Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-284

Discouraged

Improper Access Control

Abstraction: Pillar · Status: Incomplete

The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.

7802 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-V6X6-PJXW-3PV2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-28 09:34 – Updated: 2026-05-06 19:54
VLAI
Summary
Spring AI's VectorStoreChatMemoryAdvisor conversation scoping can lead to cross-tenant memory exfiltration
Details

In Spring AI, an attacker can bypass conversation isolation and exfiltrate sensitive memory from other users’ chat histories, including secrets and credentials, by injecting filter logic through conversationId. Only applications that use VectorStoreChatMemoryAdvisor and pass user-supplied input as a conversationId are affected.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.springframework.ai:spring-ai-advisors-vector-store"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.springframework.ai:spring-ai-advisors-vector-store"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40966"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T19:54:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-28T08:16:01Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In Spring AI, an attacker can bypass conversation isolation and exfiltrate sensitive memory from other users\u2019 chat histories, including secrets and credentials, by injecting filter logic through conversationId. Only applications that use VectorStoreChatMemoryAdvisor and pass user-supplied input as a conversationId are affected.",
  "id": "GHSA-v6x6-pjxw-3pv2",
  "modified": "2026-05-06T19:54:29Z",
  "published": "2026-04-28T09:34:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40966"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-ai"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?version=3.1\u0026vector=AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://spring.io/security/cve-2026-40966"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Spring AI\u0027s VectorStoreChatMemoryAdvisor conversation scoping can lead to cross-tenant memory exfiltration"
}

GHSA-V6XP-W49H-9CMC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-18 06:30 – Updated: 2024-08-29 21:31
VLAI
Details

The Net::IPV4Addr module 0.10 for Perl does not properly consider extraneous zero characters in an IP address string, which (in some situations) allows attackers to bypass access control that is based on IP addresses.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-47155"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-03-18T05:15:06Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The Net::IPV4Addr module 0.10 for Perl does not properly consider extraneous zero characters in an IP address string, which (in some situations) allows attackers to bypass access control that is based on IP addresses.",
  "id": "GHSA-v6xp-w49h-9cmc",
  "modified": "2024-08-29T21:31:02Z",
  "published": "2024-03-18T06:30:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47155"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.urth.org/2021/03/29/security-issues-in-perl-ip-address-distros/#net-ipv4addrhttpsmetacpanorgreleasenet-ipv4addr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/Net-IPv4Addr"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V72W-97M6-622R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-10 21:31 – Updated: 2025-12-10 21:31
VLAI
Details

Improper access control for volatile memory containing boot code in Universal Boot Loader (U-Boot) before 2017.11 and Qualcomm chips IPQ4019, IPQ5018, IPQ5322, IPQ6018, IPQ8064, IPQ8074, and IPQ9574 could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-24857"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-10T21:16:03Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper access control for volatile memory containing boot code in Universal Boot Loader (U-Boot) before 2017.11 and Qualcomm chips IPQ4019, IPQ5018, IPQ5322, IPQ6018, IPQ8064, IPQ8074, and IPQ9574 could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code.",
  "id": "GHSA-v72w-97m6-622r",
  "modified": "2025-12-10T21:31:37Z",
  "published": "2025-12-10T21:31:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24857"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-25-343-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V773-RXXH-3X8R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-29 06:30 – Updated: 2022-12-06 18:30
VLAI
Details

An access control issue in APsystems ENERGY COMMUNICATION UNIT (ECU-C) Power Control Software V4.1NA, V3.11.4, W2.1NA, V4.1SAA, C1.2.2 allows attackers to access sensitive data and execute specific commands and functions with full admin rights without authenticating allows him to perform multiple attacks, such as attacking wireless network in the product's range.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-44037"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-11-29T04:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An access control issue in APsystems ENERGY COMMUNICATION UNIT (ECU-C) Power Control Software V4.1NA, V3.11.4, W2.1NA, V4.1SAA, C1.2.2 allows attackers to access sensitive data and execute specific commands and functions with full admin rights without authenticating allows him to perform multiple attacks, such as attacking wireless network in the product\u0027s range.",
  "id": "GHSA-v773-rxxh-3x8r",
  "modified": "2022-12-06T18:30:21Z",
  "published": "2022-11-29T06:30:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-44037"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cyber-guy.gitbook.io/cyber-guys-blog/pocs/cve-2022-44037"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V78R-PFP2-F4C7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 03:31 – Updated: 2026-06-26 03:31
VLAI
Details

A bypass for CVE‑2026‑34913 exists with proper ownership validation that had not been applied to the reverse operation of linking campaigns and trackers through the tracker-campaigns.php script in Revive Adserver 6.0.7 and earlier. As a result, a low‑privileged user could link their trackers to campaigns owned by other managers on the same instance, leading to inconsistent ownership relationships.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-50739"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-26T02:16:53Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A bypass for CVE\u20112026\u201134913 exists with proper ownership validation that had not been applied to the reverse operation of linking campaigns and trackers through the `tracker-campaigns.php` script in Revive Adserver 6.0.7 and earlier. As a result, a low\u2011privileged user could link their trackers to campaigns owned by other managers on the same instance, leading to inconsistent ownership relationships.",
  "id": "GHSA-v78r-pfp2-f4c7",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T03:31:30Z",
  "published": "2026-06-26T03:31:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50739"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/3780709"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V7GG-CCCR-JPFX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:57 – Updated: 2025-10-22 03:30
VLAI
Details

Unspecified vulnerability in the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) component in Oracle Java SE 7 Update 7 and earlier allows remote attackers to affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability, related to JAX-WS.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2012-5076"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2012-10-16T21:55:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Unspecified vulnerability in the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) component in Oracle Java SE 7 Update 7 and earlier allows remote attackers to affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability, related to JAX-WS.",
  "id": "GHSA-v7gg-cccr-jpfx",
  "modified": "2025-10-22T03:30:32Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T00:57:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-5076"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://oval.cisecurity.org/repository/search/definition/oval%3Aorg.mitre.oval%3Adef%3A16641"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2012-5076"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2012-10/msg00016.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2012-1386.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2012-1391.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2012-1467.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/51029"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/51326"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/51390"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-201406-32.xml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/javacpuoct2012-1515924.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V7GJ-WFFH-45GP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-07 03:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:38
VLAI
Details

The JobSearch WP Job Board plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass due to a missing capability check on the jobsearch_add_job_import_schedule_call() function in versions up to, and including, 1.8.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers to add and/or modify schedule calls.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-4364"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-06-07T02:15:14Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The JobSearch WP Job Board plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass due to a missing capability check on the jobsearch_add_job_import_schedule_call() function in versions up to, and including, 1.8.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers to add and/or modify schedule calls.",
  "id": "GHSA-v7gj-wffh-45gp",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T04:38:24Z",
  "published": "2023-06-07T03:30:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-4364"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.nintechnet.com/wordpress-jobsearch-wp-job-board-plugin-fixed-vulnerability"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/7e2dd5df-f758-419c-bfb8-b8e53235fede"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/9114018f-0678-4973-bb1e-932f0d93f963?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V7J5-VC4M-723W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-22 23:08 – Updated: 2026-06-22 23:08
VLAI
Summary
Budibase has an Account Impersonation Issue — Chat Identity Link Hijacking via Missing Consent & CSRF
Details

Title

Chat Identity Link Hijacking — Attacker Can Silently Map Their Slack/Discord Identity to Any Authenticated Budibase User's Account

Severity

High — CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N = 7.3

Affected Product

  • Product: Budibase
  • Version: 3.37.2 (introduced in this version)
  • Component: packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts
  • Endpoint: GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff

Vulnerability Type

  • CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery
  • CWE-284: Improper Access Control

Vulnerability Description

GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff is a public endpoint (no auth required) that performs a permanent, state-changing operation: it binds an external chat identity (Slack/Discord/MS Teams) to an authenticated Budibase user account, with no consent UI and no CSRF protection.

The session token in the URL is created by the attacker (from their own /link slash command) and embeds the attacker's externalUserId. When an authenticated Budibase victim visits the URL, their account is silently and permanently linked to the attacker's Slack/Discord identity. The server responds with "Authentication succeeded." — no indication of what was linked.

Route Registration

// packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts:22
router.get(
  "/api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff",
  controller.handoffChatLinkSession   // registered in publicRoutes — zero auth middleware
)

Vulnerable Controller (full function)

// packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:61–110
export async function handoffChatLinkSession(
  ctx: UserCtx<void, string, { instance: string; token: string }>
) {
  const token = resolveToken(ctx.params.token)
  const session = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.getChatIdentityLinkSession(token)
  if (!session) {
    throw new HTTPError("Link token is invalid or has expired", 400)
  }
  assertSessionMatchesInstance({ workspaceId: session.workspaceId, instance: ctx.params.instance })

  if (!ctx.isAuthenticated) {
    // Unauthenticated: set return URL cookie, redirect to login
    // After login, same URL is visited again → attack completes silently
    utils.setCookie(ctx,
      `/api/chat-links/${ctx.params.instance}/${token}/handoff`,
      "budibase:returnurl",
      { sign: false }  // ← unsigned cookie, but not an open redirect
    )
    ctx.redirect("/builder/auth/login")
    return
  }

  const currentGlobalUserId = getCurrentGlobalUserId(ctx)
  const consumedSession = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.consumeChatIdentityLinkSession(token)

  // ↓↓↓ THE VULNERABLE WRITE — no consent check, no CSRF token ↓↓↓
  await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.upsertChatIdentityLink({
    provider: consumedSession.provider,
    externalUserId: consumedSession.externalUserId,  // ← ATTACKER's Slack ID
    externalUserName: consumedSession.externalUserName,
    teamId: consumedSession.teamId,
    globalUserId: currentGlobalUserId,   // ← VICTIM's Budibase user ID
    linkedBy: currentGlobalUserId,
  })

  ctx.type = "text/html"
  ctx.body = renderLinkSuccessPage()  // ← "Authentication succeeded." — no disclosure to user
}

Proof of Concept — Annotated HTTP Trace

Setup

Role Identity
Attacker Slack user U_ATTACKER (e.g. UA12345678), Budibase tenant acme, workspace ID ws_abc123
Victim Budibase admin, session cookie budibase:session=VICTIM_SESSION

Step 1 — Attacker triggers /link in Slack

Attacker types /link to the Budibase Slack bot. Budibase server creates a Redis session:

Redis key: chatIdentityLinkSession:tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Redis value (exact structure from ChatIdentityLinkSession interface):

{
  "token": "tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx",
  "tenantId": "acme",
  "workspaceId": "ws_abc123",
  "provider": "slack",
  "externalUserId": "UA12345678",
  "externalUserName": "attacker",
  "teamId": "T_ACME_SLACK",
  "createdAt": "2026-05-02T10:00:00.000Z",
  "expiresAt": "2026-05-02T10:10:00.000Z"
}

Slack DM sent privately to attacker:

Link your Slack account to continue chatting with this agent.
https://budibase.company.com/api/chat-links/ws_abc123/tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff

Key observation: This URL embeds the attacker's own externalUserId inside the token. The attacker has full control over which identity gets linked.


Step 2 — Attacker forwards URL to victim

Attacker posts in the company Slack:

@admin please click this to connect your Budibase account for AI agent access:
https://budibase.company.com/api/chat-links/ws_abc123/tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff

Step 3 — Victim clicks link (authenticated)

HTTP Request (victim's browser):

GET /api/chat-links/ws_abc123/tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff HTTP/1.1
Host: budibase.company.com
Cookie: budibase:session=VICTIM_SESSION

HTTP Response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html

<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
  <head>
    <meta charset="utf-8">
    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
    <title>Authentication succeeded</title>
  </head>
  <body>
    <p>Authentication succeeded.</p>
    <script>
      if (window.opener && !window.opener.closed) {
        try { window.opener.focus(); window.close() } catch (error) {}
      }
    </script>
  </body>
</html>

The victim sees "Authentication succeeded." with no mention of Slack, no mention of attacker, no mention of what capabilities were granted.

CouchDB global-db document written immediately after (exact structure from upsertChatIdentityLink):

{
  "_id": "chatidentitylink_acme_slack_T_ACME_SLACK_UA12345678",
  "tenantId": "acme",
  "provider": "slack",
  "externalUserId": "UA12345678",
  "globalUserId": "ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID",
  "linkedAt": "2026-05-02T10:00:42.000Z",
  "linkedBy": "ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID",
  "externalUserName": "attacker",
  "teamId": "T_ACME_SLACK",
  "createdAt": "2026-05-02T10:00:42.000Z",
  "updatedAt": "2026-05-02T10:00:42.000Z"
}

The mapping is now permanent. externalUserId = UA12345678 (attacker) → globalUserId = ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID (victim).


Step 4 — Attacker impersonates victim via AI agent

Attacker sends any message to the Budibase Slack bot from their own account (UA12345678).

The chat handler resolves the identity:

// packages/server/src/api/controllers/webhook/chatHandler.ts:421
const existingLink = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.getChatIdentityLink({
  provider: AgentChannelProvider.SLACK,
  externalUserId: "UA12345678",     // ← attacker's Slack ID
  teamId: "T_ACME_SLACK",
})
// existingLink.globalUserId = "ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID"

const linkedUser = await getGlobalUser("ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID")
// All agent tool calls now execute with victim admin's permissions

The attacker can now ask the agent:

"Show me all rows in the Customers table" "Trigger the 'Send Invoice' automation for customer ID 42" "What files are in the knowledge base?"

Each request runs with the victim admin's identity and permissions. The victim has no indication this is happening.


Step 3b — Variant: Victim Not Yet Authenticated

If the victim is not currently logged in when they click the URL:

HTTP Request:

GET /api/chat-links/ws_abc123/tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff HTTP/1.1
Host: budibase.company.com

HTTP Response:

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: /builder/auth/login
Set-Cookie: budibase:returnurl=%2Fapi%2Fchat-links%2Fws_abc123%2Ftok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx%2Fhandoff; Path=/

After the victim logs in, the browser follows the return URL and the attack completes identically to Step 3.


Impact

Dimension Detail
Confidentiality High — attacker reads all table rows, files, and knowledge base data accessible to victim
Integrity High — attacker writes rows and triggers automations (email, external API calls, record creation) as victim
Availability None
Auth required Low — attacker only needs a Slack/Discord account in the same workspace as the Budibase bot
User interaction Required — victim clicks one link (trivial social engineering in any enterprise Slack)
Scope Unchanged — impact is within the victim's Budibase tenant
Persistence Permanent — the link document persists in CouchDB until explicitly deleted; re-exploitation survives token rotation

Why Severity Is High (Not Medium)

The social engineering bar is near zero in enterprise Slack: - The link looks like a legitimate Budibase URL on the company domain - The message pattern ("link your account for AI agent access") matches the product's own UX - A victim who clicks and sees "Authentication succeeded." has no reason to be suspicious - The effect is permanent and silent — the victim never learns their account was linked

Combined with admin-level access to all application data and automation triggers, this meets the bar for High.


Remediation

Minimum Fix — Add Consent Page

Convert the handoff to a two-step flow:

GET  /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff
  → Show consent page: "You are linking your Budibase account to
    [externalUserName]'s Slack identity ([provider]).
    This allows them to interact with AI agents as you. [Confirm] [Cancel]"

POST /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff  (with CSRF token)
  → Perform the upsertChatIdentityLink() write

Moving the write to POST removes it from publicRoutes, making Budibase's existing CSRF middleware apply automatically.

Additional Hardening

  • Show the externalUserName and provider on the consent page
  • Log the event to the audit trail (both identities, timestamp, IP)
  • Optionally restrict linking to users with explicit permission (not all roles)

Credits, Vishal Kumar B https://github.com/VishaaLlKumaaRr

References

  • packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts:22 — public route registration
  • packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:61–110 — full vulnerable controller
  • packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:135–165 — session creation (embeds attacker's externalUserId)
  • packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:202–247 — upsertChatIdentityLink (permanent write)
  • packages/server/src/api/controllers/webhook/chatHandler.ts:421 — identity resolution during agent message handling
  • packages/server/src/ai/tools/budibase/automations.ts — automation trigger capability
  • packages/server/src/ai/tools/budibase/rows.ts — row read/write capability
  • packages/types/src/sdk/chatIdentityLinks.ts — session + link type definitions
  • CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery
  • CWE-284: Improper Access Control
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@budibase/server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.39.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-50132"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-22T23:08:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Title\n\n**Chat Identity Link Hijacking \u2014 Attacker Can Silently Map Their Slack/Discord Identity to Any Authenticated Budibase User\u0027s Account**\n\n## Severity\n\n**High** \u2014 CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N = **7.3**\n\n## Affected Product\n\n- **Product:** Budibase\n- **Version:** 3.37.2 (introduced in this version)\n- **Component:** `packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts`\n- **Endpoint:** `GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff`\n\n\n## Vulnerability Type\n\n- CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery\n- CWE-284: Improper Access Control\n\n---\n\n## Vulnerability Description\n\n`GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff` is a **public endpoint** (no auth required) that performs a permanent, state-changing operation: it binds an external chat identity (Slack/Discord/MS Teams) to an authenticated Budibase user account, with **no consent UI and no CSRF protection**.\n\nThe session token in the URL is created **by the attacker** (from their own `/link` slash command) and embeds **the attacker\u0027s `externalUserId`**. When an authenticated Budibase victim visits the URL, their account is silently and permanently linked to the attacker\u0027s Slack/Discord identity. The server responds with `\"Authentication succeeded.\"` \u2014 no indication of what was linked.\n\n### Route Registration\n\n```typescript\n// packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts:22\nrouter.get(\n  \"/api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff\",\n  controller.handoffChatLinkSession   // registered in publicRoutes \u2014 zero auth middleware\n)\n```\n\n### Vulnerable Controller (full function)\n\n```typescript\n// packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:61\u2013110\nexport async function handoffChatLinkSession(\n  ctx: UserCtx\u003cvoid, string, { instance: string; token: string }\u003e\n) {\n  const token = resolveToken(ctx.params.token)\n  const session = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.getChatIdentityLinkSession(token)\n  if (!session) {\n    throw new HTTPError(\"Link token is invalid or has expired\", 400)\n  }\n  assertSessionMatchesInstance({ workspaceId: session.workspaceId, instance: ctx.params.instance })\n\n  if (!ctx.isAuthenticated) {\n    // Unauthenticated: set return URL cookie, redirect to login\n    // After login, same URL is visited again \u2192 attack completes silently\n    utils.setCookie(ctx,\n      `/api/chat-links/${ctx.params.instance}/${token}/handoff`,\n      \"budibase:returnurl\",\n      { sign: false }  // \u2190 unsigned cookie, but not an open redirect\n    )\n    ctx.redirect(\"/builder/auth/login\")\n    return\n  }\n\n  const currentGlobalUserId = getCurrentGlobalUserId(ctx)\n  const consumedSession = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.consumeChatIdentityLinkSession(token)\n\n  // \u2193\u2193\u2193 THE VULNERABLE WRITE \u2014 no consent check, no CSRF token \u2193\u2193\u2193\n  await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.upsertChatIdentityLink({\n    provider: consumedSession.provider,\n    externalUserId: consumedSession.externalUserId,  // \u2190 ATTACKER\u0027s Slack ID\n    externalUserName: consumedSession.externalUserName,\n    teamId: consumedSession.teamId,\n    globalUserId: currentGlobalUserId,   // \u2190 VICTIM\u0027s Budibase user ID\n    linkedBy: currentGlobalUserId,\n  })\n\n  ctx.type = \"text/html\"\n  ctx.body = renderLinkSuccessPage()  // \u2190 \"Authentication succeeded.\" \u2014 no disclosure to user\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept \u2014 Annotated HTTP Trace\n\n### Setup\n\n| Role | Identity |\n|---|---|\n| Attacker | Slack user `U_ATTACKER` (e.g. `UA12345678`), Budibase tenant `acme`, workspace ID `ws_abc123` |\n| Victim | Budibase admin, session cookie `budibase:session=VICTIM_SESSION` |\n\n---\n\n### Step 1 \u2014 Attacker triggers `/link` in Slack\n\nAttacker types `/link` to the Budibase Slack bot. Budibase server creates a Redis session:\n\n**Redis key:** `chatIdentityLinkSession:tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx`\n\n**Redis value (exact structure from `ChatIdentityLinkSession` interface):**\n```json\n{\n  \"token\": \"tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx\",\n  \"tenantId\": \"acme\",\n  \"workspaceId\": \"ws_abc123\",\n  \"provider\": \"slack\",\n  \"externalUserId\": \"UA12345678\",\n  \"externalUserName\": \"attacker\",\n  \"teamId\": \"T_ACME_SLACK\",\n  \"createdAt\": \"2026-05-02T10:00:00.000Z\",\n  \"expiresAt\": \"2026-05-02T10:10:00.000Z\"\n}\n```\n\nSlack DM sent privately to attacker:\n```\nLink your Slack account to continue chatting with this agent.\nhttps://budibase.company.com/api/chat-links/ws_abc123/tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff\n```\n\n**Key observation:** This URL embeds the attacker\u0027s own `externalUserId` inside the token. The attacker has full control over which identity gets linked.\n\n---\n\n### Step 2 \u2014 Attacker forwards URL to victim\n\nAttacker posts in the company Slack:\n```\n@admin please click this to connect your Budibase account for AI agent access:\nhttps://budibase.company.com/api/chat-links/ws_abc123/tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff\n```\n\n---\n\n### Step 3 \u2014 Victim clicks link (authenticated)\n\n**HTTP Request (victim\u0027s browser):**\n```http\nGET /api/chat-links/ws_abc123/tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff HTTP/1.1\nHost: budibase.company.com\nCookie: budibase:session=VICTIM_SESSION\n```\n\n**HTTP Response:**\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: text/html\n\n\u003c!doctype html\u003e\n\u003chtml lang=\"en\"\u003e\n  \u003chead\u003e\n    \u003cmeta charset=\"utf-8\"\u003e\n    \u003cmeta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width, initial-scale=1\"\u003e\n    \u003ctitle\u003eAuthentication succeeded\u003c/title\u003e\n  \u003c/head\u003e\n  \u003cbody\u003e\n    \u003cp\u003eAuthentication succeeded.\u003c/p\u003e\n    \u003cscript\u003e\n      if (window.opener \u0026\u0026 !window.opener.closed) {\n        try { window.opener.focus(); window.close() } catch (error) {}\n      }\n    \u003c/script\u003e\n  \u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\nThe victim sees \"Authentication succeeded.\" with no mention of Slack, no mention of `attacker`, no mention of what capabilities were granted.\n\n**CouchDB global-db document written immediately after (exact structure from `upsertChatIdentityLink`):**\n\n```json\n{\n  \"_id\": \"chatidentitylink_acme_slack_T_ACME_SLACK_UA12345678\",\n  \"tenantId\": \"acme\",\n  \"provider\": \"slack\",\n  \"externalUserId\": \"UA12345678\",\n  \"globalUserId\": \"ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID\",\n  \"linkedAt\": \"2026-05-02T10:00:42.000Z\",\n  \"linkedBy\": \"ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID\",\n  \"externalUserName\": \"attacker\",\n  \"teamId\": \"T_ACME_SLACK\",\n  \"createdAt\": \"2026-05-02T10:00:42.000Z\",\n  \"updatedAt\": \"2026-05-02T10:00:42.000Z\"\n}\n```\n\nThe mapping is now permanent. `externalUserId = UA12345678` (attacker) \u2192 `globalUserId = ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID` (victim).\n\n---\n\n### Step 4 \u2014 Attacker impersonates victim via AI agent\n\nAttacker sends any message to the Budibase Slack bot from their own account (`UA12345678`).\n\nThe chat handler resolves the identity:\n\n```typescript\n// packages/server/src/api/controllers/webhook/chatHandler.ts:421\nconst existingLink = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.getChatIdentityLink({\n  provider: AgentChannelProvider.SLACK,\n  externalUserId: \"UA12345678\",     // \u2190 attacker\u0027s Slack ID\n  teamId: \"T_ACME_SLACK\",\n})\n// existingLink.globalUserId = \"ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID\"\n\nconst linkedUser = await getGlobalUser(\"ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID\")\n// All agent tool calls now execute with victim admin\u0027s permissions\n```\n\nThe attacker can now ask the agent:\n\n\u003e \"Show me all rows in the Customers table\"\n\u003e \"Trigger the \u0027Send Invoice\u0027 automation for customer ID 42\"\n\u003e \"What files are in the knowledge base?\"\n\nEach request runs with the victim admin\u0027s identity and permissions. The victim has no indication this is happening.\n\n---\n\n### Step 3b \u2014 Variant: Victim Not Yet Authenticated\n\nIf the victim is not currently logged in when they click the URL:\n\n**HTTP Request:**\n```http\nGET /api/chat-links/ws_abc123/tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff HTTP/1.1\nHost: budibase.company.com\n```\n\n**HTTP Response:**\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 302 Found\nLocation: /builder/auth/login\nSet-Cookie: budibase:returnurl=%2Fapi%2Fchat-links%2Fws_abc123%2Ftok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx%2Fhandoff; Path=/\n```\n\nAfter the victim logs in, the browser follows the return URL and the attack completes identically to Step 3.\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\n| Dimension | Detail |\n|---|---|\n| Confidentiality | **High** \u2014 attacker reads all table rows, files, and knowledge base data accessible to victim |\n| Integrity | **High** \u2014 attacker writes rows and triggers automations (email, external API calls, record creation) as victim |\n| Availability | None |\n| Auth required | **Low** \u2014 attacker only needs a Slack/Discord account in the same workspace as the Budibase bot |\n| User interaction | **Required** \u2014 victim clicks one link (trivial social engineering in any enterprise Slack) |\n| Scope | Unchanged \u2014 impact is within the victim\u0027s Budibase tenant |\n| Persistence | **Permanent** \u2014 the link document persists in CouchDB until explicitly deleted; re-exploitation survives token rotation |\n\n---\n\n## Why Severity Is High (Not Medium)\n\nThe social engineering bar is near zero in enterprise Slack:\n- The link looks like a legitimate Budibase URL on the company domain\n- The message pattern (\"link your account for AI agent access\") matches the product\u0027s own UX\n- A victim who clicks and sees \"Authentication succeeded.\" has no reason to be suspicious\n- The effect is **permanent and silent** \u2014 the victim never learns their account was linked\n\nCombined with admin-level access to all application data and automation triggers, this meets the bar for High.\n\n---\n\n## Remediation\n\n### Minimum Fix \u2014 Add Consent Page\n\nConvert the handoff to a two-step flow:\n\n```\nGET  /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff\n  \u2192 Show consent page: \"You are linking your Budibase account to\n    [externalUserName]\u0027s Slack identity ([provider]).\n    This allows them to interact with AI agents as you. [Confirm] [Cancel]\"\n\nPOST /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff  (with CSRF token)\n  \u2192 Perform the upsertChatIdentityLink() write\n```\n\nMoving the write to `POST` removes it from `publicRoutes`, making Budibase\u0027s existing CSRF middleware apply automatically.\n\n### Additional Hardening\n\n- Show the `externalUserName` and provider on the consent page\n- Log the event to the audit trail (both identities, timestamp, IP)\n- Optionally restrict linking to users with explicit permission (not all roles)\n\n---\nCredits,\nVishal Kumar B\nhttps://github.com/VishaaLlKumaaRr\n\n## References\n\n- `packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts:22` \u2014 public route registration\n- `packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:61\u2013110` \u2014 full vulnerable controller\n- `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:135\u2013165` \u2014 session creation (embeds attacker\u0027s externalUserId)\n- `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:202\u2013247` \u2014 upsertChatIdentityLink (permanent write)\n- `packages/server/src/api/controllers/webhook/chatHandler.ts:421` \u2014 identity resolution during agent message handling\n- `packages/server/src/ai/tools/budibase/automations.ts` \u2014 automation trigger capability\n- `packages/server/src/ai/tools/budibase/rows.ts` \u2014 row read/write capability\n- `packages/types/src/sdk/chatIdentityLinks.ts` \u2014 session + link type definitions\n- CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery\n- CWE-284: Improper Access Control",
  "id": "GHSA-v7j5-vc4m-723w",
  "modified": "2026-06-22T23:08:23Z",
  "published": "2026-06-22T23:08:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-v7j5-vc4m-723w"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/18793"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/cf66fb45d27402bace312d85616ddd4257f3a5aa"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Budibase has an Account Impersonation Issue \u2014 Chat Identity Link Hijacking via Missing Consent \u0026 CSRF"
}

GHSA-V7MP-273W-5H6J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-08 06:31 – Updated: 2025-10-08 06:31
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability was detected in JhumanJ OpnForm up to 1.9.3. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /answer. The manipulation results in unrestricted upload. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. The patch is identified as 95c3e23856465d202e6aec10bdb6ee0688b5305a. It is advisable to implement a patch to correct this issue.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-11436"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-08T06:15:34Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was detected in JhumanJ OpnForm up to 1.9.3. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /answer. The manipulation results in unrestricted upload. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. The patch is identified as 95c3e23856465d202e6aec10bdb6ee0688b5305a. It is advisable to implement a patch to correct this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-v7mp-273w-5h6j",
  "modified": "2025-10-08T06:31:04Z",
  "published": "2025-10-08T06:31:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11436"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/JhumanJ/OpnForm/pull/900/commits/95c3e23856465d202e6aec10bdb6ee0688b5305a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.google.com/document/d/1GUjJA9vUbsXUngAv6ySsbCIhVynf8_djardLZYEDOe0/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.dm5ttliupfqn"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.327373"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.327373"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.666877"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V7MW-2V7Q-CX8R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-09 18:30 – Updated: 2024-07-09 18:30
VLAI
Details

DCOM Remote Cross-Session Activation Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-38061"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-09T17:15:37Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "DCOM Remote Cross-Session Activation Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability",
  "id": "GHSA-v7mw-2v7q-cx8r",
  "modified": "2024-07-09T18:30:52Z",
  "published": "2024-07-09T18:30:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38061"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-38061"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation MIT-1
Architecture and Design Operation

Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.

Mitigation MIT-46
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Separation of Privilege

  • Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
  • Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CAPEC-19: Embedding Scripts within Scripts

An adversary leverages the capability to execute their own script by embedding it within other scripts that the target software is likely to execute due to programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute scripts.

CAPEC-441: Malicious Logic Insertion

An adversary installs or adds malicious logic (also known as malware) into a seemingly benign component of a fielded system. This logic is often hidden from the user of the system and works behind the scenes to achieve negative impacts. With the proliferation of mass digital storage and inexpensive multimedia devices, Bluetooth and 802.11 support, new attack vectors for spreading malware are emerging for things we once thought of as innocuous greeting cards, picture frames, or digital projectors. This pattern of attack focuses on systems already fielded and used in operation as opposed to systems and their components that are still under development and part of the supply chain.

CAPEC-478: Modification of Windows Service Configuration

An adversary exploits a weakness in access control to modify the execution parameters of a Windows service. The goal of this attack is to execute a malicious binary in place of an existing service.

CAPEC-479: Malicious Root Certificate

An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization and installs a new root certificate on a compromised system. Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.

CAPEC-502: Intent Spoof

An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, issues an intent directed toward a specific trusted application's component in an attempt to achieve a variety of different objectives including modification of data, information disclosure, and data injection. Components that have been unintentionally exported and made public are subject to this type of an attack. If the component trusts the intent's action without verififcation, then the target application performs the functionality at the adversary's request, helping the adversary achieve the desired negative technical impact.

CAPEC-503: WebView Exposure

An adversary, through a malicious web page, accesses application specific functionality by leveraging interfaces registered through WebView's addJavascriptInterface API. Once an interface is registered to WebView through addJavascriptInterface, it becomes global and all pages loaded in the WebView can call this interface.

CAPEC-536: Data Injected During Configuration

An attacker with access to data files and processes on a victim's system injects malicious data into critical operational data during configuration or recalibration, causing the victim's system to perform in a suboptimal manner that benefits the adversary.

CAPEC-546: Incomplete Data Deletion in a Multi-Tenant Environment

An adversary obtains unauthorized information due to insecure or incomplete data deletion in a multi-tenant environment. If a cloud provider fails to completely delete storage and data from former cloud tenants' systems/resources, once these resources are allocated to new, potentially malicious tenants, the latter can probe the provided resources for sensitive information still there.

CAPEC-550: Install New Service

When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Adversaries may install a new service which will be executed at startup (on a Windows system, by modifying the registry). The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Services are usually run with elevated privileges.

CAPEC-551: Modify Existing Service

When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Modifying existing services may break existing services or may enable services that are disabled/not commonly used.

CAPEC-552: Install Rootkit

An adversary exploits a weakness in authentication to install malware that alters the functionality and information provide by targeted operating system API calls. Often referred to as rootkits, it is often used to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.

CAPEC-556: Replace File Extension Handlers

When a file is opened, its file handler is checked to determine which program opens the file. File handlers are configuration properties of many operating systems. Applications can modify the file handler for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.

CAPEC-558: Replace Trusted Executable

An adversary exploits weaknesses in privilege management or access control to replace a trusted executable with a malicious version and enable the execution of malware when that trusted executable is called.

CAPEC-562: Modify Shared File

An adversary manipulates the files in a shared location by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to valid content. Once a user opens the shared content, the tainted content is executed.

CAPEC-563: Add Malicious File to Shared Webroot

An adversaries may add malicious content to a website through the open file share and then browse to that content with a web browser to cause the server to execute the content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges depending on how the web server is configured.

CAPEC-564: Run Software at Logon

Operating system allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or users logon to a system. If adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script. This code can allow them to maintain persistence or move laterally within an enclave because it is executed every time the affected user or users logon to a computer. Modifying logon scripts can effectively bypass workstation and enclave firewalls. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or a remote administrative account may be necessary.

CAPEC-578: Disable Security Software

An adversary exploits a weakness in access control to disable security tools so that detection does not occur. This can take the form of killing processes, deleting registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, deleting log files, or other methods.