CWE-345
DiscouragedInsufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
939 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-MMW7-WQ3C-WF9P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 00:08 – Updated: 2026-04-08 00:08Summary
The PayPal IPN v1 handler at plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php lacks transaction deduplication, allowing an attacker to replay a single legitimate IPN notification to repeatedly inflate their wallet balance and renew subscriptions. The newer ipnV2.php and webhook.php handlers correctly deduplicate via PayPalYPT_log entries, but the v1 handler was never updated and remains actively referenced as the notify_url for billing plans.
Details
When a recurring payment IPN arrives at ipn.php, the handler:
-
Verifies authenticity via
PayPalYPT::IPNcheck()(line 16), which sends the POST data to PayPal'scmd=_notify-validateendpoint. PayPal confirms the data is genuine but this verification is stateless — PayPal returnsVERIFIEDfor the same authentic data on every submission. -
Looks up the subscription from
recurring_payment_idand directly credits the user's wallet (lines 41-53):
// plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php lines 41-53
$row = Subscription::getFromAgreement($_POST["recurring_payment_id"]);
$users_id = $row['users_id'];
$payment_amount = empty($_POST['mc_gross']) ? $_POST['amount'] : $_POST['mc_gross'];
$payment_currency = empty($_POST['mc_currency']) ? $_POST['currency_code'] : $_POST['mc_currency'];
if ($walletObject->currency===$payment_currency) {
$plugin->addBalance($users_id, $payment_amount, "Paypal recurrent", json_encode($_POST));
Subscription::renew($users_id, $row['subscriptions_plans_id']);
$obj->error = false;
}
No txn_id uniqueness check. No PayPalYPT_log entry created. No deduplication of any kind.
Compare with the patched handlers:
- ipnV2.php (line 50): PayPalYPT::isTokenUsed($_GET['token']) and (line 93): PayPalYPT::isRecurringPaymentIdUsed($_POST["verify_sign"]), with PayPalYPT_log entries saved on success.
- webhook.php (line 30): PayPalYPT::isTokenUsed($token) with PayPalYPT_log entry saved on success.
The v1 ipn.php is still actively configured as notify_url in PayPalYPT.php at lines 85, 193, and 308:
$notify_url = "{$global['webSiteRootURL']}plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php";
PoC
# Prerequisites: A registered AVideo account with at least one completed PayPal subscription.
# Step 1: Complete a legitimate PayPal subscription.
# This generates an IPN notification to ipn.php containing your recurring_payment_id.
# Step 2: Capture the IPN POST body. This is available from:
# - PayPal's IPN History (paypal.com > Settings > IPN History)
# - Network interception during the initial subscription flow
# Step 3: Replay the captured IPN to inflate wallet balance.
# Each replay adds the subscription amount to the attacker's wallet.
# Single replay:
curl -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php' \
-d 'recurring_payment_id=I-XXXXXXXXXX&mc_gross=9.99&mc_currency=USD&payment_status=Completed&txn_type=recurring_payment&verify_sign=REAL_VERIFY_SIGN&payer_email=attacker@example.com'
# Bulk replay (100x = 100x the subscription amount added to wallet):
for i in $(seq 1 100); do
curl -s -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php' \
-d 'recurring_payment_id=I-XXXXXXXXXX&mc_gross=9.99&mc_currency=USD&payment_status=Completed&txn_type=recurring_payment&verify_sign=REAL_VERIFY_SIGN&payer_email=attacker@example.com'
done
# Each request passes IPNcheck() (PayPal confirms the data is authentic),
# then addBalance() credits the wallet and Subscription::renew() extends the subscription.
Impact
- Unlimited wallet balance inflation: An attacker can replay a single legitimate IPN to add arbitrary multiples of the subscription amount to their wallet balance, enabling free access to all paid content.
- Unlimited subscription renewals: Each replay also calls
Subscription::renew(), indefinitely extending subscription access from a single payment. - Financial loss: Platform operators lose revenue as attackers obtain paid services without corresponding payments.
Recommended Fix
Add deduplication to ipn.php consistent with the approach already used in ipnV2.php and webhook.php. Record each processed transaction in PayPalYPT_log and check before processing:
// plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php — replace lines 41-57 with:
} else {
_error_log("PayPalIPN: recurring_payment_id = {$_POST["recurring_payment_id"]} ");
// Deduplication: check if this IPN was already processed
$dedup_key = !empty($_POST['txn_id']) ? $_POST['txn_id'] : $_POST['verify_sign'];
if (PayPalYPT::isRecurringPaymentIdUsed($dedup_key)) {
_error_log("PayPalIPN: already processed, skipping");
die(json_encode($obj));
}
$subscription = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled("Subscription");
if (!empty($subscription)) {
$row = Subscription::getFromAgreement($_POST["recurring_payment_id"]);
_error_log("PayPalIPN: user found from recurring_payment_id (users_id = {$row['users_id']}) ");
$users_id = $row['users_id'];
$payment_amount = empty($_POST['mc_gross']) ? $_POST['amount'] : $_POST['mc_gross'];
$payment_currency = empty($_POST['mc_currency']) ? $_POST['currency_code'] : $_POST['mc_currency'];
if ($walletObject->currency===$payment_currency) {
// Log the transaction for deduplication
$pp = new PayPalYPT_log(0);
$pp->setUsers_id($users_id);
$pp->setRecurring_payment_id($dedup_key);
$pp->setValue($payment_amount);
$pp->setJson(['post' => $_POST]);
if ($pp->save()) {
$plugin->addBalance($users_id, $payment_amount, "Paypal recurrent", json_encode($_POST));
Subscription::renew($users_id, $row['subscriptions_plans_id']);
$obj->error = false;
}
} else {
_error_log("PayPalIPN: FAIL currency check $walletObject->currency===$payment_currency ");
}
}
}
Additionally, consider migrating the notify_url references in PayPalYPT.php (lines 85, 193, 308) from ipn.php to ipnV2.php or webhook.php, and eventually deprecating the v1 IPN handler entirely.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "wwbn/avideo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "26.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39366"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-08T00:08:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-07T20:16:30Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe PayPal IPN v1 handler at `plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php` lacks transaction deduplication, allowing an attacker to replay a single legitimate IPN notification to repeatedly inflate their wallet balance and renew subscriptions. The newer `ipnV2.php` and `webhook.php` handlers correctly deduplicate via `PayPalYPT_log` entries, but the v1 handler was never updated and remains actively referenced as the `notify_url` for billing plans.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a recurring payment IPN arrives at `ipn.php`, the handler:\n\n1. Verifies authenticity via `PayPalYPT::IPNcheck()` (line 16), which sends the POST data to PayPal\u0027s `cmd=_notify-validate` endpoint. PayPal confirms the data is genuine but this verification is **stateless** \u2014 PayPal returns `VERIFIED` for the same authentic data on every submission.\n\n2. Looks up the subscription from `recurring_payment_id` and directly credits the user\u0027s wallet (lines 41-53):\n\n```php\n// plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php lines 41-53\n$row = Subscription::getFromAgreement($_POST[\"recurring_payment_id\"]);\n$users_id = $row[\u0027users_id\u0027];\n$payment_amount = empty($_POST[\u0027mc_gross\u0027]) ? $_POST[\u0027amount\u0027] : $_POST[\u0027mc_gross\u0027];\n$payment_currency = empty($_POST[\u0027mc_currency\u0027]) ? $_POST[\u0027currency_code\u0027] : $_POST[\u0027mc_currency\u0027];\nif ($walletObject-\u003ecurrency===$payment_currency) {\n $plugin-\u003eaddBalance($users_id, $payment_amount, \"Paypal recurrent\", json_encode($_POST));\n Subscription::renew($users_id, $row[\u0027subscriptions_plans_id\u0027]);\n $obj-\u003eerror = false;\n}\n```\n\nNo `txn_id` uniqueness check. No `PayPalYPT_log` entry created. No deduplication of any kind.\n\nCompare with the patched handlers:\n- **`ipnV2.php`** (line 50): `PayPalYPT::isTokenUsed($_GET[\u0027token\u0027])` and (line 93): `PayPalYPT::isRecurringPaymentIdUsed($_POST[\"verify_sign\"])`, with `PayPalYPT_log` entries saved on success.\n- **`webhook.php`** (line 30): `PayPalYPT::isTokenUsed($token)` with `PayPalYPT_log` entry saved on success.\n\nThe v1 `ipn.php` is still actively configured as `notify_url` in `PayPalYPT.php` at lines 85, 193, and 308:\n```php\n$notify_url = \"{$global[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027]}plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php\";\n```\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Prerequisites: A registered AVideo account with at least one completed PayPal subscription.\n\n# Step 1: Complete a legitimate PayPal subscription.\n# This generates an IPN notification to ipn.php containing your recurring_payment_id.\n\n# Step 2: Capture the IPN POST body. This is available from:\n# - PayPal\u0027s IPN History (paypal.com \u003e Settings \u003e IPN History)\n# - Network interception during the initial subscription flow\n\n# Step 3: Replay the captured IPN to inflate wallet balance.\n# Each replay adds the subscription amount to the attacker\u0027s wallet.\n\n# Single replay:\ncurl -X POST \u0027https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027recurring_payment_id=I-XXXXXXXXXX\u0026mc_gross=9.99\u0026mc_currency=USD\u0026payment_status=Completed\u0026txn_type=recurring_payment\u0026verify_sign=REAL_VERIFY_SIGN\u0026payer_email=attacker@example.com\u0027\n\n# Bulk replay (100x = 100x the subscription amount added to wallet):\nfor i in $(seq 1 100); do\n curl -s -X POST \u0027https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027recurring_payment_id=I-XXXXXXXXXX\u0026mc_gross=9.99\u0026mc_currency=USD\u0026payment_status=Completed\u0026txn_type=recurring_payment\u0026verify_sign=REAL_VERIFY_SIGN\u0026payer_email=attacker@example.com\u0027\ndone\n\n# Each request passes IPNcheck() (PayPal confirms the data is authentic),\n# then addBalance() credits the wallet and Subscription::renew() extends the subscription.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Unlimited wallet balance inflation**: An attacker can replay a single legitimate IPN to add arbitrary multiples of the subscription amount to their wallet balance, enabling free access to all paid content.\n- **Unlimited subscription renewals**: Each replay also calls `Subscription::renew()`, indefinitely extending subscription access from a single payment.\n- **Financial loss**: Platform operators lose revenue as attackers obtain paid services without corresponding payments.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd deduplication to `ipn.php` consistent with the approach already used in `ipnV2.php` and `webhook.php`. Record each processed transaction in `PayPalYPT_log` and check before processing:\n\n```php\n// plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php \u2014 replace lines 41-57 with:\n} else {\n _error_log(\"PayPalIPN: recurring_payment_id = {$_POST[\"recurring_payment_id\"]} \");\n\n // Deduplication: check if this IPN was already processed\n $dedup_key = !empty($_POST[\u0027txn_id\u0027]) ? $_POST[\u0027txn_id\u0027] : $_POST[\u0027verify_sign\u0027];\n if (PayPalYPT::isRecurringPaymentIdUsed($dedup_key)) {\n _error_log(\"PayPalIPN: already processed, skipping\");\n die(json_encode($obj));\n }\n\n $subscription = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled(\"Subscription\");\n if (!empty($subscription)) {\n $row = Subscription::getFromAgreement($_POST[\"recurring_payment_id\"]);\n _error_log(\"PayPalIPN: user found from recurring_payment_id (users_id = {$row[\u0027users_id\u0027]}) \");\n $users_id = $row[\u0027users_id\u0027];\n $payment_amount = empty($_POST[\u0027mc_gross\u0027]) ? $_POST[\u0027amount\u0027] : $_POST[\u0027mc_gross\u0027];\n $payment_currency = empty($_POST[\u0027mc_currency\u0027]) ? $_POST[\u0027currency_code\u0027] : $_POST[\u0027mc_currency\u0027];\n if ($walletObject-\u003ecurrency===$payment_currency) {\n // Log the transaction for deduplication\n $pp = new PayPalYPT_log(0);\n $pp-\u003esetUsers_id($users_id);\n $pp-\u003esetRecurring_payment_id($dedup_key);\n $pp-\u003esetValue($payment_amount);\n $pp-\u003esetJson([\u0027post\u0027 =\u003e $_POST]);\n if ($pp-\u003esave()) {\n $plugin-\u003eaddBalance($users_id, $payment_amount, \"Paypal recurrent\", json_encode($_POST));\n Subscription::renew($users_id, $row[\u0027subscriptions_plans_id\u0027]);\n $obj-\u003eerror = false;\n }\n } else {\n _error_log(\"PayPalIPN: FAIL currency check $walletObject-\u003ecurrency===$payment_currency \");\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, consider migrating the `notify_url` references in `PayPalYPT.php` (lines 85, 193, 308) from `ipn.php` to `ipnV2.php` or `webhook.php`, and eventually deprecating the v1 IPN handler entirely.",
"id": "GHSA-mmw7-wq3c-wf9p",
"modified": "2026-04-08T00:08:33Z",
"published": "2026-04-08T00:08:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-mmw7-wq3c-wf9p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39366"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/8f53e9d9c6aaa07d51ace30691981edbbfb5ca1c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "WWBN AVideo Affected by a PayPal IPN Replay Attack Enabling Wallet Balance Inflation via Missing Transaction Deduplication in ipn.php"
}
GHSA-MP3G-56J6-CWX7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-13 12:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:07Controller may be loaded with malicious firmware which could enable remote code execution
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-25178"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-13T11:15:09Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Controller may be loaded with malicious firmware which could enable remote code execution\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-mp3g-56j6-cwx7",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:07:05Z",
"published": "2023-07-13T12:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25178"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://process.honeywell.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MP5H-M6QJ-6292
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-17 18:46 – Updated: 2026-02-19 21:23Summary
In Telegram webhook mode, if channels.telegram.webhookSecret is not set, OpenClaw may accept webhook HTTP requests without verifying Telegram’s secret token header. In deployments where the webhook endpoint is reachable by an attacker, this can allow forged Telegram updates (for example spoofing message.from.id).
Note: Telegram webhook mode is not enabled by default. It is enabled only when channels.telegram.webhookUrl is configured.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected:
<= 2026.1.30 - Patched:
>= 2026.2.1
Impact
If an attacker can reach the webhook endpoint, they may be able to send forged updates that are processed as if they came from Telegram. Depending on enabled commands/tools and configuration, this could lead to unintended bot actions.
Mitigations / Workarounds
- Set a strong
channels.telegram.webhookSecretand ensure your reverse proxy forwards theX-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Tokenheader unchanged. - Restrict network access to the webhook endpoint (for example bind to loopback and only expose via a reverse proxy).
Fix Commit(s)
- ca92597e1f9593236ad86810b66633144b69314d (config validation:
webhookUrlrequireswebhookSecret)
Defense-in-depth / supporting fixes:
- 5643a934799dc523ec2ef18c007e1aa2c386b670 (default webhook listener bind host to loopback)
- 3cbcba10cf30c2ffb898f0d8c7dfb929f15f8930 (bound webhook request body size/time)
- 633fe8b9c17f02fcc68ecdb5ec212a5ace932f09 (runtime guard: reject webhook startup when secret is missing/empty)
Thanks @yueyueL for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25474"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T18:46:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-19T07:17:45Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nIn Telegram webhook mode, if `channels.telegram.webhookSecret` is not set, OpenClaw may accept webhook HTTP requests without verifying Telegram\u2019s secret token header. In deployments where the webhook endpoint is reachable by an attacker, this can allow forged Telegram updates (for example spoofing `message.from.id`).\n\nNote: Telegram webhook mode is not enabled by default. It is enabled only when `channels.telegram.webhookUrl` is configured.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003c= 2026.1.30`\n- Patched: `\u003e= 2026.2.1`\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker can reach the webhook endpoint, they may be able to send forged updates that are processed as if they came from Telegram. Depending on enabled commands/tools and configuration, this could lead to unintended bot actions.\n\n## Mitigations / Workarounds\n\n- Set a strong `channels.telegram.webhookSecret` and ensure your reverse proxy forwards the `X-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Token` header unchanged.\n- Restrict network access to the webhook endpoint (for example bind to loopback and only expose via a reverse proxy).\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- ca92597e1f9593236ad86810b66633144b69314d (config validation: `webhookUrl` requires `webhookSecret`)\n\nDefense-in-depth / supporting fixes:\n\n- 5643a934799dc523ec2ef18c007e1aa2c386b670 (default webhook listener bind host to loopback)\n- 3cbcba10cf30c2ffb898f0d8c7dfb929f15f8930 (bound webhook request body size/time)\n- 633fe8b9c17f02fcc68ecdb5ec212a5ace932f09 (runtime guard: reject webhook startup when secret is missing/empty)\n\nThanks @yueyueL for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-mp5h-m6qj-6292",
"modified": "2026-02-19T21:23:52Z",
"published": "2026-02-17T18:46:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-mp5h-m6qj-6292"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25474"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/3cbcba10cf30c2ffb898f0d8c7dfb929f15f8930"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/5643a934799dc523ec2ef18c007e1aa2c386b670"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/633fe8b9c17f02fcc68ecdb5ec212a5ace932f09"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/ca92597e1f9593236ad86810b66633144b69314d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw has a Telegram webhook request forgery (missing `channels.telegram.webhookSecret`) \u2192 auth bypass"
}
GHSA-MP64-RM5R-C35P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-20 09:32 – Updated: 2026-03-20 09:32A vulnerability was identified in Yi Technology YI Home Camera 2 2.1.1_20171024151200. This impacts an unknown function of the file home/web/ipc of the component HTTP Firmware Update Handler. The manipulation leads to improper verification of cryptographic signature. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-4478"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T07:16:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was identified in Yi Technology YI Home Camera 2 2.1.1_20171024151200. This impacts an unknown function of the file home/web/ipc of the component HTTP Firmware Update Handler. The manipulation leads to improper verification of cryptographic signature. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-mp64-rm5r-c35p",
"modified": "2026-03-20T09:32:10Z",
"published": "2026-03-20T09:32:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-4478"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.351768"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.351768"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.773162"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-MP7C-M3RH-R56V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-16 20:18 – Updated: 2025-09-22 22:59Impact
matrix-js-sdk before 38.2.0 has insufficient validation of room predecessor links in MatrixClient::getJoinedRooms, allowing a remote attacker to attempt to replace a tombstoned room with an unrelated attacker-supplied room.
Patches
The issue has been patched and users should upgrade to 38.2.0.
Workarounds
Avoid using MatrixClient::getJoinedRooms in favour of getRooms() and filtering upgraded rooms separately.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "matrix-js-sdk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "38.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59160"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-345",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-16T20:18:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-16T17:15:41Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nmatrix-js-sdk before 38.2.0 has insufficient validation of room predecessor links in `MatrixClient::getJoinedRooms`, allowing a remote attacker to attempt to replace a tombstoned room with an unrelated attacker-supplied room.\n\n### Patches\nThe issue has been patched and users should upgrade to 38.2.0.\n\n### Workarounds\nAvoid using `MatrixClient::getJoinedRooms` in favour of `getRooms()` and filtering upgraded rooms separately.",
"id": "GHSA-mp7c-m3rh-r56v",
"modified": "2025-09-22T22:59:23Z",
"published": "2025-09-16T20:18:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-mp7c-m3rh-r56v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59160"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/commit/43c72d5bf5e2d0a26b3b4f71092e7cb39d4137c4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/releases/tag/v38.2.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/matrix-js-sdk/v/38.2.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "matrix-js-sdk has insufficient validation when considering a room to be upgraded by another"
}
GHSA-MPH8-9V29-PM42
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 23:16 – Updated: 2026-05-06 23:16Summary
The AxonFlow SDK's WebhookSubscription (or equivalent) type did not expose the HMAC-SHA256 signing key returned by the platform's CreateWebhook endpoint. Without access to the secret through the typed SDK API, callers had no path to verify the X-AxonFlow-Signature header on incoming webhook deliveries. Affected callers had two unsatisfactory options:
- Skip signature verification entirely — accepting any payload from any source that knew the webhook URL.
- Hand-parse the raw HTTP JSON response to extract the secret, bypassing the type-safe SDK surface.
This advisory is filed across all four AxonFlow SDKs (Go, Python, TypeScript, Java) because the same defect and the same fix landed in each.
Affected versions
Versions 5.6.0 and below.
Impact
A webhook receiver using the SDK's typed API to handle inbound deliveries had no path to authenticate the source of incoming payloads. An attacker who learned the webhook URL — through misconfiguration, log leakage, observable network traffic during setup, or any other discovery channel — could forge webhook deliveries indistinguishable from legitimate ones, causing the receiving application to act on fabricated events (e.g. simulated approval-granted callbacks, simulated policy-decision callbacks, simulated step-completion callbacks).
Remediation
Upgrade to the patched version listed in Vulnerabilities below. The signing key is now exposed on the WebhookSubscription response type returned by CreateWebhook. Implementations should:
- Persist the secret returned by
CreateWebhooksecurely (it is only returned once, at create time). - On each incoming webhook delivery, compute
HMAC-SHA256(secret, raw_body)and compare it in constant time against theX-AxonFlow-Signatureheader. - Reject any delivery whose signature does not match.
Credit
Identified by AxonFlow internal security review during the April 2026 quality-freeze epic.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@axonflow/sdk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T23:16:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe AxonFlow SDK\u0027s `WebhookSubscription` (or equivalent) type did not expose the HMAC-SHA256 signing key returned by the platform\u0027s `CreateWebhook` endpoint. Without access to the secret through the typed SDK API, callers had no path to verify the `X-AxonFlow-Signature` header on incoming webhook deliveries. Affected callers had two unsatisfactory options:\n\n1. Skip signature verification entirely \u2014 accepting any payload from any source that knew the webhook URL.\n2. Hand-parse the raw HTTP JSON response to extract the secret, bypassing the type-safe SDK surface.\n\nThis advisory is filed across all four AxonFlow SDKs (Go, Python, TypeScript, Java) because the same defect and the same fix landed in each.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nVersions 5.6.0 and below.\n\n## Impact\n\nA webhook receiver using the SDK\u0027s typed API to handle inbound deliveries had no path to authenticate the source of incoming payloads. An attacker who learned the webhook URL \u2014 through misconfiguration, log leakage, observable network traffic during setup, or any other discovery channel \u2014 could forge webhook deliveries indistinguishable from legitimate ones, causing the receiving application to act on fabricated events (e.g. simulated approval-granted callbacks, simulated policy-decision callbacks, simulated step-completion callbacks).\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to the patched version listed in Vulnerabilities below. The signing key is now exposed on the `WebhookSubscription` response type returned by `CreateWebhook`. Implementations should:\n\n1. Persist the secret returned by `CreateWebhook` securely (it is only returned once, at create time).\n2. On each incoming webhook delivery, compute `HMAC-SHA256(secret, raw_body)` and compare it in constant time against the `X-AxonFlow-Signature` header.\n3. Reject any delivery whose signature does not match.\n\n## Credit\n\nIdentified by AxonFlow internal security review during the April 2026 quality-freeze epic.",
"id": "GHSA-mph8-9v29-pm42",
"modified": "2026-05-06T23:16:24Z",
"published": "2026-05-06T23:16:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow-sdk-typescript/security/advisories/GHSA-mph8-9v29-pm42"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow-sdk-typescript"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "axonflow-sdk-typescript: Webhook signing-key (HMAC-SHA256) not exposed by SDK type, preventing signature verification"
}
GHSA-MQ67-Q3FX-F62H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-14 21:31 – Updated: 2025-08-14 21:31A vulnerability has been found in Tenda G1 16.01.7.8(3660). Affected by this issue is the function check_upload_file of the component Firmware Update Handler. The manipulation leads to insufficient verification of data authenticity. The attack may be launched remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitation is known to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-8980"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-14T20:15:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been found in Tenda G1 16.01.7.8(3660). Affected by this issue is the function check_upload_file of the component Firmware Update Handler. The manipulation leads to insufficient verification of data authenticity. The attack may be launched remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitation is known to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
"id": "GHSA-mq67-q3fx-f62h",
"modified": "2025-08-14T21:31:59Z",
"published": "2025-08-14T21:31:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8980"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/IOTRes/IOT_Firmware_Update/blob/main/Tenda/G1_Auth.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/IOTRes/IOT_Firmware_Update/blob/main/Tenda/G1_Inte.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.319976"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.319976"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.628605"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.628606"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tenda.com.cn"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-MR3F-MQ88-R8JQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:13 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:13A lack of target address verification in the BurnMe() function of Rob The Bank 1.0 allows attackers to steal tokens from victim users via a crafted script.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-19769"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-09-07T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A lack of target address verification in the BurnMe() function of Rob The Bank 1.0 allows attackers to steal tokens from victim users via a crafted script.",
"id": "GHSA-mr3f-mq88-r8jq",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:13:54Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:13:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-19769"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OSUPlayer/CVEs/blob/master/Suicidal/2019-07-09-01.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-MR98-JGQ9-QX85
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-02 12:31 – Updated: 2026-05-02 12:31A vulnerability was found in TRENDnet TEW-821DAP up to 1.12B01. This impacts the function platform_do_upgrade_cameo_dev of the file cameo_dev.sh of the component Firmware Update Handler. Performing a manipulation results in insufficient verification of data authenticity. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The vendor explains: "That firmware version will only work on our hardware version v1.xR. We have already EOL that product 8 years ago and are no longer selling". This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-7611"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-02T10:16:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in TRENDnet TEW-821DAP up to 1.12B01. This impacts the function platform_do_upgrade_cameo_dev of the file cameo_dev.sh of the component Firmware Update Handler. Performing a manipulation results in insufficient verification of data authenticity. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The vendor explains: \"That firmware version will only work on our hardware version v1.xR. We have already EOL that product 8 years ago and are no longer selling\". This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.",
"id": "GHSA-mr98-jgq9-qx85",
"modified": "2026-05-02T12:31:22Z",
"published": "2026-05-02T12:31:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7611"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/IOTRes/IOT_Firmware_Update/blob/main/Trendnet/TEW-821DAP_Inte.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/806218"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/360568"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/360568/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-MW35-GRPM-83J9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:02 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:02The USB firmware update script of homee Brain Cube v2 (2.28.2 and 2.28.4) devices allows an attacker with physical access to install compromised firmware. This occurs because of insufficient validation of the firmware image file and can lead to code execution on the device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-24395"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-05-20T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The USB firmware update script of homee Brain Cube v2 (2.28.2 and 2.28.4) devices allows an attacker with physical access to install compromised firmware. This occurs because of insufficient validation of the firmware image file and can lead to code execution on the device.",
"id": "GHSA-mw35-grpm-83j9",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:02:53Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:02:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24395"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2020-026.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.syss.de/pentest-blog"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing
An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.
CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages
An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.
CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.
CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.
CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)
An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.