n```\naddresses | input size | parse time\n    25000 | 0.19 MB   |     381 ms\n    50000 | 0.38 MB   |    1435 ms\n   100000 | 0.76 MB   |    7949 ms\n   200000 | 1.53 MB   |   25154 ms\n```\n\nEquivalent trigger through the normal send API (freezes the event loop):\n```js\nconst nodemailer = require(\u0027nodemailer\u0027);\nnodemailer.createTransport({ jsonTransport: true })\n  .sendMail({ from: \u0027a@b.com\u0027, to: \u0027a@b.com,\u0027.repeat(150000), subject: \u0027x\u0027, text: \u0027y\u0027 });\n// ~15+ seconds of 100% CPU inside addressparser before anything is sent\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n* **Who is impacted:** any service that runs Nodemailer (or the standalone `nodemailer/lib/addressparser`) on an address value that can be influenced by an untrusted party \u2014 a recipient field in a \"send email / invite / share\" feature, a `Reply\u2011To`/`From` derived from user input, a contact\u2011import or mailing\u2011list parser, or any endpoint that validates addresses with `addressparser`. No authentication, special option, or particular receiver is needed.\n\n## Patched in 9.1.0\n\nThree separate quadratic paths were fixed, not one:\n\n* `addressparser` rebuilt its accumulator with `concat()` on every address ([9116da9](https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/9116da9)).\n* The display-name merge loop directly below spliced each fragment out of the array, the same shape reached through `\u0027a, b \u003cc@d.com\u003e,\u0027.repeat(n)` (same commit).\n* `MimeNode#_convertAddresses` checked recipient uniqueness with a linear scan per address ([7cc38af](https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/7cc38af), refined in [34da642](https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/34da642)). This was the most severe of the three and the reported proof of concept did not reach it: `\u0027a@b.com,\u0027.repeat(n)` is one address repeated, which dedupes to a single envelope entry. A list of *distinct* recipients cost O(n^2) here, taking ~35s for 100k even after `addressparser` was fixed.\n\nFixed alongside: `[].concat.apply` in `_parseAddresses` threw `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded` past roughly 124k recipients, with no crafted input needed ([83b8c48](https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/83b8c48)).\n\nParsing 200k addresses now takes ~80ms instead of ~25s, and every path scales linearly. A new `maxRecipients` option (default 100000) throws rather than truncating, as a backstop.",
  "id": "GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T21:33:17Z",
  "published": "2026-09-08T21:33:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/pull/1848"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/34da64282dcdc9b0581c721a27ab2fa226673150"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/7cc38af418ffa6fc7e86085195ca5ca681694b3e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/9116da9528c6524cefaed75185602a7e85d20434"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/releases/tag/v9.1.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nodemailer: Quadratic (O(n\u00b2)) time complexity in addressparser allows remote denial of service via a crafted address list"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "MessagePack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.5.301"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "MessagePack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48511"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-25T19:36:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T22:16:47Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`ExpandoObjectFormatter.Deserialize` populates `System.Dynamic.ExpandoObject` by calling `IDictionary\u003cstring, object\u003e.Add` for each map entry. `ExpandoObject` internally maintains member names in array-like structures, so inserting many distinct keys can require repeated linear scans and array copies.\n\nFor large attacker-controlled maps, this produces quadratic CPU and allocation behavior. The issue is especially surprising because `ExpandoObjectResolver.Options` is configured with `MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData`, but collision-resistant dictionary comparers cannot protect `ExpandoObject` insertion internals.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications are affected when they deserialize untrusted MessagePack maps into `ExpandoObject` using `ExpandoObjectResolver` or related resolver options.\n\nA hostile payload containing many distinct keys can cause CPU exhaustion and allocation churn disproportionate to the input size. This can make a server unresponsive or exhaust memory under concurrent request load.\n\nThis is not a hash-collision attack against a configurable dictionary comparer. The super-linear behavior comes from `ExpandoObject`\u0027s insertion model, so `MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData` does not eliminate the cost.\n\n## Affected components\n\n- Package: `MessagePack`\n- APIs: `ExpandoObjectFormatter.Deserialize`, `ExpandoObjectResolver`\n- Data type: `System.Dynamic.ExpandoObject`\n- Finding ID: `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-102`\n\n## Patches\n\nFixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions.\n\nUpgrade guidance:\n\n1. Upgrade `MessagePack` to the patched version for your release line.\n2. Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions.\n\nPotential fixes include applying a map-entry count limit for `ExpandoObject` under untrusted-data settings, buffering into a security-aware dictionary before materializing a bounded `ExpandoObject`, or otherwise rejecting maps large enough to trigger quadratic behavior.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nPatching is recommended.\n\nUntil a patched version is available, avoid deserializing untrusted payloads into `ExpandoObject`. Prefer strongly typed DTOs or dictionaries with security-aware comparers and explicit count limits. Enforce request-size and map-entry limits at the transport or application layer.\n\n## Resources\n\n- `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-102`: `ExpandoObjectFormatter` quadratic insertion behavior\n- CWE-407: Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity",
  "id": "GHSA-2x83-8g95-xh59",
  "modified": "2026-06-25T19:36:23Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T19:36:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-2x83-8g95-xh59"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48511"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MessagePack-CSharp: ExpandoObject formatter can perform quadratic insertion work on untrusted maps"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-87822"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-09T15:17:27Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "t-digest versions 3.1 through 3.3 fail to validate centroid means during deserialization in MergingDigest.fromBytes, allowing attackers to inject NaN values that bypass validation checks. Attackers can craft malicious serialized digests containing NaN centroids that degrade sorting performance from O(n log n) to O(n squared), causing severe processing delays during merge operations.",
  "id": "GHSA-32f6-mgwr-pvc4",
  "modified": "2026-09-09T15:35:16Z",
  "published": "2026-09-09T15:35:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87822"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tdunning/t-digest/issues/229"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tdunning/t-digest"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tdunning/t-digest/blob/8d5c1523c3d46925e9b3979a8d63c0b9d004ed1c/core/src/main/java/com/tdunning/math/stats/MergingDigest.java"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tdunning/t-digest/blob/8d5c1523c3d46925e9b3979a8d63c0b9d004ed1c/core/src/main/java/com/tdunning/math/stats/Sort.java"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/t-digest-3.1-through-3.3-denial-of-service-via-nan-centroid-means-in-mergingdigest-frombytes"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "Django"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0a1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.0.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "Django"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.2a1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.2.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "Django"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.2a1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.28"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-14550"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-03T19:29:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-03T15:16:11Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in 6.0 before 6.0.2, 5.2 before 5.2.11, and 4.2 before 4.2.28.\n\n`ASGIRequest` allows a remote attacker to cause a potential denial-of-service via a crafted request with multiple duplicate headers.\nEarlier, unsupported Django series (such as 5.0.x, 4.1.x, and 3.2.x) were not evaluated and may also be affected.\n\nDjango would like to thank Jiyong Yang for reporting this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-33mw-q7rj-mjwj",
  "modified": "2026-06-05T16:24:05Z",
  "published": "2026-02-03T15:30:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14550"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/django/django/commit/eb22e1d6d643360e952609ef562c139a100ea4eb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/dev/releases/security"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/django/django"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/django/PYSEC-2026-43.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://groups.google.com/g/django-announce"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2026/feb/03/security-releases"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Django has Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "MessagePack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48502"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188",
      "CWE-125",
      "CWE-190",
      "CWE-407",
      "CWE-409",
      "CWE-470",
      "CWE-502",
      "CWE-674",
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-25T18:35:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T22:16:47Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`MessagePackReader.ReadDateTime()` can allocate stack memory based on an attacker-controlled MessagePack extension length. In the slow path for timestamp extension parsing, the computed `tokenSize` includes the extension body length from the wire and is used in a `stackalloc` operation before the extension length is validated as one of the valid timestamp sizes.\n\nA very small payload can claim a large timestamp extension body and cause a stack allocation large enough to trigger an uncatchable `StackOverflowException`, terminating the host process.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications are affected when they deserialize untrusted payloads into types containing `DateTime` values. This path is available through the standard formatter set and does not require opting into typeless serialization, LZ4 compression, Unity-specific resolvers, or other specialized features.\n\n`MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData` and `MaximumObjectGraphDepth` do not mitigate this issue because the crash is caused by a single-frame stack allocation, not by object graph recursion.\n\nAn attacker can send a MessagePack timestamp extension header with an oversized body length and insufficient body bytes. The reader enters the slow path, attempts to stack-allocate a buffer sized from that declared length, and can terminate the process before a catchable serialization exception is thrown.\n\n## Affected components\n\n- Package: `MessagePack`\n- API: `MessagePackReader.ReadDateTime`\n- Data types: `DateTime` and formatter paths that call `ReadDateTime`\n- Finding IDs: `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-020`, related stack allocation finding `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-CROW-MEM-001`\n\n## Patches\n\nFixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions.\n\nUpgrade guidance:\n\n1. Upgrade `MessagePack` to the patched version for your release line.\n2. Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions.\n\nThe fix should validate timestamp extension lengths before any stack allocation. Valid MessagePack timestamp payload lengths are limited to the supported timestamp encodings, so oversized extension lengths should fail with a catchable MessagePack serialization exception before the slow path allocates a buffer.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nPatching is recommended.\n\nUntil a patched version is available, avoid deserializing untrusted MessagePack payloads into schemas that contain `DateTime` or `DateTimeOffset` values. Where possible, enforce strict maximum message sizes and reject malformed extension payloads before they reach MessagePack-CSharp.\n\nThere is no complete workaround for applications that must deserialize attacker-controlled MessagePack data containing date/time fields with affected versions.\n\n## Resources\n\n- `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-020`: `ReadDateTime` stack allocation from attacker-controlled extension length\n- `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-CROW-MEM-001`: related attacker-controlled stack allocation finding in `MessagePackReader`\n- CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\n\n## CVE split rationale\n\nThis vulnerability is independently fixable in the DateTime extension parsing path by validating extension lengths before stack allocation. It is separate from recursive stack overflows, LZ4 issues, and collection allocation bugs.",
  "id": "GHSA-382j-8mxh-c7x2",
  "modified": "2026-06-25T18:35:48Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T18:35:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-382j-8mxh-c7x2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48502"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MessagePack-CSharp: Denial of service vulnerabilities can swamp the CPU or crash the process with stack and heap overflows"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-85446"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-03T23:17:24Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "MOOS-IvP versions through 24.8.1 contain a quadratic processing vulnerability in uFldNodeComms where each new node identity creates a ledger entry and triggers all-pairs distribution work. Attackers can supply unbounded distinct node names in reports to drive the shoreside broker into quadratic processing, delaying or preventing distribution of legitimate node reports.",
  "id": "GHSA-387j-4pfq-cmj4",
  "modified": "2026-09-04T00:31:09Z",
  "published": "2026-09-04T00:31:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85446"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/moos-ivp/moos-ivp/pull/131"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/moos-ivp/moos-ivp/commit/8e30008d4eb68d83797187bd46e929e6cb06b195"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/moos-ivp/moos-ivp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/moos-ivp/moos-ivp/blob/1de9ae146cd63c209e8c3fd81611a4ed2472971b/ivp/src/uFldNodeComms/FldNodeComms.cpp#L169"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/moos-ivp-through-24.8.1-ufldnodecomms-quadratic-processing-denial-of-service"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.8.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "shell-quote"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-13311"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-20T21:49:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T05:16:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`shell-quote`\u0027s `parse()` finalizes its token list with a `reduce` that uses\n`Array.prototype.concat` as the accumulator. Each `prev.concat(arg)` copies the entire growing\narray, so `parse()` runs in **O(n\u00b2)** in the number of tokens. An unauthenticated attacker who\ncan submit a string to any code path that calls `parse()` on it can block the single-threaded\nNode.js event loop for tens of seconds with a small input \u2014 a denial of service. The trigger\nneeds **no shell metacharacters** (plain space-separated words suffice), so input filters that\nonly screen for `;`, `|`, `$`, or backticks do not help.\n\n### Root cause\n`parse.js` (lines 200\u2013203), in `parseInternal` \u2014 this path runs on **every** `parse()` call:\n\n```js\n}).reduce(function (prev, arg) { // finalize parsed arguments\n    // TODO: replace this whole reduce with a concat\n    return typeof arg === \u0027undefined\u0027 ? prev : prev.concat(arg);\n}, []);\n```\n\n`prev.concat(arg)` allocates a new array and copies all of `prev` on every iteration, so\nproducing an N-token result costs `1 + 2 + \u2026 + N = O(N\u00b2)` copies. A second `acc.concat(s)`\nreduce in the `module.exports` wrapper (lines 211\u2013224, reached only when `env` is a function)\nhas the same shape. The maintainer\u0027s own `// TODO: replace this whole reduce with a concat`\nalready flags the construct.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n```js\nconst { parse } = require(\u0027shell-quote\u0027);\nconst ms = fn =\u003e { const t = process.hrtime.bigint(); fn(); return Number(process.hrtime.bigint()-t)/1e6; };\nfor (const N of [16000, 32000, 64000, 128000]) {\n  console.log(N, \u0027tokens -\u003e\u0027, ms(() =\u003e parse(\u0027x \u0027.repeat(N))).toFixed(0), \u0027ms\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nMeasured on `shell-quote@1.8.4`, Node v24:\n\n| input (N tokens) | bytes  | `parse()` | ratio vs prev (2\u00d7 input) |\n|-----------------:|-------:|----------:|:------------------------:|\n| 16 000           | 32 KB  |    678 ms | \u2014                        |\n| 32 000           | 64 KB  |  4 169 ms | \u00d76.2                     |\n| 64 000           | 128 KB | 14 914 ms | \u00d73.6                     |\n| 128 000          | 256 KB | **57 319 ms** | \u00d73.8                 |\n\nTime grows ~\u00d74 per 2\u00d7 input \u2192 confirmed O(n\u00b2). A ~128 KB input blocks the event loop ~15 s;\n~256 KB \u2192 ~57 s; a few hundred KB more \u2192 minutes.\n\u003cimg width=\"656\" height=\"214\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e8955b0e-0527-45ca-94b7-c3a2d8c0c82e\" /\u003e\n[poc.js](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29255995/poc.js)\n\n### Impact\n`parse()` is synchronous on the main thread; while it copies arrays quadratically the entire\nevent loop is blocked and the process serves no other requests. Any service that calls `parse()`\non attacker-influenced input (command parsers, chat-ops / bot command handlers, REPLs,\nbuild-script / arg-string splitters) can be driven to a sustained DoS with a single small\nrequest. No code execution and no data disclosure \u2014 availability only.\n\nEnd-to-end confirmation: a minimal HTTP server that calls `parse()` on the request body, hit\nwith **one** `POST` of `\u0027x \u0027.repeat(32000)` (~63 KB), froze for ~4.5 s. An out-of-process probe\nclient issuing harmless `GET /ping` requests (normally ~1 ms) observed **27 consecutive pings\nstalled by up to 4374 ms** during that single request \u2014 i.e. every concurrent client was denied\nservice for the whole parse. Scaling the body to a few hundred KB extends the outage to minutes.\n\nThis is the same class as several accepted 2026 advisories for quadratic-parser DoS on\nuntrusted input (e.g. markdown-it CVE-2026-48988, js-yaml CVE-2026-53550,\npython-multipart CVE-2026-53539). It is **distinct** from the known `shell-quote`\ncommand-injection issues (CVE-2021-42740, CVE-2016-10541, CVE-2026-9277), which are all in\n`quote()`, not `parse()`.\n\n### Suggested remediation\nReplace the O(n\u00b2) concat-in-reduce with a linear flatten that **pushes into the\naccumulator** instead of reallocating and copying it on every iteration. Apply the\nsame shape to the wrapper\u0027s `acc.concat(s)` reduce. A defensive input-length cap on\n`parse()` is a cheap additional stop-gap.\n\n\u003e **Maintainer note (edit):** the originally-suggested `Array.prototype.flat()` is\n\u003e ES2019 / Node 11+, but `shell-quote` declares `engines: node \u003e= 0.4`, so `.flat()`\n\u003e would silently drop support for older runtimes. The fix instead flattens one-level\n\u003e array tokens with `forEach`/`push` \u2014 and deliberately not `push.apply(...)`, since\n\u003e spreading a large array into function arguments can exceed the engine\u0027s argument\n\u003e count limit. Output is byte-identical to the current code across strings, `undefined`\n\u003e holes, one-level array tokens, and `{op}`/`{comment}`/`{op:\u0027glob\u0027}` objects, and\n\u003e finalizing is now linear (1,024,000 tokens in ~150 ms vs ~57 s for 128,000 before).\n\u003e Thanks for the clear report and PoC \u2014 the analysis and reproduction were spot on.\n\n### Disclosure\nFound by source audit + wall-clock confirmation against 1.8.4 (and verified the same code is\npresent on `main`). Reported privately here; no public disclosure until a fix is available.",
  "id": "GHSA-395f-4hp3-45gv",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T21:49:34Z",
  "published": "2026-07-20T21:49:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ljharb/shell-quote/security/advisories/GHSA-395f-4hp3-45gv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13311"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ljharb/shell-quote/commit/7ff5488599d01c323514f02f5efb74088dd134ec"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ljharb/shell-quote"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ljharb/shell-quote/releases/tag/v1.9.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/shell-quote"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "shell-quote: Quadratic-complexity Denial of Service in `parse()` (CWE-407)"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-6324"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-09T06:15:15Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions starting from 15.7 prior to 17.5.5, starting from 17.6 prior to 17.6.3, and starting from 17.7 prior to 17.7.1. It was possible to trigger a DoS by creating cyclic references between epics.",
  "id": "GHSA-3c89-47f8-w5c6",
  "modified": "2025-01-09T06:30:24Z",
  "published": "2025-01-09T06:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6324"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/2553716"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://about.gitlab.com/releases/2025/01/08/patch-release-gitlab-17-7-1-released/#cyclic-reference-of-epics-leads-resource-exhaustion"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/468914"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}