CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13454 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-3F5C-4QXJ-VMPF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2017-12-05 02:04 – Updated: 2024-04-22 19:49Next.js before 2.4.1 has directory traversal under the /_next and /static request namespace, allowing attackers to obtain sensitive information.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "next"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-16877"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T20:54:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2017-11-17T17:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Next.js before 2.4.1 has directory traversal under the `/_next` and `/static` request namespace, allowing attackers to obtain sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-3f5c-4qxj-vmpf",
"modified": "2024-04-22T19:49:35Z",
"published": "2017-12-05T02:04:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16877"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commit/02fe7cf63f6265d73bdaf8bc50a4f2fb539dcd00"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/zeit/next.js"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/zeit/next.js/releases/tag/2.4.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Next.js Directory Traversal Vulnerability"
}
GHSA-3F5M-CVQM-77G4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:17 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:17Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in the (a) "Unzip archive" and (b) "Upload files and archives" functionality in net2ftp 0.96 stable and 0.97 beta allow remote attackers to create, read, or delete arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in a filename within a (1) TAR or (2) ZIP archive. NOTE: this can be leveraged for code execution by creating a .php file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-5275"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-11-28T19:00:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in the (a) \"Unzip archive\" and (b) \"Upload files and archives\" functionality in net2ftp 0.96 stable and 0.97 beta allow remote attackers to create, read, or delete arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in a filename within a (1) TAR or (2) ZIP archive. NOTE: this can be leveraged for code execution by creating a .php file.",
"id": "GHSA-3f5m-cvqm-77g4",
"modified": "2022-05-17T02:17:59Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:17:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-5275"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/42994"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/30611"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://vuln.sg/net2ftp096-en.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/29664"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-3F7W-8RR8-F37F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-03 20:09 – Updated: 2026-08-03 20:09Target: gitpython-developers/GitPython
Tested: HEAD 07e80555 (2026-07-25), latest release 3.1.55, git version 2.50.1
Reported instances: 2 exploitable, from a sweep of 14 unguarded call sites
Summary
GitPython blocks dangerous git options through Git.check_unsafe_options(), gated per method by an allow_unsafe_options parameter. That guard is applied per call site, so any API that forwards **kwargs into a git command without calling it passes caller-controlled options straight to git.
A mechanical sweep of every method that forwards **kwargs into a .git.<command>(...) call found 14 sites with no guard. Two reach a git option that takes a filesystem path:
| # | Call site | git option | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | IndexFile.checkout() → git checkout-index |
--prefix=<path> |
arbitrary file overwrite with repository-controlled content |
| 2 | TagReference.create() → git tag |
-F <file> / --file=<file> |
arbitrary file read, returned in-band |
This is the same defect class already fixed in Commit.count() (GHSA-p538-c434-8v24), Repo.archive() and Git.ls_remote() (GHSA-956x-8gvw-wg5v). Both instances below are still present at HEAD.
Instance 1 — IndexFile.checkout(): arbitrary file overwrite
git/index/base.py:1210 accepts **kwargs and forwards them with no guard:
def checkout(self, paths=None, force=False, fprogress=lambda *args: None, **kwargs):
...
proc = self.repo.git.checkout_index(*args, **kwargs) # line 1331
...
proc = self.repo.git.checkout_index(args, **kwargs) # line 1349
There is no allow_unsafe_options parameter and no check_unsafe_options() call in the method.
git checkout-index accepts --prefix=<string>, prepended to every output path. It is not confined to the working tree, so an absolute prefix writes tracked file contents anywhere the process can write, and -f overwrites what is already there.
Reproduction
from git import Repo
Repo("/path/to/repo").index.checkout(prefix="/tmp/target_dir/", a=True, f=True)
Observed (poc/poc_checkout_index.py) — no exception raised, files land outside the repository:
[ALLOWED] no UnsafeOptionError raised
files written outside the repo: ['f.txt']
f.txt: 'hi\n'
Overwrite of a pre-existing file (poc/poc_ci_overwrite.py) — the victim file held ORIGINAL-DO-NOT-CLOBBER\n before the call:
[ALLOWED] no exception
victim content now: 'hi\n'
OVERWRITTEN: True
Why this rates High
Both halves of the write are attacker-influenced:
- Destination — the
prefixkwarg. - Content — the bytes written are repository blobs, so anyone who can land a file in the repository (a pull-request branch, a mirrored or untrusted repository, an agent-cloned repository) controls exactly what is written.
Commit a file named authorized_keys, .bashrc, config or post-checkout, choose the matching prefix (~/.ssh/, ~/, .git/hooks/), and the write becomes code execution as the service account.
For comparison within this project: GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc (arbitrary file overwrite via git diff --output) is rated High, and GHSA-p538-c434-8v24 (arbitrary file truncation via git rev-list --output) is rated Medium. --prefix supplies full content control, so it sits at or above the former.
Instance 2 — TagReference.create(): arbitrary file read
git/refs/tag.py:88 forwards **kwargs into git tag with no guard, and the signature advertises the passthrough:
def create(cls, repo, path, reference="HEAD", logmsg=None, force=False, **kwargs):
"""...
:param kwargs:
Additional keyword arguments to be passed to :manpage:`git-tag(1)`.
"""
git tag accepts -F <file> / --file=<file>, which reads the tag message from an arbitrary path. The annotated tag object stores that content and GitPython returns it to the caller via TagReference.tag.message, so the file contents come back in-band.
Reproduction
from git import Repo
from git.refs.tag import TagReference
t = TagReference.create(Repo("/path/to/repo"), "x", force=True, a=True, F="/etc/passwd")
print(t.tag.message)
Observed (poc/poc_tag_F.py), reading a canary file outside the repository:
[ALLOWED] no UnsafeOptionError raised
>>> tag message recovered from arbitrary path: 'TAG-READ-CANARY-98765\nsecond-line-secret'
Impact is a read at the privileges of the process. I am not claiming code execution for this instance. The signing options (-s, -u/--local-user) do invoke gpg from the same unguarded kwargs, but I did not develop that into command execution and make no claim about it.
Sweep results — the other 12 sites
Reported so the fix can be scoped once rather than per report. poc/sweep.py reproduces this list.
| Call site | git command | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
IndexFile.from_tree() |
read-tree |
--index-output=<path> looked reachable but is neutralised: GitPython appends its own --index-output after the caller's kwargs and git honours the last occurrence. Verified — victim file unchanged (poc/poc_readtree.py) |
IndexFile.remove() |
rm |
--pathspec-from-file only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found |
IndexFile.move() |
mv |
same |
HEAD.reset() |
reset |
same |
HEAD.checkout() |
checkout |
same |
Head.delete(), RemoteReference.delete() |
branch |
no path-taking option found |
Repo.merge_base() |
merge-base |
no path-taking option found |
Repo._get_untracked_files() |
status |
no path-taking option found |
Remote.set_url(), Remote.create(), Remote.update() |
remote |
URL handling already addressed by GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67 |
Suggested remediation
Immediate: add allow_unsafe_options: bool = False to both methods and gate Git._option_candidates(args, kwargs) against new lists — unsafe_git_checkout_index_options = ["--prefix"] (consider --temp) and unsafe_git_tag_options = ["--file", "-F"] (consider -s, -u/--local-user, --cleanup) — matching the pattern used in Repo.archive() and Commit.count().
Structural: this defect has now been fixed four times in four places (Repo.archive(), Git.ls_remote(), Commit.count(), and the two here), because the guard is opt-in per method: every new **kwargs-forwarding API starts unguarded and stays that way until someone reports it. Enforcing the check centrally in Git._call_process() — each git invocation consults a per-command unsafe-option table unless the caller opts out — would make new call sites safe by default rather than by review, and would close the remaining sites in the table above at the same time.
Disclosure
Reported privately via GitHub private vulnerability reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.56"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "GitPython"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.57"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73",
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-03T20:09:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "**Target:** gitpython-developers/GitPython\n**Tested:** HEAD `07e80555` (2026-07-25), latest release 3.1.55, `git version 2.50.1`\n**Reported instances:** 2 exploitable, from a sweep of 14 unguarded call sites\n\n## Summary\n\nGitPython blocks dangerous git options through `Git.check_unsafe_options()`, gated per method by an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter. That guard is applied **per call site**, so any API that forwards `**kwargs` into a git command without calling it passes caller-controlled options straight to git.\n\nA mechanical sweep of every method that forwards `**kwargs` into a `.git.\u003ccommand\u003e(...)` call found **14 sites with no guard**. Two reach a git option that takes a filesystem path:\n\n| # | Call site | git option | Impact |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | `IndexFile.checkout()` \u2192 `git checkout-index` | `--prefix=\u003cpath\u003e` | arbitrary file **overwrite** with repository-controlled content |\n| 2 | `TagReference.create()` \u2192 `git tag` | `-F \u003cfile\u003e` / `--file=\u003cfile\u003e` | arbitrary file **read**, returned in-band |\n\nThis is the same defect class already fixed in `Commit.count()` (GHSA-p538-c434-8v24), `Repo.archive()` and `Git.ls_remote()` (GHSA-956x-8gvw-wg5v). Both instances below are still present at HEAD.\n\n---\n\n## Instance 1 \u2014 `IndexFile.checkout()`: arbitrary file overwrite\n\n`git/index/base.py:1210` accepts `**kwargs` and forwards them with no guard:\n\n```python\ndef checkout(self, paths=None, force=False, fprogress=lambda *args: None, **kwargs):\n ...\n proc = self.repo.git.checkout_index(*args, **kwargs) # line 1331\n ...\n proc = self.repo.git.checkout_index(args, **kwargs) # line 1349\n```\n\nThere is no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter and no `check_unsafe_options()` call in the method.\n\n`git checkout-index` accepts `--prefix=\u003cstring\u003e`, prepended to every output path. It is not confined to the working tree, so an absolute prefix writes tracked file contents anywhere the process can write, and `-f` overwrites what is already there.\n\n### Reproduction\n\n```python\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo(\"/path/to/repo\").index.checkout(prefix=\"/tmp/target_dir/\", a=True, f=True)\n```\n\nObserved (`poc/poc_checkout_index.py`) \u2014 no exception raised, files land outside the repository:\n\n```\n[ALLOWED] no UnsafeOptionError raised\nfiles written outside the repo: [\u0027f.txt\u0027]\n f.txt: \u0027hi\\n\u0027\n```\n\nOverwrite of a pre-existing file (`poc/poc_ci_overwrite.py`) \u2014 the victim file held `ORIGINAL-DO-NOT-CLOBBER\\n` before the call:\n\n```\n[ALLOWED] no exception\nvictim content now: \u0027hi\\n\u0027\nOVERWRITTEN: True\n```\n\n### Why this rates High\n\nBoth halves of the write are attacker-influenced:\n\n- **Destination** \u2014 the `prefix` kwarg.\n- **Content** \u2014 the bytes written are repository blobs, so anyone who can land a file in the repository (a pull-request branch, a mirrored or untrusted repository, an agent-cloned repository) controls exactly what is written.\n\nCommit a file named `authorized_keys`, `.bashrc`, `config` or `post-checkout`, choose the matching prefix (`~/.ssh/`, `~/`, `.git/hooks/`), and the write becomes code execution as the service account.\n\nFor comparison within this project: GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc (arbitrary file overwrite via `git diff --output`) is rated High, and GHSA-p538-c434-8v24 (arbitrary file *truncation* via `git rev-list --output`) is rated Medium. `--prefix` supplies full content control, so it sits at or above the former.\n\n---\n\n## Instance 2 \u2014 `TagReference.create()`: arbitrary file read\n\n`git/refs/tag.py:88` forwards `**kwargs` into `git tag` with no guard, and the signature advertises the passthrough:\n\n```python\ndef create(cls, repo, path, reference=\"HEAD\", logmsg=None, force=False, **kwargs):\n \"\"\"...\n :param kwargs:\n Additional keyword arguments to be passed to :manpage:`git-tag(1)`.\n \"\"\"\n```\n\n`git tag` accepts `-F \u003cfile\u003e` / `--file=\u003cfile\u003e`, which reads the tag message from an arbitrary path. The annotated tag object stores that content and GitPython returns it to the caller via `TagReference.tag.message`, so the file contents come back in-band.\n\n### Reproduction\n\n```python\nfrom git import Repo\nfrom git.refs.tag import TagReference\n\nt = TagReference.create(Repo(\"/path/to/repo\"), \"x\", force=True, a=True, F=\"/etc/passwd\")\nprint(t.tag.message)\n```\n\nObserved (`poc/poc_tag_F.py`), reading a canary file outside the repository:\n\n```\n[ALLOWED] no UnsafeOptionError raised\n\u003e\u003e\u003e tag message recovered from arbitrary path: \u0027TAG-READ-CANARY-98765\\nsecond-line-secret\u0027\n```\n\nImpact is a read at the privileges of the process. I am not claiming code execution for this instance. The signing options (`-s`, `-u`/`--local-user`) do invoke gpg from the same unguarded kwargs, but I did not develop that into command execution and make no claim about it.\n\n---\n\n## Sweep results \u2014 the other 12 sites\n\nReported so the fix can be scoped once rather than per report. `poc/sweep.py` reproduces this list.\n\n| Call site | git command | Assessment |\n|---|---|---|\n| `IndexFile.from_tree()` | `read-tree` | `--index-output=\u003cpath\u003e` looked reachable but is **neutralised**: GitPython appends its own `--index-output` after the caller\u0027s kwargs and git honours the last occurrence. Verified \u2014 victim file unchanged (`poc/poc_readtree.py`) |\n| `IndexFile.remove()` | `rm` | `--pathspec-from-file` only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found |\n| `IndexFile.move()` | `mv` | same |\n| `HEAD.reset()` | `reset` | same |\n| `HEAD.checkout()` | `checkout` | same |\n| `Head.delete()`, `RemoteReference.delete()` | `branch` | no path-taking option found |\n| `Repo.merge_base()` | `merge-base` | no path-taking option found |\n| `Repo._get_untracked_files()` | `status` | no path-taking option found |\n| `Remote.set_url()`, `Remote.create()`, `Remote.update()` | `remote` | URL handling already addressed by GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67 |\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\n**Immediate:** add `allow_unsafe_options: bool = False` to both methods and gate `Git._option_candidates(args, kwargs)` against new lists \u2014 `unsafe_git_checkout_index_options = [\"--prefix\"]` (consider `--temp`) and `unsafe_git_tag_options = [\"--file\", \"-F\"]` (consider `-s`, `-u`/`--local-user`, `--cleanup`) \u2014 matching the pattern used in `Repo.archive()` and `Commit.count()`.\n\n**Structural:** this defect has now been fixed four times in four places (`Repo.archive()`, `Git.ls_remote()`, `Commit.count()`, and the two here), because the guard is opt-in per method: every new `**kwargs`-forwarding API starts unguarded and stays that way until someone reports it. Enforcing the check centrally in `Git._call_process()` \u2014 each git invocation consults a per-command unsafe-option table unless the caller opts out \u2014 would make new call sites safe by default rather than by review, and would close the remaining sites in the table above at the same time.\n\n## Disclosure\n\nReported privately via GitHub private vulnerability reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f",
"modified": "2026-08-03T20:09:56Z",
"published": "2026-08-03T20:09:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2193"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/3af0c2516c5e18c829da30338614688f6b69b49c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.57"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: Unguarded git option forwarding in IndexFile.checkout() and TagReference.create() enables arbitrary file overwrite and arbitrary file read"
}
GHSA-3F85-WH3Q-CHMR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-29 21:31 – Updated: 2026-07-29 21:31DriveLock Directory Traversal Information Disclosure Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of DriveLock. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the web service, which listens on TCP port 4568 by default. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to disclose information in the context of the service account. Was ZDI-CAN-28719.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-5489"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-29T20:17:05Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "DriveLock Directory Traversal Information Disclosure Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of DriveLock. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the web service, which listens on TCP port 4568 by default. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to disclose information in the context of the service account. Was ZDI-CAN-28719.",
"id": "GHSA-3f85-wh3q-chmr",
"modified": "2026-07-29T21:31:00Z",
"published": "2026-07-29T21:31:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5489"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.drivelock.help/sb/Content/SecurityBulletins/26-001-DESForwarding.htm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-26-285"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3F95-MXQ2-2F63
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-10 18:30 – Updated: 2026-02-03 17:39Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-m842-4qm8-7gpq. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
gradio-app/gradio is vulnerable to a local file inclusion vulnerability due to improper validation of user-supplied input in the UploadButton component. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability to read arbitrary files on the filesystem, such as private SSH keys, by manipulating the file path in the request to the /queue/join endpoint. This issue could potentially lead to remote code execution. The vulnerability is present in the handling of file upload paths, allowing attackers to redirect file uploads to unintended locations on the server.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "gradio"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.19.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-10T22:12:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-10T17:15:53Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-m842-4qm8-7gpq. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\ngradio-app/gradio is vulnerable to a local file inclusion vulnerability due to improper validation of user-supplied input in the UploadButton component. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability to read arbitrary files on the filesystem, such as private SSH keys, by manipulating the file path in the request to the `/queue/join` endpoint. This issue could potentially lead to remote code execution. The vulnerability is present in the handling of file upload paths, allowing attackers to redirect file uploads to unintended locations on the server.",
"id": "GHSA-3f95-mxq2-2f63",
"modified": "2026-02-03T17:39:05Z",
"published": "2024-04-10T18:30:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1728"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio/commit/16fbe9cd0cffa9f2a824a0165beb43446114eec7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/9bb33b71-7995-425d-91cc-2c2a2f2a068a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Duplicate Advisory: Gradio Local File Inclusion vulnerability",
"withdrawn": "2026-02-03T17:39:05Z"
}
GHSA-3FCF-G2VG-GPWM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:16 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:16Absolute path traversal vulnerability in kgb 1.0b4 allows remote attackers to write to arbitrary files via a full pathname in a crafted archive.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-1192"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2015-01-21T18:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Absolute path traversal vulnerability in kgb 1.0b4 allows remote attackers to write to arbitrary files via a full pathname in a crafted archive.",
"id": "GHSA-3fcf-g2vg-gpwm",
"modified": "2022-05-17T04:16:57Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:16:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-1192"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=774989"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/62203"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/01/18/3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/72111"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-3FFP-P8V6-MF85
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:18 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:18Directory traversal vulnerability in template/usererror.missing_extension.php in Symphony CMS before 2.6.10 allows remote attackers to rename arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the existing-folder and new-folder parameters.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-5541"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-01-20T08:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in template/usererror.missing_extension.php in Symphony CMS before 2.6.10 allows remote attackers to rename arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the existing-folder and new-folder parameters.",
"id": "GHSA-3ffp-p8v6-mf85",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:18:07Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:18:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-5541"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/symphonycms/symphony-2/issues/2639"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/symphonycms/symphony-2/releases/tag/2.6.10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/95689"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3FJ5-PXMX-GGJP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 12:31 – Updated: 2026-05-27 12:31Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Saleswonder Team: Tobias WebinarIgnition webinar-ignition allows Path Traversal.This issue affects WebinarIgnition: from n/a through < 4.08.253.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42757"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T11:16:22Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in Saleswonder Team: Tobias WebinarIgnition webinar-ignition allows Path Traversal.This issue affects WebinarIgnition: from n/a through \u003c 4.08.253.",
"id": "GHSA-3fj5-pxmx-ggjp",
"modified": "2026-05-27T12:31:23Z",
"published": "2026-05-27T12:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42757"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/webinar-ignition/vulnerability/wordpress-webinarignition-plugin-4-08-253-arbitrary-file-deletion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3FMC-7WJ3-J5V5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-22 18:30 – Updated: 2026-01-27 21:31Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in AivahThemes Anona anona allows Path Traversal.This issue affects Anona: from n/a through <= 8.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-68901"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-22T17:16:13Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in AivahThemes Anona anona allows Path Traversal.This issue affects Anona: from n/a through \u003c= 8.0.",
"id": "GHSA-3fmc-7wj3-j5v5",
"modified": "2026-01-27T21:31:41Z",
"published": "2026-01-22T18:30:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68901"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Theme/anona/vulnerability/wordpress-anona-theme-8-0-arbitrary-file-deletion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3FMG-4RW7-JR39
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:14 – Updated: 2022-05-17 01:14Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in the ServiceRegistry UI in IBM WebSphere Service Registry and Repository (WSRR) 7.5.x through 7.5.0.4, 8.0.x before 8.0.0.3, and 8.5.x before 8.5.0.1 allow remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-6155"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-12-24T11:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in the ServiceRegistry UI in IBM WebSphere Service Registry and Repository (WSRR) 7.5.x through 7.5.0.4, 8.0.x before 8.0.0.3, and 8.5.x before 8.5.0.1 allow remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-3fmg-4rw7-jr39",
"modified": "2022-05-17T01:14:51Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T01:14:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-6155"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/97678"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/61805"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg1IV63585"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg21693384"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg21693387"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg21693389"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.